Historical Background
The boundary line between the territories of China and Russia is longer than that between any other two countries. By extending the Trans Siberian railroad from Europe to Vladivostok in Asia, the Soviet Union has placed in a strategic position to wrest control over the northern and northeastern territory of China. Following the completion of the Turk-Sib Railroad, the Soviet Union hall placed itself in a similar position in Sinkiang and the west of China. Besides gaining a firm foothold in the far Pacific, the Russians further secured the right of building the Chinese Eastern Railway to shorten the distance to Vladivostok. Furthermore, Russia extended its power to South Manchuria and seized Port Arthur and Dairen. To prevent the Japanese from developing the Northeast on the one hand, and the British from extending their influence beyond the Great Wall on the other, Russia had to extend its power to East Mongolia in order to protect the interests it had acquired in the Northeast. Hence, early in 1899, Russia demanded from China the right to build a railroad extending from the neighborhood of Irkutsk on the Trans Siberia Railway via Kiakta, Ulan Bator and Kalgan to Peiping. This demand was refused by the Chinese Government, which then proceeded to build the Peking-Kalgan Railway as a counter measure. The Russians then prevailed upon Outer Mongolia to declare its independence in 1911, and put forward 5 demands to China, the first of which being that China should acknowledge the sole right of the Russians to build a railway from the Russian border to Ulan Bator. The following year, Russia secretly concluded a Mongol-Russian Railway Agreement with Outer-Mongolia, by which the Ulan Bator Government gave the Russians the right to build railways within the territory of Outer Mongolia. It was at this time that the Russians began to use railroads as an instrument of aggression.
Following the 1917 revolution, the Worker-peasant Government declared the nullification of all agreements and treaties that were of an aggressive: nature entered into by the Russian Empire. But after the Government of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics was established, it again eyed Outer Mongolia with greed and built a 150-mile branch line from the Trans-Siberian Railway to Kiakta on the Chinese border. Later, without the consent of the Chinese Government, the Soviets extended the railroad from Kiakta to Ulan Bator. From then on, Outer Monglia was as good as lost to us. On the eve of Japan's surrender in 1945, China and. Russia entered into a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance. Later, we acknowledged, under a treaty which is no longer valid, the independence of Outer Mongolia. The railway from Tsining to Ulan Bator referred to in the joint communique wiII serve to link up the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway with the Trans-Siberian Railway. When completed, it will be possible to travel by rail to the new port of Tangku via Peiping and Tientsin.
Since Russian interests in East Mongolia conflicted with those of the Japanese in Manchuria, Soviet Russia was all the more anxious to exert control over Outer Mongolia. Sinkiang has, for 50 years, been regarded as within the Russian sphere of influence. When the Turk-Sib Railway was completed, the Russians were able to wield political, economic, and military control over the province. Since no country was in a position to challenge its position in Sinkiang, and China was fully engaged otherwise, neither Tsarist nor Soviet Russia was in a hurry in demanding the right of building railroad in the province. That is why Sinkiang has remained a part of Chinese territory, at least in name.
China was particularly slow in developing railway communication in the vast Northwest. It was due to Japanese military aggression on the one hand and the discovery of rich deposits of petroleum along the Northwest Corridor on the other, that the whole nation was made aware of the importance of developing the Northwest region. At that time, there was not even a highway linking up Sinkiang with Lanchow, the geographieal center of China. A Chinese traveller from the coast who wish· ed to go to Tihua had to take the Trans-Siberian Railway to Novosibirsk and change to the Turk-Sib Railway train for Tacheng, thus re-entering his own country by the back door. Soviet Russia acquired the privilege of exploiting the Wusu oil field and other mineral resources and of building a highway from the border into Sinkiang, linking up Khorgos with Tihua and Hami. This international trunk highway, with a length of over 1,200 kilometers, was opened to traffic one day before Japan started the war against China in July, 1937. Now that the Lunghai Railroad has been extended westward beyond Lanchow, and on account of the close association of the two Red regimes, the attempt to link up the Turk-Sib Railway with the main railway system of continental China is bound to result in tighter Soviet control over the Chinese mainland and the exploitation by Soviet Russia of the natural resources in the Northwest.
Physical Conditions
Of the two projected railways, the 1,200 kilometer Ulan Bator-Tsining Line will follow the same general route projected some years ago. The writer was once in Tsining, on the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway, although he did not go much further north. It is quite obvious, however, that most of the line will traverse the Monglian plateau and that its southern section in Suiyuan Province will have to go through some mountainous terrain. The rest of the line will not meet with much engineering difficulties. It is reported that the construction of the line has been going on for long time, so it will not be a surprise at all if the line should be completed within the next two years.
As to the Sinkiang Railway: the writer is quite familIar with its problems, technical and otherwise, as he himself undertook a preliminary survey of the railroud from Lanchow to Suchow during 1943 when he was extending the Lunghai Railway towards Lanchow. He also led a railroad reconnaissance party from Suchow westward to as far as Wusu via Hami and Tihua. His reconnaissance party was, however, not able to go beyond Wusu owing to unexpected difficulties, but the writer himself proceeded successfully over the rest of the Wusu line to the Sino-Soviet border off Khorgos. According to the data derived from the survey, the first stretch of the line from Lanchow to Yungteng can be easily built: Shortly beyond Yungteng, the line will have to climb over the Wuhsiao Divide, necessitating the use of heavy grade and very sharp curvature. In order to avoid these difficulties, it was felt that the line would have to make a detour. No defiinite decision was then made pending further study by the survey party. After passing over this difficult ridge, the line would come down towards Liangchow, Kanchow, Suchow, etc. without much difficulty as far as engineering is concerned.
From Suchow westward, the survey party was of the opinion that it would be best for the line to follow the general direction of the highway trunkling along the Northwest Corridor to as far as Hami. Between Hami and Tihua, there are two routes, one north of and the other south of Tienshan Mountain, which have been known in Chinese history for some 2,000 years. Both routes are of similar length and can easily go around the Tienshan Pass towards Tihua. The distance from Tihua to Wusu along the projected railroad is about 270 kilo-meters and the rest of the line from Wusu to the border along the existing highway is 410 kilometers. Thus, a length of between 2,700 and 2,800 kilometers of this projected railway lies within Chinese territory. There is, however, a stretch of more than 200 kilometers in the Soviet side from the border to Alma Alta, an important junction on the Turk-Sib Railway.
From the technical point of view, there are not many engineering difficulties, since the chief difficulties are unfavorable weather conditions, shortage of manpower, acute shortage of supplies, including foodstuffs to feed the workers and the difficulty of transportation over this vast expanse. No matter what mechanized equipment may be employed, the transportation of large quantities of railway materials over a distance of two to three thousand kilometers is bound to be attended with difficulties. If both the Chinese Communists and their Soviet masters are determined to close his gap from both ends at any cost, they may well be able to do it by 1957, the deadline which they have set for themselves, because we know that work on part of this line has been going on for some time.
Important Questions Involved
It seems quite certain that both parties are serious about the deal and that they mean to have the railways finished on time. So far, only very sketchy bits of information have been made available to the public. Although we have little knowledge of the working condition while construction is in progress or the operational conditions following the completion of the railways, we can well visualize the so called "co-operation" will necessarily involve the following questions.
1. In view of the great length of these lines, the amount of earth work for the embankments will be enormous, necessitating a large number of workers regardless of what mechanized equipment will be employed. We are all a ware that the population along these two lines is exceedingly sparse. According to the writer's estimate while making a survey of the Sinkiang road, the number of inhabitants within 100 kilometers along the line from Lanchow to the Sinkiang border - a distance of some 1,500 kilometers - is only about one million (not including Lanchow itseff), and that the population along the projected line within Sinkiang does not exceed 600,000. In view of the shortage of labor as well as the shortage of skilled workers among the local population, it will be absolutely necessary for the Chinese Reds, under the pressure of their Soviet masters, to force the people from the coastal provinces to leave their homes to work in a region where the living conditions will be extremely harsh. In other words, the Chinese Communists can be counted on to set up a large number of forced labor camps.
2. A question the seriousness of which has not been fully appreciated is that of the railway gauge. Soviet railways are of wide gauge of five feet, somewhat wider than those of the Chinese national railways of four feet eight and half inches. Towards the close of the last century after the Russians had acquired from the Manhu Government of China the concession to build the Chinese Eastern Rail way across the Manchurian Provinces, they extended the wide gauge system to as far as Vladivostok so that the Imperial Army could directly transport their arms and troops from Siberia to the Pacific coast via Chinese territory, although the Chinese national railways in Manchuria could not make use of the Chinese Eastern Railway on account of the difference in gauge. When, at the behest of the Russians, Outer Mongolia declared independence from the Chinese Empire, the Russians also made secret agreements with the puppet Outer Mongolia regime to allow the Russians to build railways in Outer Mongolia similar in gauge to that of Russian railways. Again, in 1945, when the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance was concluded between the Chinese Government and the Soviet Government, the Soviets also demanded the insertion of a clause giving Soviet Russia the right to transport troops and military equipment by train over the so-called Chinese Changchun Railway "from one Soviet Station to another Soviet Station" without going over the red-tape of inspection, etc. Immediately after Soviet Russia declared war against Japan, the powerful Soviet Army entered the Chinese Northeastern Provinces from the back door and changed the railway gauge from the Japanese-made standard gauge back to the Soviet system, thus enabling them to ship out large quantities of industrial machinery, materials and equipment estimated at two billion U. S. dollars from Manchuria. Now the Soviet and Chinese Reds have agreed to link up the two trunk lines of different gauges. How far the wide gauge railway will be extended into Chinese territory is not disclosed in their joint communique, but it may be taken for granted that the Russians will insist on extending it far into Chinese territory. Although their joint communique is devoid of details, we have, reason to believe that there must have been some understanding as regards this matter. The free world should not regard this matter as, something purely technical, because it is bound to have far-reaching effects on the whole world.
3. The two projected railways will nave a total length of some 4,000 kilometers and the aggregate length including station sidings, etc., will be around 4,500 kilometers. Taking for granted that only the construction of single track railways is contemplated, an enormous quantity of track materials will be required. Rails and accessories alone will require hundreds of thousands of tons of steel. No less than 6,000,000 pieces of cross-ties will be needed for the track. Red China today is unable to supply even a fraction of the above amount, and it would be quite logical that Soviet Russia will be the main source of supply. Such equipment as construction tools and machinery, steel bridges, locomotives and cars will also be made by the Soviets on a large scale in order to boost their industries. The Chinese Reds will have to pay for those things either in the form of foodstuffs squeezed out from the hungry millions or in the form of concessions of natural resources such as wolfram, uranium, petroleum and other strategic materials found along the lines. It is quite certain that the agreement to undertake the joint enterprises entailed other agreements in favor of the Soviets, although the nature of such agreements may not become known for many years.
4. The purpose of constructing these two railways on the part of the Soviets is twofold: to exert tighter control over the Chinese mainland and to extend their military power to the West Pacific. It is quite likely that the Chinese Reds would bow to such Soviet demands as priority in assignment of military trains, favorable military rates, exemption from customs inspection, extension of Soviet Russia's own system of telecommunication and police net work inside Chinese territory, etc.
5. From the long range economic standpoint, the Soviets will not leave a stone unturned in demanding special freight rates for Russian commodities so that they may dump their industrial and agricultural products on the Chinese mainland. Thus, the Chinese railways will not be free to adjust their own freight rates in accordance with the best interests of the people and the nation. The full effect of such an aggressive economic policy may not be felt at the present time, but we may be sure that it will be great.
The writer believes that all these possibilities as mentioned above are based on facts. Once the joint endeavor is agreed upon, the Soviets will waste no time pushing the railroad into Chinese territory. They will attempt to gain control as fast and as far as they can, and bring with them herds of "experts" or "adviser".
Control over the Mainland and Threats to the Pacific
With these two trunk railways completed, USSR will penetrate into the Chinese mainland from three different directions as indicated in the accompanying map. And when Soviet railways have been connected with continental China's railways, they will be able to reach the coastal cities of Dairen, Tientsin, Tsingtao, Shanghai, Lienyun and Canton. In other words, the entire Chinese mainland will be placed under their control, and the entire West Pacific area will be threatened. The free world which failed to see the menace of Communist imperialism after the war with Japan, allowed the Chinese mainland to full into Communist hands. The loss of the mainland led to the Korean War and the war in Indochina, not to mention Communists acts of infiltration and subversion throughout East and Southeast Asia. The free world can only close its eyes to the aggressive acts of the communists at its own expense.