FCR: What is the role of the Mainland Affairs Council? Does it serve primarily in an advisory capacity, or does it have a broader mandate?
Ma: The council has five functions: policy research, policy formulation, policy coordination, and policy review, plus certain functions in the process of policy implementation. It coordinates the actions of various government ministries and agencies, and scrutinizes the proposals by different agencies of the government. In certain areas and to some extent, it also has an implementation function. So it is not primarily an advisory agency. It’s more than that. For instance, in terms of our indirect trade with the Mainland, the policy will be set jointly by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the members of the council, whereas implementation of the policy will be carried out primarily by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The council will not get into, say, export and import business. But in terms of what I call the Strait Exchange Foundation [海峽交流基金會, also called the Foundation for Exchanges Across the Taiwan Straits], which was organized on November 21, 1990, the council plays the role of a supervising agency. So it does have some functions in the process of implementation.
FCR: What are the basic principles underlying the formulation of the government’s Mainland policy, and how does the Mainland Affairs Council help translate these principles into action?
Ma: There are five principles underlying our policy towards the Chinese Mainland. First of all, we will defend the Constitution of the Republic of China. Second, we will oppose Marxism and Leninism, and third, we will maintain the security of the Taiwan area. Fourth, we will support the struggle of the Mainland people for freedom, human rights, and the rule of law. The fifth principle is that we will accelerate the pace of China’s reunification under the principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.
These five principles were translated into concrete action plans in the documents approved by the 13th KMT Congress two years ago in 1988, and the council has been putting them into practice. Of course, circumstances sometimes prompt us to go beyond these action plans. In such instances, we coordinate the new policy with other agencies or with the KMT Central Committee’s Mainland Policy Group. In this way, we are in a position to translate these principles into concrete policies for our relations with the Chinese Mainland.
FCR: Would you give some examples?
Ma: In the action plan approved by the KMT in 1988, it says that we will permit Taiwan residents to have family reunions on the Mainland, and we will permit Mainland residents to come over here to see their sick relatives or attend family funerals. We have already gone far beyond these limits. For instance, we have permitted legislators to visit the Mainland and allowed business people to do market surveys in the Mainland. And all these policies do not violate the spirit and letter of the five basic principles I just mentioned. Nevertheless, these policies were not contemplated in the KMT’s action plan of 1988, so we engaged in extensive contacts and consultations with the party and government agencies I have already mentioned before implementing them earlier this year. Because the five principles are very general in nature, they provide enough room for the government to use its imagination in following their spirit.
FCR: What near-term steps do you see in the development of Taiwan-Mainland relations? What specific areas—economics, sports, culture, or others—will receive the highest priority?
Ma: In the last three years we have seen the rapid development of people-to-people contacts between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits. We do see a certain degree of imbalance in terms of proportions between cultural and economic exchanges. We have witnessed the development of the “Mainland fever” in Taiwan in terms of trade and investment. We hope that in the future, more emphasis will be put on cultural exchanges. We have already paved the way for more extensive two-way cultural exchanges across the Straits. After the law governing the relations between the people of the Taiwan area and the Mainland area is passed by the Legislative Yuan, we hope that we will be able to permit more Mainland intellectuals to visit Taiwan. We also hope to increase cultural contacts and exchanges.
We would like to create a more orderly situation in the field of trade and investment by adopting a two-pronged approach. We want to manage the situation and make it an orderly process, and we want to assist businesses, particularly the small and medium-sized businesses, by protecting their interests when they are doing business on the Mainland.
The government has issued a list of 3,353 items or industries in which our businessmen are permitted to make indirect investments on the Mainland. They are permitted to set up subsidiaries in places like Hong Kong, Tokyo, or Singapore, and go from there to the Mainland. If their businesses fall into these approved categories, the government will help them organize themselves and secure the necessary business information. The Strait Exchange Foundation will try to provide protection or help in case they encounter difficulties on the other side of the Straits.
As I said earlier, this is a two-pronged measure—management plus assistance. We hope that through this new measure, we will be able to coordinate trade and investment policy toward the Mainland and help bring the government and the business community together. It is vitally important to let our business community know that we’re really in the same boat, and we should work to serve our common national interest. A blind Mainland fever is absolutely dangerous to our security and to the interests of the people on this island. So we urge the business community to cooperate with the government, and in turn the government will provide assistance and protection to the businesses when they need it.
FCR: The foundation has now been organized to operate as a nongovernmental intermediary organization between Taiwan and the Mainland. What role is the foundation expected to play in the development of Taiwan-Mainland relations? Since you are a member of the foundation’s board of supervisors, will you be serving as an informal coordinator between the council and the foundation?
Ma: The organization basically serves as an intermediary between the government here and the Chinese Mainland. As you know, the government of the Republic of China still maintains the policy of making no political contact with the Chinese communist regime. But our Mainland policy has developed to a point where many problems have arisen as a result of the very extensive contacts between the people of the two sides. And to be pragmatic, to be problem solving, we have to face the realities and try to solve these problems as they come up. Therefore, this foundation was set up jointly by the private sector and the government. By private sector, I mean the academic community, the media, the cultural community, and the business community. As a nonprofit organization, it will be able to function as a bridge rather than a wall between Taiwan and the Chinese Mainland.
My own function as a supervisor of the foundation derives from my role as the vice chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council. The foundation is under the supervision of the council not only on the basis of the contract between the government and the foundation, but also through the participation of government officials as supervisors of the foundation. We want to make sure that the council effectively directs and supervises its work, because in the future we will sign contracts with the foundation to execute non-policy measures as approved by the council.
FCR: What if Peking does not acknowledge the existence of this foundation?
Ma: If they are interested in exchanges between the people of the two sides of the Straits at all, there is no reason for them to oppose the establishment of this foundation. The purpose of the foundation is to foster exchanges between the two sides. It is not intended to hamper or to obstruct exchanges. The Chinese communist regime says it wants broader, more extensive, and faster exchanges between the two sides, and the foundation was established particularly for this purpose. That is why we say repeatedly that there is no reason for them to oppose or reject the idea of an intermediary organization. But we have no idea how they will react. If they are rational at all, they probably will not oppose this idea. On the other hand, if they want to set up their own intermediary organization, that is up to them. We have no interest of forcing them to do so, which we obviously cannot do anyway. But if they are interested in setting up a similar or counterpart organization, it would be much more appropriate and convenient in the future for them to set up branch offices in Taiwan.
I can hardly imagine a situation in which official or governmental organizations on the Chinese Mainland would have branch offices in Taiwan. I think the same is true the other way around. They wouldn’t permit an official organization to set up branch offices on the Chinese Mainland. When the relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits reaches the point where it’s desirable to set up branch offices, it would be much more convenient to have a nongovernmental intermediary organization as the organizational framework.
FCR: How is the ROC’s Mainland policy influenced by Peking’s Hong Kong policy and by its continuing refusal to renounce the use of force against Taiwan if it deems such action necessary? Do you foresee any change in Peking’s position regarding these matters?
Ma: We are watching Peking’s Hong Kong policy very closely. We have noted that their policy and their promises have not really convinced the people of Hong Kong. Hong Kong’s professionals are leaving the island at a rate of about five hundred per week. It remains to be seen what will happen to Hong Kong as 1997 approaches. It is obviously premature to predict what is going to happen. But Hong Kong residents do not appear to be very optimistic about their future. I’m sure that Peking’s policy on Hong Kong will have profound implications for Taiwan because they will try to use the same formula to handle Taiwan. Peking has drawn up a basic law for the Hong Kong special administrative region, an administrative device provided for in article 31 of Peking’s 1982 constitution. They have indicated in the past that the same article will also apply to Taiwan. I don’t believe the formula is applicable to Taiwan. We are watching the Hong Kong scene very closely to see how they handle it, but we’re not optimistic.
Lately, Peking officials have been trying to assuage the worries of people in Taiwan about Peking’s policy of not renouncing the use of force. The officials claim that the policy is directed against the advocates of Taiwan independence or against foreign powers who would steal Taiwan from China. These explanations are unconvincing, and we take their refusal to make such a renunciation as a sign of hostility. We will use renunciation as a litmus test to see whether they will demonstrate sincerity or goodwill. In addition to that, we also will see whether they will continue to interfere with the conduct of our foreign relations on the international plane. If they continue their interference, we also see that as a sign of hostility.
All of these elements will become a very important part of the basis for our policy toward the Mainland. If they continue their current practices, we will not upgrade our relations with the Mainland in any fashion whatever. We will only continue the current exchanges, namely exchanges between the people of Taiwan and the people on the Chinese Mainland and through the Strait Exchange Foundation. In the event that they are willing to renounce the use of force, or stop interfering with our conduct of foreign relations, or democratize their political system, or adopt the free market system, then I am sure we’ll be happy to review our policy toward the Mainland and make closer contact with them. But unless and until that happens, we will maintain the current limited exchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits. But even with these limited exchanges, the foundation and the Mainland Affairs Council have plenty of work to do.