"Engagement" is generally defined as a set of policies that promotes political, economic and cultural interaction with a nation with the aim of changing its character and behavior. Alternative methods for achieving those goals are "isolation," the attempt to cut off a nation from interactions with the broader world, and "containment," the attempt to limit the influence of a nation. "Engagement" is the softest of these; it attempts to influence significantly a nation's behavior by demonstrating the benefits of cooperation and allowing contact with the outside world to undermine political and cultural barriers to change and reform.
The Council on Foreign Relations, a U.S. think tank, recently released a report surveying the results of America's attempts to engage China over the past three decades. The report underlines the fact that the goals of engagement have changed over time. Rather than a method of pressuring Russia, the United States has, since the early 1990s, considered engagement as a way of encouraging the fundamental transformation of China from a closed authoritarian state that acts erratically on the world stage, to an open, free and democratic nation that would be a "good global citizen." Thus, a reassessment is in order.
The report gives engagement mixed reviews in meeting these goals. On the positive side, it points to the PRC's liberalization of its economy, its participation in international organizations and its increased attention to American interests when those do not conflict with its own. Thus it gives credit to engagement for facilitating changes within the PRC and influencing its foreign policy for the better.
On the negative side, the report emphasizes that internal changes have been limited and incomplete. Economic liberalization has not led to political democratization. Elections are important only at the local level. The Chinese Communist Party still retains the bulk of power, since it controls national institutions. Repression is still an important tool. The events of Tiananmen Square happened despite several decades of engagement. Externally, changes in the PRC's behavior are also not as extensive as has been hoped. The report argues that the PRC has displayed bad faith in some of its actions within international organizations--such as blocking international responses to the crisis in Darfur--and may be seeking to undermine the international structures that were created in the aftermath of World War II. On these issues, engagement is clearly not a success.
Despite this less than positive assessment, the report argues that the United States should continue engaging China. Only with exposure to the outside world, its authors argue, will China complete its transformation. In particular, they argue that internal reform depends largely on the example of and contacts generated by foreign non-governmental organizations. External behavior will also improve, they argue, only through the continued trade and governmental contacts with the outside world.
This policy prescription makes sense only if one posits, first, that the PRC will allow NGOs to operate freely inside China, and second, that cooperation is perceived as more beneficial to China than hegemony. The second assumption is probably stronger than the first. At least in the short run, the flow of capital and goods into and out of China provides incentives for its leaders to tread carefully in the outside world. If resisted stoutly enough, it is probably the case that they will modify their behavior in international organizations in areas that do not directly involve their interests. Internal matters are quite different. The free operation of NGOs presupposes some of the liberties that NGOs promote. Their foreign character also makes them easy targets for abuse and blame.
The report also credits the United States for what it deems a low level of tension across the Taiwan Strait. It urges U.S. policy-makers to continue with what it terms a policy of "dual restraint," that is, a policy of deterring the PRC from attacking, and discouraging Taiwan from claiming de jure independence. Importantly for Taiwan, it is unclear whether this policy of restraint is in fact engagement or containment of China. If the latter, is it possible for the United States to pursue both types of policy at the same time, or will a wider policy of engagement lead the United States to abandon its commitment to Taiwan in the interests of consistency? Moreover, this policy cannot eliminate the stresses in the relationship between the PRC and Taiwan. These, the report holds, stem from the PRC's determination to integrate Taiwan no matter its preferences and the unwillingness of Taiwan's people "to trade autonomy and democracy for subordination to Beijing." Given the intransigence of the PRC on this issue, it appears that no policy can remove such tensions, particularly one of engagement.
--David Lorenzo is an associate professor of political science at Virginia Wesleyan College. These views are the author's and not necessarily those of VWC.
Copyright 2007 by David Lorenzo
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