Taiwan Today

Increased mutual trust resulting from joint marine efforts could boost prospects for long-term peace between Taiwan and mainland China.

The diplomatic row that ignited on September 14, 2009 between Taiwan and Japan after the Japan Coast Guard arrested the captain of a sports fishing boat from Taiwan for what Japan said was fishing illegally in disputed waters in the East China Sea may actually have the effect of spurring closer maritime cooperation between mainland China and Taiwan. As the relationship between Taiwan and the mainland continues to mature, there are many areas where joint maritime operations are not only possible, but could also represent the best course of action for both sides. The ripest areas for cross-strait marine cooperation include hydrocarbon exploration, fisheries management, environmental protection, law enforcement and maritime safety, as well as cooperation on legal and political strategies related to continental shelf and island claims. In a broader multilateral context, cooperation could extend to the enhancement of maritime safety and security in the Malacca and Singapore straits, as well as protection of vessels against piracy off the coast of Somalia.

During the East China Sea incident in September, Wang Wei-hsin, 44, the Taiwanese captain of the fishing boat, said that the Japan Coast Guard had rammed his vessel, which—if true—could constitute a violation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The Republic of China’s (ROC) Coast Guard Administration (CGA) responded to Wang’s distress calls and sent its own patrol vessels to protect his fishing boat, but the CGA’s ships were halted by the Japanese, who arrested four Taiwanese CGA officers. Eventually, Wang and the CGA officers were all allowed to return to Taiwan.

The incident was one in a long string of international confrontations that have occurred near a group of islands known in Mandarin as the Diaoyutai, which means “fishing platform.” Taiwan, Japan and mainland China all claim the Diaoyutai Archipelago, a collection of five uninhabited islets and three barren rocks located approximately 220 kilometers northeast of Taiwan, 370 kilometers east of the coast of mainland China and about 370 kilometers southwest of Okinawa. In practice, Japan controls the islands, which it calls the Senkaku Islands.

Another recent conflict in the Diaoyutai Archipelago occurred in early November 2009, when a Japanese government aircraft asked the Fishery Researcher I, a research vessel operated by the ROC’s Cabinet-level Council of Agriculture, to leave the area. The Japanese government later added the clarification that it had “merely issued a verbal warning” to the vessel and had not attempted to drive it away.

The interest in the Diaoyutai islets and the waters around them stems, at least in part, from the area’s potential oil and gas reserves, important fisheries and potentially valuable deposits of cobalt, lead and zinc. The dispute over the islands’ ownership, on the other hand, rests in the differing interpretations that Taiwan, mainland China and Japan have of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. According to a 1984 legal treatise written by Ma Ying-jeou, who was then the deputy secretary-general of the Kuomintang and is now ROC president, “the Diaoyutai Islands themselves are not entitled to have a continental shelf or exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and thus have no significant legal effects on the boundary delimitation in the East China Sea.” Mainland China, for its part, holds that because the islands are small, uninhabited and unable to sustain an economic life of their own, they are not entitled to a continental shelf or a 200 nautical mile (370 kilometer) (EEZ). Japan, however, maintains that the Diaoyutai are legal islands and are therefore entitled to have an attached continental shelf and EEZ in the East China Sea.

Cooperation between Taiwan and mainland China on the Diaoyutai issue would strengthen their position versus that of Japan. In the past, however, Japan has maneuvered to keep Taiwan and the mainland from uniting on East China Sea issues, because this would have the effect of strengthening overall Chinese claims. Japan has thus focused on signing agreements with Beijing, including a fisheries agreement in 1997, which makes waters within 12 nautical miles (22.2 kilometers) of the disputed islands off limits to fishing. Mainland China and Japan have also inked a prior notification agreement for the East China Sea in which either side would inform the other if it intended to undertake research in “waters of interest to the other party.” For its part, Taiwan has acquiesced to the fishing ban and could consider adhering to the prior-notification system as well.

In the South China Sea, meanwhile, Taiwan, mainland China, the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam have laid competing claims to the same islands, as well as their adjacent waters, seabeds and concomitant resources. Many of the territorial disputes in the area center on the Nansha Islands, which are known in English as the Spratlys. Taiwan’s assertion of ownership of the largest island in the group, Taiping Island, is the strongest legal claim in the area. The ROC has continuously occupied, effectively controlled and administered Taiping Island since 1947, while other claims to the islands, including those made by mainland China, are based in part on more recent and discontinuous occupations.

Rather than exclusively pursuing efforts to extend sovereignty over the area, however, the parties involved have also begun to work together to develop the island group. In 2005, mainland China began participating in a joint seismic survey with the Philippines and Vietnam in an agreed portion of the disputed area. That survey is ongoing, but if good resource potential is identified, joint development could be the next step. Taiwan obviously has the financial and technical capability to make a significant contribution to such joint development and has offered financing for similar enterprises in the past.

Mainland China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are also discussing the formalization of their November 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which laid the foundation for long-term peace and stability in the area. Taiwan could consider unilaterally declaring its adherence to the formalized code agreed upon by mainland China and ASEAN—both to reaffirm its peaceful intentions toward settling disputes as well as its interest in cooperating with other claimants in the management of the Nansha area’s resources and environment.

Over the years, Taiwan and the mainland have held many meetings to discuss, harmonize and reinforce their claims in the Nansha Islands, the continuation of which could result in a more formal cooperation agreement. To the north of the Nansha group, Taiwan already administers Dongsha Atoll, also known as Pratas Reef, as a marine national park. The concept of administering such islands as protected areas, as well as Taiwan’s experience in managing them, could be extended to the Nansha Islands proper under future cooperative agreements.

While international law may not determine the precise form or substance of an interim solution to disputes such as those over the Diaoyutai Archipelago or Nansha Islands, there are precedents for agreements between states in similar situations in which a distinction has been made between jurisdictional questions and day-to-day operations. For example, one possibility is the “enclaving” of an island group, or agreeing to establish a narrow band of territorial waters around them while shelving sovereignty disputes, which would allow governments to move forward to jointly develop resources. At the very least, all parties involved in such an enclave should be able to agree on a code of conduct, particularly regarding naval and fishing activities. An enclave around the Nansha Islands could thus see Taiwan and mainland China working together to ensure safe passage of ships, as well as to develop resources, which would help build confidence between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.

Taiwan and mainland China could also form a united front on promoting their claim to an extended continental shelf in the East China Sea, while opposing potential similar claims by Japan. Together, for example, the two sides could jointly oppose Japan’s claim to full maritime jurisdictional zones around Okinotori, a disputed coral atoll and group of tiny rock outcrops in the Philippine Sea.

Early Cooperation

In the fisheries sector, an early example of cooperation between Taiwan and mainland China came in June 2008, when the mainland politically supported Taiwan in the aftermath of the sinking of a Taiwanese fishing boat by a Japan Coast Guard vessel near the Diaoyutai Archipelago. Then, in June 2009, mainland China sent a delegation to Taiwan to discuss ways to cooperate in the fishing industry. More recently, during the fourth round of talks between the Taiwan-based Straits Exchange Foundation and mainland China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait in late December 2009, an agreement was reached on the administration of cross-strait fishing crew personnel. From an environmental perspective, because Taiwan shares the Taiwan Strait and the East China Sea with mainland China, such cooperation in the fishing industry would also help ensure sustainability of fish stocks.

Taiwan has also expressed interest in signing a formal fisheries agreement with Japan, but Tokyo has thus far declined. In January 2009, however, Taiwan and Japan restarted fisheries talks on possible joint development of fishery resources in their disputed waters.

Taiwan and mainland China have intermittently cooperated in the area of exploration and development of offshore hydrocarbons since 1993. In May 2002, for example, the state-owned Chinese Petroleum Corp., which now operates under the name CPC Corp., Taiwan, entered into a joint oil-exploration venture with China National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC) in the Taiwan Strait. The initial exploration target area covered 15,400 square kilometers on both sides of the centerline of the strait and lay west of the Tainan Basin off southern Taiwan and east of the cities of Chaozhou and Shantou in mainland China’s Guangdong province. The results of geophysical studies carried out there from 1998 to 2000 revealed an estimated potential of 300 million barrels of crude oil. CPC and CNOOC established their 50−50 joint venture in a third territory, the British Virgin Islands, to avoid complications arising from their unique political relationship. CPC entered into the contract through its subsidiary, Overseas Petroleum and Investment Corp. (OPIC). Under the contract, OPIC and CNOOC each contributed US$12.5 million to the project.

Two wells were drilled under the contract in 2003 and 2004, but no oil was found. CPC received approval in March 2004 to open representative offices in Shanghai and Beijing, only to suspend the plans in July 2004, reportedly due to the immaturity of the mainland market and perturbations in the sensitive relationship between the two sides.

In November 2008, however, the project was revived and the companies agreed to extend the area of joint exploration by 77,700 square kilometers on the continental shelf in the northern South China Sea. In May 2009 the two parties announced they would also study the possibility of exploring the Nanri Island Basin in the Taiwan Strait.

This cooperation could pave the way for joint exploration and development of bigger and better hydrocarbon prospects in the East China Sea, which is thought to contain up to 100 billion barrels of oil reserves and is one of the last unexplored high-potential hydrocarbon resource areas located near large markets. Sovereignty of the area, however, is disputed, as it is claimed by mainland China, Taiwan, Japan and in the north by South Korea. Adding impetus to the ownership claims is the discovery that the area may encompass parts of at least three major oil-bearing sub-basins, with the best prospects being in the southwestern corner. Mainland China has already discovered eight oil and gas fields in that general area, known as the Xihu Basin, and has high expectations for making similar finds in other areas of the East China Sea.

Resource exploration aside, one of the most promising areas for maritime cooperation between Taiwan and mainland China is prevention of cross-strait human trafficking and smuggling. The CGA has reported that Taiwanese fishing crews have been found trading electrical appliances for cheap firearms, heroin and amphetamines, herbal medicines and endangered species from mainland China. Both sides have already benefited from exchanging information about suspicious vessels and enabling their respective law enforcement officers to work together.

The cooperation against smuggling remains somewhat inefficient, however, as the median line in the Taiwan Strait is a de facto boundary, which makes cross-strait movements difficult to monitor and control, as precise areas of control have not been delineated. As a result, smugglers have been able to use Taiwan as a transshipment point for drugs and firearms going to Japan, Australia and North America. Research, development and implementation of technologies to monitor and control this cross-strait traffic could become the focus of an enhanced cooperative effort to reduce that flow. Such an effort, however, would likely have to be informal and ad hoc to mitigate political obstacles and distrust. This would be an incremental approach to conflict prevention and provide a framework for broader cross-strait maritime cooperation.

There is also the possibility of joining maritime forces in areas outside the East China and South China seas. Mainland China, for example, has said that Taiwan-owned vessels that were either under attack or in imminent danger of attack by Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean could request protection from the mainland’s naval task force in the area through the Taiwan-based Straits Exchange Foundation. While this was seen by some in Taiwan as part of mainland China’s campaign to undermine Taiwan’s sovereignty, it would still have the practical benefit of protecting the safety of Taiwanese crews, ships and cargo.

Assistance Options

Taiwan’s initial official response to the mainland’s offer was that it was not prepared to accept such assistance. In January 2009, Beijing claimed that mainland naval vessels had escorted an oil tanker belonging to Taiwan’s Formosa Plastics Group in the Gulf of Aden. The ROC’s Mainland Affairs Council, however, later said that the ship in question had been registered in Liberia and was rented to a company based in South Korea. In lieu of accepting mainland China’s assistance, Taiwan has begun studying the option of sending its own naval vessels to protect its civilian ships in the area, as well as the possibility of requesting help from Western navies patrolling near Somalia.

Mainland China and Taiwan also depend on the security of the Strait of Malacca and the Singapore Strait, which have both seen repeated attacks by pirates, for transporting vital oil supplies from the Middle East. Mainland China has taken a strong interest in helping improve security in the region and is contributing to the anti-piracy measures there, a multi-national effort that Taiwan could consider joining.

In the bigger picture, cooperation between Taiwan and mainland China on international maritime issues, particularly those related to Japan in the East China Sea, could expand into wider cooperation on conflict avoidance arrangements. This increased mutual trust and confidence would boost the prospects for long-term peace and prosperity on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

Copyright © 2010 by Mark J. Valencia