The Story of China: 1912-1961
Edited by Henry Kung Captions by I-cheng Loh
Reviewed by Daisy Atterbury
In this Golden Anniversary year commemorating the founding of the Republic of China, it is inspiring to have this condensed resume of fifty glorious years. People sometimes forget the stupendous difficulties confronting the intrepid band of patriots who set the wheels of history in motion. After overthrowing the Manchus, there remained the yet more colossal task of organizing China's vast sub-continent. This was equivalent in complexity to establishing a United States of Europe—something no Westerner has yet dared to tackle. But China's leaders, by courage, sacrifice, genius and Providence, finally brought the mighty Republic into being, with its Constitution, provision for popular elections, and the most effective, progressive system of rural welfare in all Asia.
Asia's First Republic reminds us of the martyrs who paid the last full measure of devotion, besides giving the historical background of those—equally self-sacrificing—who have survived to guide the destinies of free China. After considering the heart breaking set backs, the enmity and treachery with which the nation had to contend, one speculates what would be China's condition today if she could have evolved in an atmosphere of friendly international cooperation? If Japan had respected China's territorial integrity instead of launching her unprovoked attack in 1937? If the provisions of the 1943 Cairo Conference restoring China's possessions had been carried out instead of the 1945 secret Yalta deal whereby Russia was given strategic control of Manchuria? Undoubtedly China now would be a great, peace-loving, prosperous republic in the Far East, providing stability and support for international law. The goals would already have been reached for which the nation is still struggling. But by surviving crises which would have overwhelmed people of lesser ability and determination, the Chinese have given the whole world an example of fortitude and faithfulness to principle.
Although China has been tested and tried by a malignant fate, she has been greatly blessed in the quality of her leaders. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, father of his country, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, who gave the Three People's Principles their political implementation, are rare souls in any generation. China's troubles have provided a field on which heroes can display their prowess. Vice President Chen Cheng has shown an unusual combination of military ability and genius in rural reconstruction. Taiwan's famous land-reform was administered by the Vice President-Premier, who carried on a successful rent-reduction program for three years when Governor of Hupeh on the mainland.
Asia's First Republic gives a clear account of the Communist treachery in China. President Chiang Kai-shek's book, Soviet Russia in China, analyzes Russia's complicity in using the Peiping puppets to accomplish the imperialistic ambitions of the Soviet conspiracy. Asia's First Republic closes on the optimistic note of anticipating the return to the mainland, where the economic progress evident on Taiwan can be spread to China's millions now suffering under cruel Communist oppression.
This brief account is noteworthy for its lavish use of pictures. The thrilling moments of the early revolution live again in the pictorial record. One feels deeply the human anguish and loss which the Republic of China endured, and one is filled with solemn pride over its accomplishments. One is especially impressed with the necessity of never giving up in spite of temporary defeat. "The Revolution suffered ten failures before it met with success." In the present world climate of tension with pressure to yield before Soviet blackmail, China has given us a shining example of steadfastness and faithfulness to ideals. This history makes us proud to be a member of the human race. Implicit is the conviction that God and right will prevail.
Such a capsule version of the last fifty years requires many omissions. It is too bad that so many illustrious pages must be left out of the record. We wish mention could have been made of Dr. James Yen's "Ting-hsien Mass Education and Rural Reconstruction Movement," which largely furnished the blueprint on which the joint Commission of Rural Reconstruction operates today. The extraordinary welfare projects which were carried out while China was fighting for her life in the Japanese War deserve a whole book to themselves. Hubert Freyn's "Free China's New Deal (Macmillan's, 1943) gives an all-too-brief summary of these accomplishments which have significance for the whole Far East. Members of the "Peace Corps" please copy!
Madame Chiang's homes for "Warphans," rescuing children stranded on the battlefield, gave a heartwarming demonstration of life-saving amid destruction. At one time there were 45 "Warphanages" with 30,000 children to care for. The book and movie of "The Small Woman" tells how Gladys Aylward brought her small flock of children to safety in Sian, where General Secretary of the Chinese Women's Anti-Aggression League, Pih Yi-shu, was caring for two thousand "warphans." If it had not been for this heroic program, Miss Aylward would have had nowhere to turn. She and her little group of young refugees would have perished. But the movie about the "Warphanages" has yet to be made.
China's recent history is a treasure-trove for those seeking records of heroism and human ingenuity and endurance, but the story never has been adequately presented. Indeed, the Communists deny that such constructive programs ever were accomplished; and the Red stereotypes are apt to be the ones most vividly impressed on the public mind. We hope that Asia's First Republic will be just a pilot project for a definitive history which will make use of the monumental primary sources available, and present the Republic of China's first fifty years in their true grandeur. As the free world comes to realize what China has achieved under such stress and strain, we hope the democracies will rally round to help make the next fifty years even more memorable.
THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE
Documented and Analysed
By G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal
and Roderick MacFarquhar
Published by the Chino Quarterly London. 1961.
227pp Five Shillings
Reviewed by D. J. Lee
The Moscow-Peiping relationship has always been a favorite subject of Western political observers and leaders. The least indication of discord detected between the two Communist giants often is so magnified as to encourage the most unwarranted speculations. At one time, not a few believed that Mao Tse-tung would before long be another Tito. Later events proved how wrong they were.
"The Sino-Soviet Dispute" represents an attempt on the part of Western writers and observers to present to the general reading public an analysis, based on documentary evidence, of how the Soviets and the Chinese Communists get along in the Communist world.
G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, and Roderick MacFarquhar, who are more or less known to the British public as writers on China and Far Eastern affairs, have pooled their knowledge on this subject. The booklet is a collection of articles devoted to documenting the dispute between the Russian and Chinese Communists.
There is nothing new about the documentation. Any newspaper reader is familiar with the famous, or rather infamous speech made by Khrushchev at the 20th Congress; the 1957 Moscow Declaration, Khrushchev's 21st Congress speech and his speech made in Peiping on September 30, 1959, and the Warsaw Treaty Powers' Declaration. Those who keep themselves abreast of current events are no strangers to the speech made by Khrushchev at Bucharest and the reply made by a representative from Peiping.
It is common knowledge that the first serious sign of difference between Soviet and the Chinese Communists was Khrushchev's attempt to de-Stalinize Russia's former idol at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party.
Preceding the 10 chapters on documentation is a long article entitled "Diplomacy and Revolutions: The Dialectics of a Dispute" by Richard Lowenthal. According to the author, "The profound differences in the history of the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties, both in the strategy by which they conquered power and in the methods they used afterwards for transforming society, have clearly produced a different ideological climate, different forms of inner life and a different 'style of work'; and the fact that Mao Tse-tung could only win control of the Chinese party and lead it to victory by repeatedly defying Stalin's advice has contributed to the formation of a Chinese Communist leadership which is highly conscious of those differences."
Mr. Lowenthal also lists the following factors that enabled the Peiping regime to win friends and influence people of the Communist bloc with the exception of those in Eastern Europe, which are under the iron rule of the Soviets.
1. An Algerian Communist might prefer Chinese offers of aid for the F.L.N. to the repeated Russian advice favoring negotiation with De Gaulle.
2. An Iraqi Communist might recall that neither Soviet support for Kassem's regime nor his own party's Soviet-ordered retreat from its earlier offensive policy had obtained for it a legal, let alone dominating, position under that regime.
3. An Indonesian Communist might resent the manner in which Khrushchev ignored his party during his visit, and the general Soviet wooing of the "bourgeois nationalist" regime of Sukarno that limited the democratic rights of the Communists, as well as other parties, and favored a neutralist bloc with the "renegade" Tito.
4. Would not the Communists of Latin America be sensitive to the Chinese argument that as Yankee imperialism is the main enemy, any attempts to relax Soviet-American tension are bound to weaken Soviet support for them as well as for the Peiping regime?
Another serious difference between Moscow and Peiping are their views on the "inevitability of war." According to the writers, the views held by Moscow and Peiping on this issue are poles apart. This is of course subject to debate.
The documentation and analysis presented by the three writers would have served a more useful purpose as reference material for students of Moscow-Peiping relations if they had attempted to understand the psychology of the leaders of the Peiping regime rather than merely make an analytical study of the speeches of various Communist leaders. Most of the political leaders and diplomatic observers in the West fail to take into consideration the fact that the different views on strategy and ideological interpretations held by the Peiping regime are only camouflage for a much deeper motive—to do away with the Republic of China on Taiwan, to which the masses on the mainland still look for their eventual emancipation. As long as this Government exists, the Communists' control over the mainland is destined to collapse, and at any time. The simple explanation is that the regime on the mainland does not have the support of the masses. This also explains the fact that the Chinese Communists hate the United States, because they reason that without American aid and assistance, the Republic of China would not be able to resist any aggressive action of the Peiping regime.
No Chinese Communist can sleep in peace until the Soviets have been convinced of the necessity of driving the Americans out of the Western Pacific.