Historically speaking, the Spratly Islands and the other islands in the South China Sea have been the territory of China since ancient times. Chinese have engaged in fishing and other economic activities in the area since the Western Han dynasty two millennia ago. China has exercised its sovereignty over the Spratly Islands since the thirteenth century by sending patrol ships and undertaking other activities in the area.
Early instances of China exercising sovereignty over the Spratly Islands are provided by Kublai Khan, the first emperor of the Yuan dynasty, who sent naval ships to patrol the islands in 1293, and by Cheng Ho, a Ming dynasty official, who visited the Spratly region seven times between 1403 and 1433. Later examples include the successful diplomatic negotiations by the Ching dynasty to prevent the German government from sending ships to patrol the Spratly Islands.
The Republic of China’s rule over the Spratly Islands was temporarily interrupted in the 1930s by Japan. To blunt Western ambitions for controlling the Spratlys, Japan sent naval forces to occupy the islands. The Republic of China’s rule over the islands was fully restored after World War II.
Legally speaking, the Spratly Islands were originally a no man’s land. However, because the islands were discovered by Chinese fishermen and because successive Chinese governments continuously undertook official activities in this area, sovereignty over these islands was exercized by the ROC even before the 1930s. The ROC recovered the Spratly Islands from Japan in 1946 and adopted a series of policies and measures to implement effective control over the islands.
When the Spratlys were returned to the ROC, the Guangdong provincial government was given jurisdiction over them. In 1947, the Ministry of the Interior approved a proposal to transfer control of the islands temporarily to the ROC Navy from the central government. In 1949, not long before the Nationalist government moved to Taipei, the president of the ROC promulgated the Organizational Statutes Governing the Office of the Special Administrator of Hainan (Island) and transferred the jurisdiction of the Spratly Islands from the Guangdong provincial government to the Hainan Special Administrative District.
In 1990, the Executive Yuan placed Tung-sha Tao (Pratas Island) and Tai-ping Tao (Itu Aba Island) in the Spratlys under the temporary jurisdiction of the Kaohsiung city government, set up a postal system on the islands, and brought them under a unified administration.
On April 13, 1993, the Executive Yuan approved the South China Sea Policy Guideline, which sets forth five major objectives for the area: safeguarding the ROC’s sovereignty over the four island groups in the South China Sea, strengthening development and management in the disputed area, promoting cooperation among the littoral states involved in the disputes, peacefully resolving conflicts arising over the South China Sea, and protecting the area’s ecology.
These measures are all legal and effective actions taken by the ROC with regard to the Spratly Islands. Therefore, the ROC believes its sovereignty over the islands is a fact that should be affirmed by international law and judicial verdict.
The ROC, based on its pragmatic foreign policy, will consider adopting policies of international cooperation regarding the islands, provided that the nations concerned want to improve relations with the ROC and that the ROC’s sovereignty over the islands is not affected. The ROC would consider cooperating in technical fields in which controversy is minimal and in which joint interests abound, such as navigation safety, ocean pollution control, detection of and damage control concerning natural disasters, seaborne rescue operations, oceanographic research, and ecological preservation.
The ROC would also consider responding positively to joint exploitation of the Spratly exclusive economic zone (EEZ) as a means to help alleviate territorial conflicts and create an environment for peaceful resolution of disputes. Nonetheless, it remains to be determined whether such exploitation should be bilateral or multilateral, and whether it should be restricted to the survey of marine resources or be extended to cover mineral resources as well. -abridged by Richard R. Vuylsteke