Taiwan Today

First, it brought distinguished scholars together to discuss in candid detail the impact of Taiwan's process of liberalization and democratization upon modern academic theories of development — those often abstruse but necessary theoretical paradigms that help make comparative politics possible.

Second, the conference for the first time brought together members of both the ruling party and the opposition to discuss their perceptions of Taiwan's development experience and its relevance for current and future liberalization and democratization.

The historic exchange in a public, international forum gained wide media coverage and augured well for further progress toward attaining what co-convener of the conference Dr. Stephen Haggard of Harvard's CFIA called "something to be encouraged," namely: "the institutionalization of the lines of communication between the ruling party or the dominant party and the opposition. "

Third, the conference happily departed from the dull and wasteful format of having people slowly read long papers to each other. Instead, the 15 paper presenters gave crisp summaries of their papers, which were invariably followed by stimulating commentaries. Then, each of the five main sessions reserved considerable time for questions, answers, and amplifications involving all the participants.

Wise conference planning led to positive results, and a fourth goal was amply achieved: education. For the conference served complex — and ambitious — educational functions, including (1) informing renowned political scientists with specialties in development theory but limited experience about the Taiwan case; (2) giving both the ruling party and opposition party members an opportunity to air their interpretations of the Taiwan experience publicly, and then defend their views in a free-wheeling academic atmosphere; and (3) giving a broad range of scholars, experts, and media people an opportunity to place local experience info a broader intellectual context, and ask not only where Taiwan is heading, but also what the Taiwan experience can offer other countries in the developing world.

Economically and socially, the general outline of the Taiwan success story is well-known. Sometimes the word "miracle" is used to emphasize the surprisingly rapid growth, significant structural changes, improved living standards, and considerable political democratization the island has achieved in a greatly telescoped period of time.

But evaluations of the performance of the ROC on Taiwan — by academics, journalists, and others-often focus primarily on the island's economic and social achievements, while brushing over its political accomplishments. Yet any analysis of the Taiwan scene that ignores Taiwan's political transformations, especially since July 15, 1987 when the Emergency Decree that activated martial law was lifted, is sorely limited.

A recognition of this fact, and an indication of Taiwan's importance as a political development model as much as an economic and social one, came in January 9-11 this year during the international conference co-sponsored by CFIA of Harvard University and IIR of National Chengchi University.

Twenty top political scientists from the U.S. and 160 local scholars and experts met to examine in depth the political development in Taiwan during the past four decades; the main goal of the conference was to determine the implications of that experience for general "development theory" in the province of political science.

As President Lee Teng-hui said in his written message to the conference participants: "The developmental processes and achievements of the Republic of China on Taiwan have in recent years received widespread international attention and approval. This is because, in addition to creating a model of economic growth and equal prosperity, we have also achieved complementary political development...We would like to share this experience with all countries striving after modernization, and we also crave your advice."

Dr. Chang King-yuh, director of the IIR, spoke further on the theme presented by President Lee in his opening remarks: "If one looks at the political record of the Republic of China since 1950, especially in comparison with its own past, with its neighbors, and with other developing countries in general, one cannot fail to be impressed by its achievements." These include "maintaining political stability and political institutionalization," "ensuring political participation and local self-government," and "achieving rapid economic growth, equitable distribution of wealth, and expanding educational and employment opportunities."

Chang added that observers of the current phase of the ROC's political development and democratization usually emphasize "the leadership of the late president Chiang Ching-kuo and the commitment of the elites; Taiwan's high level of economic, social, and educational development; the sense of mission of the majority Kuomintang Party and the government; and also, increased political competition and external influences."

The joint IIR-CFlA conference had particularly broad impact because some of the most eminent political scientists in the U.S. were prominent participants. Among these were: Dr. Samuel P. Huntington, director of the CFIA, and two of his colleagues at the Center, Drs. Stephen Haggard and Eric Nordlinger; Dr. Seymour Martin Lipset of the Hoover Institution and Russel Sage Foundation, and one of the best-known political scientists in the U.S.; Dr. Myron Weiner, director of the Center for International Studies at MIT; Dr. Andrew Nathan of Columbia University's East Asian Institute; Dr. Susan Pharr, director of Harvard's U.S.-Japan Program; and other distinguished scholars from some of America's best institutions of higher learning.

Chinese participants came from both inside and outside academe, with experts drawn from the fields of politics, sociology, economics, law, foreign affairs, and mass communications. But most significantly — and itself an indication of the progress made toward full democratization in the ROC — leaders of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) were for the first time official participants in a public, international conference along with members of the ruling party.

The full participation of the DPP members of the conference, including being members of various panels and taking active part in all discussion sessions, was repeatedly referred to during the conference as a milestone in the steady and sagacious political progress being made in Taiwan.

Extensive coverage of the conference by the local media ensured that all views expressed during the meetings reached a broader audience. And since there were lively exchanges between KMT, DPP, and non-partisan members among the Chinese participants, the visiting American scholars were able to supplement the 15 papers presented at the conference with substantial insights derived during the lengthy discussion times built into the format of the conference.

Professor Huntington set the intellectual context for both the papers and discussions on democratization in Taiwan with his opening keynote address. In brief, he called upon participants to place the Taiwan experience in a larger framework, the worldwide trend toward more democracy, so that the broader intellectual community could better understand the implications of the Taiwan experi­ence for other developing, liberalizing, and democratizing societies.

Huntington pointed out that just as "the economic rise of East Asia is clearly one major trend altering fundamentally the balance of world power," a second major trend has occurred in politics — "the transition to democracy in a large number of countries throughout the world." The latter has been a "remarkable democratic surge" in the past fifteen years based upon such factors as "economic wealth," the economic and military failures of undemocratic regimes, "the increased communica­tion and interaction among societies that have encouraged the spread of democratic values and ideas" and the "concepts of legitimacy," and the encouragement and in­fluence from the most powerful democratic countries in the world. These factors have been particularly relevant during the past three years in East Asia, "most notably in [South] Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan."

But Huntington added that assessing the future of democracy, including that in Taiwan, requires close attention to three areas:

• First, "there is a very clear correlation between democracy and economic development, and the economic and social preconditions for democratic political order clearly have come into existence here on Taiwan." These include a complex economy; a large middle class dominating the social scene; an overwhelmingly urban and literate population; increasing numbers of social groups, civic associations, and labor unions; a high per capita income; and new sources of power independent of govern­ment control. This "process, so far has been largely one of transformation ... democratization is an on-going process, and one that is becoming increasingly irreversible."

• Second, "the KMT regime has been one of three non-Communist one-party regimes that came into existence in the third decade of this century" (the others were the Republican People's Party in Turkey and the regime led by what is now called the Institutional Revolutionary Party in Mexico). "In all three cases, the identity of the state was defined by the ideology of the party." Thus, "the KMT defined the Republic of China in terms of Chinese nationalism and Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles [of the People]."

Now, in Taiwan, "a new political movement has arisen to challenge the Chinese national identity and argue for an independent Taiwan." This raises sweeping problems, including the area of security. But there is a significant problem at the core of this issue: If a political opposition, which is legitimate in democratic societies, chal­lenges the identity of the state as defined by the dominant party, it would be tantamount to engaging in an act of treason. How can it then be considered legitimate? This can be seen "as a crucial problem in the democratization process, and one that must be faced squarely."

• Third, "there is the question of culture and its impact on democratization." Here the issue is whether or not "the emphases in traditional Confucian culture on order, discipline, hierarchy, and primacy of the group over the individual, are obstacles to democratic development." Of course, there is also the question of just how strong Confucian values actually are in Taiwan, as well as whether these are an assistance or a hindrance to democratization.

Huntington, as Professor Weiner [see interview], emphasized that too much emphasis on Confucian harmony may forestall democratic development. In light of the "unprecedented upsurge in protests, demonstrations, strikes, riots, even scuffles in the legislature" in Taiwan during the past two years, some people have been deeply concerned. "Reflecting, perhaps, traditional Confucian commitments to order, formality, and decorum, many people here have expressed concern about these developments which they see as the unfortunate and disturbing consequences of democratization."

But Huntington sought "to reassure these people," saying that "in general, democracies are often unruly, but they are rarely unstable." While it is true that people may "march, shout, confront, and be disorderly," a look at history shows that "in complex and developed societies, democratic governments are very stable. Just as violent social revolutions never produce democracies, democracies never produce violent social revolutions."

In closing, Huntington called upon the members of his profession, political scientists, to show that "a close connection exists between the development of the disci­pline of political science, and the development of democracy." Adding that while non-democratic societies may be outstanding in fields like physics and mathematics, "they are never outstanding in the field of political science." As Professor Lipset says in another context [see interview], political scientists as intellectuals are "critical," whether they come from the left or the right. "Part of their role is to set standards," Lipset said, "and to be critical because every status quo is full of entrenched interests seeking to maintain it. They are to be the people to hold up goals for the system."

Huntington concluded with a call on political scientists in Taiwan to "playa key role in helping find answers" to the challenges of democratization, and "in devising whatever new institutional forms of democracy that may be appropriate and required."

The conference sessions examined five major subjects: (1) the social and economic background to political change; (2) the electoral system and political behavior; (3) the future role of the Kuomintang and the development of other political parties; (4) constitutional and institutional change; and (5) external implications of ROC democratization.

On the first subject, three papers provided background and focus for an animated discussion: "Economic Liberalization in Taiwan" by Dr. Wu Rong-yi of National Chung Hsing University; "Emerging Social Movements and the Rise of a Participatory Political Culture in Taiwan" by Dr. Michael Hsin-huang Hsiao of Academia Sinica; and "Transitions from Authoritarianism in East Asia: Empirical Observations" by Dr. Thomas B. Gold and Dr. Shieh Gwo-shyong, both of the University of California, Berkeley.

Dr. Wu pointed out that the ROC's fast pace of growth in the past 40 years has resulted in the increase in per capital GNP from US$200 to US$6000, which is one of the fastest growth rates in the developing world. The factors that caused the accelerated development of the economy are very complicated, but rapid industrialization is seen as the key factor. This success can be mainly attributed to the government's simultaneous adoption of a policy of import substitution and export promotion. Regarding liberalization in the past years, Wu said there have been definite achievements, but many things still remain to be done, such as continued tariff reductions, removal of import controls, and revision of unfavorable regulations.

Dr. Charles Kao, publisher of the economic monthly Commonwealth, added several points worthy of consideration in his commentary. First, part of the reason for Taiwan's success rests in its "sense of mission" following the central government's relocation to Taipei in 1949; this gave "a sense of cohesion." Second, the process of liberalization is somewhat uneven. It is too slow and limited, for example, in the areas of banking reform and privatization; both will require "painful adjustment. "

Dr. Michael Hsiao indicated in his paper that Taiwan's civil society has been mobilized through the experience and learning process provided by social movements, es­pecially those during the 1980s. He said that Taiwan's society can now be characterized as a "demanding civil society," one with a new kind of "participatory political culture" as its social and psychological base. "People realize that the only way to change the current course of the system is to participate in the process of change, as has just begun recently," he concluded.

Professor Lipset's commentary emphasized the importance of recognizing patterns in social movements. One of the key changes, he said, was in the ruling party (KMT) itself, which was in a process of shifting away from "a Leninist model" of party organization and operation to one much more democratic. Thus, Taiwan offers both a model and a useful comparative perspective for other strong, one-party states that are moving toward greater democratic environments.

Lipset also observed that the Western experience with the phenomenon of development was "gradualism," which occurred both in the U.S. and Europe. But Taiwan is experiencing much quicker development. On the whole, however, the same conditions are present in Taiwan that were useful for democratization in other Western countries. In conclusion, he touched on the theme of competitive politics, saying that the development of an arena of "institutionalized conflict" would assist the democratization process.

The paper by Drs. Gold and Shieh reviews the experiences of Taiwan and South Korea during their transitions from authoritarian to democratic societies. Clearly, while the two share many experiences, their differences are perhaps more numerous. During the discussion, Gold emphasized the importance of studying this topic: "The ROC experience is one of the greatest stories in the second half of the 20th century. One of the things that surprises me over and over again is the ignorance of the experience of Taiwan throughout the rest of the world, especially in many academic institutions. Most recent studies that attempt to explain the new democratization trend have concentrated on the cases in Latin America and to a certain extent in southern Europe. In general the East Asian experience has been largely neglected."

The second panel on the local electoral system and political behavior included papers on "The Electoral System and Voting Behavior in Taiwan" by Drs. Lui Fei-lung and Chen Yi-yan of National Chengchi University, and "Democratizing the Kuomintang Regime in Taiwan" by Dr. Cheng Tun-jen of the University of California, San Diego.

Lui and Chen explained that eleven kinds of public officials in Taiwan are elected directly or indirectly by the people. Elections started in 1946, the second year after the retrocession of Taiwan to China, and there has been a total of 84 regional and national elections held since then. The polling rate is usually at 60 to 70 percent, sometimes as high as 80 percent.

In voting behavior, they noted that party orientation does not exert much influence. Issue orientation also counts little. Instead, candidate orientation is highly influential in determining voting behavior, and most importantly, "the primary social relationship is the most important link and communication channel in social, economic, and political life in Taiwan, as well as the main determinant in voting behavior."

Professor Cheng pointed out that the emergence of a new political opposition in Taiwan during the latter half of the 1970s created a situation of strategic interaction between the KMT and its challengers. "The political opposition under the leadership of social science-trained intellectuals was able to set the agenda, shift the bargaining arenas, and thus create a competitive political edge. The KMT government under the reformist leadership was able to reset the agenda, incorporate the opposition into the revamped political framework, and reconsolidate its dominant position."

Cheng concluded by saying that a lapse into authoritarianism is very unlikely for Taiwan because "the rule of the game is becoming more entrenched and the cost of political reversal is extremely high."

The third panel focused on the development of political parties in Taiwan. In "The Changing Roles of KMT in the Political System of Taiwan," Dr. Jiang Ping-lun of National Chengchi University and Dr. Wu Wen-cheng of Soochow University said that the KMT has gradually transformed itself from an authoritarian and exclusionary party into a pragmatic and inclusive party, and that it has done so in response to the changing demands of the electorate. The authoritarian one-party system has moved to the threshold of a democratic and competitive party system.

In his paper "Political Opposition in Taiwan: A Case Study of the Democratic Progressive Party," Dr. Lu Ya-li of National Taiwan University dealt with the emergence and evolution of the DPP, its structure and problems of factionalism, and its role in Taiwan's political development. Lu gave two "theories" on the possible prospects of Taiwan's future party system. One is that given the prestige, popularity, enormous resources, and organizational expertise of the KMT, it is very difficult for the small, faction-ridden DPP to develop into an equal rival in the foreseeable future. Therefore Taiwan may develop a party system similar to that of Japan.

The other is that, with the departure of powerful leaders, the ruling party could be afflicted with factionalism, apathy of grassroots members, and antagonism between a reformed-minded elite and the conservative party bureaucrats. In this scenario, it would be reasonable to expect the DPP to become a serious rival of the KMT, and even to assume eventually the responsibility of governing in the next decade. Thus, Taiwan would have a two-party system in 10 to 15 years.

As one of the commentators in this session, Chang Chun-hong, secretary-general of the DPP Central Committee, argued that "the rise of the middle class in Taiwan and its increasing possession of the resources in terms of wealth, economic power, and knowledge should be considered as the driving force toward democracy." Chang also claimed that the emergence of the DPP and its continuous growth in strength are a result mainly of the support of these middle class people.

In the fourth panel on constitutional and institutional change, Dr. Fa Jyh-pin of National Chengchi University dealt with "The Evolution of Constitutional Interpretation in the ROC since 1947," paying special attention to the function of the Council of Grand Justices which is responsible for the interpretation of the ROC Constitution. On his paper "Constitutional Democracy and Institutional Adaptions," Dr. Jen Teh-hou of National Taiwan University indicated that the ROC's Constitution needs further adjustments in order to provide a new basis for a political system that is even more democratic.

As a discussant in the panel, former DPP chairman Yao Chia-wen noted that in view of many realities, such as the ROC de facto territory under control, the Constitu­tion should be amended and a new parliament be formed, and a new Council of Grand Justices be set up.

Dr. Edwin A. Winckler, an independent consultant researching East Asian development, presented a paper on "Taiwan Politics in the 1990s: From Hard to Soft Au­thoritarianism." lie indicated that by the mid-1990s Taiwan will have completed a transition to "soft" authoritarianism, under which leadership will be redefined with a coalition of military, party, and government officials, and the party-state will have encouraged more autonomous social organizations. He added that some of the major processes that will affect Taiwan's political development from the late 1980s through the mid-1990s include the 13th KMT National Congress in 1988, national and local elections in 1989, the presidential election in 1990, and the" Hong Kong issue" in 1997.

Winckler also encouraged the opposition DPP leaders to develop a "bread and butter" program: "In the past ten years, I have seen the tang wai [referring to the opposition; literally, 'outside the party'] every time I came here, and I asked 'when are you people going to do some public policy research and put forward concrete, legislative proposals?' Although so far several organizations with the title of public policy research organizations have been set up by the DPP, to the best of my knowledge no such research really has ever been done and no such proposal has been put forth. "

Winckler's suggestion that the DPP should reconsider its priorities, and turn away from the "Taiwan independence" issue (which at least one participant referred to as "a loser") and concentrate instead on key domestic issues like pollution, social welfare programs, and the like was echoed several times during the course of the meetings.

One of the two papers discussed at the last panel on external implications of ROC democratization was by Drs. Tsai Cheng-wen and Ming Chu-cheng of National Taiwan University, entitled "International Implications of the ROC's Democratization." They said that compared with its past image in the world, "either as an authoritarian regime or even as a Leninist regime," the greatest benefit democratization brings to Taiwan is a remarkable improvement of its image. Taiwan has the potential to turn into a second Japan in Asia, sharing international economic and security responsibilities. To the developing countries, "Taiwan's experience powerfully suggests that the miserable fate that 'dependency theorists' have postulated may not be as deterministic as it appears. Perhaps a reexamination of the modernization theory and the dependency theories will better explain the Taiwan case and help shed light on the future of the countries that intend to follow the model."

In his paper entitled "The Effect of Taiwan's Political Reform on Taiwan-Mainland Relations," Dr. Andrew Nathan indicated that political democratization in Taiwan has affected events within mainland China in fairly obvious ways — essentially by subjecting Peking leaders to the pressure of a competing political model. Less obvious are its effects on the evolution of Taiwan-mainland relations. As to the future prospects for these relations, according to Dr. Nathan, they can be sketched in terms of three scenarios. The first is for increasing tension in the Taiwan Straits; the second is for the maintenance of the current situation, "understood as de facto independence which is growing increasingly viable economically and diplomatically, despite continuing political tensions over it, but which remains unofficial." And the third is "an eleventh-hour negotiated agreement between the KMT and the CCP which legitimizes the de facto independence of the island under the thin disguise of an affirmation of China's unity." But such an agreement could only be effective if it won the support of the Taiwan electorate, he added.

Commenting on Dr. Nathan's paper, Dr. Kau Ying-mao of Brown University outlined the Chinese Communists' effort to isolate Taiwan as much as possible. "The Chinese Communists now are using a strategy of what I would call the 'Hongkongnization' of Taiwan, using a very sophisticated approach — the so-called 'united front strategy'— to increase economic integration across the Straits to reduce the political unity within Taiwan and increase Taiwan's international isolation. If this strategy succeeds, then the Communists will be able to impose the 'one country, two systems' formula on Taiwan in the near future. The reason Hong Kong cannot resist Peking's imposition of the 'one country, two systems' formula is because of the economic dependency of Hong Kong, lack of political will in Hong Kong to resist, and the international isolation of Hong Kong. So here I would suggest that Andy Nathan's assessment should be more critical and more careful."

Dr. Stephen Haggard of CFIA brought the conference to an end with "critical and careful" concluding comments. After indicating that Taiwan's development experience, from the perspective of comparative political scientists, fulfills "all the various conditions" for eventually achieving full democratization, he raised several key points:

First, "the question isn't just whether democracy will take place, but the shape democracy will take, the nature of the institutions that emerge, and also the effects of the democratic process on other issues that are of importance: stability, social justice, economic development, and so forth."

Second, there is "a distinction between liberalization and democratization. While martial law has been lifted, and the political and legal base for independent political action is being put into place, these developments have been very recent and have yet to be fully implemented. When we talk about democratization as a change of regime, at least in American social science, we mean specifically the submission of central authoritative offices to political competition, and clear lines of distinction between party and state. This has yet to occur, and it may be some time before it does."

Third, "occasionally we have confused liberalization and democratization with responsiveness. There is little doubt that the KMT government has been extremely effective and is becoming increasingly responsive ... but responsiveness is not the same as democracy, which generally makes reference to a process by which certain outcomes are arrived at, and not those outcomes themselves."

Fourth, amplifying a comment made in an earlier discussion by Professor Arthur A. Waldron of Princeton, "the very effectiveness of the KMT," and the difficulty that the opposition will have in challenging it in this regard, "has led the opposition to focus its energies not only on the question of democratization, but also on the very tricky question of national identity... this strikes me as a somewhat high risk strategy, both domestically and internationally."

Finally, from the perspective of economic change, "one would expect certain distributional conflicts to increase." Thus, "to keep Taiwan's democracy going, as well as its economic development, is clearly going to require some fairly wide-ranging reforms of the economic structure: trade liberalization, reform of the financial system, privatization of public enterprises, and so forth."

The conference is now history; but it provided scholars, both from Taiwan and the U.S., with valuable issues for reexamination and redirection. As Dr. Chang King-yuh pointed out in his closing speech: "In the future, democratization will continue as political participation in the broadest sense of the term is assured by activists and ordinary citizens. More and more diverse civic organizations will emerge to inform the public and to influence public policy. Information will be more readily available, and the legislative bodies will become increasingly more powerful and influential.

"The government will be more open with such acute pressure from different interest groups. In addition, a genuine, competitive political party system will appear. All the parties will seek greater popular support. The KMT will be challenged by both the right and the left. However, it's more than likely that as long as the KMT remains united and maintains its good economic and social performance, it will continue to have majority support."

President Lee Teng-hui made it clear, while receiving the group of scholars after the conference, that "there is no precedent in history for a democracy to be built under gunfire, and the ROC has to accelerate the pace of its democ­ratization despite Peking's refusal to renounce the use of force to resolve the disputes between the two sides. Even though its achievements in democratiza­tion have gradually won admiration and respect in the international community, the ROC will not be content because it knows that problems in the future will be more difficult and complicated."

Conference Comments

There was an overall feeling among participants that the meetings were a great success. Dr. Susan Pharr, professor of government and director of the U.S.-Japan Program in Harvard University, said: "The relative understanding we have about Taiwan in the United States has been of very strong economic changes. That knowledge has been very shallow when it comes to what's happened here in the last two years in the political climate. But I think the increasing international knowledge now between the American and Taiwan academic circles in a conference such as this is a very helpful and very important step. And I hope there will be more conferences like this in the future, and there will be more efforts to increase our knowledge on what's happening in Taiwan. Democratization itself and the trend in that direction are very important. And I think it will help in Taiwan's image problem internationally.

"I think everyone attending this conference has been deeply impressed by the chance to hear the two sides [KMT and DPP] present their views, and particularly to hear the position of the DPP which until now people have not been exposed to. We are impressed by their leaders' making their development policies and programs known.

"The economic dynamics here is really overwhelming. I'm a Japan specialist. It's really fascinating to see in comparison just what has been going on here economically."

DPP Legislator Kang Ning-hsiang, who also attended the conference, expressed his opinions about the meetings: "To put all the sectors together here to discuss Taiwan's political reform and social and political development is an improvement as well as a necessary move. The function of any political party is to offer different choices for the people, and to solicit public opinions to forge national will. This conference is the first international occasion that all political parties, left and right, are put together to discuss national affairs. It's a healthy phenomenon and should be a model for later occasions.

"In the past 40 years, support from the United States has been important to Taiwan. To win continued American support and understanding, we also have to first win the support and understanding of these scholars who can influence the U.S. government's Asian policy, especially those 'China hands' such as Dr. Huntington and Dr. Andrew Nathan. From their papers, we can see their expectations and criticisms. With the more open society emerging in Taiwan in recent years, especially in political openness, they must be glad to see that.

"This kind of conference should be expanded to include scholars of Asian studies from all other countries that have great concern with the ROC's future development in various aspects. Local people in all walks of life, no mailer what political party they are for, should also be invited to attend. After all, the survival and prosperity of Taiwan is the major concern of the 20 million people living here."

In addition to saying that the DPP would accept invitations to participate in future international conferences, Kang suggested that "the area of politics and issues such as foreign trade should also be covered, since Taiwan is now one of the four NICs in Asia."

Interviews — Key Issues

BY RICHARD R. VUYLSTEKE

On the last day of the conference, FCR asked two of America's most prominent political scientists- Professor Seymour Martin Lipset of the Hoover Institution and Russel Sage Foundation, and Professor Myron Weiner, director of the Center for International Studies at MIT— to reflect on the central issues raised by the papers and discussions during the three days of sessions. Excerpts follow:

FCR: What are the key issues that have arisen during this conference?

Lipset: I'd say there are a number of things. First, the Taiwan experience seems to fit almost perfectly the expectations of comparative theory and comparative observations. Namely, after a country becomes affluent, has a large middle class that is educated, and the like, one would expect it to liberalize politically, and to democra­tize. These are the sort of optimum conditions for democratization, and these have occurred. So now you see it is happening here.

Somewhat similarly, pressure from below is important. In South Korea there's been more, and in Taiwan less, but both places have the kind of conditions which one would expect in a democratic state.

Another aspect is that democratization in Taiwan is coming from the top. And things are going very well. It's not that they have to change the political system, but that the political system is probably out of whack with social patterns. Plus, of course, the international scene has been important in the sense that they have wanted to look better, especially vis-à-vis the mainland, to the rest of the world. This is a kind of pressure on the regime to change now rather than later.

FCR: Given the conference discussions, what seem to be the most positive signs of continued democratization in Taiwan?

Lipset: Well, I think the conference itself is a positive indication. For instance, someone said it was the first time that you have the opposition people with different points of view at the same place discussing things in a friendly, or at least in an enlight­ened fashion. They are interacting socially and intellectually, which should go on in any normal democratic society.

You assume this [conference] takes place basically under the auspices of the government — the President is involved, and so on — so I think that the very fact that you have people discussing both the bad things and the changes that have occurred here points to a very positive situation.

But I think it might have been worthwhile to have a session or at least a paper that took a devil's advocate role — that is, raising the question about what kinds of things could lead to failure. What are the things that one has to watch out for? What has been alluded to during the discussion in this respect primarily has been economic. That is, if the economy turns down, more likely due to international events, this could put a great strain on the system. Since it is a new democratic system where you don't have the institutionalized norms, this could lead to problems.

This is related to the second problem, which is the mainland. Presumably they are on the lookout for opportunity, and if you get a crisis here, it could give them a chance to subsidize trouble. Or for their own reasons, they could go back to a more active aggressive stance.

FCR: What do you think are other potential internal problems for Taiwan besides an economic downturn?

Lipset: I would assume that there are people in the party [KMT] here in Taiwan who will not be happy with having to yield power. There are people here who might say 'If we go to free elections, then we might lose, and so we shouldn't do this thing.' And if there are any signs of trouble, they might use these to press their case.

FCR: What is the role of intellectuals in the process of democratization?

Lipset: Of course there is a question first of definition, of what is an intellectual.

Sometimes people would define an intellectual as being what you would call the intelligentsia - the people who are highly educated and use ideas. But then there are those who produce ideas; these are the real intellectuals. I wouldn't say, for example, that a highly educated civil servant or a cabinet minister is an 'intellectual.' An intel­lectual can become a minister, of course, but this is a different role.

The intellectual who is outside the system in most societies tends to be critical, from the left or the right. Arthur Schlesinger once said 'An intellectual who is a defender of the status quo is not an intellectual — he's a public relations man!' It's not the role of the intellectual to defend and explicate the government's position. Part of their role is to set standards, that is to have standards for society that are higher in terms of local values, and to be critical because every status quo is full of entrenched interests seeking to maintain it. They are to be the people to hold up goals for the system.

And this doesn't come from just one direction — people may be Confucian intellectuals and say, 'Look, we're going away from what is the traditional line of things in Chinese culture, and we should go back.' As well, people could say, 'We should move forward to a more egalitarian and more productive kind of society.' And there could be all kinds of debates among these intellectuals. Also, they can 'produce.' The professional job of intellectuals, such as political and social scientists, is to analyze the system and produce data about what is going on — asking obvious things, such as how much movement there is in the system, and what's happening to egalitarianism.

FCR: What has been the most striking image about Taiwan from this, your first trip here?

Lipset: This ties in somewhat with my first trip to South Korea a year ago. I knew intellectually what to expect from my reading, but to see firsthand this relative affluence from a society which you knew was extremely poor a few years back is terribly impressive. So when I came here for the first time, I had much the same reaction about the degree of movement here.

I think this is terribly important, as I've mentioned in the conference. There has been a general feeling among Westerners considering development — and among people in less developed countries — that the process of development is inherently long-term and gradual, and that this is therefore an endemic source of major tension because, given the modern communications media, people everywhere in the world know what it is to live well. Of course, in the 18th Century they didn't. People in North America didn't say, 'Well, those people in London live this way and we don't.'

But the process of development in some countries is faster, and very slow in others. The Taiwan and South Korean experiences — and the Japanese too — suggest that it can be done within a generation. Of course, there are prerequisites, cultural and otherwise, that other countries don't have, but the argument that it can't be done is not true. I think the people that this should have the most impact on are the Communists. The Soviets always say the U.S. started way ahead and had all kinds of advantages, so they have to catch up — they say socialism will catch up with capitalism eventually. But Japan, Korea, and Taiwan started way behind them — and now they are leaving the Soviets behind!

Well, I've never talked to Russians about Korea or Taiwan, but I've discussed Japan. And they end up with some kind of racial thing — 'the Japanese are supermen' and so on. They really don't have any Marxist or any other kind of category of explanation why Japan should be doing so much better than they're doing, except that there is something racial and culturally about Japan that they don't have.

I had an interesting experience on mainland China. People there never really talked too much about political developments on Taiwan, but they did talk about the 'four young tigers' — South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong. This would be in positive terms, because they were worried about whether there was something inherent in Chinese culture that prevented development. Why did China remain poor when all these other countries developed, and was there something about Chinese that was no good in terms of modernizing? Therefore Taiwan is a very happy thing be­cause it shows that you can be Chinese and rich. You don't have to be poor, which apparently they were very consciously worried about, and not only from their pre-1949 experience when China had remained backward.

FCR: What key theme has emerged in this conference?

Weiner: I would say it is the genuineness with which people in the government and the KMT now seem committed to opening up the political system to the opposition parties. I think it is their genuine willingness to think about what they might do in the next few years both to provide increased civil liberties for the opposition, and also to think seriously about how to open the political system so that in fact the top political leadership of this country becomes elected.

I wondered when I first came whether this was just a show intended for an international audience, but I am now certainly convinced, and not just from the public discussions but from the private conversations I've had, that people are quite genuine about democratizing the political system.

I think first of all, it reflects their awareness that so much change has occurred within Taiwan, and the demand for increased political participation is so great, that they simply must be responsive if the regime itself is to be stable. And secondly, I think they are increasingly responsive to developments toward democratization else­where in Asia and the Third World. I think they are quite influenced by what's going on internationally.

Thirdly, they are quite aware of the fact that there are strong sentiments in the United States that their relationships with the United States increasingly depend upon the openness of this political system. They constantly refer to the fact that leading Democratic Senators, but also people in the Republican administration, have been pressing very hard on the democratization issue, and I think they recognize that their relations with the United States do depend upon how open the political system becomes.

FCR: You just mentioned democratization in the Third World. Based upon your extensive background in India, what are the most striking contrasts you see in Taiwan?

Weiner: One big difference between the situation here and some other parts of the Third World is that Taiwan has not had a democratic experience before. The Philippines did; India obviously has been a continuous democratic country; and those countries that have been democratic in the Third World like Sri Lanka and Malaysia come out of the British colonial tradition, where there has been a strong democratic tradition. In comparison, Taiwan starts out of a history of authoritarian rule, out of a Leninist party tradition. So from that point of view it's been much more difficult to create a more open political system than those that have had some democratic experience.

On the positive side, what is facilitating democratization here is that Taiwan does not suffer from the enormous cleavages — the internal political and social cleavages — that have been characteristic of Third World countries. First of all, you don't have the major ethnic cleavages, the Taiwanese-Mainlander distinction notwith­standing. This place just doesn't have the ethnic cleavages that Malaysia, India, or Sri Lanka have.

Secondly, the class divisions, which are so acute in so much of the Third World, have been reduced here by the enormous amount of economic growth and the kinds of policies that they have pursued here. These have minimized those kinds of sharp class cleavages. One consequence of the absence of both the class and ethnic cleavages here is that I find Taiwan by international standards to be a society with an extraordinarily low level of violence, especially compared to most of the Third World. In that kind of atmosphere, it is a lot easier to democratize a political system than if it were a violent society.

One impediment I might mention is that in spite of the fact that the cleavages are so limited, there is a kind of Confucian view that there has to be extraordinary harmony and stability and order. It's very difficult for many of the people that I've met here to accept the fact that this society can tolerate mass demonstrations and open con­flict — to accept that the place is stable enough to tolerate that kind of conflict. Having lived for many years in India, I'm always struck by the fact that Hindus take pluralism and conflict for granted, where the Confucian world finds that kind of conflict offensive. I just think they have to get over that mentality.

FCR: Would you say that there has been a two-way process of education during the conference in this respect, because this has been a theme that has emerged in the discussions about the American political experience—that it has been characterized by periods of demonstrations and violence, and that this is not necessarily anomalous for democracies.

Weiner: Sure. I agree; this is true not only of the United States but in the experience of all the democratic countries of Western Europe. Demonstrations, even vio­lence, bitter conflict — that's what a democracy is all about. If you don't permit that kind of open conflict, the risk is that you allow those kinds of tensions and grievances to grow, and then when they do emerge, the dangers to stability become even more acute. Witness the experience of the Philippines under Marcos, or the most extreme case, what happened in Iran when the Shah moved far too slowly in permitting democratization.

I have a sense that the KMT people are increasingly aware of the fact that it's to their advantage to move quickly toward modernization. If they sit on it, then sooner or later the country would be in a far less stable situation.