2026/06/10

Taiwan Today

Taiwan Review

Restoring The Balance

November 01, 1992
The policy decision by the United States to sell F-16s to the Republic of China sends a clear signal to Peking that regional security is of utmost importance.

On September 2, U.S. President George Bush announced his decision to authorize the sale of 150 F-16 A/B fighters to the Republic of China, ending decade-long restrictions on advanced aircraft sales to Taiwan. Concern for regional security was cited as the reason for the sale. The news was greeted with applause in Taipei and with anger in Peking. Although Bush's announcement is good news for Taiwan, it has also become the source of perhaps the greatest rift in U.S.-mainland relations in decades.

A war of words has since ensued be­tween the United States and mainland China, particularly over the interpretation of key diplomatic accords such as the 1982 Sino-U.S. communique, also known as the "August 17 communique." Peking vigorously protested the proposed sale almost as soon as it was announced, ac­cusing the United States of duplicity and of violating the 1982 agreement, specifi­cally those parts relating to China's in­ternal affairs and the reduction of arms sales to Taiwan. The mainland also ac­cused the United States of accelerating an arms race in Asia.

The 1982 communique states that "the question of Taiwan is China's internal affair," and that the United States "has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in China's internal affairs." In the agreement, the United States also pledged that arms sales to Taiwan "will not exceed, either in qualitative or quan­titative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Tai­wan."

At a press conference on September 3, U.S. State Department spokesman Joseph Snyder defended Bush's decision and explained why the United States had suddenly reversed its position on certain arms sales. According to Snyder, the sale was "fully in keeping with the spirit and the letter of the 1982 Sino-U.S. commu­nique." He went on to emphasize that Washington makes "a sharp distinction between those arms transfers which meet legitimate defense needs and contribute to the stability of a particular region and those that do not."

Careful examination of the commu­nique shows that the issue of arms sales to Taiwan is treated separately from the question of China's internal affairs. The two are completely unrelated. In fact, the question of weapon sales was never resolved by the communique. The agree­ment is a product of "creative ambigu­ity," fixing neither the rate of reduction nor specifying a time frame. Peking's in­terpretation therefore rests on question­able assumptions.

The sale of arms to Taiwan by the United States is governed by the Taiwan Relations Act passed by the US Congress in 1979. This document provides the legal basis for the sale. According to Section 3, "the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be nec­essary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability."

Currently, Taiwan is using U.S.-built F-5E and F-104 fighters from the 1960s. The aging planes have been involved in a number of accidents recently. Taiwan's defense capability is obviously waning, and this was an important factor in the U.S. government's decision. Acting U.S. Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger defended the administration's decision, saying that the aircraft were strictly for defensive purposes and that the new planes would merely bring the island's air force back up to its 1980 level of capability. This is clearly in keeping with the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act.

But there has been some disagree­ment over whether the F-16 should be classified as a defensive or offensive weapon, and whether Taiwan really needs such aircraft. Is Taiwan threatened? Given recent developments in the main­land, it is clear that not only Taiwan's se­curity, but that of the entire Asian region, is threatened.

In the past eight months, the main­land has undertaken an alarming military build-up. With an increased defense budget, the military has launched a drive to purchase advanced military hardware. The recent acquisition of twenty-four top­-of-the-line Russian SU-27 fighter-bomb­ers is the most notable example. There are also numerous reports of the mainland approaching the former Soviet Union to buy weapons and advanced technology to upgrade their own weapons at bargain­-basement prices. And earlier this year, mainland China was reportedly trying to purchase a 67,000-ton aircraft carrier from the Ukraine. If an arms race is ac­celerating in Asia, then mainland China must bear the responsibility.

Furthermore, Peking has maintained a hostile policy toward Taiwan for years. The mainland Chinese leadership, which authorized the brutal suppression of demonstrations at Tienanmen on June 4, 1989, has refused to renounce the use of force against Taiwan. Teng Hsiao-ping (Deng Xiaoping) has insisted on this po­sition since he was returned to power. And on September 3, 1991, Yang Shang­ kun (Yang Shangkun) said: "We shall decide if and when to blockade the Tai­wan Straits, or when military force should be used to accomplish the task of return­ing Taiwan to the motherland after a delay of more than forty years."

Given Peking's recent actions and its hostile policy toward Taipei, there is a very real need to boost the latter's secu­rity. Under the Taiwan Relations Act, guaranteeing the security of Taiwan is enough to justify the sale of defensive weapons to Taipei. Section 2 of the act states that "the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means," and that the United States will provide defensive arms "to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic systems, of the people of Taiwan."

Broader regional concerns have come into play as well. The United States and its allies can argue persuasively that the military balance has been altered in the region, thus adversely affecting the sta­bility of Asia. The Peking regime is re­sponsible for creating a great deal of instability in Asia by exporting nuclear technology and weapons, including bal­listic missiles and conventional arms. Earlier this year, the mainland landed troops on the Spratlys instead of seeking a peaceful resolution to its claims. And in July, the biggest nuclear test in the history of the mainland was conducted—the one­-megaton blast was also the largest anywhere in the world since 1976.

In an attempt to restore stability to the region and check the mainland's increasing belligerence, President Bush approved the sale of advanced warplanes to the ROC. Insuring regional security in Asia was the keynote of the president's remarks at Fort Worth, Texas, where he announced the sale. "This sale of F-16s to Taiwan will help maintain peace and stability in an area of great concern to us," Bush said.

Both Taiwan and the United States have been careful to insist that the planes will merely restore a balance of power. White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said, "We continue to believe that the de­cision to sell F-16s to Taiwan is a good one and a reasonable one in light of our military objectives and in light of their need for peace and stability in the region." The ROC government likewise maintains that the weapons are essential for maintaining se­curity in the region. "The Bush adminis­tration's wise decision will help maintain peace across the Taiwan Straits. Our security and stability are the key to the peaceful development of the Asia-Pacific region," said Premier Hau Pei-tsun.

In fact, other Asian nations have be­gun to feel uneasy over recent developments in the region. The breakup of the Soviet Union has left a power vacuum in the region which mainland China is now attempting to fill. In an emerging new world order of global cooperation, the mainland's actions run counter to most international trends and interests. Peking seems to be trying to project its power in the region. In September, Japan also be­gan to feel somewhat nervous about the mainland's military expansion and formally raised objections to its possible purchase of a Ukrainian aircraft carrier. Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew has also come out in favor of the F-16 sale.

Bush's decision is rooted in a con­sistent American policy toward Asia which spans several decades. Basically, the policy stresses the need for a regional balance of power to provide the stability necessary for economic growth and po­litical democratization. In an address to the Asia Society in New York on November 12, 1991, Bush outlined his ad­ ministration's policy for the region. Security, one of the pillars of Washington's Asia policy, is of primary impor­tance for continuing democratic and economic progress in the area. President Bush also referred to mainland China as one of the "important sources of instabil­ity" in Asia.

Former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, in an article entitled "America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for the Pa­cific," which appeared in the Winter 1991 issue of Foreign Affairs, pointed out that "China, along with other residual com­munist regimes in Asia, continues to resist democratic political reform," and that such "legacies of the past could impede a promising future." He said that the United States was committed to fostering de­mocratization to minimize the prospects of dictatorial adventure. He sees regional security as the prerequisite for maintain­ing the stability necessary for the contin­ued economic and political progress of the region. The decision to sell F-16s to Taiwan is clearly in line with America's long-term Asian policy.

Washington is sending a clear signal to the Peking regime that regional stabil­ity is of utmost importance and that any interference will not be tolerated by the world community. The governments of the United States and the ROC both hold that only by maintaining adequate defense capabilities can the mainland be forced to the negotiating table to resolve peacefully China's internal problems as it agreed to do in the 1982 Sino-U.S. communique. A strong Taiwan is one of the surest ways to ensure a stable Asia. ▪

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