Time (9/21/81) published this article by Richard Bernstein from Peiping: "The charges ring disturbingly of the past: 'Brazenly opposing the party's leadership, deviating from the orbit of socialism, desiring and envying the decadent, bourgeois way of life in the West.' These and similar superheated phrases appearing in the Chinese (Communist) press these days recall the years when the late Mao Tse-tung carried out his frenzied and reckless campaigns for ideological purity in (mainland) China. Though the more moderate post-Mao leadership in Peking had repeatedly promised not to resume such repression, the official press has recently bristled with attacks on people who are said to hold 'corrosive, erroneous ideas' and to fan 'aimless, evil winds.' Having lived through the Cultural Revolution of 1966-1976 and other waves of terror against individualism, many (mainland) Chinese are bracing themselves for a new political campaign designed to impose obedience to the Communist Party's dictates.
"It was Deputy Party Chairman Deng Xiaoping, (Red) China's most powerful leader, who had permitted a modicum of dissent in the late 1970s, much as Mao had launched his shortlived 'Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom' movement in 1957. Now Deng too has had second thoughts about the first faint burgeonings of freedom he inspired. Lately Deng has complained that the relative relaxation of recent years has led to a host of 'unhealthy tendencies,' most notably in literature and art. The press has referred darkly to the emergence of an artistic 'counterculture' and complained of stories and plays that 'propagate pessimism, nihilism and ultraindividualism,' meaning in Deng's words, 'opposition to the leadership of the party.' In the spring, Bai Hua, a well-known writer, was viciously attacked by the Liberation Army Daily for a screenplay called Bitter Love that, the paper charged, showed 'hatred for our party and our socialist motherland.' More ominously, say (mainland) Chinese sources, Deng has named at least ten writers who will be singled out in the months ahead as targets of a national campaign of 'criticism and self-criticism.'
"Even Chinese (Communist) leaders, like Deng himself, have stressed that the current campaign will produce nothing like the sweeping repression of the past, when tens of thousands were indiscriminately shipped off to labor camps or killed. Nor does it seem that (Red) China's leaders are preparing to impose anything like the absolute uniformity in literature and art that was ordained during the Cultural Revolution. But the new crackdown has had a dampening effect on many writers and artists who had been hoping that the government would allow ever greater degrees of free expression.
"The repression began early this year when the Communist Party embarked on a no-nonsense effort to crush the stubborn remains of the 'democracy movement' that had flourished in 1978 and 1979. Most of the activities, particularly putting up posters on Peking's 'democracy wall,' had already been banned by the party in 1980. Several of the liberals' most articulate spokesmen were arrested that year, including Liu Qing, deputy editor of the most widely circulated underground journal, April 5th Forum.
"This year (Red) China's leaders set out to stamp out the more than 50 small underground journals that had blossomed during the movement's headier days. Though the journals were crudely mimeographed publications with readerships of at most a few hundred each, they were formally banned by the Party Central Committee in February. 'The conservatives in the military and in the security apparatus just couldn't stand the underground papers,' says one diplomat who is based in Peking. 'They were determined to eradicate the dissident movement once and for all and, in this, they have been pretty successful.'
"The result has been a series of arrests, mostly of underground editors who had persisted in publishing. One such paper was Responsibility, published by the rather grandly titled National Federation of Unofficial Publications. When a group of ten federation members from various cities assembled in Peking last April to discuss strategy, they were nabbed by police. Among the seized was Xu Wenli, 36, a railway electrician who had edited the April 5th Forum and was one of the democracy movement's most articulate spokesmen. Neither Xu nor any of the others has been seen or heard from. In the weeks that followed that roundup, provincial police swept down on various other editors outside Peking, putting an estimated 50 of them into custody. The government has continued to arrest other activists.
"In recent months there have been few new arrests, but the general mood of the government is hardly one of tolerance. The party leadership embarked on a series of programs that are menacing reminders of the dangers of departing from ideological orthodoxy. For example, after a long period of neglect, political study sessions have once again become mandatory in schools, offices and factories. This month foreign correspondents in Peking were warned by a high-ranking official in the Foreign Ministry against giving favorable coverage to dissidents.
"Much of this new stress on ideology and discipline has puzzled analysts who expected a period of relaxation to follow the harsh crackdown earlier this year. One possible explanation for the campaign is the leaders' concern that any slackness could produce the kind of discontent that erupted during the heyday of the democracy movement of 1978-1979. Another explanation postulates a political compromise between Deng and more conservative law-and-order forces within the party. Some analysts speculate that Deng wants to show party hard-liners he is not soft on dissent so they will go along with his ideological heresy of allowing greater participation by foreign capitalists in the country's economy and his effort to weed out old, incompetent Maoists from the bureaucracy.
"Meanwhile, the country's disappointed artists and intellectuals will have to wait for better times to come. They will scarcely be encouraged by reading (Red) China's new constitution, which guarantees the right of free speech, of publication and of assembly — all freedoms that have been victims of the regime's new tough policies." (Full text)
Time of the same issue continued the discussion in a companion article: "One of the early victims of the current Chinese (Communist) drive to crush dissent was Liu Qing, deputy editor of the April 5th Forum, the most widely respected of the unofficial journals that sprang up during the ill-fated democracy movement of 1978-79. A copy of Liu's account of how he challenged (Red) China's legal system and what happened to him afterward was recently smuggled out of the labor camp and obtained by TIME. Some excerpts:
"When Ren Wanding [head of the (mainland) Chinese Human Rights League], Wei Jingsheng, Fu Yuehua, Chen Lu, Zhang Wenhe and others were arrested in March 1979, the event was followed closely by the (mainland) Chinese and foreign press. Why this concern about the fate of a few ordinary (mainland) Chinese citizens? It is because the arrests had created a cold March wind that was blowing across the (mainland) Chinese political horizon.
"Wei Jingsheng had violated the law against divulging secrets, but the court convicted him of two other more serious crimes and sentenced him to 15 years' imprisonment and a loss of his political rights for three years. This kind of harsh Judgment is a mockery of the Chinese (Communist) judicial system, and it is a warning to everyone to be very cautious in speaking one's mind. Real liberation of thought and true freedom of expression must wait until man is willing to struggle for them.
"Liu took on the job of spreading the word about Wei's unjust punishment. 'If I had not pointed out this unfairness,' he writes, 'I would have had to be either a coward or the worst kind of human being.' On Nov. 11, 1979. Liu went to 'democracy wall' in Peking to sell some of the 1,000 copies of the Wei trial transcript he had mimeographed. Agents of (Red China's secret police, the Public Security Bureau (PSB) arrested some of the buyers. Liu then went to the PSB headquarters in Peking to seek redress for them.
"I was confident that what I did was all legal and that the PSB had no legal basis to defend its arrests. After seriously thinking things over, I decided that I must never retreat. Those who enforce law must have respect for the law.
"My insistence on the law and on legality enraged the PSB interrogators. Finally one of them said angrily: 'Now that you are here, you don't have to answer our questions. But as long as you refuse to answer our questions, you'll never be allowed to leave.'
"I reminded them that detaining me without proper papers was illegal, and that I had no intention of submitting to illegal detention.
"Their reply: 'This is the office of the dictatorship.'
"Without a trial, Liu was detained for more than six months in prison, where, still insisting upon his innocence, still demanding that the authorities observe their own laws, he was held in solitary confinement for over five months. 'Even for real criminals,' he notes, 'solitary confinement is illegal.'
"The period of my solitary confinement was not long and naturally it has not affected me very seriously. But changes are already noticeable. One day, I noticed a lot of loose hair on my sheet. When I looked at myself in the small mirror on the cell door I discovered that part of my head is already bald. The dampness and coldness in the cell, plus my habit of curling up in a corner for long periods must have been the cause of my swollen left foot which still gives me pain. My near-sightedness has considerably worsened. I started to talk to myself, sometimes loudly, debating with an imaginary opponent. I also try to recall some mathematical or physical problems and do exercises against the wall. Please don't laugh at me. I think a lot about my mother, worrying about the anxiety I have brought her in her old age. This makes me very sorrowful. I looked through a broken window in the toilet and saw a small patch of grassy ground near the foot of the high wall. The green blades appeared to have just emerged from the dark muddy soil. I was suddenly overcome by a strong desire — I wanted to get out and be closer to the grass!
"Liu tells of how the PSB interrogators promised him he would be released if he would only confess to his crime of 'violating the administration of public security' When Liu was allowed out of solitary, his sympathetic fellow prisoners gave him baths and mended his clothes. Some guards were friendly to him, but others came to take him away.
"When I was brought back to the small cell my body was covered with blue wounds from the beating. I had been forced to wear a heavy gas mask that made it very hard for me to breathe, and I was laden with a heavy chain cutting into my flesh.
"I met Zhang Wenhe, a founding member of the Chinese Human Rights League. Like me, Zhang also behaved badly in prison — constantly protesting and arguing with the guards. Consequently he also suffered more. He was forced to wear chains for several consecutive months, which gave him much pain and trouble whenever he tried to eat, go to the toilet or sleep. He was also forced to wear such headgear as a gas mask or a tank helmet after being cruelly beaten several times. His cell was close to mine. We were often let out of our cells at about the same time. By deliberately slowing down our steps we sometimes would get a chance to shake hands and to exchange a few words.
"On July 21,1980, still without having been tried, Liu was taken to a 'labor reform camp' called Lianhua Temple in Hua County, Shaanxi province. Liu is scheduled to remain in the labor camp until November 1981. Liu evidently wanted the account of his ordeal to be sent to major (mainland) Chinese newspapers and to Deng Xiaoping and other Peking leaders. 'Dare you publish it?' Liu asks in a letter to the editors. 'Judging by my limited Wisdom, I believe I need not wait for the answer. In any case you may regard this material as a small gift from me that may entertain you during your leisure hours.' In the 200-page account, Liu has a message for (Red) China's leaders. He asks for a public trial but acknowledges that officials have the power to ignore the law and punish him. 'In any event,' says Liu, 'I am a little bird having fallen into your cage, and have no choice'. " (Full text)
Wall Street Journal — Ambition gone awry
The Wall Street Journal (9/2/81) published this article by Frank Ching from Peiping: "In February 1978, (Red) China's post-Mao leadership proposed a grandiose program for the country's modernization. Then-Chairman Hua Guofeng said in a speech outlining the program that (Red) China was planning 120 large-scale projects 'including 10 iron and steel complexes, nine nonferrous metal complexes, eight coal mines, 10 oil and gas fields, 30 power stations, six new trunk railways and five key harbors.'
"As a result of the program, the chairman said, (Red) China would be a 'modern, powerful socialist country' standing in 'the front ranks of the world' by the year 2000.
"Ambitious words - too ambitious it now is clear. Today, 3½ years after the chairman's speech, the modernization program hasn't gotten off the ground. Targets have had to be scaled down, projects abandoned, contracts canceled. (Red) China's leaders are still paying lip service to modernization, but the initial grand vision has faded.
"Many reasons underlie the failure. At the time the modernization program was launched, (Red) China was just emerging from decades of isolation and the 10-year turmoil of the Cultural Revolution; Peking's top economic planners were adept at political maneuvering but had spent little time on economic work. Consequently, the program was hampered from the outset by woefully inadequate planning and an ignorance of practicalities.
"As the Chinese (Communists) themselves now explain it, they thought they could leapfrog various stages of development by importing the most advanced technology and equipment in the world. 'We had a strong wish to change (Red) China overnight into a modern country,' says one Chinese (Communist) official. 'But our well-intentioned actions only created more problems.'
"Nowhere are those problems more evident than at Baoshan, near Shanghai. There the Chinese (Communists) planned to build the centerpiece of their modernization effort, an ultramodern integrated steel mill. To be constructed in two stages, the multi-billion-dollar mill was to have a capacity of six million tons of steel a year. Completion of the first stage, at which time the mill would be operational but only capable of producing half its eventual planned capacity, was scheduled for the end of 1982.
"Today, the second stage has been canceled and completion of the first stage has been postponed. And although there is no certainty about the ultimate fate of the project — the Chinese (Communist) leadership gives conflicting signals on the subject — the Baoshan mill serves as a graphic illustration of the chaos that pervades much of the (mainland) Chinese economy and helps to tell why the modernization program has thus far failed.
"The Baoshan project got under way even before the modernization program was announced. In November 1977, Li Xiannian, a Communist Party vice chairman and a veteran economic planner who had survived the purges of the Cultural Revolution, asked Yoshihiro Inayama, the chairman of Nippon Steel Corp., the largest steelmaker in the non-Communist world, to help (Red) China build a modern steel mill.
"Mr. Inayama, a moving force in the development of Sino (Communist)-Japanese economic relations, immediately agreed to aid the Chinese (Communists); and soon thereafter, a Chinese (Communist) delegation led by Ye Zhi-quiang, (Red) China's vice minister of the metallurgical industry, toured Nippon Steel facilities in Japan. After the tour, the Chinese (Communists) made it plain they wanted a steel complex comparable to the Oita works, Nippon Steel's most advanced.
"According to Hitomi Yano, Nippon Steel's chief Peking representative, the Japanese suggested that 'taking into consideration (mainland) China's industrial level,' the Baoshan blast furnace needn't be as big as the one at Oita; but the Chinese (Communists) demurred. The Chinese (Communist) attitude, Mr. Yano says, was that 'it is easy to reach low-level technology but harder to get high-level technology. If (Red) China only gets low-level technology, it will never catch up.'
"The Japanese didn't insist; after all, the Chinese (Communists) were paying the bill...
"But the Japanese wondered about the Chinese (Communist) feasibility study for Baoshan... 'We asked for the Chinese (Communist) feasibility study, and they only gave us a little information,' says Koichi Imamura, Nippon Steel's deputy chief at Baoshan.
" 'For example,' Mr. Imamura continues, 'we asked where the coal would come from in time for Baoshan's opening and how much it would cost to develop such coal. The Chinese (Communists) wouldn't give detailed answers, only assuring us that they would be able to do it.
" 'Any country selling plants to (Red) China would encounter the same problem. We don't feel we have any responsibility. The building of Baoshan —when, where and how — was all decided by the Chinese (Communists). They had their own plans.'
"But the Chinese (Communist) plans, quite simply, weren't good enough. The deputy commander in chief of the Baoshan project, a senior official of the metallurgical ministry who insists that he be identified only as Mr. Liu, says that the Chinese (Communists) had done research into the best site available, deciding finally on Baoshan because of its coastal location and its proximity to the big industrial city of Shanghai. Mr. Liu says the ministry did little research into the source of raw materials since in (mainland) China these are all distributed by the state. Also, the official says, very little market research was done because the ministry's job was only to produce steel, not to sell it. Finally, although Nippon Steel had told the Chinese (Communists) that completion of an integrated steel mill — including site selection, feasibility study and construction — normally takes four years, the Chinese (Communists) wanted the Baoshan mill completed in only a year and a half.
"To implement first-stage contracts between Nippon Steel and the Chinese (Communists), several hundred Japanese arrived at Baoshan; among their tasks was to supervise installation of the imported equipment. But problems soon became apparent. For example, in order for the mill to operate at greatest efficiency, it needed high-grade iron ore; (mainland) Chinese ore, however, has a relatively low iron content. The decision was therefore made to import high-grade ore from Australia. But that presented further difficulties. Because the Yangtze River's silt makes it impossible for large vessels to dock, ore-bearing ships would have to lighten their load elsewhere before approaching Baoshan — and each additional step would make the production process more expensive." (Partial text)