There is a particularly interesting contrast between the negotiations conducted between Communist China and the UK and those conducted with the Portuguese. During the former, superior Chinese tactics forced London into concession after concession, while in the Macao negotiations the Portuguese were able to win their own major points. The two processes give useful insights into how to negotiate with the Communist Chinese on political or economic matters.
When conducting their negotiations, the Portuguese apparently understood and took full advantage of the strengthened position given them by the dynamics of the political situation in mainland China following the student demonstrations and purge of Hu Yao-pang in January 1987. The Communist Chinese, in their negotiations with London, had effectively used the threat to take unilateral action on Hong Kong's future, thus forcing the British to negotiate against a Chinese-set deadline of September 1984. But the Portuguese in their own negotiations used a similar tactic against Peking, threatening that unless the final agreement suited certain of their basic concerns, they would simply hand Macao back within a year or two. This was the last thing that Peking wanted, fearing that a premature handover of Macao under those circumstances would damage Hong Kong's prospects for economic and political stability prior to 1997.
Equally impressive was the Portuguese success on the nationality and travel documents issues. In effect, the Chinese Communists have recognized dual nationality for certain groups in Macao, comprising an estimated 20 percent of the colony's population. This is something Peking absolutely refused in the case of Hong Kong. The Portuguese regard it a matter of national honor that Macanese who hold Portuguese passports can continue to use them after the return of Macao in 1999. Under the Joint Declaration on Macao, they will in fact be able to continue using them when traveling from Macao to Portugal. Moreover, Macanese will even be able to reside in Portugal, and will eventually be able to travel to other EEC states after current restrictions are lifted in the 1990s because of Portugal's EEC membership. The Portuguese negotiated vigorously on this point, and by their insistence, won it.
In contrast, the last thing the British want is for Hong Kong Chinese to be able to reside in the UK, either before or after 1997. As far as the British are concerned, they are not at all upset by the Chinese insistence on the one nationality principle.
Do these marked differences mean that the residents of Macao can expect more favorable overall treatment from Peking than those in Hong Kong? Or in the final analysis will the status of Hong Kong nevertheless dictate the future of Macao? Answers to these questions will depend on the essential meaning of Hong Kong's "high degree of autonomy," under the so-called "one country, two systems" principle, after 1997.
It is elementary that reaching agreement with Peking negotiators does not mean the end of the process. They will repeatedly seek modifications or reinterpretations of formal understandings to serve their own interests. Indeed, negotiations of Hong Kong's Basic Law already reveal that Peking has had second thoughts on many parts of the so-called Joint Declaration agreement of September 1984.
Whereas the Declaration calls for "a high degree of autonomy" for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), which "will be vested with executive, legislative and independent judicial power," it is now evident that Pekin wants more authority for the HKSAR executive branch than for the legislative branch.
The draft articles of the Hong Kong Basic Law also provide that its "interpretation" be vested in mainland China's "National People's Congress Standing Committee," which may also propose amendments to the Basic Law and revise or revoke laws enacted by HKSAR's legislature. They also provide that the mainland's "State Council" has the power by proclamation to apply "laws outside the scope" of HKSAR's high degree of autonomy.
These pro-Communist Chinese modifications are not surprising, especially when one recalls that the unrepresentative drafting committee of Hong Kong's Basic Law includes 36 members from mainland China and 23 Hong Kong residents appointed by Peking. It is therefore apparent that the post-1997 government of Hong Kong will be under direct control of Peking, and that the Basic Law's provisions for "autonomy," internal "democracy," and "elections" are illusory prospects so far as any likelihood of actual local self-government is concerned.
Peking simply has no intention of creating a truly autonomous HKSAR. Experience elsewhere tends to underscore this intention. When Tibet, for example, came under direct control of Peking in 1959, autonomy was withheld from the region upon the rationale of the "vital interests" and "domestic sovereignty" of China. The same rhetoric is likely to be used to justify top-down decision making for both Hong Kong and Macao. Despite some differences in the Hong Kong and Macao situations, the content and implementation of Hong Kong's Basic Law is likely to serve as a model for Macao. Since the Cultural Revolution, mainland China has already had much more extensive influence in all major sectors of Macao's life than it has had in Hong Kong.
Moreover, Mainland China is unlikely to experience any sweeping reforms in its own system that would assure local self-control for Hong Kong and Macao. Its much publicized reform movement shows no signs of shifting away from a system of a one-party rule that hinders the free flow of ideas. Its bureaucracy of party and military cadres resistant to change also remains fully entrenched, and there is yet to be an operative legal code that protects rights, life, and property. Hong Kong's status will not dictate Macao's future. Rather, Peking's centrist and authoritarian political system will determine the fate of both colonies.—(Dr. Chang is a political scientist and a visiting scholar at the University of Maryland School of Law.)