Taiwan Today

The recent elections for national legislative and local executive offices served to advance Taiwan's democratic development and enhance its international reputation. An Australian political scientist who spent seven weeks in Taiwan during the pre-election and election periods analyzes the results of the balloting.

Through their ballots in the legislative and county executive/mayoral elections on December 1, Taiwan's voters consolidated their political system's democratic development. The establishment of true democracy requires passing through several stages over a considerable period of time. From the early 1950s, candidates of the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) or Nationalist Party dominated the political scene but would sometimes lose to non-partisan opponents in often fiercely contested elections. Taiwan's civil liberties slowly expanded beginning in the 1970s as limits on freedom of speech and the press gradually broadened (though backward steps also occurred and many opposition figures suffered imprisonment for political offenses). Well into the 1990s, however, despite the overall liberalization, everyone understood that the KMT would remain the ruling party, controlling Taiwan's central government.

The main political opposition, with much of its leadership still in prison, formed the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1986. President Lee Teng-hui, who came to office in 1988 upon the death of President Chiang Ching-kuo, worked both explicitly and tacitly with the opposition to develop Taiwan's democracy. By the early 1990s, freedom of speech and freedom of the press were basically no longer restricted. But Taiwan still faced the ultimate test of democratization--the peaceful transfer of power between the government and the opposition.

The first stage of this peaceful transfer of power in Taiwan took place after the presidential election of March 18, 2000 when the DPP ticket of Chen Shui-bian and Annette Lu, two former political prisoners, won with a plurality (39.3 percent) of votes. Importantly, even the conservative demonstrators who shouted their disaffection in front of the KMT Central Party Headquarters for several days following the election recognized the legitimacy of the Chen-Lu victory.

With President Chen Shui-bian's election, the DPP officially became the ruling party while the KMT went into opposition. Yet this transition was far from smooth. The KMT still held a majority in the legislature, which had been elected in 1998, and used that edge to block much of the president's program. The government for its part seemed to stumble, failing to educate Taiwan's citizens on key public policy issues that could have enhanced support for its decisions. Unlike the loyal opposition in many parliamentary democracies, the new opposition too often gave priority to its partisan interests rather than the national interest.

As Taiwan approached the December 1, 2001 elections, its economy also faced considerable difficulty, wracked by recession and record unemployment. Although external factors contributed heavily to Taiwan's economic difficulties, many DPP leaders worried that the voters would punish the party for its economic performance. KMT leaders trumpeted their three decades of successful economic leadership, while the DPP appealed to voters to help President Chen get rid of "do-nothing" legislators.

In the final election results, Taiwan's voters delivered a mixed verdict. The DPP gained a resounding victory in the legislative elections, yet suffered overall losses in the simultaneous county executive/mayoral contests. In 1998, the KMT had won an absolute majority of 123 of the 225 legislative seats, while the DPP trailed with seventy seats. Owing to the intricacies of Taiwan's unusual electoral system, no party even nominated sufficient candidates to gain an absolute majority of seats in 2001. The DPP, however, emerged as the largest party in the legislature with eighty-seven seats. The KMT trailed far behind with only sixty-eight seats, barely half of its 1998 representation. The new People First Party (PFP) led by James Soong--the former KMT party secretary-general and Taiwan governor who left the party and came in second in a run for president in 2000--gained forty-six seats, while the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), founded only a few months earlier under the encouragement of former President Lee Teng-hui, gained thirteen seats. The New Party, which had done so well in 1995 when it took twenty-one seats in a 164-member legislature, won only one seat and lost its government campaign subsidy by falling short of the minimum 5 percent of the vote. Independents won the remaining ten seats. The outcome is that all sides have now agreed that the DPP has the right to form the new government. While the final composition of a governing alliance remained indefinite as of mid-December 2001, the DPP government should now be able to count on legislative support.

In the county executive/mayoral elections, where it had performed well in recent years, the DPP suffered several losses. In 1997 it won twelve local executive elections, but in 2001 it won only nine. The DPP lost six of its existing seats to the KMT, while it was able to wrest only two seats from the KMT and one from a non-partisan. Despite its success against the DPP in the local elections, the KMT, which also won nine seats, gained only one additional local executive position because it lost two seats to the PFP and another to the New Party. The PFP and New Party gains occurred in Taitung in eastern Taiwan and the two offshore island counties near the Chinese mainland, three counties with very small populations.

An examination of the election campaigns and results raises several important issues. First, the 2000 presidential election demonstrated a regional divide, with southern Taiwan supporting the DPP and northern Taiwan more supportive of the KMT and James Soong. In the December 2001 elections, this geographical division continued, though it was not quite so clear-cut as in 2000. In the county executive and mayoral elections, the DPP won all of the southern counties and municipalities except Yunlin, as well as taking Taipei, Nantou, and Ilan Counties. In the past, the DPP did well in urban areas, but in this round of elections all municipalities except Tainan voted KMT. The KMT won the northwest coast with its large concentration of military bases and mainlanders as well as Hakka, who have tended to be less supportive of the DPP than have Hokkien Taiwanese.

The legislative elections, while more complicated owing to the multi-seat electoral districts and the larger number of parties competing, showed a similar pattern of geographical division. Southern Taiwanese long complained that the former KMT government gave priority to economic development in the North. The DPP government now emphasizes greater geographical balance in its development strategies.

Second, the government proved successful in preventing electoral bribery or "vote-buying." Vote-buying had been a characteristic of Taiwan elections for several decades and had worsened during the 1990s as democratization and increasing prosperity gave wealthy politicians opportunities to "invest" in political office. Under the leadership of Minister Chen Ding-nan, the Ministry of Justice conducted a comprehensive campaign to end vote-buying nationwide. Numerous media advertisements urged citizens to report incidents of vote-buying and collect rewards. Investigators also followed money trails through financial institutions. Strict rules set a limit of NT$30 (US$0.87) for any gift to voters. As a result, the baseball-style caps worn by candidates' supporters were of markedly poorer quality than in the past to avoid exceeding the NT$30 limit. The new government's campaign has changed the dynamics of electoral politics in Taiwan. For this achievement alone, the Chen Shui-bian government deserves high marks for political reform.

Third, the fate of the KMT, which ruled Taiwan for fifty-five uninterrupted years, remains in the balance. The KMT possesses organization and considerable wealth, which should give it strength. When the party first came to Taiwan in 1945 under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, the regime emphasized Taiwan's Chinese nature and suppressed Taiwanese language, history, and local culture. With the beginning of democratization in the early 1990s, expressions of "Taiwanese identity" bloomed. People spoke Taiwanese languages, ate Taiwanese cuisine, studied Taiwanese history, and explored elements of Taiwanese culture. Since Taiwanese natives account for 85 percent of the population, the former minority mainlander elite, who emphasized Taiwan's Chinese identity, felt under siege as democracy gave the majority Taiwanese new political power.

In the 2000 presidential election campaign, the KMT rejected former President Lee Teng-hui's emphasis on "Taiwanization" and tried to hold onto the mainlander vote being wooed by James Soong. Under the chairmanship of former Premier and Vice President Lien Chan, the failed 2000 presidential candidate who is widely regarded as a weak leader, the KMT has lost its way. In 2001, rather than projecting an image of a Taiwan moving forward, it emphasized its ties to the past by decorating the Central Party Headquarters with huge pictures of Sun Yat-sen and by rhetoric acclaiming the KMT's contribution to the Chinese Revolution. Rather than concentrating on support among the 85 percent of Taiwanese voters, the KMT tried to regain the mainlander votes lost to James Soong. In a democracy where votes count, this was a losing strategy. That former President Lee Teng-hui, widely accepted as the "father of democracy" in Taiwan, could gain thirteen legislative seats for his new TSU with few resources and unknown candidates only underscores the importance of Taiwan identity and nationalism to the electorate. The KMT now faces great danger, as an alliance among the DPP, the PFP, and the TSU--all very poor parties compared to the KMT--will almost certainly pass legislation to investigate the origins of the KMT's property. If it faces a loss of wealth as well as its loss of direction, the KMT could easily expire--an outcome that would have profound implications for Taiwan's democratic development.

Fourth, despite the emphasis on political parties in this and other analyses of Taiwan's elections, Taiwan's voters have consistently shown that they often vote for the individual candidate rather than a political party. Under the previous authoritarian regime, most political competition occurred among local factions within the ruling KMT. The emergence and growth of the DPP has not entirely altered this situation. In many localities the DPP and local factions have formed alliances, and the factions are by no means subordinated to the party. During the recent election campaign, a local DPP leader explained: "In bringing in the factions, we thought we were bringing in a cat. In fact, we brought in a tiger--and it's devouring us!"

Similarly, when resigning as director of the KMT's Organization and Development Committee on December 7, less than a week after the elections, Chao Shou-po stated that the KMT too had become over-reliant on the local political factions: "As far as our voting mobilization is concerned, we must resolve to release ourselves from the enslavement of local political factions.... In some places, local political factions even led party operation by the nose." Despite artificial attempts to fortify political parties through the use of party lists for at-large seats in legislative elections, Taiwan's political parties have some distance to go before they reach the strength and maturity of political parties in parliamentary democracies. (In comparative perspective, American political parties are also relatively weak.)

Fifth, Taiwan's voters have again conclusively demonstrated that they do not find attractive the "one country, two systems" proposition of the People's Republic of China. In the 1995 legislative elections, the Labor Party, which ran on a platform of "one country, two systems," gained only a few hundred votes. Similarly, the New Party, which in recent years had moved to a virulently pro-China position, this time suffered a huge defeat and appears doomed to leave Taiwan's political stage.

In the 1995 legislative elections and in the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections, China tried to pressure Taiwan's voters with missiles and verbal threats. In both cases, Taiwan's voters reacted negatively to the pressure and voted for candidates whom the Chinese authorities opposed. In addition, since 1999, China has refused to talk with the Taiwan authorities and has explicitly refused to take notice of the many overtures made by the Chen Shui-bian government. China's leaders must now face the fact that they will have to deal with a DPP-led government. If they do not, the divide between China and Taiwan will continue to widen.

Finally, Taiwan's democratic development also strengthens its international position. Because of the Chiang Kai-shek regime's implacable "one China" policies, Taiwan today finds itself in a difficult situation internationally. China constantly tries to restrict the island's "international space" in various multilateral organizations and forums. As a result, Taiwan's international relations are primarily of an "officially unofficial" nature. Yet, because of its democratization and heightened attention to human rights, Taiwan has gained increased political support around the world. The United States has expanded its explicit military backing, and quieter support now comes from Japan, Australia, and Europe. Historically, much of Taiwan's diplomatic support came from those who shared a strongly anti-communist outlook. Today, in the post-Cold War world, such anti-communism is irrelevant. Rather, Taiwan's new support comes precisely because of its democratization.

Thus, the successful legislative and county executive/mayoral elections of December 1, 2001 have helped Taiwan and its citizens in several ways. Most importantly, they have given Taiwan's residents a strong voice in the island's future. And as a consequence, they have increased the island's support in the international community.

Copyright 2002 by J. Bruce Jacobs.