Asian Outlook, monthly, "What is Really at the Root of the Vietnam Crisis?" by Colonel Chien Cheng—
North Vietnam is a land of poverty. It has experienced serious economic difficulties, especially in agriculture. As a result of the failure of Soviet agricultural methods, North Vietnam suffered an acute food shortage. During visits to Moscow and Peiping in 1955, Ho Chi Minh declared that unless other countries gave economic aid to North Vietnam, he would have to invade the south to obtain rice. From 1956 to 1960, Hanoi profited from the competition of Moscow and Peiping for its allegiance. It received US$350 million in economic assistance from these two Communist countries. But this was not a permanent solution. North Vietnam's agricultural production was not sufficient to feed a growing population.
With Red China's support, North Vietnam began in 1960 to send guerrillas south in large numbers and established a "National Liberation Front" there to overthrow the South Vietnamese government by force and subversion.
With substantial U.S. assistance, the Saigon government of President Ngo Dinh Diem achieved a considerable degree of economic stability. But because of Communist infiltration of Buddhist organizations and because Diem depended too much on members of his family, this government came under attack in 1963. Unfortunately, U.S. President John F. Kennedy, who seemingly was unaware of the Communist plot, forced Diem to choose between compromise with Hanoi and termination of U.S. aid. This action was similar to that of President Truman in pressing the Republic of China to compromise with the Chinese Communists in 1949. Diem was killed in a military coup in November, 1963. After that political crises succeeded one another as young generals tried to use coup as a shortcut to power. The situation became unstable and facilitated the Communist infiltration and subversion. Not until Air Force Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky came to power was the political situation in South Vietnam improved.
Despite the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, the Vietnamese Communists still carry on aggression in South Vietnam. Without Red China's support and assistance, the Hanoi regime would have had to stop the war long ago. Its economic resources would be exhausted.
Since the establishment of their regime in Peiping, the Chinese Reds have regarded Vietnam as a buffer state and a natural sphere of their influence. They wanted to use Indochina as a base for the conquest of all Southeast Asia. Their ambition in Vietnam as well as in Southeast Asia was revealed by Liu Shao-chi in this 1949 statement: "The national liberation movement in the colonies and semi-colonies will never stop short of complete victory. Wherever and whenever possible a People's Liberation Army must be established as it was by the Chinese people in order to achieve victory. The successful people's revolution in mainland China can be a pattern for the peoples in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. The People's Republic of China will stand firmly with them and support their armed struggle for a victory."
To keep a promise made during his election campaign, U.S. President Eisenhower visited Korea in 1952 to speed the ceasefire there. At that time, President Chiang Kai-shek warned that after a ceasefire in Korea, the Chinese Communists would shift their aggression to other parts of Asia. He predicted that the Chinese Reds would make Indochina their next objective. Korean President Syngman Rhee and Philippine President Ramon Magsaysay shared this opinion.
After the Korean Armistice, the Chinese Communists began turning over Russian-made equipment and weapons to North Vietnam.
The root of the crisis in Vietnam is in Peiping, not Hanoi. As long as the Peiping regime exists, no genuine peace can be attained, even if an armistice is negotiated in Vietnam. It is reported that the Chinese Reds have long-range plans to communize all of Asia before 1980.
Red Camp Conflict
Issues & Studies, monthly, "Moscow and the Chinese Communists" by Franz H. Michael—
Some people see the Peiping-Moscow conflict as one of national interests. To me, the conflict appears to be entirely within the framework of Communism. It is basically a struggle for leadership of the Communist bloc and movement.
When Lenin founded the Comintern—the Communist International—he thought of it as a World Communist Party. At that time the only country controlled by the Communists was the Soviet Union. Russia was regarded by Lenin and later by Stalin as the base of Communism. It was called the "Fatherland of Communism". Because Stalin said this base had to be defended first, some people have considered that Soviet policy is dictated by Soviet "national interest" rather than by Communist interest. In my view, Stalin's policy of defending the base of Communism was as much in Communist as in Soviet interest.
After World War II the Communist conquest of countries in Eastern Europe and eventually of China resulted in Communist control of a number of states. Now the Communists had serious problems of organization—how to organize leadership, how to determine who would be the leader, and how consultation should be carried out. In my view it is the amorphous nature of the Communist bloc and movement since World War II that is at issue in the conflict between Moscow and Peiping.
What is the real cause of the conflict? First of all, there was destalinization. Being a Stalinist, Mao Tse-tung felt threatened. His own position was endangered. He had to take action, and, in his view, aggressive action was his best defense. Since the dissolution of the Comintern, the only form of consultation among Communist parties has been inter-party meetings. Two such meetings have been held in Moscow. But these meetings, with their declarations and statements, were not a practical tool for common policymaking to provide an organizational basis for joint leadership. At the 1957 meeting in Moscow, Mao demanded that he should be consulted on policymaking. In his words, there should be "real" and not merely "formal" consultation. I think basic reason for conflict is the fact that he was not consulted. Khrushchev did not accept Mao as an equal or near-equal in the making of decisions on overall Communist strategy. As this became clear, the conflict became very serious. Mao decided to go it alone. He introduced the communes and the "big leap forward". The communes and the big leap forward were not only a new strategy within China, but were also a direct challenge to Soviet leadership of the world movement. The Chinese Reds claimed that through the commune system and the big leap forward they were passing the Soviet Union on the road to Communism. If they were out in front, they could lead the Communist movement.
Of course, the Chinese Communist strategy failed. But it was the challenge that led Khrushchev to make attempts to counter Peiping. Khrushchev attempted to get rid of Mao by instigating members of the CCP Central Committee to attack him. But Mao survived and after 1959 waged a bitter campaign against Khrushchev. After Khrushchev's fall, Mao continued his fight and claimed leadership of the bloc and movement. Although the new Soviet leaders will never accept his claim, they have tried to keep the door open for reconciliation. At the 21st Party Congress, Khrushchev had established the concept of the "party of the whole people" and the "state of the whole people". In my view, this theoretical claim was made to reassert Soviet leadership over the bloc and movement. The Chinese Communists of course opposed the claim. So at the 23rd Soviet Party Congress in March of this year, the new Soviet leaders did not mention their claim of being the "party of the people" and the "state of the people". Nor did they mention their blueprint of Communism. This was to keep the door open for negotiation on the future organization of the leadership of the Communist bloc and movement.
Mao did not accept the offer. He had gone all the way in claiming that he was the leader of the bloc and movement and that the Soviets had left the socialist road. This was summed up in the accusation of "revisionism". The Chinese Communists said they were following the right and therefore had become Communist world leaders.
Mao has failed in this attempt to assert his world Communist leadership. His attempt to gain control of the Communist bloc and movement and his strategy toward the West have been defeated. As a result, there has been a continuing and growing opposition to Mao in the Chinese Communist hierarchy. In 1959, Mao won out over Peng Te-huai, who criticized his policies at the Lushan conference, and a substantial number of military and other leaders were purged. But from that time on, there were increasing signs that other Communist leaders opposed Mao's policy. The tendency has been accentuated in the last two years. All those purged have a record of such opposition. At the Central Committee meeting of last August 1-12, Mao did not have the support of a majority. Only a minority of delegates· and alternate delegates were present. It appears that Mao's use of the army, which has been subjected to purge and which may not be too reliable, and of the cultural revolution and the "Red Guards", is a way of fighting those in the Party's leader ship who disobey. He has to use his own forces to remold a disobedient party. This necessity is, in my view, at least in part the result of the Moscow-Peiping power struggle that Mao has been losing.
What are the possibilities? The first is that the present situation may be prolonged but the period will not be too lengthy. Another possibility, and in fact a probability, is that after Mao's death, or even before, there will be in mainland China a demaoization as there was a destalinization in Russia, and that the Communist leadership that takes over in Peiping will bring about a reconciliation with the Soviet Union. Then it will become important to know what forms such a reconciliation might take. The third possibility, and this is difficult to assess, is that a Hungarian-type anti-Communist rebellion may occur on the Chinese mainland. As in Hungary, this might start near the top but would really be directed against Communism itself. I have never regarded such an anti-Communist revolution as impossible. Today, because of the violence of intra-Communist struggle, such an uprising could occur at any moment. It is not easy to envisage the form such a revolution might take or the leadership that might emerge. If the present violence on the mainland continues, it may well pave the way for a popular anti-Communist revolt. It is vital that we be ready for any possibility and opportunity in a situation that may come to a head rapidly.
Pakistani Trade
Mainland Today (Ching Jih Ta Lu), fort-nightly, "Peiping's Trade with and Assistance to Pakistan" by Lo Wan-lin—
To ingratiate themselves with Pakistan, the Chinese Communists have increased their trade with that country. This tendency has been accentuated since the border conflict between India and Red China in 1962. Previously, Peiping was the biggest buyer of Indian jute. But in 1962 the purchases stopped. At the same time, the Chinese Reds turned to Pakistan for other products they used to import from India. As early as 1951, because they wanted to stockpile materials for the Korean War, Peiping's trade with Pakistan had boomed. Trade fluctuated after that but the trend was of increase down to the signing of a trade agreement in 1962. The agreement does not specify items nor amounts.
Pakistan imports coal, paper and products, timber, pharmaceuticals, steel and iron products, chemicals, cotton yarn and spices from Red China. The amount of imports was US$4,500,000 in 1957-1958, US$5,000,000 in 1962-1963 and US$20,400,000 in 1965 1966.
Peiping's import from Pakistan were US$3,800,000 in 1957-1958 and US$7,500,000 in 1962-1963. The increase was in raw cotton. Of the 750,000 bales of cotton exported by Pakistan in 1962-1963, Peiping bought 302,000.
In a 1963 barter deal, Pakistan imported 100,000 metric tons of cement valued at US$1,570,000 from Communist China in exchange for 113,000 tons of jute. Pakistan and the Chinese Communists subsequently made several other barter deals.
The Chinese Communists have extended a long-term (40 to 50 years), interest-free loan of US$60 million to Pakistan to purchase mainland-made products. According to the Pakistani minister of commerce, most of this loan has been used. The Chinese Communists not only extended the loan but sold their products at low prices. Pakistan markets have large quantities of Peiping-made goods.
The Pakistani used part of the loan to establish a US$25,600,000 machinery factory in the outskirt of Karachi. It makes machinery to refine sugar and make cement. Output will be 15,000 tons of machinery a year.
Because of politics, the Chinese Communists are increasing trade with and economic aid to Pakistan.
Life in Tunnels
Newsdom (Sinwen Tienti Weekly), "Chinese Communist Regular Troops in the Border Areas of Yunnan Are Living in Tunnels" by Feng Chun-chung—
Following is my interview with a Chinese Communist transportation officer who escaped from Yunnan to Thailand recently.
Q. You said that in transporting military supplies from one place to another, you could earn some money by doing small business. How?
A. By smuggling opium. We bought opium from the minority peoples in border areas, tied it on our legs, took it to Kunming and sold it. Each time I could carry 20 to 30 ounces and earned more than 1,000 dollars.
Q. Wasn't there any check station from Fuhai or Cheli to Kunming?
A. Sure there was. But I wore a uniform and had papers issued by the military, so no one dared to search me. Besides, I was always very composed.
Q. Did the Communist cadres or officers know that you were smuggling?
A. Yes. But I bribed those who knew of my activities.
Q. What do you mean by the military? What kind of troops?
A. The 125th Regiment of the 42nd Division. Originally this regiment was stationed in Paoshan and Yungping. It was moved to Cheli recently. Although there are rumors that it will move to Yiwu soon, I don't think that's likely.
Q. What makes you think it will not be transferred to a distant place?
A. Many people think there are not many troops in Communist military camps. The Reds never let the people know about the number and movements of their troops. I discovered each camp has a large number of troops.
The Communists forbid outsiders to enter their barracks, especially those of regular troops. I had worked for them for many years and had gone into their barracks. I couldn't help wondering why there were so few soldiers in each camp.
Once I accompanied an acrobatic troupe to Manlung village near Fuhai. When our bus stopped at the village, members of the team took their musical instruments and walked into a rice field. I followed but at a distance. When they reached the foot of a mountain, they sat down to rest. When dark came, they disappeared. I went closer and found a secret door which led to underground barracks. In the afternoon of the next day, the team emerged from the foot of another mountain about three kilometers away. The name of this mountain is Nilung.
The team wanted me to send them to Nichang, another village in Yunnan, where members of the Pai Yi tribe live. At Nichang I saw only two or three barracks and two guards. It seemed to me there was not more than a platoon in the barracks. I knew there must be many troops inside the mountain. My guess was correct. The team disappeared once more. And it happened again subsequent to this. On the way back to Fuhai we saw large numbers of troops engaged in maneuvers. As there are no barracks around the area (Manlung), I believe the troops came from under ground.
Q. If, Communist troops live underground, how do they solve the sex problem? Are there any military prostitutes?
A. We rarely saw Communist soldiers in cheap joints. There are rumors they eat pills to stifle their sexual desire but I have no evidence of this. Sometimes I talked about sex when I rode with the Red troops, but they did not express any interest.
Q. Do you have any other findings about the Communist underground barracks?
A. All important traffic centers near the border have underground barracks. Once I ventured to ask a Communist soldier about them. He told me: "This should not be discussed openly. If my political instructor learns of it, both of us will be in trouble. But since you already know our secret, it doesn't really matter. Life in the tunnels is not pleasant. Although there are many recreation facilities, they are overcrowded. Our time for classes is too long and our time for sleep is too short. Sometimes when we conducted military exercises, we were happy and unwilling to go back to the tunnels."
I asked him why they live underground in peacetime. He answered: "Our commanders want us to become accustomed to life in tunnels." As for the Vietnamese war and possible conflict between the Chinese Communists and the United States, he said: "We are not afraid of the American paper tiger. Even atomic weapons cannot destroy our fortifications. The Vietnamese people's revolutionary troops use underground strategy against the U.S. imperialists with much success. We are always ready to go to Vietnam. Our political instructor said we must be in a constant state of war preparedness. Many comrades are scared. They are afraid that the U.S. imperialists will use atomic weapons. As for me, I am not afraid, not a bit."