Taiwan Today

They may look like flyspecks on a map, but the Spratly and Paracel island groups in the South China Sea have an importance far beyond what their size would suggest. They lie on vital sea-lanes, depended upon by Japan, for example, for its oil shipments from the Middle East. They have additional military value be­cause any naval force dominating these waters would pose a direct threat to all Southeast Asian nations. Moreover, the 200-mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs) surrounding these small islands, as stipu­lated under international law, give the nations that control them claim over ex­tensive fishing grounds. Even more im­portantly, any claimant to these islands, reefs, and continental shelf areas will have access to what are suspected—al­though not yet substantiated—to be rich seabed oil, natural gas, and mineral de­posits.

Although these disputed islands are primarily a problem for Asia-Pacific na­tions, the South China Sea is important to all major trading nations, including those in Europe. Many of the nations comprising the European Union (until recently known as the Economic Community) have had long diplomatic, military, and business contacts with the Asia-Pacific region. The growing capability of Mainland China to project power by flexing its military mus­cles in the South China Sea worries many European Union (E. U.) nations—but also offers them many opportunities. They can be more politically and diplomatically in­volved with conflict resolution in the area, and they are already finding Southeast Asian nations eager customers for ad­vanced military equipment to counter Mainland China’s military buildup.

The following assessment of the dis­putes over the Spratly and Paracel Is­lands was written by Michael Hindley, member of the European Parliament from Great Britain, Socialist Group trade spokesman, and member of the External Economic Relations Committee and China Delegation. The study was co­-authored by James Bridge, a European parliamentary assistant.

The ownership of the Spratly Is­lands in the South China Sea is disputed by the Republic of China, the People’s Republic of China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malay­sia, and Brunei (which only claims terri­torial waters in the area). The PRC is the most geopolitically significant nation in the dispute and has the greatest potential for projecting military power in the re­gion. The ownership of the Paracels is dis­puted by the PRC and Vietnam. Both sets of islands have strategic and economic importance. They are excellent sites for military bases and reportedly possess vast seabed resources, primarily oil. The disputes over these islands present a po­tential threat to stability in the Asia-Pa­cific region.

The status of the islands is being closely monitored by the six member na­tions of ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations)—Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, and the Philippines—and the association’s seven dialogue partners, the European Union, the United States, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. ASEAN hopes to use its established institu­tional channels for dialogue as a means to promote security consultations concern­ing regional disputes, including those over these islands. Success in setting up negotiations and achieving a peaceful set­tlement would set a valuable precedent for future cooperation in the region.

The end of the Cold War altered the balance of power in the South China Sea. Since the United States withdrew from Subic Bay in the Philippines and the former Soviet Union withdrew from Camranh Bay in Vietnam, the PRC has been in the best position to take advantage of the resulting power vacuum. The PRC claims most of the South China Sea and argues that the approximately 800,000 square kilometers of this territory has been encroached upon by other countries in the region.

The PRC fully occupies the Paracels (Hsi Sha in Chinese and Hoang Sa in Vi­etnamese), having ousted the South Viet­namese presence in January 1974 with a combined naval and air operation. The subsequently united Vietnam maintains its claim to the Paracels, but the islands remain occupied by PRC military forces.

The dispute over the Spratlys is more complex than the one over the Paracels because the islands are occupied and claimed by several different nations. The Spratlys, comprising more than 230 is­lands, islets, and reefs, cover an area of approximately 250,000 square kilome­ters. In March 1988, Mainland China took six islands in the group by armed force from Vietnam.

Negotiations among the claimants over the Spratlys have been characterized thus far by inconclusiveness and contra­dictions, particularly on the part of the PRC. Beijing stresses its desire that the disputes be settled peacefully and ap­proves of joint economic development of the area, but at the same time argues that its possession of the islands is incontest­able. The PRC has also passed a law gov­erning its internal waters that claims all the islets in the region, and it has pro­duced maps which imply that it has sole ownership of the islands.

The general consensus in the Euro­pean Union seems to be that at this time Mainland China’s military buildup does not constitute an overt threat in the region, but that Beijing’s approach to the disputes over the two island groups is nevertheless a matter of concern, especially because of the E.U.’s economic connections with Asia.

European Union member states and European businesses have long-standing political and economic interests in East Asia, including with Hong Kong and Macau, which have provided major busi­ness connections in the region. In 1992 the E.U. traded more with East Asia than with North America. The Spratly and Paracel is­lands continue to be important today, as in the past, because they straddle the trade routes between East and Southeast Asia.

The disputes have already created some difficulties for European businesses operating in the region. Ships owned by British Petroleum were reportedly har­assed by a PRC naval vessel. The com­pany has a contract with Vietnam that allows it to prospect for oil in its territorial waters, but these waters are also claimed by the PRC. Beijing, in turn, granted a contract to U.S.-owned Crestone Energy Corp. in 1992 to conduct survey work in the same area. These companies could become involved in the dispute between the PRC and Vietnam and thereby indi­rectly involve the United States and the European Union. Similar problems could arise for other E.U. or U.S. companies if the South China Sea disputes are not re­solved.

Security considerations are also im­portant, particularly with regard to the PRC. The high economic and military growth rate of Southeast Asian nations has indicated a shift of global power to­ward the region, especially since the end of the Cold War. These rapidly develop­ing countries have been modernizing and expanding their military strength, reflect­ing their new wealth and power. The dis­puted islands present excellent sites for projecting military power in the area. The PRC has already expressed its intention to develop a deep-sea navy, and other coun­tries in the region are also increasing their naval strength.

Firms from European Union nations are already major suppliers of arms to the region. Brunei, Malaysia, and Indonesia are purchasing aircraft from the U.K. The Philippines is acquiring Italian aircraft. Malaysia is buying two guided missile frigates from the U.K. And Indonesia has purchased sixteen corvettes from the former East German Navy. While this trade contributes to European Union exports and jobs, the E.U. runs the risk of encouraging an arms race in the area.

A survey of the national claims in the South China Sea follows:

ROC and PRC

The ROC and PRC use mainly histori­cal arguments to support China’s claim to the islands in the South China Sea. Beijing’s difficult relations with Taiwan will play a key role in resolving any re­gional disputes. In principal, Beijing ob­jects to negotiations involving Taiwan, even though for all intents and purposes the ROC and PRC claims are the same because they are both in the name of “China.”

In October 1993, the PRC claimed that it advocates peaceful negotiations and wants stability in the disputed territories, favoring joint exploration and a solution to the current negotiations concerning the Paracel and Spratly island groups. But Beijing’s intentions are ambiguous. De­spite its declarations, the PRC is inflexible about its full ownership of the islands. This claim was supported by the PRC’s Territo­rial Sea Law, promulgated in February 1992. Its award of a three-year contract to Crestone Energy Corp., permitting it to operate only 160 kilometers from the Viet­namese coast to explore what the Vietnam­ese describe as its Tu Chinh Bank, gives a practical edge to this claim.

To date, Mainland China occupies Yung-shu Chiao (Fiery Cross Reef) and six other islets or reefs and has been ex­ploring for oil in the seabed west of Wan­-an Tan (Vanguard Bank) since June 1992.

The ROC Navy has long garrisoned the largest island in the Spratly group, Tai-ping Tao (Itu Aba Island). The ROC also erected boundary tablets on some is­lands in 1966. In 1990, Tai-ping Tao and Tung-sha (in the Pratas island group) were placed under the temporary admin­istration of the city government of Kaohsiung in southern Taiwan.

The South China Sea Policy Guide­line, approved by the ROC Executive Yuan on April 13, 1993, sets out five main objectives for the South China Sea island groups (see box).

Vietnam

Vietnam claims the Paracel Islands, which are fully occupied by the PRC. It also has claims on the Spratlys and has constructed an airport on Spratly Island and occupied twenty-four other islets and reefs. During summer 1993, there was a high-level official meeting of Vietnamese and PRC vice ministers on island borders, but the Spratlys and Paracels were not dis­cussed in depth, largely because of the sensitivity of the issue. But both sides, along with ASEAN, have agreed that they will do their utmost to ensure a peaceful outcome to the disputes over the islands. Vietnam reaffirms its sovereignty, but it is open for discussions with all claimants and asks all parties to refrain from the use of force.

Philippines

The Philippines claims sixty of the reefs, islets, shoals, and sand banks of the Spratlys group, which it collectively calls Kalayaan. The Philippines frames its claim in terms of the United Nations In­ternational Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Treaty. This treaty, having now gained sixty signatures, will be rati­fied in November 1994 and will apply to those states which have signed it.

The Philippines has a military pres­ence in the Spratlys, including an airstrip. The PRC has reportedly agreed not to at­tack Philippine troops based on the islands.

President Ramos was informed by Chairman Qiao Shi of the standing com­mittee of the National People’s Congress at a meeting in Malacanang during sum­mer 1993 that the PRC is determined to contribute to maintaining peace and sta­bility in the Asia-Pacific region. Qiao re­marked that the PRC is ready “ ... to get involved in cooperation on the basis of policies which are viewed as the common program of all ASEAN countries.” The PRC also expressed support for the proposed ASEAN Regional Forum.

The first Working Group Meeting on Marine Scientific Research in the South China Sea was held in Manila last year as one means of bringing about eventual peaceful resolution of the sovereignty and jurisdictional issues in the South China Sea. The meeting was attended by representatives from Thailand, Malaysia, Sin­gapore, Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Mainland China, and Canada. Canada, which funded the meet­ings, called for increased military trans­parency in the region, including all countries giving advance notification of naval maneuvers.

Malaysia

Malaysia occupies Tan-wan Chiao (Swallow Reef) in the Spratlys and built an airstrip there in September 1991. It also claims eleven other islets or reefs and is now developing tourism in the area. Ma­laysia has a military presence on Swallow Reef, Mariveles Reef, and Ardasier Bank. Its claim is based on the UNCLOS Treaty.

Brunei

Brunei claims the Louisa Reef, from which the 200-mile exclusive economic zone would reach to the southern Spratly Islands. Brunei’s claim is also based on the UNCLOS Treaty.

Japan

Japan occupied some of the South China Sea islands from 1937 until the end of World War II, but it renounced all claims at the San Francisco peace confer­ence of 1952. As a regional superpower, Japan could potentially play a mediating role in the dispute, but Tokyo may well be reluctant to be drawn in.

ASEAN offers perhaps the best re­gional forum for settling the disputes, although Mainland China and Taiwan are not members and Vietnam has only observer status. The ASEAN-E.U. Post Ministerial Conference Senior Officials Meeting of May 20-21, 1993, was arranged to pre­pare the way for a future forum for dis­cussing security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. The meeting was attended by the six ASEAN members and ASEAN’s seven dia­logue partners.

ASEAN has taken steps to create a framework for consultation and dialogue by setting up the ASEAN Regional Forum. Other organizations have also been set up in the region, including the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group and the East Asian Economic Group (EAEG), initiated by Malaysia. Indonesia has en­couraged cooperation by hosting work­shops every year since 1990 (with financial assistance from the Canadian In­ternational Development Agency) on managing potential conflict in the South China Sea.

In Manila, in July 1992, the foreign ministers of ASEAN issued a declaration on the South China Sea calling for restraint, cooperation, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. Cooperation would include ensuring the safety of maritime naviga­tion and communication, protection against pollution of the marine environ­ment, coordination of search and rescue operations, efforts toward combating pi­racy and armed robbery, and collabora­tion in the campaign against drug trafficking.

These initiatives indicate that a peaceful settlement to the disputes over the islands is perhaps more likely than conflict. But agreement on cooperation has limited plausibility without PRC co­operation. For now, the disagreements over territory and sovereignty pose a chal­lenge to regional security. The PRC seems to be torn between improving rela­tions with its Southeast Asian neighbors and asserting its sovereignty. Beijing’s statements and actions to date indicate that it is not yet ready to come to a nego­tiated settlement. At the same time, it does not at this stage indicate a desire to settle the issue by force.

At worst, the conflicting claims may develop into limited, violent conflict, probably restricted to the disputed terri­tory. At best, a useful precedent will be set for settling such disputes, which are in many ways artificial, as there is no indig­enous population and therefore no deep­-set historical hatreds between inhabitants, such as in the former Yugoslavia. It would be tragic if a war should occur over virtually uninhabited islands.

A historical precedent for a solution might exist in the negotiated resolution over the ownership of North Sea oil in Western Europe, which was also essen­tially a question of the substantial seabed resources.

Developing frameworks for negotia­tion and achieving peaceful solutions are essential in this region of rapidly growing economic and military importance. ASEAN, in partnership with Mainland China, Taiwan, and Vietnam, would seem to present the best institution to assist in achieving this aim.