at the Dr. Sun Yat-sen Monthly Memorial
Service at the Presidential Office,
June 2, 1953
The Korea truce negotiations have been in progress since July 1951. During the negotiations there have been a number of issues in dispute, some of which are of a technical character, while others involve basic principles. After repeated and prolonged negotiations, most of the disputable points have now been settled, though during the course of negotiation the United Nations Command has made a number of concessions. One big problem that still remains to be solved is the exchange of prisoners of war. It is a problem involving fundamental principles and one which I wish to discuss first. Since the truce talks have been dragging on for so long, and the problems involved are so complicated, attention has been turned to the truce talks themselves, while the cause and nature of the Korean war, and even the Republic of Korea have been forgotten. Some people think that if the problem of war prisoners were settled and the truce talks concluded, all problems in Korea would be solved, and from then on we would be in a position to shake hands with the aggressor and proceed to talk on world peace. Such thinking is most dangerous.
The preliminary purpose of the truce talks is, of course, to secure a ceasefire. Therefore, we must not forget how the Korean War was started and what kind of a war it is. At the end of World War II, the Far East Command of the Allied Forces issued an order that American and Russian troops would receive the surrender of Japanese troops respectively in northern and southern Korea, with the 38th Parallel North as a demarcation line. This was how the 38th parallel came to be known. Evidently, this demarcation line was made for the convenience of occupation; it was intended to be an entirely temporary line, with no political significance at all. In the Cairo Conference of 1943 and subsequently in the meetings of the United Notions, the purposes of the Allies in Korea were clearly set. At the Cairo Conference, it was decided that in due course Korea should become free and independent. This decision was later reaffirmed in the Potsdam Conference. The United Nations since its formation has also repeatedly stated that its main objective in Korea is to establish a united, independent and democratic Korea. In no circumstance can this objective be allowed to change. Russia, however, once having set foot on the soil of North Korea, deliberately contrived to turn it into a base for aggression in the Far East and refused to agree with the United States on the establishment of a unified government for all Korea. It refused the entry into North Korea of a United Nations commission, whose function was to help Korea to unify itself. It also refused to recognize the legal Government of the Republic of Korea, which was elected under the supervision of a United Nations Commission. Moreover, it created a puppet Communist regime in North Korea. In short Russia transformed the temporary demarcation line for Japanese surrender, the 38th Parallel North, into a political line of demarcation between the rivaling North and South Korea. In June 1950, Russia recklessly directed and helped its Communist stooges in North Korea to invade South Korea in an attempt to destroy by force the only legal government in Korea. When the United Nations, in accordance with its Charter, acted to check such aggressive activities, Russia directed the puppet Chinese Communist regime to dispatch troops to Korea to participate in the war of aggression. That is the origin of the Korean War. So far as the United Nations is concerned, it is a war to stop aggression in accordance with the Charter, a war to achieve collective security, and a war to help the Korean people obtain independence and unification.
At the start of the Korean War, the United Nations took prompt and determined action to stop Communist aggression in Korea and to defend the Republic of Korea. This was the first time that the system of collective security proved effective. The peace-loving and freedom-loving peoples of the world were greatly encouraged by this political move of the United Nations. Their faith in the future of the United Nations increased when, following the armed invasion of Korea by the Chinese Communists, the United Nations solemnly branded the Chinese Communists as aggressors. Meanwhile, the United Nations recommended to its member states the enforcement of a strict embargo on strategic materials to both the Chinese and Korean Communists. This action has further elevated the prestige of the United Nations. Needless to say, the United Nations has paid a great price for this war to stop aggression, while the Korean people have been suffering terribly from the aggressor. Loyal member nations of the United Nations, particularly the United States which has contributed 95 % of the manpower as well as the material resources of the total United Nations war effort, have all made great sacrifices. According to statistics released by the Pentagon on May 20, 1953, American casualties totaled 135,115. These men, as well as many others of the United Nations forces, sacrificed their lives or were wounded or disable for the cause of justice and freedom. We must pay our highest tribute to all of them. It is regrettable that handicapped by the policies of some Allied governments, the UN troops were not allowed to pursue the enemy beyond the boundary of Korea. Therefore, the enemy enjoyed the benefit of having an inviolable sanctuary on the northern shores of the Yalu River, where his air force could take refuge and where his ground forces could reorganize and obtain fresh supplies.
The United Nations forces landed at Inchon in 1950 and was then in a position to destroy the enemy, but due to above-mentioned handicaps, they had to withdraw soon afterwards. The Korean war, a war to be fought, but I not permitted to be won, is indeed unprecedented either in military history or in international law. Nevertheless, the United Nations forces have not failed in achieving certain results in their campaign. They have dealt a considerable blow to the aggressor, who was compelled to seek for a breathing spell. That was why in June 1951 Malik expressed a willingness to start truce negotiations with the United Nations Command, resulting in the present talks which have been in progress since June 1951. We all know that the Communists are not sincere in participating in the truce talks. It was only because they had encountered difficulties in their aggression that they hoped to wait for some other opportunity either to resume their aggressive activities in Korea or to engage in aggression elsewhere. But the United Nations would not miss any chance for peace. It agreed to start the truce talks on the assumption that the aggressor was willing to lay down his arms and to stop aggression. This is the significance of the truce talks. What we want to accomplish is not merely a truce, but the attainment of the objective that has been announced and is being pursued by the United Nations in Korea, There are, however, some people who think now that if the Communists are willing to stop the fighting, they ought to be forgiven. Some even suggest that the Communists ought to be given some reward, such as the admission of the Chinese Communists to the United Nations and the continued rule of North Korea by the Korean Communists. The idea is preposterous. Such views can only be likened to offering a reward to a bandit who has committed murder and arson and is continuing to do so even after he has been brought under control. Can there be peace and order in such a community? Is this not encouraging crime? If the governments and peoples of the free world follow such a line of thinking, it means the denying of the high mission of the United Nations and the very existence of the world organization. Then the sufferings sustained by millions of the Korean people and the sacrifices made by the hundreds and thousands of the United Nations troops would all have been in vain. Now that the truce talks in Korea have reached a critical juncture, we must have a clear understanding of the significance of the talks. We must reaffirm that the United Nations agreed to start the truce negotiations because following the employment of force, it entertained the hope of checking aggression through peaceful methods so as to safeguard the Korean people and to attain the United Nations objective in Korea, that is, to establish a united, independent and democratic Korea. Since the Korean war is being fought by the United Nations for the protection of the Korean people, any proposal for truce should not be unacceptable to the Korean people. The Republic of China is a loyal member of the United Nations and a close neighbor of Korea. We love peace and we do not want to see the expansion of the war. If the truce talks help to attain the afore-mentioned objective of the United Nations, we will give them our full support. If on the contrary, such talks turn out to be a compromise with the aggressor, giving no consideration to the wishes of the Korean people, we will strongly oppose them.
I have another important point to raise here. It is our conviction that there should be a time limit for the truce talks. We cannot allow the talks to drag on. The Communists have apparently fully exploited the almost two-year-old truce talks to strengthen their own position. In the truce talks, the Chinese Communists have been using the same methods which they used in their negotiations with our Government on the mainland, that is, fight and talk; talk and fight. If the United Nations should allow the talks to drag on, the Communists would sooner or later strike again when they are in a position to do so. This is obviously against the collective security measures of the United Nations.
The present truce talks in Korea bogged down on the issue of the repatriation of the prisoners of war. This is an important problem involving principles. The problem of the exchange of war prisoners arose because many Chinese and Koreans, having suffered immensely under Communist rule, did not hesitate to lay down their arms and run for freedom once they had reached the warfronts. It is only natural that they should refuse to return to Communist oppression and slaughter. Article I of the United Nations Charter clearly sets forth the purposes and principles of the United Nations, one of which is "promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms." The United Nations certainly cannot force the prisoners of war to abandon that freedom which is already in sight. Otherwise, the United Nations would be violating its own Charter and jeopardizing its own existence. As Communist rule is based on brute force and oppression of the people, the Communists will not let the people enjoy freedom. The foundation of the Communist rule is in direct contrast to the spirit and principles of the United Nations. In the hands of the United Nations Command, there are 21,000 Chinese Communist prisoners, of whom more than two-thirds are not willing to return to Communist rule. The Chinese Communists want them to return not because they have any love for them, for the Communists have already murdered more than 10,000,000 people on the China mainland, but because in allowing the prisoners to remain free, the Chinese Communists would give a ray of hope for freedom to millions of other Chinese now under Communist tyranny. In future wars of aggression started by the Chinese Communists, Communist soldiers would run for freedom as soon as they arrive at the battlefield and the Chinese Communists would not be able to control their army. That is why the Communists attach so much importance to the issue of war prisoners and have allowed the truce talks to drag on for almost two years.
In the talks, the United Nations Command has insisted on the principle of voluntary repatriation. When the issue was debated in the United Nations General Assembly last year, the free nations unanimously insisted that this principle must be observed. Even the resolution proposed by India, though it had many defects, recognized the principle of voluntary repatriation. In the negotiations, the United Nations must give adequate attention to the details regarding the actual enforcement of the repatriation to see whether this principle will be observed, whether the repatriation can be smoothly carried out in Korea, and whether the arrangements made are acceptable to the Korean people. The Indian resolution, which I mentioned a while ago, contained in it the principle of voluntary repatriation, but the application of its detailed provisions would result in forcible repatriation. When the resolution was put to the vote paragraph by paragraph in the United Nations General Assembly, the Chinese delegation voted in favor of the paragraphs setting forth the principle of voluntary repatriation, but against those concerning the methods of repatriation; and when the resolution as a whole was put to the vote, the Chinese delegation abstained.
After the resumption of the truce talks in Korea, the Communist delegates proposed an eight-point plan which was obviously contradictory to the principle of voluntary repatriation. The main points of the Communist proposal are as follows:
1. As soon as armistice is reached, war prisoners shall be subjected to the supervision and control of the Five Nation Repatriation Commission, which includes India, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland.
2. 'Neutral' guards shall be provided by these five nations.
3. The Communist shall be given four months in which to send representatives to persuade the war prisoners to return to their respective countries.
4. At the end of the period, if there are still war prisoners refusing to return to Communist rule, the matter shall be referred to the Political Conference that is to be held following the signing of the armistice.
We can clearly see that: (1) Among the five nations there are Soviet satellites and the neutrality of the commission is highly questionable. If all the so-called neutral nations are to send guards, those from satellite countries will no doubt be used to force the prisoners of war to return to Communist rule. (2) The Communists have asked for four months to talk to the war prisoners. Apparently they need the time to apply their tactic of "brain washing", so that they may force the war prisoners to return to their homes. (3) If the question of the disposal of those war prisoners who refuse to return is to be referred to the Political Conference, it may take an indefinite period of time to solve the problem. This amounts to telling the prisoners: "If you refuse to go home, you will remain prisoners indefinitely and will never gain freedom." The eight-point plan gives clear indication of the real intention of the communists. It gives the war prisoners two choices. One is to return to Communist tyranny and be massacred. The other is life imprisonment and eventual forcible repatriation. In either case, death awaits the prisoners. These are the true features of the Communist eight-point proposal.
Knowing the intrigues of the Communists The United Nations Command rejected the eight-point plan and made a 26-point counter proposal on May 13. In conformity with the principle of voluntary repatriation, the UN proposal provides that (1) the Korean war prisoners unwilling to be repatriated shall be released and freed; (2) the period for the Five-nation Repatriation Commission to look after the Chinese war prisoners shall be shortened to two months; (3) India alone shall send guards to the war prisoners camps; (4)after two months, those Chinese prisoners of war who refuse to be repatriated shall be released and granted the status of civilians. Although this counter-proposal is much more reasonable, the United Nations Command has not seriously considered whether the Five-Nation Commission could remain neutral. No definite measure has been drawn up to prevent the satellite countries on the Commission from jointly using force to threaten the war prisoners who refuse to be repatriated. Although it is a compromise plan, the Communists have bluntly rejected it. The UN Command made a new proposal on May 25. Up to the present the contents of this new proposal have been kept secret by both sides. However, this plan has roused strong opposition from the Government and people of the Republic of Korea. The South Korean representative participating in the truce talks has expressed his readiness to withdraw from the meetings at Panmunjom. Obviously the new UN proposal is not acceptable to the people of South Korea, because it does not meet their wishes. I am not going into the details on this plan, but the points I have just raised concerning the Korean truce talks and, the problem of war prisoners equally apply to the new UN proposal. In other words, if the UN proposal adopts the same methods of repatriation as the Indian plan is substantially the same as the eight-point plan proposed by the Communists on May 7, the UN Command must have made concessions that involve fundamental principles; and so, even if an armistice is reached, It will certainly not be an armistice with honor.
We are very much concerned over the issue f the repatriation of war prisoners not only because there are more than 14,000 Chinese among the war prisoners who refuse to be repatriated, but because as a loyal member of the United Nations, we know that the armistice talks in Korea will have far-reaching effects on the future of the United Nations. We have made known our views on the problem, of repatriation of war prisoners at the United Nations. We have done so with the Government of the United States which is conducting the truce talks. It has been our view that on the principle of voluntary repatriation the United Nations should not make any concession. The United Nations Command should insist on the principle of voluntary repatriation so as to uphold the prestige of the United Nations and to maintain the spirit of the UN Charter. The problem is not simply a problem of repatriation of the Chinese and North Korean Communist war prisoners, it is also a problem of protecting the freedom of the entire mankind. It would be too great a price to pay if the free world were to give up the struggle of mankind for freedom and to force the war prisoners to return to their home countries so that it could have a temporary peace and resume business with the Communist aggressor. The Government of the United States has repeatedly assured us verbally and on May 18 in written form, that the Government of the United States would insist on the principle of voluntary repatriation. In a statement issued on May 26, President Dwight D. Eisenhower emphasized the same principle. We have great respect for the United States for this firm stand, but we must call the attention of the Government of the United States and that of other free countries to the need of carefully studying the repatriation measures to see if they are in line with the principle of voluntary repatriation and acceptable to the people of Korea. Our views have been consistent; we have expressed these views in the United Nations and have on several occasions expressed the same views to the Government of the United States; and we are still holding the same views.
Following the conclusion of a truce, a Political Conference will be held. I wish now to discuss the nature of this Political Conference. Because of the prolongation of the truce talks in Korea, some people might have the false impression that the Political Conference was to be a conference in which all the Far Eastern political problems will be discussed. Paragraph 60 of the draft armistice agreement stipulates that both parties shall recommend to the governments concerned that within three months after the armistice is signed, they should send representatives to a high-level political conference, at which the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea and the peaceful solution of the Korean problem, etc., will be discussed. In this conference it is the obligation of the United Nations to work out measures for the prevention of the recurrence of aggression, for the protection of Korea, and for the establishment of a united, independent and democratic Korea. All this is to be achieved in the Political Conference by peaceful means. There is no reason whatever for the United Nations to agree to the discussion of any matter outside of Korea. I have with me two documents to support my argument. First, the United States which leads the free world in the fight against aggression and which plays an active part in the armistice talks, has reassured us that the United Nations would be glad to discuss problems concerning Korea, if the Communist agreed to an armistice, but that the United Nations would not agree to the attachment of any dishonorable political strings to the armistice. Second, in agreeing to the recommendation contained in Article IV, paragraph 60, of the draft Armistice Agreement, Vice-Admiral C. Turner Joy of the United Nations Truce Team, made a statement for the record concerning the understanding of this proposal by the United Nations Command. In that statement, he said that it must be made clearly understood that both parties do not construe the word “et cetera" to relate to matters outside of Korea. We understand that there will be numerous problems to be solved after the armistice such as: (1) the troops that have invaded Korea should not be permitted to remain in Korea; (2) Korea should not be divided into two halves; and (3) preventive measures should be taken against the recurrence of aggression in Korea. These problems will have to be solved by political means instead of by force. It is, therefore, necessary to hold such a political conference. But we should have a clear understanding of the nature of the Political Conference and no advocate of the appeasement policy should be allowed to suggest the making of infamous and dishonorable concessions on the part of the UN following the conclusion of an armistice.
No condition to the Korean armistice is more dishonorable than the consideration of admitting the Chinese Communists to the United Nations. It is a well-known fact that the Chinese Communist regime was created by Soviet Russia. That it has been able to control the China mainland is the result of Soviet aggression in China. This puppet regime, backed by Soviet military might, maintains its power by virtue of its oppression of the Chinese people on the China mainland. I have just mentioned that over two-thirds of the Chinese prisoners of war are not willing to return. This tells the story. Moreover, the Chinese Communists have been condemned as aggressors by the U. N. Since the United Nations is dedicated to the maintenance of world peace and security, and the enhancement of respect for freedom of the human race, it has no reason to consider the admission of the Chinese Communist puppet regime to the U. N. The people in Free China, the overseas Chinese and freedom-loving people on the China mainland have been waging a life and death struggle with the Communists. It is our firm conviction that we shall be able to resist Soviet aggression and defeat the puppet Communist regime. The Government of the Republic of China now in Taiwan is the only legitimate government of China, and our representatives in the U. N. are the only legitimate Chinese Representatives. If justice is to prevail, the Chinese Communists should never be admitted into this world organization. I consider it most ridiculous to link the truce parley in Korea with the admission of the Chinese Communists into the U. N. Otherwise, it would mean that the Chinese Communists would be rewarded by agreeing to a truce in Korea. In other words, we would allow the Chinese Communists to fight their way into the U. N. Should the Chinese Communists be admitted, it would mean the destruction of righteousness in this world, the collapse of the foundation of the United Nations and the doom of the world organization.
Lastly, I wish to present my views on the Soviet peace offensive.
Ever since its establishment, the Communist regime in Russia has launched peace offensives from time to time. Let us recall the notable ones. In 1921, shortly after the Russian Communists had established their regime, they encountered insurmountable difficulties. Lenin had to bring back the system of private ownership of property and free trade. He even compromised with the capitalist countries so as to get loans from them. In 1935, after the Nazis had consolidated their control in Germany, they became a great threat to Soviet Russia. The Kremlin again showed a friendly attitude to the democracies. It obviously wanted to cooperate with the democracies in dealing with Nazi Germany. When Hitler invaded Russia in 1941, the Soviets again turned to the democracies for help.
It is very clear that whenever there is internal difficulty or external danger, Soviet Russia would resort to the launching of a peace offensive. The Western powers had in the past failed to recognize these favorite tricks of the Kremlin. They did not know the Communists were by nature faithless. They offered help and cooperation each time when the Russians staged a peace offensive. As a result, the Russians were able to grow stronger and stronger, and the free world has suffered much at their hands. That is why the world today is in such a precarious situation.
The Russians launched another peace offensive after the death of Stalin. President Chiang has clearly told the world that Russia's purpose in launching this new peace offensive was to secure a breathing spell so as to consolidate its position at home and to tighten its control over the satellites abroad. Above all, Russia wants to intensify the controversies and conflicts among the nations of the free world. This sound analysis should serve as a warning to those politicians who are inclined to be taken in by the Communist peace offensive. Unless there is a basic change in Soviet policy, is there any use for the statesmen of the free world to negotiate with Russians?
President Eisenhower, knowing all this, proposed a five-point program for peace and requested the Russians to prove their desire for peace by deeds. But the Communists, taking advantage of the prolonged Korean truce talks, have now strengthened their aggressive forces in Korea. The Russians have again refused to resume the negotiations on the Austrian state treaty. Facts prove that they have no desire for a peaceful, settlement of the existing international problems.
Whether or not President Eisenhower will say in Bermuda that Russia has proved to the world its sincere wishes for peace, or whether the free world should give Russia another chance to prove its sincerity, I do not know.
The so-called top-level talks had indeed played an important role during World War II. The big powers then were sincere in leading the free world in the fight against aggression. Their decisions were accordingly respected by other allies. This was an important moral factor for the success of the top-level meetings in the last war. The Atlantic Charter and the Cairo Declaration won the support of all nations. The Munich and Yalta conferences were also top-level meetings, but owing to the lack of the moral factor, they produced tragic consequences and regarded as disgraceful. I sincerely hope that the Bermuda meeting will not be a prelude to another Yalta, but a symptom of solidarity among the democratic countries.
Statement Made by Ambassador C. L. Hsia to the United Nations Opium Conference on May 12, 1953
Forty-four years ago the International Opium Commission met in Shanghai. The meetings which took place from February 1 to February 26, 1909 were the first of the kind and forerunners of all subsequent international opium conferences and the present United Nations Opium Conference is the latest of the series.
The International Opium Commission of 1909 was called at the instance of the United States, partly because of its concern at that time with the opium problem in its Philippine possessions and partly because of the great sympathy of the American Government and people with the efforts of China to rid herself, under tremendous difficulties, of the opium curse. China was one of thirteen powers that participated in the work of the Commission. The main purpose of the Commission was to enable the Governments to exchange views as to the opium problem and to make recommendations as to the future action to be taken by those Governments. The most important record was a set of nine resolutions adopted by the Commission and it is interesting to note that of these nine resolutions five dealt with the opium situation then obtaining in China.
The successful experiment of the International Opium Commission led to the calling of a conference, composed of delegates with plenipotentiary powers at The Hague on December 1, 1911, and. the adoption on January 23, 1912, of the agreement since known as The Hague International Opium Convention which laid the foundation, of all future international opium legislation. China was one of the twelve participants of the Conference. My country has therefore been closely associated with the work of successive opium conferences and it may be said that my country has a special and lasting interest in and concern with the production of traffic in and use of opium as matter of international responsibility.
I hope you will not think me immodest if say that the Chinese Delegation is privileged to have had a hand in paving the Way for the holding of this United Nations Opium Conference. The first and initial step taken in the long and tortuous road leading to our Conference today was the adoption at the third session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs of a Chinese resolution entitled Limitation of the Production of Raw Materials. The Chinese resolution was adopted on 18 May 1948 and formed the basis of the resolution of the Economic and Social Council known as Council resolution 159 E (VII). The Chinese resolution was a simple one and read as follows:
THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL REQUESTS the Secretary-General to initiate studies and inquiries on the desirability of convening a conference of the opium-producing countries and of countries using opium in the manufacture of drugs for medical and scientific needs, for the purpose of reaching an interim commodity agreement limiting the production and exports of opium to these needs, pending the adoption of an international convention on limitation of raw materials used in the manufacture of narcotic drugs.
The results of these studies and inquiries should be submitted to the next session of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs.”
The Chinese Representative made two brief statements indicating the motives and the hopes of the Chinese Government and people which had prompted the action.
During a general debate on 14 May 1948, as China's Representative on the Commission, called the Commission's attention to the urgency of taking a forward step in the limitation of opium production, I said inter alia:
"In the light of the information gathered far from the replies furnished by Governments both recently and during the time of the League of Nations, the Chinese Government is not unaware of the manifold difficulties involved in any scheme, which aims at arriving at a general agreement to limit and control the cultivation of opium poppy, the production of raw opium and other raw materials used in the manufacture of opium alkaloids.
"The social and economic implications of the problems are too oft-repeated and well-known to require any lengthy discussion by us here.
"In spite of these difficulties, it is, however, generally conceded that along with the limitation and control of manufactured drugs which has proved very successful, we must go forward to put into effect as soon as possible some general agreement on the limitation and control of opium poppy, if the world-wide illicit traffic in opium and its derivatives is to be curtailed. As a matter of fact, the control of raw materials should go hand in hand with the control of manufactured drugs if it did not precede it.
"It may he recalled that steps to consider such a general international agreement for the limitation of cultivation of opium poppy to medical and scientific needs did not begin yesterday. As early as 1931, the Council and the Assembly of the League of Nations took initial steps leading to such a conference for such purposes. In 1936, the Opium Advisory Committee declared that measures of controlling cultivation of opium poppy were urgently needed…
"When the United Nations obtains for the Commission on Narcotic Drugs a complete picture of the opium situation of the entire world, my delegation submits that it will be time for the United Nations to proceed immediately with the preparation of an international conference of all opium-producing countries and others directly interested, the purpose of which is to arrive at a general agreement to limit and control cultivation of opium poppy, the production of raw opium and other raw materials used in the manufacture of opium alkaloids.
"In the opinion of the Chinese Government, the calling of such a conference or a series of such conferences is an essential step toward the establishment of a world control and regulation of narcotic drugs under one universal convention through one central board, councilor commission on narcotic drug within the framework of the United Nations." Three days later on 17 May 1948, in introducing the Chinese resolution I addressed the Commission in these words:
"For limitation of cultivation of opium poppy, after eighteen years of study and planning, a stage has been reached where some concrete action is necessary.
"The resolution of the Council of the League of Nations in 1931, and recently the resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Economic and Social Council and this commission have all agreed that the matter of limitation is one of urgency.
"The Joint Resolution of 1944 of the House and Senate of the United States of America authorized the Executive Branch of their Government to urge upon the governments of the opium producing countries to take immediate steps to limit and control the growth of opium poppy and the production of opium and its derivatives to the amount actually required for strictly medicinal and scientific purposes. In its identic notes to the governments concerned, the Government of the United States expressed the hope that they would be willing to participate in a conference which was expected to be held after the war for the purpose of drafting a suitable poppy limitation convention. To this note my Government replied that since it has consistently followed the policy of rigid suppression of narcotics, it therefore approves in principle the proposals of the American government.
"While the preparatory work for a general limitation conference and convention may still take a few years, there is no reason why an interim measure could not be put into effect in the meantime, which would bring us a step nearer to the ultimate goal.
"I have been instructed by my Government to propose to this session of the Commission that recommendations be forwarded to the Economic and Social Council for a definite plan of action along the following lines:
"That acting on advice of this Commission the Economic and Social Council authorized the Secretary-General to take immediate steps to study and inquire into the feasibility of calling within the shortest time possible a conference of the main-opium producing and consuming countries for the purpose of preparing and concluding therein a commodity agreement among and between themselves, under which the Governments of the producing countries agree to limit the production of opium in a way consistent with world legitimate needs and to keep such regulating stocks as may be needed to meet these requirements under all circumstances. They would further agree to export certain fixed amounts of opium to consuming countries in accordance with the terms of the agreement; and the governments of the consuming countries agree to buy direct from the governments of the producing countries opium required for their legitimate purposes. Any cultivation and any opium not covered by the Agreement would be declared and treated as clandestine and illicit."
Two years were spent in trying to reach the conclusion of an interim agreement to limit the production of opium to medical and scientific needs. During its 6th session the Narcotic Commission came to a dead end road. It is instructive to recall briefly the intensive activities of the Commission and the Secretariat during the period in question.
The Ad hoc Committee of the principal-opium-producing countries met at hospitable Ankara in November and December 949 and was able to reach agreement on three important questions: (a) the limitation of world opium production each year to that required for medical and scientific needs; (b) the assignment of shares (or quotas) of this limited output to each of the opium-producing countries on a percentage basis; and (c) the reorganization of the Opium Trade as an international monopoly.
In the early parts of August 1950, representatives of the principal drug-manufacturing met countries met in Geneva, and, while accepting in principle the decisions taken at Ankara, drew attention to certain provisions of the It draft interim agreement of special interest to themselves which, in their opinion, needed modification.
The Commission's Joint Committee of the Principal Opium-producing Countries and of the Principal Drug-manufacturing countries, which met in August and November 1950, reaffirmed the agreements reached at Ankara and also took a number of provisional decisions on several principles embodied in the draft interim agreement, emphasizing that some form of international inspection would be essential to ensure the successful operation of the proposed international opium monopoly.
Before the end of its first session, however the Joint Committee found itself unable to reach agreement on four major questions:(a) the basic price at which the international opium monopoly should conduct its opium transactions; (b) the form that international inspection should take, (c) the problem of the competition that the drug manufacturing would face from exports of opium alkaloids by countries producing opium under the interim agreement and (d) the measures required meet competition from exports of alkaloids made from poppy straw.
At its fifth session of the Narcotic Commission, fears were expressed that interests of countries who were neither producers of opium nor manufacturers of opium alkaloids were not sufficiently safeguarded in the proposed Interim Agreement; since ultimate consumers in those countries would, in fact, be paving for that control.
During its 6th session the Narcotic Commission came to the conclusion that world conditions generally as well as those obtaining in the opium trade made it impossible, in the immediate future, to achieve further progress with the proposed interim agreement and the establishment of an international opium monopoly within the framework of such a treaty.
The Narcotic Commission then turned its attention towards finding some other way by which opium production could be at least partially limited to medical and scientific needs, and examined a French proposal for the adoption of the 1931 Convention for limiting the Manufacturing and regulating the Distributions of Narcotic Drugs to the production of and trade in opium, and gave careful consideration to a draft protocol introduced by the representative of France. The Committee realized there was an important difference of principle between limiting the manufacturing and regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs and the limiting of opium production and trade. The Commission proposed that the most practical form of international control of opium production at present would be a post factum character-namely, the limitation of the stock of opium that any country might hold under the prepared treaty or protocol. Section 3, entitled Maximum Stocks, contains some of the key provisions of the entire draft protocol.
The Economic and Social Council in its Report to the 6th session of the General Assembly summarized the situation as follows: "The Council, in its discussion of this matter, noted that most of the members of the Commission had held the opinion that the best solution in limiting the production of opium to medical and scientific needs would be the establishment of an international opium monopoly, although they felt that such a solution was not immediately applicable. The Council considered it desirable, however, to take such measures to limit the production of opium as were practicable, and therefore adopted resolution 395 B (XIII), noting the principles of the protocol drafted by the Commission and requesting the Secretary-General, as recommended by the Commission, to submit these principles to governments for their comments."
Fellow delegates, some of you may be wondering why my Government has taken so great an interest and made such persistent effort in the movement aiming at eventual and complete eradication of the opium evil. A brief review of some of the salient historical events will explain China's special interest in and her consistent stand taken at successive opium conferences. In the light of these events you will, I am sure, readily understand and sympathize with the attitude of my delegation towards some of the problems with which this Conference will be confronted during the next few weeks.
China became an early victim of prepared opium and for more than one-half of a century the opium smoking caused untold suffering to my people. We have often called opium a plague, a deluge and a deadly enemy to be fought with all the resources at the nation's disposal--an enemy with which there can be no compromise.
The existence of the poppy plant was known in China since the eighth century A. D. and its medicinal value had been known for several centuries, but the habit of smoking it was probably of more recent origin and borrowed from abroad. Once introduced, the vice spread so rapidly, that the Chinese authorities found it necessary to prevent it by stringent prohibitory edicts. The first of these edicts was issued in 1796 and four years later the importation of foreign opium was forbidden. At this time the importation of opium, almost wholly from India, had amounted to over four thousand chests, annually or over 500,000 pounds. By 1838 it had reached the enormous quantity of over twenty thousand chests which is equivalent to 2,660,000 pounds or approximately 1200 tons, It was the drastic attempt and the determined manner of the Chinese authorities to deal with this grave situation that furnished the principal cause of the war with Great Britain. Sir George Stanton, one time a distinguished servant of the East India Company, in the British House of Commons, on April 14, 1843, said:
"I have neither denied that if there had been no opium smuggling, there would have been no war."
During the years immediately following the Opium War the British Government made repeated efforts to induce the Chinese authorities to legitimize the importation of opium into its borders. Eventually the Chinese Government in 1858 reluctantly abandoned its fight to exclude the drug. In the worse of Mr. Roundtree in his volume entitled The Imperial Drug Trade,
"The drug which the Chinese Government has objected to so tenaciously for so long a time and at such a costly price, now had its, admission legalized at a less duty than England then levied on Chinese silks and teas.--China had yielded to a steady continuous pressure, which it had not the strength to resist."
By 1906 the evil of opium smoking in China had become so great that it gained a firm hold upon 8,000,000 of the adult population of the country and it was practically a matter of life and death to the Chinese people that the practice should be checked and, if possible, wholly suppressed. To this Herculean task the Chinese Government addressed itself. The Government decided that within a period of ten years the evils arising from foreign and native opium be equally and completely eradicated.
In this crusade against the smoking of opium China asked the aid of Great Britain from whose Indian possessions came almost all of the opium that was imported. In May of 1906 the persons in Great Britain whoever opposed to the continuance of the Indian trade in opium secured the passage, in the British House of Commons, of a Resolution condemning in unqualified terms the opium traffic. In 1907 China succeeded in obtaining Great Britain consent to an agreement according to which the Government of India was to reduce each year the export of opium from India by an amount equal to 10 per cent of the then total amount exported provided that China should reduce in equal proportion the amount of home produced opium. The result of this agreement, if successfully carried out by both parties, would be to bring to an end in 1917 the consumption of opium in China, since there would then be no available supply of the drug.
To the surprise of the whole world, China was able to carry out her part of the agreement of 1907. The British Government carried out its part, and thus, in 1917 China found herself substantially freed from the curse which had so grievously afflicted her opium production in China had come practically to an end, and she was no longer obliged to receive opium I within her borders.
Those epoch-making events in China to which I have just made reference served to focus the world attention on opium as an international problem, and prompted the Government of the United States to take the initiative to call the International Opium Commission of 1909. The action constituted for the first time the recognition that the traffic in and use of opium is a I matter of moment and international concern.
The first Hague Opium Conference, as admitted in the preamble was an outgrowth from the work of the International Opium Commission which had met at Shanghai three years earlier. Composed of delegates with plenipotentiary powers the Conference met at The Hague on December 1, 1911, and adopted on January 23, 1912, the agreement since known as The Hague International Opium Convention. It is an instrument of the greatest importance and lays down the principles and methods of all subsequent international legislation in matters concerning narcotics. In t he opinion of my delegation, the world owed a great debt to the Government of the United States not only because of the initiative and leadership taken by President Taft but also because of the highly useful memorandum sent to the other Governments by the United States Government containing a tentative list of topics to be considered by the Conference. The list of 14 topics still provides a useful agenda and guide in international legislation on the opium problem.
While we admit readily and gratefully that the Hague International Opium Convention of 1912 was an important achievement, some of the provisions fell short of the high hopes of some of the participants including the Government and people of China. The Convention did lot always insist on what was the best or the most effective method of solving the problems as the Conference saw them. In face of vested interests, the Convention in more than one place accepted the second best and made compromises; it provided escape clauses and left loopholes. We are here to continue and complete the unfinished tasks of the First Hague Conference and let us hope that we may not commit the same mistakes or fall into the lame temptations. In a gathering of this kind, when we are faced with strong and determined oppositions, it is so easy to temporize, to postpone the issue, to compromise or to take half-measures. If so, we would not be able to accomplish what we carne here to do.
Allow me to illustrate what I mean. Article I of The Hague Convention reads:
"The Contracting Powers shall enact effective laws or regulations for the control of the production and distribution of raw opium unless laws or regulations on the subject are already in existence."
It is presumably intended to spell out Point (a) in the tentative list of topics which spoke of:
“Advisability of uniform laws and regulations to control the production, manufacture and distribution of opium, its derivatives, and preparations."
It is significant that the Convention did not insist on uniform laws or regulations and was satisfied with effective laws or regulations. The question is: whether the contracting powers have made effective laws or regulations in pursuance of this Article. It seems apparent that not all the contracting powers have carried out their obligation under this provision. If they had done so, the present Conference and the proposed Protocol would not have been necessary.
Again, allow me to take Chapter II which deals with Prepared Opium. From the point of view of my Government this is not a satisfactory chapter.
Though forbidden by law in China, the smoking of opium, that is the use of prepared opium, continued to be legalized by most, if not all, colonial powers having possessions in the Far East. It was to these Governments that Chapter II of The Hague Convention was primarily directed. It was the failure by these Governments to observe the promises of this Chapter that necessitated the calling of the First Geneva Opium Conference.
Again in Article 7 of Chapter II the powers agree to prohibit the import and export of prepared opium, but qualify this undertaking as to exportation by the proviso that: "those powers. However, which are not yet ready to prohibit immediately the export of prepared opium shall prohibit it as soon as possible."
Here is a big loophole, which we now in this conference try to plug forty-one year later.
One more illustration. In Chapter III, Article 11,
"The contracting Powers shall take measures to prohibit, as regards their internal trade, the delivery of morphine, cocaine, and their respective salts to any unauthorized persons, unless regulations on the subject are already in existence."
This obligation was stated in absolute terms.
But when we come to Articles 10, 12 and 13, the obligation in each case was watered down and nullified considerably by the phrase that the contracting Powers "shall use their best endeavors."
It is not my intention to conduct a critical analysis of the various provisions of The Hague Convention. I have brought forward these matters with a two-fold purpose: to point out, on the one hand, the kind of pitfalls against which we must be constantly on guard; and, on the other hand, to make clear the position which my Government has consistently taken.
To complete the story, I shall mention briefly the fact that China participated in both of the Geneva Opium Conferences that took place in 1924 and 1925, and that China had withdrawn from these Conferences before they were concluded. The Chief delegate of China, Dr. Sao-Ke Alfred Sze, a veteran Chinese diplomat known personally to many of you here present, set forth the reasons in his letter of withdrawal from which I shall quote the following significant passages:
"By the Convention signed at The Hague in 1912, the High Contracting Parties obligated themselves (Article VI) to 'take measures for the gradual and effective suppression of the manufacture of internal trade in and these of prepared opium,' that is of opium for smoking. This obligation was, however, qualified by the provision that those Powers who were not then ready immediately to prohibit the export of prepared opium, should do so as soon as possible, and that until this prohibition should be made absolute, the export should be restricted and controlled in certain specified ways.
"It was the expectation of the world, and certainly that of the Chinese people, that the Powers signatories to The Hague Convention, and which continued to legalize the use of opium, would take prompt and decisive steps to introduce systems of control which would by their operation, necessarily bring the temporarily legalized smoking of opium to an end within a few years, or at the termination of specified period. In fact, however, this has not been the case, and because this has not been the result, this First Opium Conference was convened. In other words, "the purpose of this Conference was that the Powers participating in it might come to some new agreement as to the action to be taken by them all in order to bring about that effective suppression of the temporarily legalized use of prepared opium to which the Powers had pledged themselves in The Hague Convention.
"No such effective action is made obligatory upon the Powers by the draft Agreement that has resulted from the labors of this Conference. Some few, but not important, unqualified obligations have been assumed by the Powers; as, for example, that the sale of opium, to minors shall be prohibited; etc.
"All of the other undertakings of the Agreement, except the one providing for a review of the situation before the end of the year 1929, an Article VI later referred to are so qualified as to render them in no sense imperative."
As regards the Second Geneva Conference the American and Chinese Delegations withdrew at the close of the final meeting of the Committee of Sixteen. The two delegations took more or less the same position. In the American memorandum of withdrawal, it said inter alia:
"Despite more than two months of discussion and repeated adjournment it now clearly appears that the purpose for which the Conference was called cannot be accomplished. The reports of the various Committees of the Conference plainly indicate that there is no likelihood under present conditions that the production of raw opium and coca leaves will be restricted to the medicinal and scientific needs of the world. In fact, the nature of the reservations made show that no appreciable reduction in raw opium may be expected…
"In the circumstances, the Delegation of the United States, in pursuance of instructions received from its Government, has no alternative, under the terms of the Joint Resolution authorizing participation in the Conference, other than to withdraw, as it could not sign the Agreement which it is proposed to include."
In the case of the Chinese Delegation, it took the view that signatories of The Hague Convention had assumed definite obligations under Chapter II of the Convention and it looked that those Powers, within whose territories or possessions the use of prepared opium was still permitted by law were not prepared to agree to the inclusion within the Geneva Convention. The chief Chinese delegate in his letter of withdrawal said inter alia:
"The Chinese Delegation had the honor to say that no proposal which might be presented to the Conference could be acceptable to China which did not give definite assurance that, within a reasonable period of time, the termination of which could be clearly foreseen, the legalized traffic in prepared opium would be brought to an end."
As regards the present draft Protocol, the general attitude of my delegation has been accurately expressed in the 1951 and 1952 Reports of the Economic and Social Council to the General Assembly. I refer to the passage in the 1951 Report where the Council said that the best solution in limiting the production of opium to medical and scientific needs would be the establishment of an international opium monopoly. Since such a solution was not immediately applicable, it was desirable to take such measures to limit the production of opium as were practicable. China agreed with the Council decision that it would be desirable for Governments to have before them, when preparing their observations on the Protocol, the text of the draft interim agreement to limit the production of opium to medical needs E/CN.7/221.
My delegation also fully endorsed the view of the Council as stated in its 1952 Report when it said:
"The Council felt that in view of the urgency of the problem of illicit traffic and of drug addiction the international conference should not be further postponed. Most members felt that despite certain gaps, the draft protocol represented for the time being the best means of settling, partially at least, the problem of limiting opium production so as to reduce the illicit traffic and drug addiction."
Finally, my Government has made fairly detailed observations on the draft protocol which are to be found in E/2186 pp. 16-23. My Government concludes its observations with these words:
"In the light of the comparative table set forth hereinabove, the principles of the protocol simply simulate the methods provided in the existing conventions, with some modifications; and apply them to limitation of production of opium. Although there is some improvement, the principles are still far from the desired goal.
"Since agreement on quotas by the producing countries had already been achieved at Ankara, the proposal contained in the principles, that the producing countries may give their own estimates, seems retrogressive. Moreover, the principles make no provision for international inspection. They are apt to become empty words, productive of no good results. It must be realized that the dangerous ramifications of opium exceed those of other narcotic drugs. To apply to opium the post-factum method of control which is applied to the manufactured drugs would certainly be inadequate."
To sum up, the position of my delegation towards the draft protocol is as follows: In the view of my delegation, to matters are of major importance. It is generally agreed that the establishment of an international opium monopoly would be the best and most effective solution. Our first major task, therefore, is to ascertain whether the system proposed in the draft protocol is an adequate substitute for an international opium monopoly. The second important question is: Whether the draft protocol is merely a collection of pious hopes or whether it has a strong enough backbone to stand up against pressures of one kind or another and has a set of teeth that can bite. We believe in international inspection. In the absence of inspection, we shall carefully examine the efficacy of those enforcement measures, proposed in the draft protocol.
Finally, I wish to declare that my Government and people entertain high expectations in the outcome of this Conference. It is our fervent hope that this Conference may at last find the solution to a problem that has been a matter of deepest concern of my people for a hundred years. The task that we have undertaken is one of difficulty and complexity and whatever measure of success we shall achieve will be the measure of our goodwill, co-operation and unselfish devotion. I on my part wish to assure, you, sir, and' my fellow delegates, that my delegation will do everything possible to make the Conference a success. May the United Nations Opium Conference attain the high and noble purpose to which we all are dedicated.
Statement by Mr. Chow Shu-kai, Delegate of the Republic of China to the Ninth Session of ECAFE during the Discussion on the"Economic Situation in Asia and the Far East" - Bandung, Indonesia 9 February, 1953
Mr. Chairman, The Chinese delegation wishes to associate itself with other Delegations in paying tribute to the Secretariat for the painstaking efforts made by the Executive Secretary and his staff in producing the Economic, Survey of the region the quality of which has improved from year to year.
We note with gratification that, with one or two exceptions, almost all countries in this region have made substantial progress during the last few years in rehabilitating the devastation caused by the war and in embarking upon programs of continued reconstruction and development. Coming from a country which for many thousand years has emphasized the importance of giving enough to the people to eat, we attach great significance to the production of food in this area. Although there has been some increase in the postwar years, the output is still below the pre-war level. It must be recalled that the nutrition standard of this region was none too high before the war. The insufficiency of post-war production, therefore, calls for our added attention and further improvement.
It is theoretically correct to advocate industrialization in order to raise the standard of living. In doing so, however, we must at least restore the pre-war living standard insofar as food is concerned. The program of industrialization would defeat its own purpose if the population cannot have adequate nourishment. It is the view of the Chinese delegation that during the transitional period from the post-war rehabilitation to further expansion, countries of this region might do well to maintain a balanced economy. That is to say, agricultural production, especially with regard to foodstuff, should not be neglected during the process of industrialization. Before we venture on some ambitious projects, our attention and resources should be first directed to the improvement of such matters as landholding system, irrigation, seeds, fertilizers, flood control, insect control, etc. An enlightened system of taxation and development of' inland transportation are it also essential to the encouragement of more production as well as to the even distribution of the same.
Countries of this region can be divided into three categories. Some are highly industrialized, while others are semi-industrialized or predominantly agricultural. While the effort to achieve the balance of trade and payments is a laudable objective, in these days of international economic inter-dependence no country can be self-sufficient; and it is uneconomical and indeed dangerous if every country endeavours to attain that. There must be regional planning to create some form of division and coordination of labour among countries of the region, in order to make the fullest use of the specific capacity of individual states and to avoid unnecessary competition. As the distinguished Delegate of the United States has already pointed out, the work of this Commission has so far been largely concerned with certain technical problems, and the time has now come that, instead of dealing with individual trees, we should look at the forest as a whole. We are gratified that a beginning is now being made with the innovation of this general debate, and we hope that farsighted planning at a regional level can gradually be worked out.
While admiring the achievements of countries of this region and expressing our hopes for the future, the Chinese Delegation cannot help feeling envious and sad when we discuss the conditions of China. It appears to be the desire of the Commission that in its investigation and research, the Secretariat should give a more thorough coverage of developments on the mainland of China. No one can be more concerned with the situation there than we are. I shall, therefore, endeavour to supplement the facts and figures as contained in the two documents prepared by the Secretariat.
Before I proceed, Mr. Chairman, permit me to make three points clear:
(1) Like the data quoted in the papers issued by the Secretariat, the source of our in. formation also comes from newspapers and periodicals published by the Chinese Communist puppet authorities. In this connection, I must point out that it is extremely difficult to ascertain whether I they are telling the truth. For instance, in respect of the increase in the production of cotton on the mainland of China, we have now three versions:
(a) Table 1 on page 4 of the 1951 survey gives the following figures:
Pre-war: 100, 1949/50: 51, 1950/51: 84, 1951/52: 133.
(b) A certain speaker said last Saturday afternoon, however, that the increase was 52%.
(c) On page 5 of the memorandum circulated by the Delegation of the World Federation of Trade Unions (E/CN. 11/NGO/2) it is stated that the increase since 1949 is 20 % only.
Whichever way one calculates them, the three figures cannot agree. I am at a loss to understand why these people can't make up their minds. May be the Comin-for