Politics

The 1992 Consensus: The key to cross-strait reconciliation

(CNA)

• Publication Date：08/30/2011
• Source： Taiwan Today
• By  Dr. Su Chi

The “92 consensus” has once again become a focal point in the news and in the political realm in Taiwan. For this term I have been criticized innumerable times in the last decade. But I rarely responded. However, at this historic juncture, a look at the historical context of this issue may help provide new insights into the future of cross-strait relations.

Indeed, the term “92 consensus” was coined by me, but I did not create it out of thin air; it was rather an old-wine-in-a-new-bottle approach to a pre-existing fact. In 1992, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait did come to a consensus. This consensus was contained in an exchange of notes as well as unilateral statements. As this was not contained within a single, signed document, there is naturally some degree of ambiguity surrounding it.

The birth of this consensus, however ambiguous, bears historical significance because it represents the first political compromise between Taiwan and mainland China after a long series of military confrontations and ideological struggles dating back to 1949. Furthermore, the subject involves none other than the thorniest “one China” issue. Hence the ambiguity not only reflects the difficult circumstances of the day but underscores the wisdom of those tackling this challenge.

Had the two sides not come to a consensus in 1992, as some argue, then the 1993 Koo-Wang Talks in Singapore would not have ensued, nor would the 21 rounds of negotiations between Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the mainland’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) have taken place over the following seven years.

To have arrived at the rare compromise under such difficult circumstances shows that, first of all, both the Beijing government and the Lee Teng-hui administration in Taipei were inclined toward reconciliation in their relationship. Second, there were some commonalities in the positions between them. And third, basic mutual trust had been established.

The situation underwent drastic changes when former President Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won electoral victory in 2000. As the departing chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council at the time, I was deeply concerned that the two sides would be hard pressed to find common ground. After all, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) emphasized its “one China” principle without discussing the “respective interpretation” of the One China. The Kuomintang took the position that there was “one China, with each side having its own interpretation” of what it constitutes, while the DPP focused on having “respective interpretations” without touching on “one China.” As such, there was some common ground to be found between the CCP and KMT, but none between the CCP and the DPP. It was highly likely that this huge gap would lead to an impasse in—or even deterioration of—cross-strait relations after the DPP assumed power.

In an effort to salvage the situation, at the end of April that year, I proposed the new terminology “92 consensus” as a new bottle for old wine. This new package could conceal the basic discrepancy between the DPP’s and CCP’s positions on the sovereignty issue while creating common ground between the two parties. Should both sides be willing and if there was a little basic mutual trust, this invaluable cross-strait reconciliation could be extended beyond 2000.

At the time I was worried that Beijing would be the one more likely to reject this new bottle because it practically deleted the term “one China” from the new formulation which was historically significant to the CCP. If they accepted the “92 consensus” that did not expressly include “one China” in writing, it might be construed by party hawks in Beijing as a major concession to the DPP. Surprisingly, in late August that year, ARATS expressed their willingness to resume cross-strait negotiations based on the “92 consensus”, only to see the Chen administration reject it. In the subsequent eight years, the DPP heaped scorn on the term repeatedly, describing it as “surrender consensus” or insisting that “92 consensus did not exist.” Meanwhile, a growing number of people on both sides of the strait, even some governments, have come to regard the “92 consensus” as a bridge for cross-strait reconciliation.

The 1992 consensus is the key with which the Ma Ying-jeou administration restarted negotiations and achieved new reconciliation with Beijing. More importantly, the two sides have demonstrated intentions to make peace and, irrespective of disparities in their political stances, successfully rebuilt mutual trust while seeking commonalities amid differences.

To contend now as to whether, objectively, the 1992 consensus exists is not very meaningful. This is because the issue is not a scientific, but a political one shaped by individual interpretations. The really meaningful questions are: does each of the three political parties concerned have a desire toward reconciliation of the cross-strait relations? What are the differences and commonalities among them? How are the differences and commonalities to be handled? Is there any basic mutual trust? If the 1992 consensus is unacceptable, is there a better bridge to reconciliation?

I am afraid we should be more concerned with finding the answers to these questions.

Dr. Su Chi is a former secretary-general of the ROC National Security Council. The views are the author’s and not necessarily those of Taiwan Today. Copyright © 2011 by Dr. Su Chi

(This commentary originally appeared in China Times Aug. 26.)

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