Taiwan's application to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) is virtually complete. By late February, after highly successful rounds of negotiations with the United States and the fifteen-member European Union (EU), Minister of Economic Affairs Wang Chih-kang and other officials were already predicting that Taiwan would enter the WTO (under the designation "the Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu") by the end of this year.
It's far too early to celebrate, however, and not just because a few items have to be ironed out with the EU and Switzerland, the last remaining bilateral set of negotiations to be concluded (of twenty-six in total requested by WTO members). The problem: Beijing.
Beijing has long insisted that Taiwan not be allowed entry to the WTO before its own application is approved. But the PRC's application is woefully behind schedule, its bilateral negotiations with WTO members (including the United States) are bogged down, and its overall attitude toward the organization's requirements leaves much to be desired.
The chances of the PRC entering the WTO this year, or even next, are essentially nil--unless the organization decides to make it a "special case," granting admission on the basis of Beijing's promises about economic reform instead of concrete action. But this possibility appears slim, because of the PRC's lengthy record of broken promises on trade and other matters (think of Hong Kong, missile sales, and the spread of nuclear-related technology). Beijing's word doesn't carry much weight these days.
If the PRC cannot gain WTO membership, does that mean Taiwan's accession will have to wait indefinitely? Not if the WTO plays by its own rules: when Taiwan meets all the stated requirements, it should become a member. If things were only that simple! It would be a serious mistake to underestimate the intense pressure that Beijing will bring to bear upon WTO members to deny Taiwan's accession.
In March of this year, during a seminar on mainland China and cross-strait affairs sponsored by the ROC's Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) and the Institute for National Policy Research (INPR), a private-sector think tank, several European participants complained that their countries seemed helpless in the face of Chinese economic threats. In the United Nations, for instance, they had to reject Taiwan's bid for admission and avoid voting against the PRC on human rights violations; to do otherwise would bring retaliation in the areas of commerce and trade. "Being small economies, we cannot afford to be cut out of China's market," said one Scandinavian participant.
Of course, Beijing's coercive tactics aren't limited to small countries. They are used against the United States, Germany, France, and other major economic powers as well. The continuing international debate over whether the PRC will become a responsible world power (raised also during the MAC and INPR seminar) seems totally irrelevant, given the power that Beijing already wields despite its actual economic and military weaknesses.
Beijing skillfully plays countries off against each other. If the US challenges the PRC over sensitive "internal affairs," then a pending Chinese contract with, say, an American aircraft company suddenly runs into difficulties and the business goes to a European company. Or let a Scandinavian country support a UN critique of China's poor record on human rights, and it suddenly loses a major market for its fish. "Do our bidding, or be denied our markets" is the name of the PRC's game, and it works.
It could happen again. All the time and effort that Taiwan has expended in preparing its WTO application and undertaking negotiations in good faith with the organization's members could turn out to be a waste, because the WTO could decide to make Taiwan wait indefinitely for the PRC, which might not even want to join the body soon--unless, of course, it turns out to be bound by fewer rules than anyone else.
If Beijing is able to block Taiwan's admission, its bullying tactics will reach another plateau. The PRC will realize that it can push the WTO around no less than it does the UN and its agencies. Henceforth, no international organization will be immune from this threat.
Equally worrying is that Taiwan's admission is still in doubt, even though its case to enter the WTO is supported by a "squeaky-clean application" (in the words of one American official) and its status as a customs territory complies with the WTO rules to the letter. If the organization holds up Taiwan's accession, the impact will go beyond economics--it will also deal an incalculably serious blow to the island's status as a free and independent polity.
The PRC has already been highly successful in isolating Taiwan from the international community; if Beijing convinces the hundred-plus members of the WTO to acquiesce in this case, the first Chinese democracy is going to be in considerable peril. The message to the PRC will be clear: nations consider their commercial interests to be more important than protecting the principles of the organizations in which they are members, to say nothing of keeping a free, democratic society from being pushed around by an authoritarian state.
Taiwan's WTO bid gives nations an important opportunity to stand firm and force Beijing to play by international rules, not its own. Moreover, if Taiwan enters the WTO immediately upon meeting its set requirements for admission, it would send a clear message to Beijing that bullying doesn't always succeed. The results of sending the opposite message are sobering to contemplate.