Taiwan Strait, that is not the only narrow waterway
crucial to its survival.
Taiwan's attention is rightly focused on the Taiwan Strait and the danger that lurks beyond it. However, it should devote some concern to another strait which is vital to its security--the Malacca Strait. Through this strait flows most of its US$3.72 billion worth of trade with Europe and all of the imported Middle East and western African oil that fuels Taiwan's economy, particularly its industrial, transportation and residential sectors. Taiwan depends on imports for most of its energy requirements and it only maintains stocks for 30 days consumption in an emergency. Thus Taiwan's energy security--and its political survival--depends on unhindered passage through the Malacca Strait.
Ominously, the strait has recently become a nexus of big power rivalry involving China, India, Japan and the United States. The perceived threats of piracy and terrorism to the safety and security of shipping in the Malacca Strait have been the rationale for the increased attention of big powers. Although the strait's littoral states--Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore--have struggled to maintain security in the strait and their sovereign right to do so, Australia, India, Japan and the United States have all offered military "assistance." Even China has offered to assist the littoral states in ensuring safe and secure passage. Obviously China's involvement in "protecting" the strait would not be in Taiwan's long-term interest. So far these offers have been rejected by the littoral states. But the big powers persist, and it is becoming increasingly difficult for the littoral states to resist the pressure of their offers of "assistance."
The issue of who has the right to enforce security in the Malacca Strait should be of interest to Taiwan both conceptually and in practice. This is because the conceptual struggle over who has this right and whether it is exclusive or not has become the latest battlefront in the contest between Westphalian sovereignty and modern interpretations thereof.
In 1648, the Treaty of Westphalia created the modern nation state and enshrined the concept of the sanctity of its sovereignty. This notion of sovereignty considers internal affairs of nations inviolate. The newly created European states enjoyed such sovereignty and profited by the legitimacy and stability it conveyed. Naturally more recently independent states wish to do the same and thus fiercely guard their Westphalian sovereignty. Indeed, this is the origin of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
But when the concept was extended seaward to encompass strategic straits, the maritime powers balked. Indonesia and Malaysia claimed the Malacca Strait as part of their territorial or, for Indonesia, their archipelagic and territorial waters and thus under their complete sovereignty. Both Indonesia and Malaysia saw this claim as a means to protect themselves from gunboat diplomacy and foreign intervention in the affairs of their fledgling nations. Otherwise the Malacca Strait could have become a dagger pointed at the heart of their newly won independence. However, despite their concerns, they failed to achieve full sovereignty over the strait.
In the negotiations leading to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, two competing concepts emerged regarding the regime for navigation in straits used for international navigation such as the Malacca Strait--innocent passage and transit passage. A regime of innocent passage would have allowed Indonesia and Malaysia to retain their sovereignty over the strait in the sense that any passage prejudicial to their peace, good order and security could be denied.
But for the maritime powers, the Malacca Strait was the shortest and cheapest route between the Indian and Pacific oceans and they wanted passage of their naval and commercial vessels to be absolutely guaranteed. Thus the maritime powers led by the United States and the then Soviet Union pushed through a regime of transit passage in which the passage of vessels and aircraft cannot be impeded, hampered or suspended. Singapore--economically and politically dependent on safe, secure and free passage through the strait--then as now sided with the maritime powers. Thus Indonesia and Malaysia have a sense of unfulfilled sovereignty over the strait.
The United States--and now others like Australia, Israel, Japan, Russia and the United Kingdom--increasingly argue that in their view sovereignty is not sacrosanct and that external powers have the right to intervene in states that are unable to suppress violent groups, including pirates or terrorists, particularly when they pose a danger beyond that nation's borders. Some have called for or claimed there are criteria for such interventions, such as the state having "failed" or if the purpose of intervention is solely humanitarian. But no criteria have been agreed on and the rationale for such intervention remains in dispute. This is the unfortunate background to the current controversy regarding who has the right and responsibility to respond to the proliferating piracy and the threat of a terrorist attack that could constrain or supposedly even block shipping in the strait.
Moreover, some states have increasingly asserted and have even acted upon the right to pre-emptive self-defense. Indeed, this doctrine led to the invasion of Iraq. It has also stimulated the worldwide hunt for weapons of mass destruction, particularly on the high seas where it has begun to erode the principle of freedom of navigation. And it could, under certain circumstances, lead to unilateral action to suppress piracy and terrorism in the Malacca Strait. Obviously it would be dangerous for Taiwan if China were to apply this evolving modern concept of sovereignty to its internecine squabble with Taiwan. Thus Taiwan has to be careful regarding its position on the Malacca Strait issue.
While all outside powers are ostensibly concerned with piracy and terrorism, they are equally worried about a potential rival gaining exclusive control of this vital waterway. Japan and the United States want to ensure that 80 percent of the oil that drives Japan's economy will continue to flow through the strait under any and all circumstances. The United States also wants to be able to always have the strait available as an alternative route for movement of its naval assets between the Pacific and Indian oceans. Similarly, as its naval force expands its reach, India wishes to use the strait for access to the South China Sea possibly as a US-encouraged counterweight to China.
China's interests are similar to those of Japan and the United States--which puts it in direct competition with them. China is increasingly relying on oil imports from the Middle East to drive its booming economy. Indeed Beijing sees oil and gas imports as vital to its economic growth and indeed its very stability. Already 60 percent of China's oil imports currently pass through the strait. And its energy demand is expected to increase over the next 20 years to 110 million barrels per day in 2030 with most of that coming through the Malacca Strait.
When discussing the Malacca Strait, China has repeatedly referred to Zheng He's voyages of exploration. In this context it is worth remembering that one of the main goals of Zheng He's epic travels was to secure the port of Malacca and thus ensure safe passage for Chinese vessels through the strait. China believes that the US strategy in the event of a clash over Taiwan is to disrupt its energy imports. Indeed it believes the US Navy now tacitly controls the strait. Thus China's navy is rapidly transforming itself from a coastal defense force to a bluewater power with a modernization effort unprecedented in the post Cold-War era. And China is seeking access for its navy to deep-water ports from Bangladesh and Myanmar to Cambodia that can be used as bases to keep open vital sea-lanes, including the Malacca Strait.
Obviously Taiwan's interests lie with those of Japan and the United States in preventing China from controlling the strait. Thus anything Taiwan can do to influence events in this direction would be in its long-term interest. This includes supporting the littoral states in their drive to retain their sovereignty there.
At the very least Taiwan needs to develop a political and military strategy to protect its interests in a safe and secure Malacca Strait. One possibility for Taiwan would be to try to establish itself as a genuine stakeholder in the safety and security of the Malacca Strait. This would be consonant with Taipei Mayor Ma Ying-jeou's proposed strategy of positioning Taiwan as "a responsible stakeholder in East Asia." In the context of the Malacca Strait, this might include publicizing Taiwan's use and dependence on the strait and offering to contribute funds, technology and training to help the littoral states improve safety and security there. Even if the offer were only accepted on an unofficial or "economy to economy" basis, it would help ensure Taiwan's interests are at least considered in the evolving regime for the strait.