Who controls the present controls the past.
Who controls the past controls the future.
Ever since representatives of Peking and London signed the Hongkong agreement on September 26, 1984, the date has become critical in determining the future of Hongkong and, to a great extent, the destiny of all Chinese.
The Hongkong agreement consists of a Joint Declaration and three Annexes. The Declaration's opening paragraph states that Communist China will begin exercising sovereignty over Hongkong on July 1, 1997. According to the agreement, while Britain must hand over the colony to Communist China, Peking pledges to give a high degree of autonomy to Hongkong, keeping its status quo in the form of a "Special Administrative Region" (SAR) for 50 years after 1997. Peking has publicized the arrangement as a key example of its bold political formula of "one country, two systems."
Today, more than two years after the signing of the accord, there is little indication of political crisis among the bustling crowds that rush along at Nathan Road in the heart of Kowloon, bathed in a sea of neon lights from the giant commercial signs of department stores, restaurants, theaters, and majong clubs.
The combination of slow, double-deck street trams and the new high-speed computerized subway trains establishes a link between Hongkong's past and ultra-modern present. As the subway trains of the Mass Transit Railway carry millions of Hongkong residents deep beneath Victoria Harbor between the Kowloon Peninsula and Hongkong Island, the fast pace of life seems unchanged from years past.
But there are deeper current threatening to form political whirlpools that could seriously disrupt Hongkong's usual lifestyle. A new experiment in political structure is underway.
Time's Paris Correspondent Thomas A. Sancton, author of the magazine's 1981 Man of the Year article on Poland's Lech Walesa and the October 8, 1984 cover story on the Hongkong agreement, sees disturbing similarities: "I am struck by the parallel between Walesa's attempt to win liberalization in Communist Poland and this plan to fold a capitalist enclave into Communist China. Both experiment were based on written agreements. Poland's lasted 16 month. Will the Hongkong accord last for 50 years?"
For a large segment of Hongkong's 5.5 million residents, the questions are much the same: Will Peking's leaders follow the agreement and honor their pledge of giving Hongkong a high degree of autonomy after 1997? On what legal basis has this promise been made? What are the chances of success for the "one country, two systems" formula? And what does the formula really mean?
"The term 'one country, two systems' only appears once in the Hongkong agreement; it is not discussed, not defined, and not described," says Peter Harris, head of Political Science Department of Hongkong University.
Harris, a British citizen, has lived in Hongkong for 17 years. He has undertaken research on 40 countries that have at least two different political systems operating within one sovereign state, including Cyprus, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, and Belgium. In most cases, he says, there are extreme difficulties, and in no case is there much satisfaction.
"Teng Hsiao-ping said that the 'one country, two systems' formula is the most important idea of political science ever," Harris explains, "but my worry is that nobody has properly examined this term. In my opinion, it is hard to separate politics from economics, and it is even more difficult to prevent the Chinese Communist party from interfering. This idea of 'one country, two systems' is not practical."
Harris adds that by using the term, "two systems," Peking seems prepared to tolerate a limited amount of capitalism. The agreement clearly states that capitalism will not be illegal. But what would Peking do if it should go to war with Vietnam again, he asks, or even with the Soviet Union? Would Communist China permit Hongkong to trade with them simply because Peking, according to the agreement, must not interfere with Hongkong's capitalist system?
A hard nut to crack, indeed.
"The idea of 'one country, two systems' has inconsistency and tension in its very nature," says Ambrose Y.K. King, professor of political science at the Chinese University of Hongkong.
After a pause to puff thoughtfully on his pipe, King adds that even if the Chinese Communists succeed in this experiment, Chinese mainlanders could well ask why not extend the capitalist lifestyle to them and raise living standards to comparative levels. And should the idea fail, why should the Peking leadership risk degrading the lives of 5.5 million Hongkong residents?
Lao Ssu-kuang, professor of philosophy at the Chinese University of Hongkong, thinks the "one country, two systems" theory is only good for stimulating the imagination. "If unification is the real goal," he says, "then such a theory could possess nothing more than instrumental significance."
Since the signing of the Hongkong accord, three political issues have attracted widespread attention and caused considerable unease about the colony's future. Peking's do-as-it-likes attitude in each case has prompted observers to re-evaluate the possibility that the 50-year SAR plan will actually work.
The first issue involves the Hongkong government's democratic reforms. From now until the 1997 handover, the Hongkong government's most important duty—both in terms of morality and self-interest—is to preserve Hongkong's stability and prosperity. London has moved to institute some fundamental changes in Hongkong's system of government to give it the autonomous status promised in the Joint Declaration. But it is now clear that Peking has the final say on whatever London proposes.
At the top of London's list for changes is a shift toward a fully elected Legislative Council, the law-making advisory body which currently has 24 indirectly elected members and 32 appointed members, of whom 10 are senior officials. This proposal quickly ignited intense debates on whether Hongkong should have one-man, one-vote direct elections to the Council, as in a full democracy.
"But most important is the exact form of the SAR executive," says Emily Lau, Hongkong correspondent for the Far Eastern Economic Review. "The problem here is how the SAR chief executive and his principal officials are going to be selected and what mechanisms are required to make the executive 'accountable to the legislature' as stipulated in the Joint Declaration. We will keep on watching on this."
In November 1985,however, Peking accused the British Government of "deviating from the Joint Declaration," a clear reference to Peking's displeasure with British attempts at unilateral political change in Hongkong. The accusation was made by Peking's representative in Hongkong, Hsu Chia-tun, director of the official Hsinhua News Agency's Hongkong branch. The low-key British response left many in Hongkong with the impression that Britain just wants to transfer Hongkong peacefully to Peking and ha already given up on the battle for a truly representative government. Meanwhile, Emily Lau indicates that the biggest barrier to the Hongkong government's democratic reform besides Peking is local political and economic profiteers who care only about their own established interests in Hongkong.
"It is understandable that the Chinese Communists want Hongkong's status quo to remain because it is beneficial for their economy," Ambrose King says. "Furthermore, Hongkong's tycoons naturally don't want any social change that may threaten their established interests."
The second issue involves the drafting of the Basic Law.
Because the Basic Law is expected to function as a mini-constitution for the Hongkong SAR, Communist China claims the drafting process is an internal affair. As a result, 34 of the 59 members of the Peking-appointed Basic Law Drafting Committee (BLDC) are Chinese mainlanders. And most of the 25 Hongkong representatives are successful businessmen and generally considered as pro-Peking. This has given many Hongkong residents the distinct impression that their views will not be represented in the BLDC. Nevertheless, many people expect Peking to present the Basic Law in a take-it-or-leave-it manner, leaving both the government and people of Hongkong with few bargaining chips in hand.
There is a growing lack of confidence in Peking's willingness to abide by the Joint Declaration. Martin Lee, an elected member of Hongkong's Legislative Council, indicated this concern in a Wall Street Journal article when he asked: "What can be done to ensure that what has been promised in the Joint Declaration will not be taken away by the Basic Law by which Hongkong will be governed after 1997?" His answer was that Hongkong needs democracy to protect its freedoms.
Lee adds that it has been repeatedly asked why Hongkong should now require democracy to protect its freedoms when those freedoms have been protected for over 100 years without benefit of democracy. In the past Hongkong has been ruled by a governor appointed by Britain and assisted by a carefully selected council. The answer is that Hongkong owes its freedoms not to the Hongkong government but to the British government, which is democratic. Should the Hongkong government abuse its powers, questions would be asked in the British Parliament; but when Hongkong reverts to the Mainland in 1997, its freedoms can only be safeguarded by the "National People's Congress" in Communist China, where the Communist Party remains above the law in practice if not in theory.
A third issue that raised unusual popular response from Hongkong residents involves the controversy surrounding the construction of the Daya Bay nuclear power plant, located about 30 miles northeast of Hongkong.
Peking's economic plans estimate that 70 percent of the power generated by the new plant will be purchased by Hongkong consumers. But Hongkong residents voiced serious concerns about the possible devastating effects from a plant malfunction. Their worries were substantially bolstered by the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in the Soviet Union. However, a petition against construction of the plant signed by one million residents was virtually ignored by Peking. Even more distressing to colony residents, Peking has yet to produce adequate evidence to support claims of plant safety, and even signed the contract with contractors before receiving a safety evaluation of the site and plant design.
Lee Yee, editor-in-chief of The Nineties, a Hongkong monthly magazine, says that the Daya Bay incident has taught Hongkong two important lessons. First, people in Hongkong have next to no influence over Peking decision-making, even concerning those issues that have the greatest impact upon their lives. Second, and even more ominous, the Hongkong government has demonstrated an apparent unwillingness to confront Peking over local issues. Lee concludes that as long as Peking continues pressing ahead with plans for the plant, while mouthing vague assurances about safety and displaying total indifference to resident's worries, the so-called high-degree of autonomy that Peking pledged for Hongkong after 1997 seems more and more an empty promise.
Hongkong was ceded to Britain in 1842 in the wake of Britain's victory over the Ching Dynasty during the Opium War. From a pristine "barren rock island with hardly a house on it," as Lord Palmerston called it in the 19th century, Hongkong has been transformed into the most concrete instance of Adam Smith's laissez faire theory of economics. It has become "the pearl in the Crown of Her Majesty" as well as the world's largest entrepôt and third largest monetary center. Hongkong's development has been quite like the ugly duckling that grew up to lay golden eggs.
Today, visitors to the bustling Central District of Hongkong may be surprised to find that banks seem to outnumber Hongkong's ubiquitous restaurants and cafes. Currently, 44 of the world's top 50 banks have branches in Hongkong, many of which have redesigned the skyline with towering architectural edifices such as the Exchange Square building and the new HK$5 billion Hongkong and Shanghai Bank. Along streets shaded by the soaring facades of venerable financial institutions, people walk swiftly from place to place, giving the sense of a whole city geared for the pursuit of wealth.
Forecasts for Hongkong's 1986 economic performance made during the final quarter predicted a 5.6 percent growth rate, a significant increase over the mere 0.8 percent of 1985. Nevertheless, Hongkong's leading English-language daily, the South China Morning Post (SCMP), has reported that major banks and economists are concerned that Hongkong's economic growth rate could decline if industry fails to diversify.
Hongkong economist Edward Chen told an SCMP reporter that comparative growth rates for two of Hongkong's primary trade competitors, South Korea and Taiwan, were 10 and nine percent respectively. Hongkong is still basically an assembler of goods with less advanced industrial development than either South Korea or Taiwan. If Hongkong fails to do something soon to change its industrial infrastructure, Chen believes that in four to five years the colony will face serious economic difficulties.
Standard Chartered Asia Bank chief economist James Lee agrees that Hongkong's expected economic growth rate is disappointing. "If we fail to widen the range of our industry," Lee told the SCMP, "then in four years we will face a big drop in our growth rate."
Although Hongkong still claims to be the world's biggest exporter of garments, toys, radios, clocks and watches, its economy depends very much on textile exports. Moreover, Hongkong's textile industry has been threatened in recent years by American quotas on textile imports.
For example, Power Garment Company, one of the leading garment manufacturers in Hongkong, recently concentrated in producing low-end products—items below $15 in value—simply because of American quota restrictions on Hongkong textile exports. Chu Wing-chiu, Power Garment's deputy managing director, says the company is doing its best to respond to economic realities: "Though it is unfair for the U.S. to impose a quota system on us, considering Hongkong is a free harbor, we must be realistic. What we are trying to do is to lower our costs by mass production through automation."
Chu says that the company's exports of the past two years to the U.S. have been limited to a no-growth level. Due to American quotas, he adds, there is a widespread trend among Hongkong's small textile companies to subcontract with larger ones just to survive. This, together with the trade threats posed by mainland China, South Korea, and Taiwan, has seriously aggravated the situation for Hongkong textile manufacturers.
For those who take Hongkong's computerized stock market as an index of economic prospects, Hongkong's exchange offered a more encouraging picture as 1986 entered the fourth quarter. From September, the Hang Seng Index, which is the N. Y. stock exchange equivalent, fluctuated at the relatively high levels of 1800 to 2400 points.
"But this boom is only for short-term speculation," according to Peng Chen-hai, elected member of the Legislative Council of the Hongkong government. Peng adds that 1990 will be a critical year for Hongkong's economy because many businessmen believe the subsequent five-year period will be the last period safe from Communist interference. This short-term profit-taking mentality signals a growing crisis of faith in Hongkong's economic prospects.
Hongkong Governor Sir Edward Youde has said that economically it is strongly in mainland China's own interests that Hongkong should remain stable and prosperous after 1997. Peking's fundamental task, therefore, is to guarantee a prosperous and stable environment for Hongkong. But this presupposes that mainland China itself will have a high degree of economic and political stability, and be able to absorb its capitalist cousin without disruption. As Peter Harris of Hongkong University puts it: "Hongkong people are much smarter than Chinese mainlanders. To a great extent, Hongkong is culturally colonizing the mainland."
Hongkong has a vibrant, diversified press with over 485 mass circulation periodicals, including 57 newspapers. Hongkong also has a high newspaper-reading ratio, with 350 copies for every 1,000 citizens. This is second only to Japan in Asia, and holds a slight edge over U.S. readers.
The number of Hongkong's publications has soared in its free press environment. The choices can be overwhelming to a newcomer; he can buy an immense variety of magazines and newspapers on Hongkong's sidewalks, ranging from the Readers' Digest (the Chinese-edition department of the magazine is based in Hongkong) to Chinese editions of Playboy and Penthouse. Moreover, many specialty newspapers cater to specific interests such as horse-racing, sports, and—of course—finance.
Although often superficial, Hongkong's print media provides a broad spectrum of views and analyses of local issues. And this includes social, economic, and political assessments. "The phenomenon is miraculous, compared with the exercise of press censorship in many parts of the world," says Leonard L. Chu, a lecturer in the Department of Journalism and Communication at the Chinese University of Hongkong.
Despite its history of press freedom, Hongkong papers have begun displaying unusually cautious self-censorship. The presence of the Peking regime has made itself known through the Hongkong office of Hsinhua News Agency, which is generally regarded as a significant political organ rather than a press office.
Long used to unfettered freedom of expression, Hongkong residents have now begun to worry how much of it will remain after 1997. Many Hongkong publications, such as the Asian Wall Street Journal, Far Eastern Economic Review, and Asiaweek, have expressed concern about what press freedom will remain in the Hongkong SAR after 1997, for Communist attitudes toward the freedom of press do not significantly resemble those in a democratic society.
To their credit, some Chinese reporters, columnists, and editors have decided to brave the possibility of being "blacklisted" by continuing their undaunted criticism of local politics, the Chinese Communist regime, and other critical issues. It appears that Hongkong's Chinese-language media are much more vulnerable than the English-language publications because of the increasing presence of Peking's officials in Hongkong.
The Nineties's Lee Yee says: "Judging from its traditions and political system, I don't think mainland China will tolerate criticism after 1997. But, in my opinion, criticisms only serve to encourage social progress."
Hu Chu-jen, chief editor of Hongkong's semi-monthly magazine Pai Shing, laments that in the past two years outspoken remarks in Hongkong have become even more valuable than ever before—simply because of their rarity. He says that since Hongkong is small and rumors spread rapidly, accurate reporting prevents the undermining of social stability. "Because they are so uncertain about the Communists' reaction to their opinions, Hongkong's press has begun to censor themselves," Hu adds. "I know what I am engaged in now is important for the future of Hongkong; all I want is to be honest to my job."
Concerning the possibility of being blacklisted, Hu says that if things become too unbearable he might have to leave his beloved Hongkong. He concludes, "Whenever I think about the future of Hongkong, I feel sad for Chinese people."
Hongkong has often been criticized as being a businessman's dream but a cultural desert. This tarnished image has been polished somewhat by a home-grown philosophical movement over the past three decades. Well-known scholars like Chien Mu, Mou Tsung-san, and Hsu Fu-kuan re-evaluated and recast traditional values of Confucianism by building upon the Neo-Confucian scholarship of recent centuries.
Neo-Confucianism, meaning "New" Confucianism, refers to centuries of scholarship that elaborated ideas latent in the original works attributed to Confucius, China's most venerable sage who died in the 5th century B.C. The first Neo-Confucian scholar of note wrote in the 12th century; the Hongkong philosophers have added important modern insights to this lengthy tradition.
Like these scholars who have established Hongkong's place in the world of Chinese philosophy, younger residents have built a new pride of place. This is quite different from the "mentality of the refugee" found in older generations. "This sense of pride is becoming important enough to be a decisive factor in the future of Hongkong," says Joseph Y.S. Tseng, a political science professor at the Chinese University of Hongkong.
Tseng adds that the feelings of inferiority and nihilistic indifference often felt by previous generations of Hongkong's Chinese residents are now being replaced by a young and intense sense of belonging. To them, Hongkong is not merely "a borrowed place in a borrowed time"—it is home.
The cultural landscape has been further cultivated by creative writers. According to Lin Tai-i, editor-in-chief of the Chinese edition of Readers' Digest, Hongkong is a suitable place for writers simply because it provides an environment of freedom in which they can grow and develop. Though Hongkong has not produced "heavyweight" literary talents over the past century, it has produced some minor classics in modern Chinese literature. Lin, daughter of the well-known scholar-essayist Dr. Lin Yu-tang, believes Hongkong's prosperity and large reading public encourages potential writers. As a result, "Hongkong's literary creativity has greatly escalated during the past few decades."
Ni Kuang, one of the most prolific Chinese writers of popular prose, adds that "Hongkong is a superbly beneficial place for the development of a writer. He can write anything he wants to."
Over the past few decades, Ni has written an estimated 100 million words in either newspapers or his own books. Known especially for his science-fiction novels, he is a speedy writer, averaging 8,000 words a day. Ni claims that he usually does not expend much energy on planning the development of his plots. He just lets his pen tell the stories.
Ni says that after he had been persecuted by Chinese Communists with a 10-year labour reform to the "northern wilderness" of Tsinghai province, he managed to escape from mainland China by swimming to Hongkong. He then started to write.
The burning question for Ni Kuang and other Hongkong writers is simply: What writing will be allowed after 1997? "There is no choice for me except to leave Hongkong," Ni says. "I hate Communists, and Communists hate me. Wherever they are, I leave."
While novelist Ni Kuang feels increasingly wedged in by coming changes in Hongkong, the situation seems less worrisome to poet Lan Hai-wen who also braved the danger of being killed by Communist border guards during his swim to Hongkong in search for "poetic justice."
One may easily be fooled by Lan's appearance as he relaxes in T-shirt and faded jeans. But his middle-aged features take on youthful animation when he speaks of his unbending spirit to create vital poetry.
Lan eloquently describes how he is devoting himself to creating an epic of the Chinese race. He says that China has always prided itself on being a "kingdom of poetry," but its failure so far to produce any great epic about the origin and growth of the race diminishes that claim.
In the trade-off of earning a living and pursuing his poetic craft, Lan runs a small grocery store and works there every morning to cover his expenses. Every afternoon he returns to a small attic study overflowing with books and manuscripts to continue his poetic creation.
"China has a timeless legacy of poetry," Lan says, "and also has a vast population of poets. One of the important functions of poetry is to teach. When a poetic movement revives on the Chinese mainland, we Chinese will gain access to the realm of a timeless China."
Despite the overwhelming social differences that have evolved between the residents of Hongkong and their mainland cousins to the north during the last 100 years, viewed from the perspective of Chinese history the dissimilarities presented by Hongkong are perhaps no greater than those introduced with the founding of the Ching dynasty in 1644. In time the "foreign" Manchu rule and cultural orientations were absorbed into the lengthy Chinese tradition. This could happen again with the startling phenomenon of modern Hongkong. The force of tradition could indeed have roots deeper than the surface changes one sees, for example, on Nathan Road.
An example of the durability of ancient customs may be seen at the New Territories border station at Lowu each autumn equinox during Moon Festival, the quintessential Chinese holiday. Each year, beginning a few days before August 15th in the lunar calendar, an estimated 100,000 to 200,000 Hongkong Chinese cross the border—a tunnel-like bridge guarded by armed soldiers—to the Chinese mainland. They go to visit their families, their luggage made even more burdensome by heavy loads of presents and moon cakes.
According to tradition, the full moon symbolizes family reunion and every Chinese should return to his family each year on the Moon Festival. As the long lines of Hongkong residents file across the bridge they join over one billion Chinese worldwide in celebrating this special time, symbolizing a unity of Chinese thought and mores that transcends borders or political systems. Nevertheless, the degree to which this foundation of tradition will successfully bear the weight of transition after 1997 remains an open question.
Yet another perspective, more private and reflective, can be gained by ascending Victoria Peak on Hongkong Island, long admired for its magnificent view, day and night. By day, the vibrant city flashes in the sunlight, reflecting the brazen financial success it has become in its environment of economic and political freedom—far different from what is found to the north.
By night, the view is even more spectacular, especially if there is a full moon. Hongkong's brilliant panoply of light is enhanced by Victoria Harbor, which separates Hongkong Island from the Kowloon Peninsula. Its channel moderates the pressure of packed buildings, while reflecting both celestial and man-made lights, adding its own rippling charms to their splendor. But nowadays residents and visitors alike must wonder how long the lights below will continue to brighten this free city. In a few short years the new Basic Law will influence the Hang Seng Index, the quality of newspapers, and even the creation of poetry.
A final glance at the full moon before descending back to the never-ceasing bustle of the city may well prompt a quiet wish that the moon could serve as a crystal ball and reveal the future of Hongkong.
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Special Committee Views Critical Hongkong Issues
Soon after Britain and Communist China signed the September 26, 1984 agreement on the future of Hongkong, the government of the Republic of China set up an ad hoc committee to study suitable ways of dealing with the Hongkong issue. The committee functions as an advisory panel to the premier of the Executive Yuan (ROC cabinet). It is chaired by the vice premier of the Executive Yuan, Lin Yang-kang, who recently discussed the committee's work in an interview with the Free China Review and the Free China Journal. Excerpts follow:
On the issue of the future of Hongkong, does the Republic of China government have a clear policy? If so, what are its main points?
Lin: The government has stated many times that the Hongkong area belongs to the Republic of China. In 1943 the government notified the British that it reserved the right to resume its sovereignty over Hongkong in the future. Matters that concern the sovereignty of the area should be negotiated with the ROC government, and not the Peking regime whose legitimacy we have never recognized. Therefore, we don't recognize the Joint Declaration of 1984. Moreover, we do not recognize it because we—and many Chinese in the free world—consider that it is an insufficient guarantee of the prosperity and stability of Hongkong and of the development of democracy by which that prosperity and stability can be safeguarded.
In September 1984, Premier Yu Kuo-hwa announced 12 measures for supporting our compatriots in Hongkong. President Chiang Ching-kuo also said in October of the same year that the government would assist in every possible and appropriate way the Hongkong people's struggle for freedom, stability and prosperity.
The main function of the committee is to study developments in Hongkong' and propose appropriate measures to deal with them. The purpose of its establishment is not to sabotage peaceful development in Hongkong, which would only hurt our compatriots and provide the Communists with an excuse to strangle their freedom. We wish to assist them in whatever way we can to preserve their freedom and prosperity so that both Hongkong and the Taiwan area can provide Chinese models for the mainland.
The government has often been criticized for not taking sufficient initiative in its handling of the Hongkong issue. What are your comments on this?
Lin: The government has been reacting to the situation in Hongkong in various ways. In the last two years the committee has been drawing up measures to deal with problems that our compatriots in Hongkong might encounter. We have made arrangements, for example, for those who want to come here to buy real estate, to invest, to work, and to study. But, because Hong-kong is still under British rule, which does not have official diplomatic relations with us, we can't say we have no problems in handling the issue. Still, we understand our Hongkong compatriots' love of freedom and democracy and their anti-Communist sentiments, and we will give them due support when the situation requires it. The main thrust of our policy, however, is not a passive one of providing refuge for Hongkong people fleeing Communism, but an active one of helping them fight for their rights.
Lin: I don't think there will be major changes before 1997, because trade between the ROC and Hongkong is beneficial to both parties. After 1997, we'll have to wait and see. As one Hongkong scholar postulates, there are two sides to the 1997 coin. On the one hand, it is the year Communist China officially assumes control over Hongkong. On the other hand, after 1997 mainland China will be more subject to influence from Hongkong.
How does the ROC government view the attempted political reforms in Hongkong?
Lin: Although both Britain and Communist China want to maintain the stability and prosperity of Hongkong, they have conflicting interests when it comes to forming a democratic system in the colony. While the ROC government is in favor of the political reforms, I think eventually the area's democratization has to be accomplished by the Hongkong people themselves. There are still many things that the people in Hongkong can do in the next 11 years. The British government, without doubt, will benefit from the establishing of democracy in Hongkong. And if the Hongkong people's will to fight for democracy is strong enough, I think they can influence the British government. The ROC government fully supports the reforms.