The New York Times (7/11/78) published this article by Kiyoshi Nasu: "In trying to normalize relations with the Peking Government within the framework of the Shanghai Communique of 1972, the Carter Administration seems to misunderstand the mind of the Asian people.
"During my recent visit to the Far East, many political, business and academic leaders in the area expressed their deep concern that, should the United States sever diplomatic relations and abrogate the mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China, a faithful ally in Asia, and thus act contrary to one of the most important Confucian values, the United States would lose forever the trust and confidence of the Asian people, including the mainland Chinese, and thus alienate all of Asia.
"The Peking Government has laid down three conditions to the United States to normalize relations: severance of diplomatic relations with Taiwan, withdrawal of United States forces and military facilities from Taiwan, and abrogation of the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan.
"Should the Administration accept these conditions, Taiwan would be placed in dire straits. Discounting the political shock waves that would spread throughout Asia, Taiwan would immediately be forced to face Peking's whims, because Peking will interpret the move as United States acknowledgement of Taiwan as a part of Communist China's territory and feel free to act to unite its territory.
"Liberal American scholars maintain that the United States should normalize relations with Peking immediately in order to keep Peking from ever reaching rapprochement with Moscow. This contention is groundless. The hostility between (Red) China and the Soviet Union is based on deep rooted factors such as national rivalry and territorial problems.
''The Washington-Peking relations also would not change. The Peking leaders still consider the United States a capitalist-imperialist state and will continue to do so until they realize that Communism is not the way of the modem world. Normalization would not change that rationale. Following the normalization, Peking could approach Moscow at any time.
"The Washington-Moscow relations, on the other hand, would be further strained, making the world situation worse. Through this presumed action, the United States would lose an effective point upon which to exert leverage on the Soviet Union.
"The United States would not have much to gain economic ally either. Despite a huge population, (Red) China, with its low per capita annual income ($300), does not possess great import purchasing power. Peking also lacks sufficient foreign exchange for large purchases of goods and services. United States trade with (Red) China was $336 million in 1976, while that with Taiwan ($5.6 billion in 1977) has been increasing steadily at a value more than ten times of that with the mainland.
''Two Presidents and two Secretaries of State have visited Peking on 10 occasions during the last five years. No ranking figures from Communist China have paid an official visit to Washington. Many Asians wonder why the United States, the greatest nation on earth, has to be so servile as to beg for normalization; and why the United States is unnecessarily negotiating from a position of weakness, seemingly unaware of possible repercussions such normalization will bring about to Taiwan and to Asia's security.
"Peking eagerly hopes that the United States will retain its influence in the Far East. It is Peking that needs, desires and covets normalization. It also needs American technology and assistance.
"Accordingly, United States leaders should not have made another pilgrimage to Communist China, but the Communist Chinese leaders should have visited Washington. It should have been the United States that presented its own conditions for normalizing relations with the Peking Government.
"The United States conditions should be based on the following principles: that the United States will not betray her faithful ally; that it will continue to uphold the human rights and self-determination of the people of Taiwan; that normalization will not do anything to cause repercussions and endanger peace and security in the Far East and in Southeast Asia; and that normalization will not do anything to seriously prejudice the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan problem by the Taiwanese and (mainland) Chinese.
"The United States should firmly state that, until the problem of Taiwan is settled, the United States will maintain normal diplomatic relations and the mutual defense treaty with the Nationalist Chinese. At the same time, she should state her willing ness to establish normal relations with Peking.
"Communist China would not immediately accept the American conditions, and would make a big fuss. But at the same time, Asians, including mainland Chinese, will surely pay more respect to the United States. Such is the psychology of Asians.
"The United States should never commit the folly of giving a faithful ally and independent state to the Communist camp, while stripping 17 million people of their homeland and human rights." (Full text)
Newsweek - Simon Leys' warning
Newsweek (7/3/78) published this article by Simon Leys: "An influential American foreign-affairs specialist argued recently that since the (Peiping regime) does not operate on the same psychic and philosophical principles as the West, President Carter's human-rights standards should not apply to the Chinese (on the mainland). He said that the (Peiping regime) was some thing of an egalitarian paradise where the material and spiritual needs of the populace were efficiently met. As a result, he contended, it was imperative that 'Washington should hasten toward establishing normal diplomatic relations with Peking so as to ease exchanges of ideas, persons and goods from which the two countries can mutually benefit.'
"It is quite remarkable, and yet - alas - not untypical, to see that someone is right for all the wrong reasons, reasons that are best refuted by the (mainland) Chinese themselves. In (Red) China, people face arrest and execution as they clamor for 'legality and democracy.' The leader ship, to its credit, seems bent on clearing up the chaos left by the Mao era, but nonetheless has been obliged to admit publicly that (Red) China, under Mao, fared very badly indeed. From the Politburo's own assessments emerges a picture of a cultural and intellectual desert, a land of political terror, economic waste, backwardness and mismanagement. In the words of Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-ping, even 'the problem of food production has not yet been basically resolved,' and a state of lawless ness, arbitrary rule and 'Fascist tyranny' resulting from the longtime influence of the 'Gang of Four' still prevails.
"Diplomatic recognition of a country does not entail the passing of any value judgment on that country's political system and should not be tantamount to awarding its leaden with a good behavior certificate. Yet this does not mean that it should be achieved under any conditions or at any cost. However desirable, normalization of relations with Peking should not be bought at the shameful and unnecessary price of betraying other partners. This would be the case if the U.S. were to renege on its earlier pledge toward the security of Taiwan in order to consolidate ties with Peking. Taiwan should retain the faculty to pursue its separate and successful destiny as long as it deems it appropriate.
" 'For years now, no China specialist has uttered the taboo phrase "two Chinas" except perhaps in sleep, delirium or drunkenness,' Prof. John K. Fairbank once said. It is true enough that there can theoretically be but one China, an axiom that is accepted in Taipei as well as Peking. It is nonetheless a fact that this one Chinese nation happens, once more in its history, to be temporarily ruled by two different governments at the same time. The first man on the moon carried with him the flags of all the different political units in which mankind is somewhat arbitrarily divided, so that none would be excluded. The Chinese living under Peking's rule were symbolically represented by the flag of the (Peiping regime), while the Chinese living on Taiwan were represented by the Kuomintang flag. Seen from a distance of 239,000 problems seem easier to handle. How is the U.S. now going to do on earth what justice and common sense so naturally dictated on the moon?
"The whole process of rapprochement between (Red) China and the U.S. was triggered in 1969 by (Red) China's acute and justified - fear of Soviet aggression, and was bolstered subsequently by America's wise determination to stand by (Red) China's side. This single, yet decisive, factor proved a sound and strong basis on which to build the (Red) Sino-American relationship. It is going to cement it for a long time, preventing the two countries from falling apart, whatever other unresolved problems or areas of contention may remain between them ...
"It is hard to see what the United States would gain by achieving normalization on Peking's terms. It would merely show to its allies and partners, and to (Red) China itself, how unreliable are American commitments. And allowing Taiwan the chance to pursue its separate development ... can only serve the best interest of China in the long run. The amazing success that Taiwan has achieved in economic, agricultural and industrial development may present a (Red) China already liberated from most of its Maoist dogmas with some useful lessons and alternative solutions. Taiwan has been conspicuously successful in absorbing modern technology, winning foreign markets, adjusting to the complexities of international competition and forming cosmopolitan and scientifically trained elites. There is no doubt that the expertise accumulated by Taiwan in so many vital fields should prove one day of tremendous value for China.
"If Taiwan's right to separate development should be guaranteed, it is not only because the Taiwan experiment is so precious and fragile. It is also because it is still the wish of Taiwan's population not to be forcibly incorporated into the (Peiping regime) at this stage. At the end of World War II, hundreds of thousands of Russians were delivered against their will into the hands of Stalin. It has taken 30 years for the West to begin feeling some guilt for this crime. Should 17 million Chinese now be betrayed in similar fashion, how long would it take for the deed to register within Western consciences?" (Partial text)
Herald Tribune - Who gets educated?
The International Herald Tribune (6/27/78) published this article by Jay Mathews from Hongkong: "Ma Po was born into an intellectual (mainland) Chinese family and later labeled an 'active counterrevolutionary.' So, despite his top grades in high school, he was sent to Inner Mongolia instead of college in 1966.
"Now, at 30, he has been allowed to enroll as a freshman at prestigious Peking University.
"The change in policy has been so radical and sudden that it has brought the first rumblings of a grassroots challenge to the policies of (Red) China's new leaders, the successors to the late Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung.
"An official radio broadcast from the eastern province of Anhwei quotes education officials as charging that 'the new enrollment system does not represent the interests of the working class and the poor and middle-level peasants, and runs counter to the party's class line.'
"Other recent broadcasts and official articles have also hinted at new attacks on the educational system, the starting point for much political turmoil in (Red) China in the last two decades.
"'The new education system is clearly the most serious point of controversy in (Red) China today,' an analyst said (in Hongkong). Travelers who have talked to foreign students at Peking University say that there are signs of tension between senior students who were selected on political grounds and newcomers admitted on the basis of test scores. 'The worker-peasant students are not happy with the new breed,' a foreign traveler said.
"Ma Po, a Chinese major at Peking University, was among only 278,000 to gain admittance to universities out of 5.7 million who took entrance examinations. The exams were a key part of the sudden change in the school system.
"During the last six years of Mao's life, according to official statements at the time and refugee interviews, many children of worker and peasant families who did not perform well in tests were still admitted to college.
"Although the Chinese (Communists) have not published figures comparing the numbers of workers and peasants enrolled under the Maoist and post-Mao systems, the few statistics available seem to indicate that they are not getting a share of college places based on their share of the population.
"The province of Heilung-kiang reported last month that 59 percent of new college students in the province were children of workers and peasants. But worker and peasant families are estimated to make up at least 80 percent of the (mainland) Chinese population.
"In a sharp criticism of the new system, education officials in Anhwei, who apparently perceive a trend against 'laboring classes,' said that 'enrolling hundreds of thousands of students has offended tens of millions of students.'
"'If such things go unchecked,' they said to colleagues supporting the changes, 'we would like to see if the poor and lower-middle peasants will oppose you.' The Anhwei broadcast derided critics of the new system, while acknowledging their existence.
"Chinese (Communist) leaders, particularly party Vice Chair man Teng Hsiao-ping, have argued that universities must raise their academic standards if (Red) China is to modernize its economy rapidly.
"A recent Chinese (Communist) news agency dispatch said that priority is given to workers or peasant youth if they have 'equal marks' on the examination with young' people from other social backgrounds.
"But the 85 percent of (mainland) Chinese youth who live in peasant villages and communes are at a great disadvantage in the tough college entrance test. A (mainland) Chinese child growing up in a large city is usually guaranteed a place in senior high school. In the countryside, there are not enough senior high schools for everyone, and in those that do exist the equipment and teachers are not as good as at city schools.
"'Socialist society is still not communism and the differences in the level of education between rural and urban schools, a relic of history, still exist,' the news agency said. 'The gap is being narrowed step by step, but the only way to eliminate it completely is to develop primary and secondary education in the rural areas and raise their education standards. It cannot be done by changing the principle of selecting the best students.'
"Ma Po's mother is a novelist, his father a university administrator. Like many intellectually inclined party members, they were severely attacked during the Cultural Revolution of the late 1960s. Their son was similarly punished by being sent to work for five years in an Inner Mongolian rock quarry. In a recent Peking Review article he recalled the day when he was finally exonerated: 'I was so overjoyed that I rushed outside and ran wildly about and rolled on the snow.'" (Full text)
Detroit News - Playing 'the card'
The Detroit News (6/ 13/78) published this article by John P. Roche: "Ever since President Carter's national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, returned from Peking amidst rumors of glad tidings from the East I have been meditating on what is called 'playing the Chinese (Communist) card.'
"Operating on the conventional wisdom that my enemy's enemy is my friend, the theory postulates that it is in the American interest to build up the Chinese (Communists) against the Soviets. The last time this Machiavellianism was tried in a big way occurred in 1939 when Stalin embraced Hitler. As is well known, the policy was not an unmitigated success.
"For 30 years I have objected to the proposition that the United States could shape the Chinese future. From 1946 on into the 1950's, there was a group of Americans - Joe McCarthy and Richard Nixon prominent among them - who said we 'gave away China.'
"If you asked whether China was ours to 'give away: or made the common sense statement that President Truman would have triggered the greatest mutiny in military history if in 1945 he had told us, 'Now men, don't go home yet; we must protect China from the Reds,' somebody called you a 'commie.'
"Yet there was no cut-rate way to save the mainland from Mao. The Nationalists were exhausted from an endless war with Japan ... The Communists, fatuously billed as mere 'agrarian reformers' by some liberals and deliberately so designated by the Communists and fellow-travelers, were efficient, totalitarian and, in a more malignant sense, corrupt. However, their corruption was less visible: It involved corruption of the soul.
"When I said this a t the time Mr. Nixon and Mao were chumming it up, a number of impressionable American Sinologists accused me of ideological blindness, of failing to appreciate how the sainted Mao had transformed the (mainland) Chinese into anew, higher breed of humankind. Fortunately since then a cloud of witnesses have appeared, encouraged by Deputy Prime Minister Teng, to denounce the evils of the past. By comparison with their testimony, my charges were mild.
"In cold analytical terms, the Chinese (Communist regime) is the biggest concentration camp on earth, run by a military junta. Its major problems are domestic, notably maintaining the unity that has existed since 1950 against 'mountain-topism,' that is, regional Communist warlords. Han nationalism, which could be called belief in the Chinese 'master race,' is the most effective instrument for achieving internal cohesion. This in turn requires an external threat, provided in spades by Moscow's overreaction to Peking's impotent claims to huge chunks of Soviet turf.
"Peking's reliance on the Soviet enemy to keep the troops in line - since Vietnam the United States is useless for this purpose limits Teng's options. The odds against a rapprochement with Brezhnev are roughly those against drawing one card to fill an inside straight-flush. This leaves the present regime with a minimax strategy toward the United States. The minimum is to persuade the Americans to contribute substantially to (Red) China's modernization; the maximum is to stimulate a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union.
"This is not a Roche Fantasy. The late Chairman Mao openly stated on numerous occasions, in slightly varying formulations, that if there were a general nuclear war, the Americans, Europeans and Russians would be exterminated, but there would still be two or three hundred million Chinese. Those who think this nightmare vision vanished with its prophet should read the blood-curdling speech Chinese (Communist) Foreign Minister Huang Hua made to the United Nations disarmament session. Long-run Chinese Communist strategy is clearly posited on limited Armageddon rephrased as 'let's you and him have a nuclear war.'
"Thus when I hear the manipulative optimists in the ad ministration talk about 'playing the Chinese (Communist) card,' I get nervous. How, except in some meaningless juridical sense, can you talk of 'normalizing' relations with a regime that pleasantly anticipates your radioactivation?
"Moreover, since I suspect Deputy Prime Minister Teng is one of the shrewdest operators in history, I wonder what he has in mind when he contemplates 'playing the American card'?
"Let's not rush to the card table." (Partial text)
Wanderer - The 'Sea of Russia'
The Wanderer (6/8/78) published this article by Paul Scott from Taipei: "From this vantage point in the Far East, one can see the growing red shadow being cast over the western Pacific by the increasing military might of the Soviet Union.
"In the China sea lanes between this island-nation of 17,000,000 and Japan, more Soviet warships than U.S. can now be seen ploughing these waters - a clear sign of the changing balance of military power in the region.
"The seriousness of the situation was highlighted recently in a speech given by Shin Kane- maru, director general of Japan's Defense agency, a position equivalent to that held by the U.S. secretary of defense.
"Noting the continued Soviet military buildup in the western Pacific and the continued pullback of U.S. forces, Kanemaru warned:
" 'Russian warships and other vessels make such frequent appearance in the Sea of Japan and the Sea of China these days that we might as well refer to these waters as the Sea of Russia.'
"Kanemaru stressed the huge disparity in Soviet and U.S.- Japanese military air strength, pointing out that 'the Soviet Union deploys more than 2,000 aircraft in the Far East while the Japanese and the U.S. now have operational less than half that number.'
"As for the growing Soviet naval strength in the region, the information here is that the Russians' western Pacific fleet is now made up of 450 warships' or more than double the size of the U.S. fleet.
"The Soviet fleet includes 10 cruisers (of which five carry missiles), 80 destroyers, 25 nuclear-powered submarines and 85 conventional submarines, and a wide range of other naval support vessels.
"This changing balance of naval power has caused major newspapers in Tokyo and Taipei in recent days to headline articles stating that leaders in both Japan and Taiwan are concerned that the U.S. now lacks the power to defend this region.
"While U.S. diplomats and military commanders here and in Tokyo deny this loss of U.S. power, they do confirm that the Russians have been building up naval and air power in the Far East and the U.S. has been reducing its military forces. Should this present trend continue, they agree the forecast could become a reality.
"Although none of the U.S. military officers stationed here will speak out publicly for fear of being fired, nearly all indicate their private disagreement with President Carter's plans for pulling out U.S. forces from South Korea.
"The U.S. military is also strongly against breaking diplomatic and military ties with the Republic of Free China here, as is now being seriously considered by President Carter and his foreign policy advisers.
"The new alliance between Communist China and the U.S. which Zbigniew Brzezinski, the President's national security adviser, pushed during his visit to Peking is viewed as no answer to the growing Soviet military power, according to U.S. military officials here.
"Their answer is for the United States to strengthen its military and diplomatic ties with Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea while gradually increasing both our naval and air power in the western Pacific." (Partial text)