The Philadelphia Inquirer (4/15/81) published this article by John Roderick from Taipei:
"Premier Sun Yun-suan said the Nationalist Chinese government here hopes the Reagan administration will restore 'mutual trust' between the United States and Taiwan. He described the Nationalists as feeling betrayed when former President Jimmy Carter broke diplomatic relations and recognized Peking two years ago.
"In an interview, Sun also reaffirmed his government's hard line toward mainland China — a flat refusal to hold talks or to initiate any other contacts with the Communist regime.
" 'We shall never abandon our principles of not having any contact or talk with the Chinese Communists.' he said, adding that China can be reunited only if Peking's leaders 'publicly renounce and realistically give up communism and its system,' and 'respect the political system, national flag and anthem of the Republic of China.'
"Sun, 67, also made it clear that his government would continue to treat political dissent sternly, saying it 'can never allow anyone to engage in divisive political campaigns and activities in the name of "independence." '
"Taiwan, with a population of 17 million people, has survived the shock of the loss of formal diplomatic ties with the United States - thanks in part to the continued flourishing commerce between the two countries.
"Now, government officials hope President Reagan will not let them down, as they say Carter did when he announced on Dec. 15, 1978, that the United States was establishing full diplomatic relations with Peking. Sun said there were strong feelings here of 'disappointment and a sense of betrayal.'
"Sounding more wishful than certain, Sun said his government wants Reagan to follow through on the implied promise he made as the Republican candidate last August — to restore some form of official ties with Taiwan.
"Sun maintained that the Chinese Communists 'still constitute a grave threat' to Taiwan's security and contended that peace overtures, which began after the United States recognized Peking, were part of a Communist strategy that shifts between peaceful and warlike gestures." (Partial text)
Los Angeles Times — Avoiding temptation
The Los Angeles Times (4/12/81) published this article by Harry Harding: "American arms sales to (Red) China are once again under active consideration in Washington. During his recent trip to Western Europe, Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger hinted that the Reagan Administration was examining the possibility of selling American weapons to (Red) China if the Soviets invade Poland. Such an option seems appealing. But it would be far wiser to avoid temptation.
"Under present circumstances, the sale of American weapons to (Red) China would be far more important symbolically than substantively. Only a massive infusion of American arms and technology could remove (Red) China's deficiencies in modern military equipment, and make a major difference in the military balance between (Red) China and the Soviet Union. A Pentagon study under taken during the Carter Administration estimated that it would require an investment of between $41 billion and $63 billion to give (Red) China a 'confident capability' to defend itself effectively against a conventional Soviet attack. Neither (Red) China nor the United States could possibly afford such a program. Nor could the Chinese (Communist) army absorb large amounts of sophisticated military technology.
"A feasible program of arms sales to (Red) China, therefore, would involve much smaller quantities of equipment. Such a program would have little effect on the military balance in Asia. It would not tie down more Soviet forces along the Sino-Soviet frontier; nor would it significantly improve (Red) China's ability to defend itself against a Soviet attack, or dramatically increase (Red) China's potential to attack its smaller neighbors.
"Instead, a realistic program of arms sales to (Red) China would be symbolic, designed to achieve diplomatic and political purposes rather than military ends. But the signals that arms sales would send to America's friends and adversaries might not be those that Washington intended.
"To the Soviets, for example, American arms sales to (Red) China in retaliation for an invasion of Poland would certainly be a highly visible sign of American displeasure, but not necessarily an effective one. Unless it was a part of a more comprehensive, carefully constructed policy, arms sales to (Red) China might well indicate that the United States had no more relevant response to Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe than to offer to sell small quantities of weapons to an untested ally in Asia. Moreover, such sales might also suggest to Moscow that American policy toward (Red) China was determined essentially by Soviet behavior, and was not undertaken on its own merit. The Kremlin could well conclude that it would be possible for a calculated Soviet policy to split Washington and Peking apart, as well as to drive them together.
"To American friends in Asia, including Japan, Australia, South Korea and some of the countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the sale of American arms to (Red) China in the near future would be profoundly disturbing. America's Asian allies are acutely aware of the regional issues — Korea, Indochina, Taiwan, offshore oil development — on which their interests do not completely coincide with those of Peking. And they are also uncertain of (Red) China's long term policies and intentions in Asia. By selling weapons to Peking in the face of such reservations, the United States would be signaling that, when forced to choose, it assigns a higher priority to the (Red) China connection than to its relations with more traditional Asian allies.
"To (Red) China, the sale of American weapons under present circumstances would send mixed signals. On the positive side, arms sales would give some credence to American statements of interest in Chinese (Communist) security, and would symbolize the Reagan Administration's desire to maintain good relations with Peking. But arms sales would communicate troubling messages as well. First, undertaken in the absence of a coherent China policy, and in light of President Reagan's campaign statements about upgrading American relations with Taiwan, arms sales to Peking now might suggest that the new Administration was attempting to secure, through progress in the military sphere, Chinese (Communist) ac quiescence to a deterioration of their ... relationship. Second, linking the provision of military technology so closely to the international behavior of the Soviet Union — in the aftermath of Afghanistan, and now of Poland — would indicate to Peking that Washington considers the (Red China)-American relationship to be a tactical device for punishing Soviet transgressions, rather than a matter of long-term national strategy. And third, by selling even limited quantities of weapons to Peking, the United States would be making tacit endorsements of Chinese (Communist) foreign policy and implicit commitments to Chinese (Communist) security that might later prove unwise." (Partial text)
Christian Sc. Monitor — Pluses and minuses
The Christian Science Monitor (3/18/81) published this article by Edward A. Olsen: "In recent months there has been a palpable shift in the United States' security perceptions, tending to legitimize the concept of closer military cooperation with the People's Republic of China (Red China). The fundamental motivation behind that shift is Washington's desire to shore up US global alliances in order to redress any imbalance in the US-USSR balance of power. But the inclusion of (Red) China on a large scale in America's mutual security net work would be counterproductive.
"Presumably the poor record of Japanese rearmament efforts and South Korea's uncertain prospects caused Washington to reassess the totality of its Asian regional strength. Despite the recent upsurge of defense consciousness in Japan and the relative calm prevailing in Seoul, the prospect of adding some form of Chinese (Communist) armed power to augment existing bilateral US-Japan and US-South Korea arrangements for East Asian security sparked new interest in Washington.
"Before the US goes further along that path the pluses and minuses of closer US-PRC (Red China) security cooperation ought to be examined in light of American objectives. On the surface it seems quite obvious that a strong (Red) China acting in strategic concert with the US would help redress any US-USSR imbalance. Moscow almost certainly would perceive it that way. However, what about the impact of closer US-PRC (Red China) security ties on other Asian friends and allies? The picture is far murkier.
"Tokyo's uncertainties over US resolve and perceptions of Soviet expansionism in the Far East finally seem to be arousing the Japanese from their comfortable postwar lethargy. However, if the US goes too far in shoring up its Asian security network via Chinese (Communist) cooperation, it risks simultaneously undercutting its best hope for fostering Japanese security consciousness. The Japanese would be quite happy to let the burden of regional security shift to a Washington-Peking axis with Tokyo playing a corollary security role and emphasizing its economic interests.
"Any moves by Washington enmeshing the US more deeply in Asian security are welcome in Seoul. Though the US intention might be to strengthen regional self-reliance and gradually be relieved of some onerous burdens with (Red) China's help, South Koreans know the Japanese well enough to be confident the American bilateral security overtures to ward (Red) China would likely prove self-defeating regionally...
"The direct bilateral impacts of any truly significant US-PRC (Red China) security cooperation clearly would be counterproductive to overall US objectives in Northeast Asia: regional stability and regional self-reliance.
"In addition to those minuses. Peking's military liabilities surely match, and perhaps surpass, its assets as a quasi-ally. Is it wise to inch closer to the probable loser in any (Red China)-Soviet armed confrontation? Clearly it is not. Furthermore, can the US rely on Chinese (Communist) leadership to remain stable? That is highly problematical. American interests in Asia — security, political and economic — would be far safer in the hands of contemporary Japan than of (Red) China." (Partial text)
Time — Flood and famine
Time (4/6/81) published this article: "Officials of international aid organizations in Geneva last week were privately nervous — and somewhat aghast. They were finally digesting the consequences of a calamity that has spawned rumors and speculation for months. (Mainland) China, the world's most populous nation, is suffering from the worst — and least publicized series of natural disasters since its 1976 Tangshan earthquake. Some 20 million people in two widely separated regions of the country are living on meager government supplied cereal rations as they cope with the twin catastrophes of flood and drought. For the first time in its 31-year history, the Chinese Communist regime has been forced to issue a circumspect appeal for large-scale international aid. So extraordinary is the re quest, and so explosive its implications, that both Chinese (Communist) and United Nations officials have been trying to keep the revelation as muffled as possible.
"Last summer (mainland) China's central Hubei province suffered weeks of torrential rains that led to the worst flooding the country has seen in 26 years. While giant dikes held back the main torrent of the mighty Yang-tze River, 142 branch levees burst, spilling water over the low, rice-growing terrain, affecting some 6.2 million peasant families. Says one observer of the disaster area: 'Much of the land is covered by silt and debris, and can't be cultivated. There are villages where absolutely everything has been swept away.' Though a cleanup is well under way, tens of thousands of (mainland) Chinese are still living in makeshift tar-paper shacks, and millions are getting by on a starvation diet of about 14 oz. of coarse grains daily. Nearly a quarter of the preschool children in the hardest hit area have contracted such water-borne diseases as hepatitis, dysentery and schistosomiasis.
"The flood disaster pales, however, when compared with the results of a two-year drought that is centered in the northern province of Hebei, but has also affected five other neighboring provinces. An estimated 14 million people are living on survival rations. Says a recent visitor: 'There are vast areas of parched land where nothing has grown since early last year. Wells are bone dry or terribly low.' Contagious diseases are epidemic, and rickets strikes an estimated 11% of children under 14. The drought shows no sign of ending. Declares an international relief official: 'The situation can only deteriorate even further from here.'
"Last December the Chinese (Communist) leadership finally decided to break with the Maoist principle of national self-reliance and quietly appealed for help to the United Nations Disaster Relief Office (UNDRO). A team of UNDRO inspectors toured the affected areas in January ... they estimated that (mainland) China would need 1.5 million tons of rice, wheat and other grains, along with medicine, clothing, blankets, seed, milk powder and additional necessities.
"Where the relief supplies might come from is not clear. Last week a first shipment of 17 million vitamin pills arrived in (mainland) China from U.N. warehouses in Denmark. The European Community has pledged $6.2 million in aid, mostly milk powder and edible oils. Although the U.S. has listened with sympathy to the (mainland) Chinese appeal, at week's end Washington was still pondering its own aid contribution. International grain stockpiles for relief purposes are already strained by requests from famine-struck African countries, and from other nations such as Poland and Viet Nam. Undoubtedly, (mainland) China will be forced to buy on the open market at least some of the $700 million emergency grain supply it needs.
"Chinese (Communist) officials insist that the country will get by as much as possible on its own, but the continuing troubles could have far-reaching international consequences. Both Hubei and Hebei are traditionally areas of agricultural surplus, meaning that their difficulties are throwing the country's entire food supply out of line. Last year (mainland) China was forced to import between 12 million and 15 million tons of grain. If the drought continues, it could affect as many as 130 million people, further dislocating the economy. As one U.N. aid official puts it: 'Imagine a quarter of the world's population relying on handouts from the West.' " (Partial text)
New York Times — 1951—or maybe 1851
The New York Times (3/26/81) published this article by James P. Sterba from Peiping: "Moving to Peking is a lot like moving into 1951, and a little like moving into 1851. It can be a humorous novelty that tends to wear thin with the first dust storm, or after the discovery that curling up with a shortwave radio to find out what's happening in the world is often the only nightlife in town.
"Of course, to most of the one billion residents of this country, the growing corps of foreign diplomats, business executives, journalists and scholars here live in splendid, pampered luxury. But by Western standards, foreigners must cope with conditions of isolation and deprivation that make even hardened third-world veterans yearn for early reassignment. Foreign residents live in hotels or else in three walled compounds guarded by People's Liberation Army soldiers, who are there to keep local (mainland) Chinese friends out.
"With roughly 800 square feet, I live in a palace by local housing standards. But it is a palace built to resemble a 1950's high school locker room, with a metal door and window frames, exposed silver pipes, whitewashed walls and cold chipped-stone floor tiles. There are two bedrooms, one bath, a living and dining room and a kitchen and utility room. And one small closet. Imported Hong Kong furnishings, however, have made it comfortable.
"But the wooden furniture, accustomed to the humid climate in Hong Kong, is uncomfortable in dry and dusty Peking. It gives off thunderous cracks, usually in the middle of the night, or else it just falls apart. The glue in laminated furniture, for example, turns to powder and refuses to hold.
"By sleeping late, one not only avoids the morning crowds at the Friendship Store, where foreigners are supposed to shop, one also avoids having to choose meats and fresh vegetables because by 9 A.M. or so, there is often virtually nothing good left to buy.
"Eating at one's apartment is a much different story. It can be demoralizing. Cooks for foreign ambassadors get first choice of meat and vegetables at the two grocery stores that foreigners are supposed to patronize. After that, at 8: 30 A.M., the stores are open to other customers from abroad. But (mainland) Chinese cooks have an inside track on good cuts of meat and the latest influx of, say, bean sprouts, all of which is dumped in great unrefrigerated heaps onto dusty counters.
"One could venture off to a state-run market for local (mainland) Chinese and stand in long lines, or to a free market, where private-plot produce is available at higher prices, and buy, for example, a chicken. But this chicken will talk all the way home. For a fee, its seller will remove its head, but not its feathers.
"The most commonly heard phrase in Peking is 'meiyou,' pronounced as in 'hold the mayo.' It means, literally, 'no have.' In 30-odd years, the (mainland) Chinese have not yet turned scarcity management into a science.
"Scarcity is not the only problem for Americans taking up residence in Peking. Whatever that stuff is, advertised on American television commercials, that gets clothes 'whiter than white,' (mainland) Chinese soap doesn't have it. (Mainland) Chinese soap settles for gray. Extremely hard water must share the blame. From a gallon of tap water, a coffee filter often nets a thumb-sized blob of calcium, sand, soot particles and other mineral treasures.
"Because of their appearance, Westerners here cannot blend with the local population. They become afraid to fraternize with local (mainland) Chinese, not because of what might happen to them but because of what Chinese (Communist) authorities might do to their (mainland) Chinese friends, like throwing them in jail.
"Thus, Westerners who have lived in both Moscow and Peking say they found Soviet society induced more paranoia but that life in (mainland) China offered more isolation. In both places, they are watched, their rooms and phones are presumed to be monitored, and they are regularly followed.
"One foreign embassy official described it this way: 'The psychological isolation experienced by the foreigner in Peking is disheartening and causes tension and personal paranoia to build up to the point where emotional malfunction interferes with a normal family life and routine office business.
" 'Peking is a bleak, Cromwellian, puritanical environment which eventually affects even the most dedicated Sinologist. To the dedicated non-Sinologist the atmosphere is devastating.'
"But, initially, Peking is challenging. Dealing with (Red) China's pervasive bureaucracy can be high adventure, although in the end, it is an experience in defeat.
"For instance, getting a driver's license. (Mainland) Chinese can't own cars, but foreigners can. They need a driver's license easily acquired by presenting a valid foreign license and passing a physical examination. I flunked the eye test.
"American ophthalmologists have long argued in favor of eye exercises rather than corrective glasses in my case, a measles-weakened left eye and a keen right eye. Together they can read the finest print.
"Because the eye examination room was too small, the eye chart, consisting of E's pointing in various directions, was reflected off a mirror, making the E's distorted. Nevertheless, I could see the smallest E's. Then I was given a soup spoon with which to cover my right eye, and, sure enough, the bottom two rows of E's were blurry.
"Even though I promised never to drive with a soup spoon over my right eye, I had to get glasses. But even the weakest of glasses bent my visual world and caused headaches. The compromise: Buy a pair of $6 glasses from the United States. Wear them to have a photograph taken for the license, but promise never to wear them when driving." (Partial text)
Newsweek — Army hard times
Newsweek (3/30/81) published this article by Fay Willey with Melinda Liu from Peiping: "While Mao Tse-tung was alive, a post in the Chinese (Communist) People's Liberation Army was a fast route to power, prestige and privilege. No longer. Deng Xiao-ping has trimmed the military's budget, weeded its ranks, reduced its perquisites and checked its political influence. And in contrast to the days when all (mainland) China was instructed to 'learn from the PLA,' officers and men have been directed to 'adjust' their thinking. 'Those that have opinions or suggestions may submit them to the leadership: political commissar Wei Guoquing told a recent PLA conference. But, he added, 'there must be no expression of opposition whatsoever in their actions.'
"Not surprisingly, army morale has plummeted. The troops are grumbling about Deng's policies, and officials admit that PLA enlistments have dropped off sharply. Much of the problem springs from cutbacks in benefits such as army home leave and elimination of the automatic bonuses army families in rural areas received when a son or husband joined the PLA
"This year, (Red) China reduced the defense budget by $4.2 billion as part of the government's effort to erase its deficit. Military leaders find the cutbacks hard to accept. The army hierarchy worries that budget slashes will soon leave the PLA short of equipment. And PLA officers are concerned about law and order; ... they say Deng is paving the way for dissent and disunity...
"The Chinese (Communist) press is full of pointed reminders that good soldiers follow Communist Party orders unswervingly 'If we fail to do this, we might even blunder during war: Liberation Army Daily warned not long ago. The government has announced plans to require soldiers to swear a four-part oath of loyalty to the party leadership, and it has dusted off the cult of Lei Feng, a 1960s 'soldier hero' who won fame for his selfless, obedient behavior—and for his willingness to darn his own socks. At the other extreme, the People's Daily took the unusual step of telling stories about a former official—Mao's discredited Defense Minister, the late Lin Biao. According to the paper, Lin was a hopeless drug addict who could not kick the habit although Mao put his personal physician on the case. Finally, Lin led an abortive coup against Mao and died in disgrace. Deng, obviously, wants to avoid such troubles. To keep discipline tight, Deng recently installed a fellow reformist, 72-year-old Geng Biao, as (Red) China's new Defense Minister.
"Given the primitive state of (Red) China's economy, Deng believes that the armed forces do not deserve priority over agricultural and industrial development. Yet as the 1979 (Red China)-Vietnamese war proved all too graphically, the PLA is in grave need of modernization. Troops with limited education must give way to men with higher skills; equipment designed decades ago must be replaced with weapons more suitable for the 1980s..." (Partial text)