Taiwan Today

Dr. David Rowe urges the U.S. to forge diplomatic ties and formal security relations with Free China and stop deceiving itself about Peiping Where are the anti-Communist leaders of yesterday? There were thousands in high places not long ago—presidents of the United States and France, statesmen of many countries, scholars, intellectuals and actionists. They disappeared in the miasma of detente and appeasement. They vanished in the hope of "doing business" with Red China. They were deceived by the foolish supposition that it is always wrong to be "against" things and that if there is anything wrong with the Communists, it must be controlled through persuasion. A few doughty warriors are still around. We have our own Ku Cheng-kang and a number of others. Our President, Chiang Ching-kuo, has never deviated from his lifelong struggle against Communism. Premier Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore has not been fooled. In the United States, some congressmen and many leaders at the state level are still aware of the Communist threat. The American intellectual community has not wholly deserted the anti-Communist cause. Not all American academics regard pro-Chinese Communism as fashionable. One of these is David Nelson Rowe, emeritus professor of political science at Yale University. Professor Rowe, who holds degrees from Princeton and the Universities of Southern California and Chicago, and who studied at Havard and the College of Chinese Studies in Peiping, might not like to be called an anti-Communist. He has only contempt for the few professional sycophants of that calling. He is a historian who has specialized in the Far East for nearly half a century. His findings and opinions are based on fact and history, not on emotionalism. Dr. Rowe has traveled to the Far East almost annually for many years, and still does. He is an acknowledged specialist and authority on Korea and China. He has raised his voice at scores of anti-Communist and scholarly meetings, warning that the struggle for freedom and democracy will be won with realities and not with wishful thinking. In a recent interview with The Review of the News, David Rowe made some telling points about the current situation involving the Republic of China, the United States and the Chinese Communists. These are a few of the highlights: —The Chinese Communists seek to take over Taiwan in one way or another and "unify" China. —President Carter's recognition of the Chinese Communists was largely motivated by his political fear of Senator Kennedy. —Red China seeks to increase its strength so it can negotiate with the Soviet Union on an equal basis. —Playing of the Red China card against the U.S.S.R. is not something new in U.S. policy contemplations. —American businessmen visiting the Chinese mainland have transferred advice and technology and received nothing in return. —Modernization of Taiwan, Hongkong and Singapore shows what the Chinese can do with a revolution in mentality. —No accommodation is possible between the ROC and Red China—ever. —The United States can defend Taiwan by providing defensive weapons and retaining control of the necessary offensive weapons. —Trade with the Republic of China is far more important than that with the Chinese Communists. It should be protected by a viable defense and security arrangement, including some form of diplomatic relations. This would have the approval of every American ally in Asia. Dr. Rowe's new book, The Carter China Policy: Results and Prospects, is available from 19 Spring Rock Road, Branford, Connecticut 06405, for US$3.75. A partial text of the interview conducted by John Rees follows: Q. Dr. Rowe, the Carter administration has pressed a dramatic courtship of the People's Republic of China. What is behind this? A. What we have seen is the culmination of a policy the State Department has been developing for decades. The next objective is to allow the Chinese Communists to take over Taiwan one way or another and "unify" China, as they put it, on their own terms. After the Korean War, of course, the State Department had to put this effort into abeyance. President Nixon kicked it off again with his visit to Peiping. Both Presidents Nixon and Ford could have settled for the same terms of recognition that Carter eventually settled for, but that was not politically conceivable for either of them. Q. Why would even Jimmy Carter extend recognition to the Peiping regime on its own terms? A. In my estimation it was largely a result of political considerations. Carter wanted to grab this issue away from Senator Kennedy who in 1978 had taken all the attention away from him at the Democratic Midterm Convention. Kennedy then seemed to be threatening Carter and the President was alarmed. For years Senator Kennedy had advocated almost total surrender to Peiping; and Carter thought that by taking this issue himself, and proceeding with recognition, he would prevent Kennedy from utilizing it with the left wing of the Democratic party. That was probably the immediate motivation combined with the fact that the State Department had been pushing along these lines for years and was advising just such action. Q. When the Carter Administration announced that we were terminating our recognition of the Republic of China and initiating relations with the Chinese Reds, pundits in the mass media expressed the opinion that Peiping would serve as a military ally of the United States against the Soviet Union and might even go to war with Moscow while we sat outside and waited for the radioactive clouds to disappear. Do you think Peiping could ever be a military ally of ours against the U.S.S.R.? A. No, because to the extent that we build up Communist China, we will increase the motivation for both the Russians and Chinese (Communists) to come to terms with each other. You see the Chinese Communists are primarily concerned with attaining sufficient status as a world power to make it possible for them to speak to their brother Communists in Moscow on a more equal basis. The minute Peiping attains this level—or Peiping and Moscow think it has done so—there will be every reason for these two Communist regimes to cooperate openly again. Q. Are there any indications this process is underway? A. Indeed there are. They have on-going negotiations and the Chinese Communists have made some rather unprecedented moves in the direction of the Russians. Not that Peiping is offering to surrender anything vital. It never does. The objective is to increase Red Chinese strength so that Peiping can negotiate with its fellow Communists in Moscow on an equal basis. Q. Then there is no real advantage to the West in selling weapons or building up the P.R.C.'s industrial base? A. To repeat: To the extent we build up the Red Chinese, we motivate them to settle their differences with the Soviets. And if they do that they'll openly ally against us with the U.S.S.R. After all, these two Communist regimes have fundamental common bonds of ideology, sympathy and interests in the world. Q. That "(Red) China card" theory—using the P.R.C. against the U.S.S.R.—wasn't something new from Brzezinski, was it? A. Not at all. As early as the Johnson administration there were people in Washington, particularly in the State Department, who were thinking in terms of the current Brzezinski strategy of utilizing the Communist Chinese against the Russians. Even then I warned that this is a very dangerous game and one we were not capable of playing. I said this to the State Department at the undersecretary level, and in the end President Johnson did not do it. Then came Nixon. Q. Is there a marked difference in outlook between the present elderly Peiping leadership and a generation of younger or middle-aged leaders who will want to make major changes? A. No, you see what happens in Communist China is that they just hand over power from one old generation to another almost as old. It's always there and doesn't change. This is history. We saw Mao Tse-tung handing over power, supposedly, to Hua Kuo-feng. But Hua was a little too young, so they brought back 75-year-old Teng Hsiao-ping. And Teng will eventually be replaced by people who are only about 10 years younger. There is a built-in Chinese cultural prejudice against young people taking over from old people, and this is reflected in the Chinese Communist party. Q. Professor Rowe, over the past three years a lot of American and other Western technology has been transferred to the Red Chinese. Are any benefits likely to accrue to our country from this sort of trade? A. The businessmen who've gone in since Carter normalized relations in December, 1978, have transferred a lot of advice and technology for free and got nothing back in return. This problem of modernizing China dates back for three-quarters of a century and transfer of technology isn't going to do the job. Q. Why not? A. Let me give you a trivial example that will shed light on the greater problem. Back when Mao's Little Red Book was the standard text for all Red Chinese, they used to say that Peiping's pilots flew their planes with one hand and read the Little Red Book with the other. This was the symbolic way of saying that technology and efficiency are secondary to political orientation and direction. I use this seemingly insignificant illustration to show you what the real problem is. There can be no modernization of (mainland) China, technology or no technology, without a revolutionary political change. Q. What do you mean? A. I mean they've got to abandon their rigid centralization in policy making and control. They would have to open the avenues of communication so that everything that goes on in the country can be objectively criticized. You can call that freedom; I don't care what label you put on it. Let's not use any ideological label and simply say that any system that is based on a refusal to allow communications upward—that is one which allows only downward communications—cannot achieve modernization. Q. Are you saying centralization mandates rigidity and obsolescence? A. It's an objective fact. Any system that is based upon a total control of policy making in one center of power over an area as vast or greater than the United States, and where in fact the economy is so decentralized as to defy description, and which at the same time refuses to allow anyone to criticize the results of those policies, cannot modernize. Q. Is there any sign that the Peiping leadership might allow criticism of existing policies so as to improve efficiency if nothing else? A. No way. That is the point at which Teng Hsiao-ping called a halt last year. He allowed the (mainland) Chinese people to put up posters on walls in Peiping which were critical of party officials and economic and social policies. It developed that he couldn't tolerate even that and threw the critics in prison. Now he's totally blind to the absolute necessity of a political change if he is to succeed in economic modernization. He's totally blind. Not only are all the signs pointing away from freedom in communications, but Teng believes in the "inherent superiority" of his system. I'm not talking about the Communist system in a vacuum, but in (mainland) China as applied to the (mainland) Chinese. If you want to see the sort of modernization of which the Chinese people are capable, look at Taiwan, look at Hongkong, look at Singapore. That's where the modern Chinese revolution is. It's a revolution in mentality that has allowed the technological revolution to be effective. You see, some people say all you have to do is "modernize technologically" and everything else will be changed as a result. That's putting the thing backwards. Q. And that is the major theme of your recent book, U.S.-China Policy Today, 1979-1980. Do you think that the P.R.C. will try to use the Republic of China on Taiwan either as an example for modernizing or in other ways? A. They will certainly examine Taiwan and try to see how the free Chinese manage their economy and adapt technologies. But remember, the adaptation of new technologies in Taiwan and the other areas I have cited is partially a result of Americans and others coming in freely, introducing the materials themselves on a profit-making basis, training local people to do the work, teaching modern management, and so on. No such access is permitted in the P.R.C. Q. Is any sort of accommodation possible between Taipei and Peiping? A. None. Zero. And it's not going to change. Q. That is also what Taipei's ambassador said in the United States when we interviewed him in these pages several months ago. A. Konsin Shah? Q. Yes. He was absolutely emphatic about that. A. Of course. It's not just a matter of the Taiwanese government saying that this is their policy. It is their policy. You recall those people who were tried recently in Kaohsiung? One of them had traveled to Japan and made contact with the P.R.C. embassy in Tokyo. Then he went over to Peiping on business to sell eels from Taiwan to the mainland. Do you know happened? Q. Well, eel fishing is very profitable. A. Yes, and eel production is a big business in Taiwan. But, when he came back to Taiwan, one of the major points in his indictment and conviction on charges of conspiracy and subversion was his "business ties" to Peiping. So if selling eels can have that result, there is no chance of Taipei yielding on more substantive issues with the P.R.C. Q. Is the Carter administration trying to push Taiwan into the arms of the regime on the mainland? A. Well, Washington did meddle in this trial and issued a very injudicious "human rights" statement which was a gratuitous interference in the autonomy and sovereignty of the Republic of China. Q. We are told that a substantial number of first-and second-generation overseas Chinese who are being invited back to visit the mainland have established a harmonious relationship. Is that really the case or is it just propaganda? A. Some go back to visit family members, but little trade has resulted. In the early days of their rule, the Chinese Communists could not tolerate even a program in which their people would be exposed to outside ideas and influences. Now, of course, the Peiping regime wants to send a number of young people to study here and in other Western countries to learn modern sciences and technology. I don't see how Red China will be able to tolerate this for long. It is almost impossible to educate people in the American way of doing things without changing their entire mentality. Can you imagine Peiping allowing those "students" to go back and poison Red China's system with the American way of doing things? I don't believe they'll ever tolerate that. Q. Apparently our mass media are reporting on the exceptions. A. That's the trouble, you see. The American journalist just loves anything, exceptional or not, that can be presented to support his own view of how we should deal with the Chinese Communists. The American media are by and large staffed with people who believe that you can profitably do business with Peiping. This is a fallacy. Q. Let's explore that point. From an economic viewpoint, is there any advantage to U.S. trade with Peiping? A. We are already getting more trade in textiles than our American unions want to see. Piled up in warehouses in Seattle is the entire annual quota of cotton shirts made in the P.R.C. It cannot be admitted into this country because it would knock out the whole quota. The main thing that has happened in trade is that American entrepreneurs in the oil and petroleum-products business have gone to Peiping with great expectations. They've been allowed to make the preliminary surveys of the offshore oil situation, in return for which they have had to pay the Chinese Communists—with no guarantee of equity of any kind in the final result, whatever it might be. Q. Yet a number of oil companies have gone in even under those conditions. A. When one went in, everybody else decided to do the same—the British, the Americans and all the rest. Now we see them operating in the P.R.C. on a totally non-profit basis. That can't go on forever because these companies are dependent on profits. If the P.R.C. is just tolerating them while it squeezes out the transfer of technology, it won't last. Q. What could a new administration in the White House do to build or rebuild bridges with the Republic of China on Taiwan? A. There are two things that have to be done. We have to restore some form of diplomatic relations between the United States and the people on Taiwan and the government of the Republic of China, even if it's only a liaison office. Then we have to re-engage in a new security arrangement between our two countries. The U.S. should want to see that Taiwan remains immune from Communist control. Our dilemma is that we haven't wanted to give them the military equipment necessary to defend themselves because we are afraid they might use it on the P.R.C. Therefore, we might reserve the offensive equipment to ourselves—that's what you can do under a security treaty—and give them only defensive weapons while we retain "offensive" weapons for defending Taiwan in our own hands. That's what has to be done. It would solve the whole problem of the security of Taiwan. Q. What about continuing relations with Peiping? A. The masters of the regime in Peiping need us far more than we need them, and so they are not going to break with us. Q. Do you see our economic relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan remaining strong? A. The outstanding problem is that of sustaining our current economic interests and relationships with Taiwan, which as you no doubt know are far, far greater than anything we have with the P.R.C. The volume of trade between the 17 million people on Taiwan and the United States is greater than the volume of trade we have with the 800 million on the mainland. Some people say, well, why worry when we're still trading. The problem is that the P.R.C.'s leaders have clearly stated, time and time again, that their aim is to take over Taiwan one way or another, by force, by intimidation, or in any way possible. So if we want to sustain the profitability of our relationship with the Chinese people on Taiwan, and above all if we want to avoid the sort of catastrophic total political defeat that would come from our selling 17 million people into Communist slavery, we are going to have to develop some kind of security arrangement. We had it before; it worked fine for 25 years. Then at one stroke, in December, 1978, Jimmy Carter gave it all away. Q. Are you opposed to any trade and relations with Red China? A. I've never said we shouldn't do business with the mainland. What I am saying is that to sustain American interests in Taiwan, which are not only economic, but also political, we have to have a viable defense and security arrangement. And the only way we can do that is to enter into some form of diplomatic relations with the Republic of China. Q. And that would reassure Japan, Australia, and every American ally in Asia. A. Every ally. Every one!