This and other topics are discussed in the interview with Andrew Nien-Dzu Yang (楊念祖), secretary general of the Chinese Council of Advanced Policy Studies (CAPS) in Taipei, a privately supported think tank that specializes in military and security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. Yang was interviewed by the Free China Review in early January of this year.
What is the status of cross-straits relations?
Andrew Yang: The repercussions of President Lee's visit to the US last June, including the mainland's missile exercises, show that Taiwan is now high on China's agenda. Beijing is also paying more attention to Taiwan because of our increased international activity and the coming presidential election. Cross-straits tension may be further heightened if President Lee gets re-elected and if we maintain our aggressive approach to international affairs. In fact, Taiwan-mainland relations are not only an issue in the coming ROC presidential election, they also attract international attention and are an issue in mainland China's internal politics.
Beijing has listed three conditions under which it would use force against Taiwan. How clear are these conditions?
Actually, it is difficult to know what the Mainland Chinese have in mind. Take the example of foreign intervention" in Taiwan. The Chinese leadership has said repeatedly that they have warned the international community that Taiwan is a domestic issue, not an international one. And that view certainly has been repeatedly emphasized in their diplomatic relations. But I don't see what kind of intervention is meant. Perhaps this statement is geared to warn the US about too much involvement with Taiwan—that the US should not try to test the limits of China's tolerance. I think the warning about foreign intervention is sending the message to the US government that it should focus on China's unification, and that current or future US policy should not support Taiwan independence.
Scaling down—an exercise to keep Taiwan's armed forces in a state of combat readiness. Budgetary constraints mean that the upper-echelon officer corps must be scaled down as well.
The PRC missile tests last summer have prompted a call from many quarters locally for increased defense preparedness, including acquiring more high-tech weapons systems. Would such a move further increase cross-straits tensions?
I think Asia-Pacific nations in particular do not wish to see an increase in military tensions across the Taiwan Straits, because an arms race of any sort between China and Taiwan would not favor security and prosperity in the region. These countries think that a peaceful environment is absolutely necessary for continued economic development. They of course prefer long-term peace in the region, but they see some potential confrontations, threats, or uncertainties on the horizon, such as North Korea's possible development of nuclear capabilities and further controversies in the South China Sea over territorial claims. They certainly don't want to see the Taiwan issue become yet another source of instability.
To some extent, the North Korea problem has been contained by the US and other countries, and the South China Sea disputes have been contained by encouraging China to participate in bilateral and multilateral discussions. But countries in the region do not see any kind of international endeavor to contain the Taiwan issue, because China has ruled out intervention by foreign powers.
The PRC's military buildup has stirred up regional security concerns. What are the PRC's intentions in the region?
Several crucial factors need to be taken into consideration when evaluating Chinese military capabilities or the increase of Chinese military power. Since the end of the Cold War, the superpowers, as well as China's regional neighbors, have come to realize the PRC' s increasing strategic importance in the Asia-Pacific region—not only because of its greater economic strength and more dynamic approach to international activities, but also because it is a nuclear power. Even if China's nuclear power is comparatively rudimentary, it means that the PRC will play a very important regional role.
Furthermore, because of China's economic development, it now has the potential to divert more resources to defense modernization. This is officially part of China's agenda, so the more economic conditions improve, the more resources the Chinese military receives to improve its arsenal. As we look back on China's economic reforms, we see an obvious in crease in the military budget, with clear intent to modernize its hardware systems. Inevitably, if such momentum is maintained, by the early 21st century China's military capability will be quite advanced. They may not necessarily be up to the US or Russian level, but certainly they will override the military capabilities of other countries in the Asia-Pacific region.
The ROC Navy is far better equipped than the PRC's, and its ships are better built. If war came, the narrowness of the Taiwan Straits would give the ROC an advantage.
This trend stimulates concerns in the region. ASEAN nations, for example, are also in the process of development, and they are trying to expand their international economic interests. But those interests overlap with Chinese strategic and economic interests in the region. This causes a lot of anxiety among China's neighbors. Thus, there is increased talk about seeking more military transparency and confidence-building measures to bring about peaceful dialogue to resolve controversy. These are preventative measures, ways to bring China into the international fold. These do not necessarily mean using military power to contain China, but in stead making use of international forums to encourage its leaders to consider regional interests as well as China's own national development. At present, the "China threat" is not considered as strong as before, but it certainly exists to some extent as a result of China's economic development and military modernization.
What will induce China to play by international rules?
China is interested in avoiding any major bilateral or regional alliances that would dictate the rules of the game in the Asia-Pacific region. At least for the moment, the Chinese perception is that any talks about regional security, stability, and so forth, are largely initiated by the US or ASEAN countries. But China feels that nobody has really listened to what it has to say about regional or security issues.
Why? Because when China says something on these matters, it immediately receives a negative response—or at least not a very positive one—from its neighbors, because they perceive China as uncooperative. They feel that China does not adopt a compromising attitude toward regional initiatives. So there is a gap between what China perceives about regional security, and the region's perception of China' s economic and potential military power.
At the moment, the question is how to deal with these miscalculations, misunderstandings, and misperceptions. China says, "Look at our defense budget. It is not up to the standard of Japan, it lags behind that of the United States, it's not even comparable to that of Australia. So we're not spending so much on defense modernization. We're very modest compared with large countries. All we need is the minimum defense security."
Fine, that's logical. But even if China's military weaponry is outdated, it's still a big power. It's the perception of Chinese power that is changing. Even the United States has con ceded that China is gradually becoming a power in the region. Formerly, the Soviet Union threatened US interests, but the USSR is gone. But China is different. It's still a communist society, it's still dominated by the communist party, and its intention is to expand its influence in the region.
So what can be done? The only thing to do is to help this big power become more familiar with the Asia-Pacific environment. All countries have to work on this. Many things have to be done before China plays by the same rules as everyone else.
I think we should put first things first. First, decide how to get rid of the obstacles to peace, such as finding a way to encourage discussion about mutual interests. For instance, China is not willing to talk about finding a multilateral framework to deal with the South China Sea issue. China claims the South China Sea as its historical waters. But ASEAN countries are saying, "Look, we are the closest nations to those islands. China is much farther away. Why don't we just work together [to solve this], just start from a single point and gradually move to multilateral issues?"
Another concern that should be taken into consideration by every country is that' China is facing a tremendous amount of internal pressure from economic and social changes. It's a huge challenge for the Chinese leadership, and they'll certainly use any kind of excuse to counterbalance this internal pressure. One of the easiest shortcuts for the Chinese leadership to maintain their internal political status, present or future, is to manipulate external affairs. China can't be pushed around. This is the lesson that should be learned from the controversies in cross-straits relations during the last six months. China is not a sleeping giant. It's awake, and we need to adopt new rules to engage it.
The United States still seems to be the main counterbalance to PRC power. How effective is it?
1 have seen an increasing number of former government officials, academics, and other China experts in the US asking the Clinton Administration and the Congress to come up with an integrated policy toward mainland China and Taiwan. They strongly suggest taking a fresh look at cross-straits relations, one that re-evaluates current policy. The absence of a clear and cohesive US policy is a great source of anxiety.
Also, there's a tendency in Taiwan, as well as on the Mainland China side, to highlight the most favorable statements in US policy as a way of legitimizing their actions toward each other. This is dangerous. If US policy is misinterpreted by either China or Taiwan, the US government should take it very seriously, because that will certainly increase tension and jeopardize cross-straits relations. So the US should tell China, as well as Taiwan, that this is our policy—don't misread it, and don't expect us to say anything else.
Last year's PRC missile tests prompted calls for more high-tech weapons systems. But under the present system the highly-qualified personnel who use them, such as these helicopter pilots, all too often leave the services for more attractive careers outside.
What did the missile tests reveal about PRC military capabilities?
Certainly the missile tests gave the US an opportunity to observe the Chinese military arsenal in action and analyze Chinese missile capability. And to some ex tent the exercises were tolerated by the regional powers as being acceptable military games.
The US still has a tremendous advantage over China in terms of arms, and the Chinese are certainly aware of the military might demonstrated by the US in the Gulf War. PLA leaders know that they are far behind the US capability. They want to up grade to the level of US military power by the first decade of the 21st century, but the military has a long way to go. It needs a lot of resources, and it's beyond the PLA's power to demand such resources be allocated to the military machine.
Does the ROC have the weaponry and manpower it needs to defend itself?
Acquiring more sophisticated weapons systems is the first priority for upgrading Taiwan's defense capabilities. Not only because China is upgrading its military hardware, but also because the difficulties of getting advanced weapons systems have increased in past years. There's always a seize-the-moment mentality in terms of acquiring an advanced weapons system, as happened with the Mirage 2000s and F-16s. But you also have to follow up, maintain the momentum, to have access to spare parts and training programs.
I think this is the moment to upgrade our defensive posture by acquiring hardware and training people, especially because we have the economic backbone to support defense acquisitions. Previously, we weren't so economically successful, but since the mid-1980s we've had the money. This is a good time for defense modernization.
But how best to bring the military ma chine together? We have a problem retaining non-commissioned officers (NCOs), experienced pilots, and technicians, because there's tremendous competition from the civilian sector and other branches of government. We have a draft system, but the period of service is only two years, then people are automatically discharged. Money has been spent, but the quality of personnel has not risen.
The MND [Ministry of National Defense] has initiated a number of incentive programs to handle personnel shortages in the military. The number one area is to strengthen the NCO system and the naval forces by increasing salaries and benefits, improving the promotion system, and making career prospects more attractive. I think these incentives may encourage more young people to stay in the armed forces and learn a skill. They can work in a very professional environment. The programs will also encourage those senior ship commanders and senior pilots to stay; their satisfaction will come not only from better pay, but also from improved career prospects.
Much of this only happened last year; the MND is trying to speed up these programs to retain talented people. Up until the delivery of the first batch ofF-16s and Mirage 2000s, there'll be more and more new programs to keep pilots in the service, because it is very, very expensive to train a new fighter pilot. It costs about two to three million US dollars to train an F-16 pilot, and Mirage 2000 pilot training is even more costly, up to four or five million US dollars. And one aircraft actually needs at least three pilots to maintain fighting capability. And if we maintain an Air Force of up to 350 aircraft, we require approximately 1,500 pilots. We need to act quickly to attract young, talented persons to join the military forces so as to maintain our defense capability. Otherwise, we'll face a lot of challenges in putting those planes in the air and conducting defensive missions. All military branches now require a higher level of skilled people working together in an increasingly sophisticated and technologically oriented environment.
The IDF— Taiwan's indigenous jet fighter. New, sophisticated weapons systems are a priority for upgrading Taiwan's defenses, but now the armed forces must think twice before they spend.
Are any changes under way in the ROC's military command structure?
We still maintain a large upper echelon officer structure, but that is being streamlined and scaled down as part of a ten-year program. It's still being implemented. The goal is to make the organization more dynamic, so headquarters staffs will be trimmed to eliminate bureaucracy and increase efficiency in the chain of command.
What about budget control? Is legislative oversight increasing?
Other government departments, for example the DGBAS [Directorate General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics], have initiated new bookkeeping regulations. So the military is now keeping its books very carefully; that change has come very fast. Now there are tight restrictions on resource and budget allocations. So I think the auditing department is already keeping a close eye on the money. The Control Yuan is also more involved with investigating misconduct. Last year it uncovered several scandals, and I think the Legislative Yuan is also keeping a close eye on those budget matters by demanding more [budgetary] transparency. I think the military is getting more careful about spending its money correctly and efficiently.
What is the status of the ROC's overall military readiness?
The military itself is a highly disciplined and professional entity. As far as combat readiness is concerned, they certainly have maintained high standards with regard to both men and machines. They are ready to face any kind of immediate threat from Mainland China. For example, daily operations by fighter aircraft conducting patrols across the strait are routine. Several sorties are sent out every day. Putting those planes in the air is not an easy job. It requires highly qualified technicians and logistical support. The same thing applies to the submarine patrols, and other combat forces. I think people should feel good about the tax money they spend to provide this kind of security.