The primary motives of the Chinese Communists in initiating the "people's communes" (briefly called "communes" hereafter) in the countryside in 1958 were to overcome the current economic difficulties and to hasten socialist construction in an attempt to beat the Soviet Union in realizing Communism.
After seizing mainland China in 1949, the Communists derived their capital for economic development from Soviet aid, and from the confiscation of the property of the people, particularly the rural people, and the exploitation of their labor. From the very beginning, the Chinese Communists gave top priority to heavy industry (particularly military industry), followed by light industry and agriculture. Calculated on the basis of the figures given in The Great Ten Years (p. 51 and p. 61), the total investment in basic construction in industry and agriculture from 1952 to 1957 was estimated at 30,501 million JMP. Of this amount, 22,570 million or 71.6 per cent, went to heavy industry, 4,150 million or 13.2 per cent to light industry and 4,790 or 15.2 per cent to agriculture. The ratio of industrial investment to investment in agriculture was 100 to 17.9, and the ratio of investment in heavy industry to that in light industry was 100 to 18.4. This militaristic economic policy resulted in agriculture lagging behind industry and light industry behind heavy industry. Colonialism ended with the conclusion of World War II. If an agricultural country hopes to have a modernized economy with an industrial base, it must rely on the countryside for capital accumulation. The countryside is also the main source of supply for food and materials and the main market for the sale of industrial goods. It is estimated that on mainland China agricultural products provide 50 per cent of the raw materials for industrial production, and 80 per cent of those for light industry; agricultural products and processed agricultural goods make up two-thirds of the exports; and over 70 per cent of the industrial products are sold in the rural areas. Moreover, over 50 per cent of the mainland's yearly revenue originates either directly or indirectly in the rural areas. Compared with light industry and agriculture, heavy industry requires more investment and yet is slow to show results. China is an agricultural country; and hence her economy cannot be modernized without a generally advanced agriculture.
By the time Peiping's "First Five-Year Plan" had ended, the Soviets had already begun to cut their aid to mainland China. The wealth of the people had been exhausted. Consequently, although the "socialist transformation" had been completed1, lack of capital and materials needed for industrialization proved to be a hindrance to progress in socialist construction. Moreover, the ever increasing population added to economic instability.
Beginning in 1956 the Communists began to have preliminary success in close planting, technically if not economically. They believed that promotion of close planting would expand the leaf surface and thus result in more photosynthesis. This would lead to a large increase in agricultural production. Over-optimistic and over-confident, the Communists thus embarked on an adventurist line without considering such questions as: How far should this development go? What other measures should be taken in promoting close planting? What were the actual economic benefits? In early 1958 the people on the mainland were called upon to implement the "general line" : "going all out and aiming high to get greater, quicker, better and more economical results in building socialism" and to launch the "big leap forward in industrial and agricultural production." In view of the fact that "smelting by native methods," "basic construction in agriculture," "deep plowing and close planting", large-scale irrigation and fertilization by layers needed a much greater amount of labor than the policies of any previous period, the Communists adopted the rural commune system in order to expand the scope of collective ownership and collective management and to assume direct political control over the economy. By doing so, they hoped to improve planning in the collective economy and to make effective use of the manpower and the financial and material resources of the countryside. All these were conditions essential to the success of the "big leap forward."
The commune system was first initiated on an experimental basis in Suiping and Hsingping Counties in Honan in the summer of 1958. Liaoning and Chekiang soon followed suit; however, the practice was not unified. In August 1958 the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee held a large scale meeting at Peitaiho in Hopei, which approved and promulgated the "Resolution Concerning the Establishment of the People's Communes in the Rural Areas." The resolution pointed out that the commune system was an inevitable development. The commune was organized on the basis of one for each hsiang (district), comprising approximately 2,000 households. In September of that year the movement began to expand from North China to South China. The original 740,000 "advanced agricultural producers' cooperatives" (briefly called advanced cooperatives) were merged and by the end of December of that year 25,587 communes had been formed, comprising 123.35 million peas ant households, 99.1 per cent of the total. Each commune had an average of 4,637 households.
In the very beginning the measures taken by the communes were varied and irregular. Some improvement was made after the Peitaiho Meeting; however, there were still discrepancies. Almost all of the communes adopted much more radical measures than authorized by the resolution of Peitaiho Meeting. For example, the resolution made no mention of the practice of a supply system, actually, however, all the communes adopted a type of supply system under different names and to different degrees. The situation of the commune in the early period is as follows:
The commune was socialist in nature and had existed during the transitional period before Communism. It was also held to be the basic organizational unit in the future Communist society. It adopted the system of "combining political with economic affairs." Generally, (in over 99 per cent of the cases) there was one commune for each district. There were some cases in which several districts had one commune and one county had just one commune. Residents were naturally members of the communes in their respective districts. When assigned to work in a particular place, they would be assigned to the commune in that district. Members enjoyed no freedom of joining or leaving a commune. Under the policy of "combining political with economic affairs," the original agricultural, handicraft, credit, supply-marketing, and transportation cooperatives were incorporated into administrative units, thus forming a "five-in-one" commune composed of workers, peasants, merchants, students and soldiers. The organizational pattern was thus: (1) The original District Conference of Representatives became the Commune Conference of Representatives; the original District People's Council became the Commune Administrative Committee; the original administrative personnel of the district became commune members; the original district head became the chairman of the commune; and the secretary of the original CCP District Committee became the secretary of the CCP Commune Committee. (2) The commune engaged in agricultural work, forestry, fishing, animal husbandry and sideline jobs and took charge of labor and consumption activities. At the same time, it directed activities in the fields of civil affairs, finance, trade, transportation education, recreation, military affairs and public security. The commune exercised an overall control over the labor, daily life and ideology of its members. Consequently, besides being a production and living unit it was also an economic and political unit. It was merely an agent of the Communist regime, directly responsible to the Party; hence it was not the usual basic-level administrative organization with buffer powers, but the basic instrument of the regime. It resembled neither a self-governing body in a democracy which shares power with the central authorities and respects fundamental human rights, nor the original "advanced cooperative" which was merely an economic unit with indirect and less rigid political control coming from outside.
There were three levels in terms of structure: highest level—commune; second level—production brigade; and the third level—production team. The center of power at each level was the Administrative Committee. There were commune chairmen, brigade leaders and team leaders, in charge of all the activities of the members at each level. Under them were administrative units and personnel, each with a different assignment. The organization and functions of each commune were not exactly the same.
In the early period, the ownership system fell into three categories:
Collective ownership—This is a form of public ownership of the socialist system, practiced during the transitional period from private ownership to "ownership by the whole people." It was temporarily taken as the basis of the ownership system of the commune. Collective property was composed of:
Means of production under the collective ownership of advanced cooperatives, including fields, forests, orchards, pastoral lands, ponds, houses, warehouses, stables, farm tools, processing facilities, irrigation facilities, draft animals and fertilizer, as well as public accumulation funds and stock funds;
All the private plots, poultry and animals raised as family avocations and other related means of production originally possessed by members of "high advanced cooperatives" were taken over and collectively owned; and income of the commune such as cash and goods before it was allocated.
"Ownership by the whole people"—This is also a form of public ownership of the socialist system and will continue to exist in the future Communist society. The early phase of the commune had only rudiments of this system.
The property of financial and tax-collecting units stationed by the state in the rural areas such as banks, business shops, and other enterprises, considered as belonging to all the people, were turned over to the commune so as to save manpower and expenditure in tax collection and procurement and to coordinate the planning of the commune with that of the state. Although the amount of property considered as owned by all the people and distributed by the state to the commune was not huge, it was a significant step in terms of determining the direction of the future development of collective ownership. The accumulative investments the commune had made each year in basic construction projects involving more than one commune, one county and even one special district could no longer be claimed by the commune. Hence, they had actually become the property owned by all the people.
Private ownership—The wages earned by commune members by participating in collective labor could be used by them to buy daily necessities. These articles were owned privately by commune members.
All the business of the commune was subject to "unified operation" by the Commune Administrative Committee while the management duties were shared by the commune, brigade and team. Organs at the commune level were the main operational units, responsible for any losses that might occur. The production plan within the Commune was drawn up by the Commune Administrative Committee and specific assignments were made by the committee. Through a purchase-marketing contract, the production planning of the commune was indirectly incorporated into state planning. The production brigade supervised production and economic check-ups; the production team was responsible for the organization and management of labor. However, actually, all powers were vested in the commune; the so-called "division of administrative power among levels" was, more often than not, a slogan. Thus, there was frequent confusion and disjunction. The power of production management was divided as follows:
Agriculture: The Commune Administrative Committee divided the farm land of the commune into several areas and turned them over to the production brigade for management.
Forestry and Animal Husbandry : Large forests, orchards, plantations and pastoral areas were directly controlled by the commune, others were administered by the production brigade.
Fishery: Whether the fishing grounds were controlled by the commune, the brigade or the team depended on the size of the area and the facilities.
Sideline jobs: A professional team was organized to take charge of the raising of pigs, chickens, rabbits and ducks, supervised by the production brigade and the production team.
Labor management was the basic measure taken by the commune to control and enslave the people. The system demanded that the labor force be strictly and effectively controlled through labor management in order to meet the needs of the "big leap forward." The "big leap" campaign required much manpower because: (1) smelting had to be done by "native" methods, (2) close planting and deep plowing required much irrigation, applying of fertilizer on a large scale, and careful field management; and (3) running of enterprises in forestry, fishing, animal husbandry and sideline jobs had to be expanded and marketable agricultural products had to be promoted in order to meet the needs of the cities and industry.
The resolution adopted at the Peitaiho Meeting pointed out that large-scale basic construction in agriculture and measures for promoting advanced agricultural techniques required more labor, and that industrial development in the rural areas also required that the labor force on the agricultural front be shifted to industry. Mainland China, which traditionally has enjoyed a labor surplus, began to experience a labor shortage, which posed an urgent problem for the Communists at that time.2
Labor management within the commune was supervised by the production team. In order to tighten its control, the production team adopted the following measures, called "three changes":
"Collectivization of life": This was intended to develop the potential labor force of women at home. Under this measure, all the house work which was supposed to be done by women, such as caring for children, cooking, sewing and washing, was turned over to the collectively established nurseries, public mess halls, sewing sections and washing sections.3 After being relieved of their house work, women were able to go to the "production front" just as men did. They ate, attended political classes and slept in the field. The number of women involved was estimated at some 60 million.
"Militarization of organization": This was intended to increase the number of work days of the commune members. Both male and female members of the commune were organized into divisions, regiments, battalions, companies and platoons, regulated by military discipline. This measure would prevent members from taking leave and slowing down in their work.
"Combat-readiness in action": This was intended to increase the intensity of labor. Commune members were required to engage in basic construction and farm work in the same way that a "large army corps" would go to the battlefield—in quick and unified movements. This was particularly required during the busy farming season.
Under these three intensive measures, the amount of labor, the number of workdays, and labor productivity registered a considerable increase over the period of the "advanced cooperatives." The daily working hours also increased, generally from 12 to 15 hours a day. During the busy season, people were required to engage in "blitz" work and work throughout the night for several consecutive days, according to Communist reports.
The gross production of the commune in the whole year was classified as follows:
Taxes and profits of state-owned enterprises: All revenues from tax collections and profits were calculated by the commune, and after deducting service charges and management and production costs, were handed over to the State Treasury.
Compensation funds: These funds, deducted from business income, were to be used for simple reproduction (as the Marxists call it) the following year. They covered: production costs (depreciation of assets, repairs, and costs of seeds, fodder, fertilizer, insecticide, water supply and industrial materials) and management costs (expenditures in providing drinking water, fuel, postal services, stationary, and travel expenses).
Public Accumulations: Including accumulation funds, stored goods and revolving funds, which would be used for later investments or expanded reproduction.
Consumption Funds: Part of the funds was used for public welfare and part was distributed among the commune members in the form of a supply fund and wage fund. The supply fund was shared by commune members and their dependents, while the wage fund was divided into two categories: basic wage (given to individual laborers on the basis of "to each according to his labor") and the bonus wage (given only to outstanding laborers). The amount of supply funds and wage funds differed from commune to commune.
After adopting the new distribution system, all communes decided to considerably increase the percentage of the net income (gross income minus taxes, production costs and management costs) retained for accumulation funds. In some cases it was raised to 70 per cent; it was never less than 50 per cent. In 1956 the Communist authorities stipulated that 70 per cent of the gross income of the "high-level cooperatives" should be allocated to peasants. The Communist State Statistics Bureau, basing itself on an investigation of the gross production distribution of 228 "advanced cooperatives" in 1957, pointed out that the average remuneration for each cooperative was 52.2 per cent of the gross production while accumulation funds, including public welfare funds, comprised only 6.8 per cent. Under the new distribution system, only 30 per cent of the gross production was intended to be used for consumption purposes by commune members (according to a report of People's Daily, September 19, 1958). The remaining 70 per cent was used to pay taxes and for compensation funds and accumulation funds. Since the amount allocated for taxes, compensation funds and consumption funds was comparatively stable, the amount of the accumulation funds as well as its proportion to the gross income fluctuated violently. The larger the gross production, the greater the amount of the accumulation funds. In 1958 the Communists expected that the value of agricultural production would increase by about 100 per cent over the previous year. If so, some 60,000 million JMP could be retained for the accumulation fund. Actually, however, the in crease of that year was only 25 per cent, therefore, the amount retained for the accumulation funds could not be huge as anticipated by the Communists. Chou En-lai disclosed publicly that the public accumulation funds of that year had been only 10,000 million JMP.4
The agricultural cooperation completed in 1957 had already deprived the peasants of much of their property and freedom; however, they were still allowed to own a small private plot and to engage in sideline work. The institution of the commune system took away the last bit of private property. Families were destroyed. Members of each household were forced to work 12 to 15 hours a day; the food provided by the mess hall was not only inferior in quality but also insufficient in quantity. The dissatisfied and angry peasants began to slow down in their work and even to put up open resistance. Moreover, many of the communes were set up in a hurry and hence both organization and management were in a mess. Before joining the commune, many peasants burned their farm tools and ate their poultry and other animals as a demonstration of their protest. In view of the disruption of rural social order, the Communist authorities were compelled to reorganize the communes in order to appease the peasants. The sixth plenary session of the CCP 8th Central Committee held in Wuhan adopted a resolution warning against rashness during the transitional period toward Communism. After giving reasons for moderation, it also decided to: (1) give each individual some freedom within the framework of greater collectivization; (2) increase wages as incentive to production; (3) delegate more authority to the lower levels in operation and management of the enterprises; (4) suspend the drive for militarization of life and improve the public mess halls. These new measures were implemented immediately after the conclusion of the 6th plenary session.
The principle of the ownership of the means of production, the management system, the checking and distribution system, as well as the technical aspects of production management, labor deployment and the life of commune members were all under examination. The 8th plenary session of the CCP 8th Central Committee, convened in August 1959, resolved that: (1) The "unified operation of the commune" be changed into the "unified leadership of the commune." (2) Part of the collectively owned property and operation and management authority be turned over to the production brigade and team, with the brigade as the base. (3) The scope of "collectivization of life" be narrowed, both "militarization of the organization" and "combat-readiness in action" be suspended; commune members should be allowed to decide for themselves whether they wanted to eat in the mess hall; and food grains were supplied on the basis of "fixing the amount according to each individual, sending it to each household and each recipient keeping the surplus". (4) Commune members should be allowed to have small plots of land for raising hogs and be given a free hand in cultivating unused land as that along rivers or at street corners and to retain what they cultivate. This was the first step taken by the Communists to improve the commune system.
However, the Leftists on the mainland would not concede defeat easily. They soon launched counterattacks. In the winter of 1959 they again put forward the slogan of "three changes". They forbade commune members to raise hogs privately, took back the land used for growing fodder, and forced commune members to eat in the mess halls. (The number of people eating in the mess hall immediately jumped to 80 per cent of the total.) At the same time, steps were taken to strengthen the commune—develop the economy, raise the amount of the accumulation funds retained by the commune and speed up the development from "basic ownership by the production brigade and the team" to "basic ownership by the commune" and finally to ownership by the whole people.5 Thus the countryside in mainland China was again plunged into extreme disorder. Then, the radicals had to beat a retreat. By this time, mainland China had had no rain for over six months, pointing to a big natural disaster on a scale not seen for 100 years, despite the fact that the acreage of the irrigated land had increased to 60 per cent of the total farmland. About 50 per cent of the farm land was affected, with the result that agricultural production experienced a sharp drop. To avoid deterioration in agricultural production, in December 1960 the Chinese Communists promulgated the "Urgent Circular Concerning Instructions for Rural Work", permitting peasants to have private plots and to engage in sideline jobs, restoring a free market in the countryside, and calling for strict implementation of the principle of keeping a balance between labor and leisure. Three or four months later, on the basis of the above "urgent circular", the "Draft Regulations Governing the Rural People's Communes" were promulgated. Later, another step was taken, namely, changing the "three-level ownership with ownership by the production brigade as the basis" to the "three-level ownership with ownership by the production team as the basis." After more than two years, the Regulations were again revised. Revisions included: (1) suspension of commune operated enterprises; (2) restoration of handicraft cooperatives in the rural areas; (3) the production brigade might be revoked or retained; (4) elimination of mess halls; (5) increase of the area of the private plots from 5 to 7 per cent, which, including fodder land and wasteland, should not exceed 15 per cent of the total farm land of the production team; (6) reducing the size of the commune: one commune for each district or small district with the production team as the basic accounting unit. Thus, the number of communes rose to more than 74,000. The communes retreated from the status of "advanced cooperatives." The title, "people's commune" and the system of "combining political with economic affairs" remained unchanged. According to the revision of Article II of the Regulations, the production team became the basic accounting unit of the commune. The measure of "four fixings" and "three contracts and one reward" was replaced by a responsibility system for management in the field. This was the second stage in reforming the commune.
After Mao Tse-tung launched the Cultural Revolution and succeeded in regaining his power, the Maoists shouted the slogan "Learn agriculture from Tachai", stressing the need to use the "Tachai spirit"6 to counter Liu Shao-chi's line featured by the "Taoyuan experience."7 The "Tachai spirit" is an embodiment of Mao's line of "putting politics in command." Under the call for learning from Tachai, private plots have been taken back, the system of requiring commune members to work a specific number of days in a year or month has been adopted; "work points" of "model" commune members have been taken as the standard in remunerating commune members, and every day each commune member has the responsibility of indicating the number of work points he intends to attain.
In retrospect, we find that less than six months after the establishment of the commune, the turmoil in the rural areas forced the Chinese Communists to undertake a large-scale reorganization effort. After 12 years, the commune is still far from stable. The history of the commune during the past ten years has been a tug-of-war between the Chinese Communist authorities and the broad masses of peasants. This struggle has not yet ended.
Peiping's attempt to realize the "big leap forward" in agricultural production through the commune system and to use this agricultural expansion as the main base for industrialization has failed. With this failure, agricultural production in mainland China has experienced a further decline. The reason for the failure may be explained in this fashion: the system of collective ownership and unified management practiced by the commune (as with "advanced cooperatives") has deprived peasants of all their property and freedom, and consequently their hopes for the future. Hope is essential to the existence of man and to his determination to overcome hardship. Viewed in this light, Liu Shao-chi's line is more acceptable to the peasants in mainland China than Mao's. But this is only a choice between two evils, not a wholehearted acceptance. People in the rural areas of Kwangtung Province have reportedly indicated their wish to have their own land, to help each other in time of need and to have free time after work. This is the real voice of the peasantry on the mainland. Only by restoring private ownership and free management can they instill hope in the peasants; and only on this basis can capital construction and progress in technology have their due impact. The sabotage encountered by the Peiping regime during the socialist "transformation of agriculture" can serve as a good example. The revised draft "Constitution" of the Peiping regime makes it clear that private plots will continue to exist for the time being. This is because the farmers on the mainland are still turning a cold shoulder to the collective economy of socialism and therefore products from private plots and sideline jobs are needed to make up for the insufficiency of production.
During the 20-year period from 1900 to 1920 agricultural construction began in Taiwan, then under Japanese occupation, by importing capital and technical know-how from Japan and by expanding the farm land and by cataloguing land records. But as most of the land was owned by powerful local landlords, agricultural development was very slow. After 1939 when the Japanese authorities began to enforce strict food rations and effect government purchase of food grain in order to meet the needs of the war, the farmers became further discouraged. With irrigation facilities left unrepaired and with shortages in fertilizer, agricultural production continued to drop. In 1945 the output of coarse rice was only 45 per cent of the highest recorded production.
After World War II, Taiwan was restored to the Republic of China from Japanese rule. The control system in food grains was suspended and free trade restored. The reconstruction of power plants, the greater availability of fertilizer and increased water conservation helped rejuvenate agricultural production and the welfare of the farmers. The Chinese Government decided in 1949 to carry out the program of reducing farm rent to 37.5 per cent of the annual main crop yield. This marked the first step in a series of land reforms. In 1953 the constructive land-to-the-tiller program was introduced through peaceful means, thus enabling most of the farmers to own the land they had been tilling. The government paid a lump sum to the landlords, 30 per cent in stock in government enterprises and 70 per cent in commodity bonds (paid back in 10 years at 4 per cent interest), in compensation for their land. The following figures show the changes in the status of farmers during the 17-year period from 1953 to 1969: The proportion of full owners rose from 36 to 80 per cent; that of part owners dropped from 26 to 11 per cent; and that of tenants dropped from 36 to 9 per cent.
The warm and humid weather in Taiwan favors the cultivation of rice and other related crops; the climate permits two or three rice harvests a year. But typhoons, germs and insects are constant hazards and the high mountains and rapid rivers make it difficult to conserve farm land and retain fertilizer. These are factors which adversely affect agricultural development. Therefore, the human factors, which include an advanced system, policy, techniques, and the amount and source of construction capital are most essential in promoting a successful agricultural program.
In sharp contrast to the agricultural stagnation and poor living standards on mainland China, there is rural prosperity in Taiwan. This is a result of the implementation of the land-to-the-tiller program, which has provided the farmers with a new stimulus to develop agricultural production. The increase in farm capital and labor, coupled with government-initiated measures to improve facilities and techniques and the encouragement of investment in agricultural construction, has helped offset the unfavorable natural conditions and give play to the favorable geographical factors. This has resulted in a conspicuous and continued increase in total agricultural output, per unit yield and labor productivity. This agricultural prosperity gave impetus to rapid development in industry, commerce and transportation, and brought about increases in foreign exchange, per capita income and job openings. When the rate of growth of the gross national product exceeds the growth of population, the amount of savings and capital will also rise. The following is a closer look at these increases;
Agricultural production
Taking 1952 as 100, the figures are 121.4 for 1965, 143.2 for 1960, 178.0 for 1964, and 226.0 for 1968. Thus, agricultural production increased by 126 per cent during the 16-year period. (Source: Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1970, Council for International Economic Cooperation and Development (CIECD), Executive Yuan.)
Unit area yields of major food crops
Brown rice: The per-hectare yield was 1,998 kilograms in 1952 and 3,188 kilograms in 1968, an increase of 64 per cent.
Sweet potatoes: The per-hectare yield was 8,953 kilograms in 1952 and 14,334 in 1968, an increase of 60 per cent. (Source: Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1970, CIECD)
Rate of agricultural production per unit of labor
Taking 1952 as 100, the figures are 120.3 for 1956, 133.3 for 1960, 160.0 for 1964 and 199.0 for 1968. Thus the rate increased by 99 per cent during the 19-year period. (Source: Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1970, CIECD)
Industrial production
Taking 1952 as 100, the figures are 155.4 for 1956, 144.6 for 1960, 409.6 for 1964 and 939.7 for 1969. Thus, the 18-year period saw a jump of 840 per cent. Private industry grew even faster than public industry; in 1952 the growth rates were 42.7 per cent to 57.3 per cent; however, in 1966 the rates were 82.2 per cent to 31.8 per cent.
National income
National income: Taking 1952 as 100, the figures are 133.1 for 1956, 174.8 for 1960, 251.4 for 1964 and 365.0 for 1968. The 16-year period saw an increase of 265 per cent.
Per capita income: Taking 1952 as 100, the figures are 110.8 for 1956, 125.3 for 1960, 167.5 for 1964 and 206.1 for 1968. The 16-year period saw an increase of 106 per cent. (Source: Director General of Budgets, Accounts and Statistics, Executive Yuan DGBAS)
National savings
Amount: NT$708 million for 1952 and NT$27,882 million for 1968, an increase of 385.0 per cent.
Percentage of the national income: 4.8 for 1952, 4.9 for 1956, 6.9 for 1960, 15.6 for 1964 and 20.9 for 1968. (Source: DGBAS)
Following the failure of the "big leap forward," mainland China experienced a steady decline in agricultural production. There was a slight upward trend in 1964. However, since 1957 the total food production, including that of the private plots, has hovered between 185 and 195 million metric tons, while the population has increased by more than 100 million. During the several years before the Sino-Japanese war, the amount of energy consumed by each person per day in mainland China totaled 2,380 Calories, very close to the standard amount of 2,400 Calories. After the Communist occupation, under a system of strict food control, each person could get no more than 2,000 Calories a day. Our estimates indicate that this number has recently dropped to 1,750.
Living in a warmer climate and with much less manual labor to perform, the people in Taiwan should need less energy than that required by the people in mainland China. However, each person in Taiwan now consumes an average of 2,545 Calories a day, 45 per cent more than his counterpart across the straits. If the Chinese Communists hope to reach this figure, they will have to produce at least 250 million metric tons of food a year. Hence, we can expect a food shortage of about 50 million metric tons in mainland China to continue for some time.
1. The "socialist transformation" of the private economy which began in 1953 was completed in 1957.
2. The "Chinese Agricultural Academy" in 1959 made a model survey of the Hung Kuang Commune in Ching County, Hopei, which pointed out that shortly after the establishment of the communes in 1958 a shortage of labor appeared. The survey explained the phenomenon by saying that careful and intensive cultivation as well as expansion of "reproduction" required more labor. For example, the amount of labor needed for irrigation in 1958 was double that of 1957, the amount of labor needed for applying fertilizer was seven times that of 1957, and the amount of labor needed for plowing in 1958 was nine times more than that of 1957. (New China Bi-Monthly, No. 6, 1959)
3. At the end of 1958, there were 3.4 million public mess halls, 3.4 million nurseries, and 0.15 million houses for the aged. (The Great Ten Years, P.44).
4. Disclosed by Chou En-lai in the "The Great Ten Years", People's Daily, September 10, 1959.
5. Tan Chen-lin made the report to the NPC in March 1960.
6. Tachai refers to the Tachai Commune and Tachai Brigade in a place in Hsiyang County, Shansi.
7. Taoyuan refers to the Taoyuan Brigade in Luwangchuan Commune, Funing County, Hopei. Wang Kuang-mei, Liu Shao-chi's wife, was sent to study the conditions of the brigade in November 1963. She later summed up her impressions as the "Taoyuan experience," to be propagated throughout mainland China. What had been done by the Taoyuan Brigade represented Liu's "economist line" of "San Tzu I Pao" and material incentives. The so-called "San Tzu I Pao" refers to: "extension of pilots for private use, extension of free markets, the increase of the number of small enterprises with sole responsibility for their own profits or losses, and fixing of output quotas on the basis of individual household."