Tsai Cheng-wen, a national policy advisor to the president and professor of political science at National Taiwan University, was one of the primary KMT figures behind the latest round of constitutional reforms.
FCR: Why were reforms to the ROC Constitution necessary?
Tsai Cheng-wen (蔡政文): The past decade undoubtedly qualifies as a period of international political and economic change unrivaled in intensity. It was also a period during which democracy made its most rapid gains in the Republic of China. The transformation of global politics and economics has given rise to increasingly keen competition in the international arena, posing a severe challenge to our nation. The growth of democracy has led to changes in the political climate, and a number of problems have arisen with the old system, which cannot respond to the changing times.
In order to meet global challenges and lay a firm foundation for a stable democratic government, President Lee Teng-hui convened the National Development Conference [NDC] in December 1996. The conference focused on the constitutional system, and brought ruling and opposition parties together to reach consensus on a number of issues. These agreements served as a central axis for this most recent round of constitutional amendments.
The KMT, in order to implement the agreements reached at the NDC, established a task force responsible for planning constitutional revisions, together with a subordinate advisory task force. Specialists and scholars were invited to hold wide-ranging talks on unresolved aspects of the consensus on constitutional government reached at the National Development Conference. The fundamental principles underlying this round of constitutional revision were to maintain the framework of the original five-power Constitution and limit changes to a minimum, as well as make ROC institutions more democratic, stable, and efficient.
During the National Assembly session that ran between May 5 and July 23 of this year, the KMT [Kuomintang] and the DPP [Democratic Progressive Party], cooperated to successfully complete a number of Additional Articles of the Constitution.
What are the likely effects of these revisions on the ROC's political situation?
First, the popularly elected president will become the core of political stability. Now that the president is popularly elected, he enjoys a broad, solid base of mass support and should be able to play the key role in ensuring national security and political stability. The revised Additional Articles of the Constitution stipulate that the president may appoint the premier without the confirmation of the Legislative Yuan. The president has also been given the power to dissolve the legislature, though not on his own initiative. These powers will be subject to the scrutiny of the voters once every four years, and their exercise is limited by political realities as well as the system of checks and balances provided for in the Constitution.
Second, the revisions establish a mechanism for positive interaction among political parties. Democratic politics is multiparty politics. The development of positive interaction among political parties hinges on the establishment of party discipline and respect for commitments made by interparty coalitions. Party discipline is the foundation of interparty consul tations and coalitions. Thus, the president's power to dissolve the Legislative Yuan and the legislature's power to initiate a no-confidence vote against the premier will help to establish party discipline and ensure that promises made by interparty coalitions are effective. This in turn will promote the positive development of multiparty politics and contribute to political stability.
Third, the new revisions establish a mechanism for resolving political deadlock. If in the future the president and premier belong to different parties, or should a coalition cabinet be formed, it is possible that deadlocks might arise between the administrative and the legislative branches of the government. This would adversely affect political stability and the operations of the state. In order to remedy this situation in the absence of a system for resolving political stalemates, the president has been endowed with the power to dissolve the legislature under certain circumstances. The legislature, in turn, has the power to initiate a no-confidence vote against the premier. If the president dissolves the legislature, it means that the people themselves have the final say in political deadlocks, and this conforms well to the ideal of popular sovereignty.
Fourth, the revisions establish mechanisms for checks and balances and responsible government. Under a cabinet system, where the executive and legislative branches are merged, a balance between powers and responsibilities is stressed. Under a presidential system, however, members of the executive and legislative branches are elected directly by the people, and their powers are separate. It is thus checks and balances between the two branches that are emphasized. The improve ments that the ROC has made up to the present endow our system with characteristics of both the cabinet and presidential systems. The president may dissolve the Legislative Yuan, but is himself subject to many restrictions under the Constitution's system of checks and balances. The president can be elected to only two terms of four years, the National Assembly can recall the president and vice president, and the Legislative Yuan can impeach the president and vice president. In future constitu tional changes, citizens may even gain the rights of initiative and referendum to use against the president.
Fifth, the efficacy of institutions will be enhanced. In order to better adapt to an ever-changing and increasingly competi tive international environment--and to the evolution of cross-strait relations--our most urgent task is to enhance the efficiency of the ROC's democratic institutions. With the latest reforms, administrative agencies now have more flexibility in making personnel decisions, gubernatorial elections at the provincial level have been suspended, and the functions and organization of the provincial government have been streamlined. All this will help increase efficiency.
To what extent will the recent amendments spur positive interaction among political parties?
The new checks and balances in the constitutional system will solve problems that were intractable under the earlier, less comprehensive Constitution. Working at the institutional level, they will promote positive interactions between the ruling and opposition parties.
As they stand, the revised articles change the relationship between the president, the premier, and the Legislative Yuan. The president no longer requires the consent of the legislature when appointing the premier; he also has the right to dissolve the Legislative Yuan, if asked to do so by the premier. On the other hand, the legislature has been newly empowered with the right to initiate a no-confidence vote against the premier. As the executive branch is still accountable to the legislature, and as the legislature can force the premier to resign, the president must consider the political composition of the legislature, and thus has little latitude in selecting the premier.
Furthermore, the president cannot take the initiative to dissolve the Legislative Yuan; he can do so only after the legisla ture has passed a no-confidence vote against the premier. This restricts the president's power to take action to resolve stand-offs between the executive and legislative branches. However, under the new system, legislators will have to consider the possibility of the Legislative Yuan being dissolved, and all the costs that a new election would involve, should they opt to mount a vote of no-confidence against the premier. This check will have a stabilizing effect on the political environment.
Although the president's power to dissolve the legislature is not as effective a deterrent as it might have been, it is enough to ensure disciplined voting among the members of each party's legislative caucus, and make it difficult for legislators to deviate from the party line. This same disciplinary effect could also be achieved in the event that no single political party won a majority in the legislature. Under such circumstances, it would be necessary to form a coalition government, and the commitments of parties in such a coalition would be honored by all. Furthermore, it would be unlikely for legislators to initiate a no-confidence vote against the premier simply over ideological differences, as such a move might result in the dissolution of the legislature, and the results of a new election might not prove entirely desirable.
The results of this round of constitutional revision clearly do not expand presidential powers. It must be understood that a so-called expansion of power occurs only if the powers of one side--either the legislative or the executive branch--are expanded without a corresponding expansion for the other side. The resulting imbalance is an expansion of power. However, under the 1997 constitutional revision, the Legislative Yuan has been vested with the power to initiate a no-confidence vote against the premier. The overall direction of constitutional reform points to a concentration in the Legislative Yuan of legislative powers that under the original five-power Constitution had been spread throughout the government.
It is conceivable that in future constitutional revisions, such functions as the power to impeach the president, to access documents from administrative agencies, to hold public hearings, and to audit government budgets may eventually be exercised by the legislature. From an objective standpoint, one cannot deny the possibility that executive power might some day become subservient to legislative power. All this goes to show that the Legislative Yuan has emerged as the biggest winner from the 1997 constitutional revisions.
In comparison, the increase in presidential power is in fact limited. First, the president's power to dissolve the Legislative Yuan is counterbalanced by the legislature's power to initiate a no-confidence vote against the premier. Second, he faces restrictions on the number of terms he may serve, as well as being open to impeachment by the legislature and recall by the people. An additional though indirect restriction comes from the fact that the premier whom he appoints is accountable to the legislature.
Furthermore, concern on the part of political parties and legislators over the costs of dissolving and reelecting the legislature will limit the chances of a no-confidence vote being brought against the premier. Instead, it lays the groundwork for even more meaningful policy dialogue among political parties and allows more room for compromise.
Overall, the most important development to come out of the new constitutional revisions is political accountability. From disciplined voting in the legislature encouraged by checks and balances in various institutions, to the accountability of the executive branch to the legislative branch, to the restrictions on the exercise of presidential powers--all are conducive to the formation of a system under which political responsibility is clearly defined. Undisciplined voting by legislators blurring responsibility for policy will no longer be a problem, and interaction among political parties can be realized in the form of a dialogue on policy matters. These changes are sure to carry politics in the ROC one step closer toward positive interaction among political parties.
How much flexibility will the president have when appointing the premier?
Even though the president can appoint the premier without the legislature's consent, it is a kind of illusory power--it isn't a realistic power, because under the new amendments the premier can be held responsible to the legislature. So the president has to appoint the premier according to the configuration of political parties in the Legislative Yuan.
Moreover, the legislature has the vote of no-confidence. In case the president appoints a new premier who is not accept able to the legislature, it can propose a vote of no confidence on the new premier. Therefore, from my point of view, the president has no real power of appointment of a new premier. In fact, even if we say that the president need not get the consent of the legislature, he is in fact constrained by these two conditions.
Has the dual-head of government system been clarified, with the president having the dominant role?
Yes, but only when the president and premier belong to the same party. But in fact from the new amendments we cannot conclude so soon that the premier's power will be subordinate to that of the president. In fact, most of the power still belongs to the premier and Cabinet. The president has no concrete power at all, according to the new amendments. He has only two powers--the power of appointment of the new premier, and the passive power of dissolution of the Legislative Yuan. This is more akin to the cabinet system than the presidential system.
But it is still not a perfect mechanism, because the president has only the passive power of dissolution; he can only dissolve the legislature after the premier requests it, following a successful no-confidence vote. In a real parliamentary system, he would have the initial power of the dissolution of the legislature and also the passive power--like France. That's why I am not quite satisfied with the results of the amendments thus far. But after the negotiations between the DPP and the KMT, we reached a compromise that the executive has only the half-power of dissolution, but the legislative has the full power of the vote of no-confidence. The consequence is that the executive is subordinate to the legislature. This is not quite balanced.
In fact, in our Constitution more power is given to the premier than to the president. If the president and the majority of the legislators belong to the same party, the president can choose what kind of power he wants to manipulate. But if the Legislative Yuan has no majority, and the government must be a coalition government, the president would find it very difficult to exert his power. In fact, in the Constitution there is no real reserve power to the president, even if we say that the president must concentrate his power on foreign policy and national defense and cross-strait relations. But in fact, we cannot find this stipulated really clearly in the Constitution.
Is the current system of checks and balances between the president and the legislature adequate?
From the point of view of checks and balances, the president is checked more than any other democratic country's leader. In Taiwan, the president can be elected at most for two four-year terms, like the American system; he can be impeached by the Legislative Yuan; and the National Assembly can recall the president. Moreover, the premier must be responsible before the legislature, and is checked by it. So where can you find a president who is checked by so many methods by the legislature and the people? How can anyone say that our president has imperial power?
Recently, I found that Italy also tried to revise its constitution from a parliamentary system to a dual-leadership system. Those who initially supported the project eventually found that their president had no power--just like Taiwan. They also elect their president by direct universal suffrage, and they wanted to give the power of dissolution to the president, but finally after negotiations between the different parties, the result was the same as Taiwan: the Italian president will have only passive power of dissolution. That means the president can only dissolve the parliament after a vote no-confidence is successful. And then, their attempt to have the president chair their council of ministers [the Cabinet] also failed--as in Taiwan it is still the premier who chairs the council. We had the same idea here, but finally that was rejected.
Why was the number of legislators increased from 164 to 225?
Because we will stop the election of provincial assembly members and also we are going to reduce the number of National Assembly members in the future. As regards people who cannot continue to run for provincial elections or National Assembly, they can try to change their roles at the national level by running for the Legislative Yuan. At first we thought that more than 200 would be a good number--and the DPP thought 250. Then we compromised on 225.
By adding members, the efficiency of the Legislative Yuan will be helped. We think that the internal regulation of the legislature, such as the committee structure, must change because the number of legislators has increased. For greater efficiency, the legislature must focus its work more in committees, and not on the floor of the Legislative Yuan.
Were you surprised at the intensity of the infighting at the National Assembly meeting, and what does this say about political party development in Taiwan?
This reflects our political culture: it isn't a polished political culture. We are still in a period of transition. Institutionally speaking, we are a democratic country, but people still don't have the habits of democratic political behavior. Most people respond to trends in the social and economic scene, but they have only semi-democratic personalities. This takes time to evolve; behaviorally, it takes time to adjust to the democratic way of doing things. That's why you can find a lot of violence, or show-business scuffling, in the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan; it reflects a degree of immaturity. We still have a long way to go.
Given the interactions between the Executive Yuan and Legislative Yuan, and the recent cooperation in the National Assembly, are you optimistic about the ROC's political development?
Parties must compete, but they must also cooperate. Both are necessary. In recent years, we found that most of the time the parties compete, not cooperate. That's why our system cannot function very smoothly and why we had to modify our institutional arrangements. The key point, or spirit, of our constitutional reform is to strengthen the development of party politics in the right way. If the parties can be more disciplined in their voting and can cooperate, the party system will be further consolidated, which will give greater political stability. This is an important goal of our constitutional reforms. That's why we hope that the Executive Yuan and Legislative Yuan can become more cooperative and work more smoothly, and that the parties can work together.
--interview by Richard R. Vuylsteke