Entitled “A Question of Balance: Political Context and Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Dispute,” the report states that the “air war for Taiwan could essentially be over before much of the Blue [ROC Air Force and U.S. Air Force] has even fired a shot.”
This disturbing finding is based on a cross-strait conflict scenario in which mainland Chinese short-range ballistic missile strikes devastate military air bases in Taiwan and southern Japan. Any aircraft surviving these attacks are left on the ground as sitting ducks to be destroyed by People’s Liberation Army Air Force sorties.
With the ROC and U.S. air forces out of the game, except for American planes based in Guam or on carriers, PLA jets will rule the skies over Taiwan and the strait, thus increasing the chance of success for a PLA amphibious assault on the island.
In reading this study, one must keep in mind the caveat that improving cross-strait ties brought about by the administration of President Ma Ying-jeou has considerably decreased the chances of armed conflict breaking out between Taipei and Beijing. But the authors warn that if the political landscape on either side of the strait was to change and negatively impact upon cross-strait ties, a scenario could emerge where the mainland employs military force to achieve its goal of unification with Taiwan.
For ROC defense planners, the RAND assessment underscores the need to seriously address mainland China’s rising military power and credible threat to the island. This means that the National Security Council and Ministry of National Defense need to be on the same page when it comes to formulating Taiwan’s defense policy and purchasing materiel.
Take the sale of 66 F-16 C/D fighter jets that has been stalled since 2006 for example. Shiny new aircraft might prove popular with less-sophisticated voters, but in light of the study’s findings, Taiwan should forget about what may well be nothing more than expensive PLA missile fodder in the event of a cross-strait war.
In last year’s “Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy,” author William S. Murray—a mainland China expert at the U.S. Naval War College—recommends Taiwan passes on the F-16s and “rethinks and redesigns its defense strategy.”
“On the modern battlefield, if you can hide you can survive. But if you are a fixed target you probably face destruction,” he said. “I am not sure what the F-16s accomplish. I agree that the F-16 itself can survive a [mainland] Chinese missile attack, but without a runway it is not flyable. I don’t know that it’s the best thing for Taiwan.”
What the government needs to do is acknowledge the threat posed by Beijing’s growing force of SRBMs and begin taking realistic measures to neutralize this weapon.
According to the U.S. Department of Defense, by November 2007, the PLA had deployed between 990 and 1,070 SRBMs to garrisons opposite Taiwan. This number is increasing at a rate of more than 100 per year, with no sign of abatement.
The first step to minimizing the impact of mainland China’s SRBMs is embarking upon an extensive program of strengthening the “soft defenses” of Taiwan’s air bases. This includes the bunkering, deep burial, dispersal, and concealment of ROC Air Force assets. Improving capabilities for rapid recovery after attack and upgrading terminal defenses against SRBMs are equally important.
Another option is constructing a large air base possibly modeled on the Slatina and Zeljava facilities in the former Yugoslavia. In addition to the Hualien and Taitung ROC Air Force mountain shelters in eastern Taiwan, this facility would give more of Taiwan’s jets a greater chance surviving PLA missile attacks.
But the jewel in Taiwan’s defense crown is undoubtedly the Hsiung Feng II-E (Brave Wind) land-attack cruise missile. Designed to strike targets across the Taiwan Strait, which is no more than 220 kilometers wide and 130 kilometers at its narrowest point, the weapon is the island’s best bet in deterring PLA aggression.
Developed by Taiwan’s military-run Chung-shan Institute of Science and Technology, a 600-kilometer variant of the Brave Wind is in production, with plans for an 800-kilometer-variant on the drawing board. Although in June 2005, a local newspaper said a 1,000-kilometer version was tested by the MND—a report that was never confirmed.
As long as mainland China continues to target Taiwan with SRBMs, production of the Brave Wind must continue and should even be increased. Beijing must be left in no doubt that a strike against Taiwan will result in PLA aircraft returning to their coastal air bases to be greeted by similar scenes of devastation to the ones just inflicted across the strait.
For those who fear upsetting Beijing with an “offensive” weapon such as the Brave Wind, they need to take stock of the situation Taiwan is faced with today in cross-strait relations. In any negotiations with Beijing, the government cannot afford to be hamstrung by an enfeebled military unable to deal with the mainland’s growing military power.
Until Beijing renounces its “right” to use force against Taiwan and withdraws its missiles, Taipei must do everything in its power to maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. If this means passing on jet fighter purchases and developing indigenous “offensive” weapons, then so be it.
—Alex Yermoloff is a free-lance writer based in the Isle of Dogs, U.K. These views are the author’s and not necessarily those of “Taiwan Today.” Copyright © 2009 by Alex Yermoloff
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