A report presented to the "National People's Congress" not long ago by "Premier" Chao Tzu-yang, proposed negotiations and called on the KMT authorities to undertake "practical steps" to consummate peaceful unification. But besides the peace overture, Peking is also pursuing other means. For example, "Vice-Premier" Yao Yi-lin, asserted during a press conference in March that Chinese authorities had not "precluded the possibility of taking non-peaceful means" to achieve reunification Yao's implied threat to use force for reunification followed on the heels of a highly-publicized TV news documentary, which showed that mainland Chinese marines were well-trained in invasion tactics.
Peking is also trying to enlist the help of the U.S., Taiwan's most important friend. When Yang Shang-kun, "vice-chairman" of the CCP's military commission, toured the United States in May, he repeatedly raised the matter of Taiwan's unification with President Reagan and other top American officials. This was tantamount to seeking the involvement of the U.S. in what Peking has called a "domestic affair." U.S. officials have consistently rejected such a mediating role.
In the past several years, mainland Chinese leaders have called for peace talks between the KMT and the CCP to serve as first step toward peaceful unification. They have offered in their various proposals to make Taiwan a special administrative region of China. Taipei has thus far rejected all of Peking's overtures, and it is easy to see why. Accepting the Peking regime's terms would reduce the ROC government to the status of a local government, destroying its claim to be the legal government of all China.
Moreover, the still unofficial opposition "Democratic Progressive Party," which won warm support in the recent elections, is opposed to negotiations between the KMT and the Communists, and has instead called for self-determination by Taiwan's 19 million people to decide the island's future. But President Chiang Ching-kuo and the ruling party have to contend with the views and interests of all people on Taiwan, and few of them want unification under anything like the present circumstances, let alone on the terms set by Peking.
By Asian standards, the people on Taiwan are doing quite well economically, and the KMT is continuing to enhance the environment for political participation while accelerating democratization. Taiwan residents look with no little apprehension, distrust, and disgust at the repressive CCP rule on the mainland with its recurrent political and social turmoil, and its economic backwardness. They are not anxious to live under such a political system.
While it is true that many mainlanders in Taiwan have secretly crossed the Straits to see their relatives in recent years—and that some curious Taiwan-born tourists have also ventured to visit the mainland via Japan, Hongkong, and Macao—few have stayed. It is also true that increasing numbers of businessmen in Taiwan are engaged in indirect trade with the mainland, which some observers estimate amounts to US$ 1 billion a year. But these entrepreneurs in the penumbra of the law prefer the status quo to life under Communism.
Peking's so-called peace offensive has hit a stonewall because most people in Taiwan question the credibility of the offer. In addition, they are watching closely to see if Peking will in fact honor their pledges on Hongkong and Macao. The early signs are not particularly positive. Peking's tendency to ignore the concerns of the Hongkong people—as in the case of the construction of the Daya Bay nuclear power plant in the lace of strong opposition by Hongkong residents and in its inclination to interfere prematurely in such Hongkong affairs as the democratic reforms—do not give rise to much confidence in Peking's word. This evaluation is further strengthened by Peking's recent suppression of pro-democracy demonstrations in various mainland China cities.
What other tack can Peking follow? The use of force that Yao Yi-lin has hinted at would be a terrible mistake. It would shatter the attempt by the CCP to build an image as a responsible and peace-loving leadership. It also would be extraordinarily costly in terms of human lives and material resources, even if it should succeed. The damage to Peking's relations with Tokyo and Washington also would be severe, especially because the U.S. would most likely be compelled by the provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act to defend and support Taiwan.
But there is another alternative, Peking must first nurture a sense of mutual trust and create conditions for peaceful unification that involves modernizing its own economy and substantially raising the standard of living on the mainland. That means instituting a rule of law, practicing democracy, and showing greater respect for human rights.
If Peking can bridge the yawning economic and social gaps between the mainland and Taiwan, and if Peking does abide by its promise not to force changes in Macao and Hongkong for 50 years, then Taiwan's reunification will begin to lake care of itself. Until this occurs, however, reunification seems very much an impossible mission. — Dr. Parris H. Chang is a professor of political science and chairman of Asian Area Studies at Penn State University, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.