Toward the end of January, the Legislative Yuan (parliament) approved a long-awaited bill on a revised Civic Organizations Law. One week later, it passed two more key bills, one revising the Law of Election and Recall of Public Officials, and the other on voluntary retirement of senior parliamentarians.
The ruling party, the Kuomimang (KMT), has called the passage and promulgation of these bills a major milestone m the history of the nation's political development. These developments have been in line with long-term plans made by the ruling party for further democratizing politics in the ROC. Since the spring of 1986, the ruling KMT has launched a reform drive, not only to reform the party itself but to reform the whole political system ill which it functions.
In the following detailed analysis, Dr. Wu Wen-cheng, associate professor of political science at Soochow University, and Dr. Chen I-hsin, associate professor at the Graduate Institute of American studies at Tamkang University, examine the social and political ramifications of these three bills.
Their assessment addresses the following issues: (1) the social and political background of these bills;(2) the main differences between the old and new civic organizations law, and the election and recall law;(3) haw the retirement law will permit more Taiwan-elected parliamentarians to replace the aged and ailing mainland China-elected deputies; and (4) the main controversies surrounding these bills.
The revised Civic Organizations Law passed by the Legislative Yuan on January 20, 1989 indicates a major step in the transition of the ROC's political system from an authoritarian party-state to a democratic and competitive party system. For the first time in the history of China, inter-party competition has been legalized.
The ROC's ruling party, the Kuomintang, was born of the successful revolutionary effort to overthrow the Ching Dynasty, a historic event that led to the founding of the Republic of China in 1912. The country was originally organized and functioned as a non-competitive party-state system; the legal status of no other party was recognized, except during the first few years of the republic and during the war against Japan.
The revolutionary nature of the KMT has not changed since the fall of mainland China to the hands of the Chinese Communist Party in 1949. In the 1950s and 1960s, except for the two minor "friendly" parties-the Young China Party (YCP) and the China Democratic Socialist Party (CDSP), which both receive monthly subsidies from the KMT—the formation of new parties was banned by the imposition of the Emergency Decree that activated martial law. Consequently, in the first two decades in Taiwan, there was virtually no organized opposition or competition in the various local elections. Electoral competition was limited to pitting power-backed KMT candidates against a handful of independents.
In 1960, a few liberal intellectuals tried to unite the independent Taiwanese politicians in an attempt to form the China Democratic Party (CDP). Before the new party could get on its feet, however, its organizer, Lei Chen, was arrested and the CDP aborted.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a new generation of young Taiwanese politicians, who had grown up and received their education under the KMT rule, entered electoral politics. They organized the so-called "Tangwai" (which translates literally as "outside the party") and won an unexpected number of seats in the Taiwan Provincial Assembly in the 1977 elections. It also seated four county magistrates in the elections of the same year. The Tangwai, actually a loose collection of various opposition political figures and groups, has received around 25 percent of the votes in various elections ever since. While the Tangwai forces grew through electoral competition, the KMT tolerated the growth of the opposition forces and even allowed them to publish magazines and books critical of KMT policies.
From the 1980 elections on, the Tangwai operated much as a legitimate political party, recommending (a euphemism for nominating) candidates, presenting a unified platform, and assisting in the campaigns of the candidates it favored. In another major political step, during the spring of 1984 opposition members holding elective offices formed the so-called" Association for the Study of Public Policies" as the coordinating center of their movement.
In March 1986, the ruling KMT held the third plenum of its 12th Central Committee. Reforms were proposed in six critical political and social areas: (1) strengthening the central parliamentary organs; (2) legalizing local self-governments; (3) consolidating laws concerning national security; (4) providing a legal basis for civic organizations; (5) correcting public mores, revising laws, and maintaining social order; and (6) listing the principal missions of the KMT itself. In addition, the plenum called on the government to lift the Emergency Decree.
Encouraged perhaps by the new atmosphere of liberalization and democratization on the island, the opposition began secretly forming the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which came into being on September 28, 1986. The official response to this action indicated that democratization was moving further ahead. Instead of banning the DPP and arresting opposition leaders, which it had the power to do under existing laws, the government and the KMT speeded up a series of political reforms, including the legalization of new parties. Moreover, the KMT began communicating with DPP leaders.
The enactment of the revised civic organizations law has finally completed the legalization process, a result possible only after a series of heated negotiations, debates, and compromises between KMT and DPP leaders. On two occasions, for example, the DPP even mobilized its supporters to besiege the Legislative Yuan to exert pressure on the KMT and, through stiff no-holds-barred negotiations, achieved much of what it wanted in regard to the revised Civic Organizations Law.
Points won by the DPP include: (1) a decision that the central committee responsible for oversight of party activities should be directly under tile Executive Yuan instead of the Ministry of the Interior; (2) no political party should appoint more than half of the members of the committee; (3) a new party only has to register to gain legal status instead of having to seek prior approval; (4) all political parties shall have equal access to the public mass media; (5) no criminal penalties (as distinguished from civil ones) should be meted out for violations of the law by political parties.
On the other hand, the KMT was able to retain the label "The Period of Mobilization and Suppression of Communist Rebellion" as part of the official title of the new law. The new law also retains unchanged the three provisions from the National Security Law that say there can be no violation of the Constitution, and no advocation of communism and secessionism (meaning Taiwan's independence). The latter concern about "Taiwan independence" has been a continuing sore spot between the ruling party and many Tangwai political figures. Because the DPP has strong communal consciousness and local sentiment, this at times poses a genuine problem of integration. After the DPP gains legal status under the new law, many people hope that it will concentrate its energies on pursuing public policy issues and gaining support from the electorate rather than continue emphasizing the question of national identity.
Article 49 of the new Civic Organizations Law stipulates that political groups must be organized and function in accord with democratic principles. Since the KMT has been steadily shaking off its old authoritarian role and becoming a competitor in the ROC's more democratic political system, the DPP is also being challenged to serve the interests of the nation by channeling its activities toward electoral and parliamentary politics, instead of expending energy and resources on street protests and demonstrations.
A New Look for Elections
The bill revising the Law of Election and Recall of Public Officials was approved by the Legislative Yuan on January 26, 1989, one day before the legislative session adjourned. The bill went into effect three days after it was promulgated by President Lee Teng-hui on February 3, 1989.
Since the original Election and Recall Law became effective in 1980, this is the second time it has been revised. The main purpose of the revision this time is to make it accord with the passage of the revised law governing civic organizations, and to bring it in line with the increasing demands for public political participation now that the ROC has entered a new era of competitive party politics.
When the original election and recall law was passed in 1980, the Emergency Decree had not yet been lifted and, as a result, restrictions concerning campaign activities were quite strict. For instance, they forbade all candidates to form voluntary or paid campaigners' groups to conduct campaign activities for other candidates in their own election districts, let alone other election districts.
In order to meet increasing public demands for greater political participation, all these restrictions have been removed in the revised election and recall law. Nevertheless, some restrictions remain: candidates and political parties are not permitted to conduct campaign activities except in the prescribed period; nor make campaign speeches except during public and private campaign forums; nor sponsor street marches, launch signature drives, set off firecrackers, or use loudspeaker vans except at the sites of campaign forums; and cannot put up campaign posters farther than 30 meters away from either the candidate's or their party's campaign headquarters. These stipulations have been included, according to the drafters of the legislation, in order to maintain social order during the campaign period.
Likewise, the stipulations that non-registered campaigners are forbidden to make speeches in public and that private campaign forums should be arranged prior to public campaign forums remain unchanged.
One of the requirements for party formation included in the revised law on civic organizations is that political parties recommend their own candidates to participate in elections. In order to encourage political parties to nominate their party members to participate in elections, the revised election and recall law grants political parties some privileged treatment. For example, candidates nominated by the parties only have to pay half of the cash deposit required by the election commission for official candidacy (done to ensure higher standards of electioneering by discouraging "whimsical candidates" and crass opportunists). Moreover, parties can form united campaign headquarters and receive donations.
Primary goals for the revised election and recall law include moving domestic party politics further along the right track by clarifying regulations of subsidy, political donations, and tax deductions-all of which are new concepts in Chinese politics. According to the provisions concerning subsidies in the new law, any candidate (including those who lose) who receives a vote total exceeding three-fourths of the minimum votes that were required to be elected from a certain electoral district will receive NT$10 per vote subsidy from the election committee.
Individuals and businesses may also donate campaign funds for individual candidates or political parties, and the donations will be tax deductible. These donations are limited to NT$20,000 (US$1 = NT$27.50) for candidates and NT$200,000 for political parties if the donor is an individual. An individual's donations for political parties cannot exceed 20 percent of his yearly income before taxes. And the maximum donation by businesses is limited to NT$300,000 for candidates and NT$3,000,000 for political parties. Donations by a business for political parties cannot exceed 10 per cent of its yearly earning before taxes.
Another stipulation indicating the progress made in the revised election and recall law is a new regulation added to the organization of the Central Election Commission (CEC). The cabinet-level CEC is the supreme decision making body responsible for election affairs. The CEC has long consisted of representatives only from the KMT. But the new law stipulates that representatives from anyone party cannot exceed 50 percent of the members of the CEC, thereby greatly enhancing the fairness and reliability of the organization. From now on, representatives from the DPP will have their say in the CEC, thus increasing its opportunities to participate in the political activities within the system. DPP participation in the CEC should bring it more firmly into the overall political system, and decrease at least to some extent the anti-system activities that have to date characterized many of its efforts.
Although the revised election and recall bill was passed by the KMT-dominated parliament, the KMT and the DPP failed to reach a consensus on one issue and two controversial articles. The issue was whether the legislature should revise the bill to restore the civil rights of released political prisoners. If the bill is so revised, it would mean that some of opposition leaders who have been deprived of their civil rights would be able to run in the December parliamentary and local elections. The legislators of both the KMT and the DPP have agreed to resolve the issue through other channels.
One of the controversial articles was on how many votes a member of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly and the Taipei and Kaohsiung City Councils can cast in the election of members of the Control Yuan, who as members of the nation's highest watchdog body are not elected by popular vote. They are instead elected by members of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly and the Taipei and Kaohsiung City Councils. The original law allowed each member to cast a number of votes equal to half of the seats to be elected in the assembly or each council. According to the revisions, the number of votes granted to each member will be one-third of the seats the body is authorized to elect. For example, if the provincial assembly is authorized to elect nine Control Yuan members, provincial assembly members would have three votes each. The DPP argued that the number of votes granted to each member be one-fourth of the seats the body is authorized to elect. The revised article was a result of compromise.
Another controversial article concerned when a change in the election districts should be announced. Earlier, legislative committees had voted to require the CEC to announce rezoning of electoral districts two years before an election. But when the motion went to the floor in the process of second reading, 21 legislators led by Chang Ping-chao, moved that the two-year period should be shortened to six months; the motion was passed with the support of 132 lawmakers, much to the displeasure of the DPP. The DPP charged that changes in electoral districts proposed by the KMT's top election strategist John Kuan would give the KMT the upper hand in future elections, especially if gerrymandering were done to achieve special advantages for the ruling party.
The passage of Chang's motion indicates that rezoning of the electoral districts prior to the November parliamentary and local elections is inevitable. It is generally hoped that the CEC will invite representatives from all political parties and impartial scholars and experts as soon as possible to reach a consensus on how the electoral districts can be rezoned on a generally fair basis.
Despite these disputes concerning the bill on a revised election and recall law, the passage of the bill marks a milestone in the ROC's process of democratization. From now on the competition between different political parties has some consensus-backed rules of the game to follow.
Public pressures for greater involvement in the political process helped bring about the passage of three key bills in late January. (File photo)
Rejuvenating Parliamentary Bodies
Whereas the bill on a revised election and recall law was approved by the Legislative Yuan in a relatively calm manner on January 26, 1989, the bill on Voluntary Retirement of Senior Parliamentarians was approved in a considerably less sedate atmosphere. The bill was rushed through the parliament in the absence of the regular second and third readings on the same day—and it turned out to be one of the most controversial events in the ROC's recent lawmaking history.
The voluntary retirement bill also went into effect three days after it was promulgated by President Lee Teng-hui on February 3. The main purpose for the KMT to ensure passage of the bill was to give it an opportunity to rejuvenate and revitalize the nation's three central parliamentary bodies and make the political system more competitive and democratic.
The majority of the members of the three central representative organs the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan, and the Control Yuan-were elected in 1947. Because holding subsequent elections was practically impossible in mainland China after 1949, these representatives have been allowed to serve in these organs indefinitely through constitutional interpretations made by the Council of Grand Justices in the early 1950s.
National elections were suspended from 1948 to 1968. Although the ROC government began to implement local self-government and to hold local elections in 1950, political participation for the majority of people in Taiwan during the 1950s and 1960s was limited due to the concern for national security and political stability. Only the Provincial Assembly and local governments were open for those who were interested in politics.
Political participation gradually expanded during the 1970s and 1980s, as more channels were opened for those people interested in entering politics. In 1969, the government held a supplementary election for the three central parliamentary bodies, thus extending electoral participation to the national level. Five more national elections have been held since 1969, and the seats being contested have gradually been increased. Since 1972, the additional representatives have had to face re-election at regular intervals: six years for members of the National Assembly and the Control Yuan, and three years for members of the Legislative Yuan. These by-elections have been held to satisfy the increasing popular demand for broader political participation.
Nevertheless, the additional representatives still constitute a small minority in these three bodies. Presently about 900 out of 1,000 members of the National Assembly, and approximately 200 of 300 members of the Legislative Yuan are those senior representatives elected more than 40 years ago. Moreover, these representatives have been frozen in office since the early 1950s without having to renew their mandates from their constituents at fixed periods.
The ROC government used to base its legitimacy (fa tung) and its claim of being the sole representative of all China on the representativeness of these senior parliamentarians. As time elapsed, however, the actual representativeness of these senior parliamentarians has come under increasing doubt and criticism. In addition, time waits for no man—these senior parliamentarians have aged (their average age is now about 80) and their attrition has increased in recent years.
Traditional dress, modern activity—Taiwan enters the world of inter-party competition, changing the face of the political scene. (File photo)
Half of the existing senior legislators have been ridiculed by the opposition politicians as the "voting force" because they do not attend the sessions for debate and discussion but instead are rushed to the floor by the KMT party whip only when the time comes for a final vote on a bill. Recently, even less flattering epithets have been directed toward them for their lack of active participation in legislative functions.
Since these senior representatives do not have to run for re-election, they cannot in fact be held accountable to the electorate in Taiwan. Therefore, in the eyes of more and more people, they cannot claim to represent the interests and opinions of the people in Taiwan any more than they do for those on the mainland.
Given such an unfavorable situation with these senior parliamentarians, the KMT has been increasingly aware that its legitimacy to rule will be negatively influenced if it continues to provide a shield for them. Before President Chiang Ching-kuo died in January 1988, he initiated the parliamentary reform bill that calls for the voluntary retirement of more than 1,000 mainland-elected senior representatives with pensions of up to NT$3.7 million (US$134,000) each to "rejuvenate" the nation's three aging central elective bodies.
When the bill was supposed to go to the floor for second reading on January 26, the lawmaking chamber experienced one of the worst scenes of chaos in its history. The chaos started after DPP legislator Hsu Kuo-tai tried to block the screening of the bill on Voluntary Retirement of Senior Parliamentarians. When KMT legislator Ramon B.K. Chua said that the bill had to be passed without further delay, Hsu pushed him to the ground and hit him with a microphone. Other DPP legislators also rushed to the rostrum in an attempt to prevent the normal legislative proceedings.
The KMT insisted that the bill only "encourage" the senior members of the three parliamentary bodies to retire voluntarily, while the DPP strongly demanded that a deadline be set for the senior members to leave their long-held seats compulsorily and without pensions.
While the opposition legislators were busy with their interventionist activities around the podium, Speaker Liu Kuo-tsai proceeded to rush through an abbreviated set of proceedings and declare the bill passed after a show of hands on the floor.
The opposition legislators charged that the passage of the bill was "illegal" because required second and third readings had been omitted. But in defense of the bill as passed, legislator Liang Su-yung, chairman of the KMT Policy Coordination Committee, said that the KMT had to resort to the "extraordinary measure" to pass the bill because it was impossible to complete its legislation in a normal manner under the chaotic circumstances in the chamber.
President Lee Teng-hui, in his capacity as chairman of the party, directed the KMT cadres in the three parliamentary bodies on February 2 to "actively promote" the parliamentary reform bill. It is expected that about 200 mainland China-elected parliamentarians of the three central parliamentary bodies, who have long been bedridden or are residing overseas, will retire within six months after the president promulgates the parliamentary reform bill. This would at least give Taiwan-elected legislators in the Legislative Yuan a stronger voice in that body.
To achieve the goal of rejuvenating parliament and strengthening its functions, the government proposed the bill in the hopes that senior parliamentarians would retire in phases while at the same time new blood would be injected into the parliament. The KMT's policy-making Central Standing Committee, during its regular weekly meeting on February 1 this year, approved a plan proposed by the National Security Council (NSC). The plan was officially approved by the NSC on February 22. According to the plan, the three parliamentary bodies will have a total membership of 579, which is less than half the total membership of the present parliament, in order to make it more proportionate to the population. The National Assembly, which is the nation's electoral college and has the power to amend the Constitution, will have 375 deputies, the Legislative Yuan will have 150, and the watchdog Control Yuan will have 54.
The quota for the Legislative Yuan will be filled in two phases. In the upcoming elections in December this year, the number of supplementary legislators will be increased from the present 98 to 130. The membership will be further increased to 150 in the 1992 parliamentary election. The Control Yuan quota will be filled at one stroke in the 1992 elections, at the end of the six-year term; the number of supplementary members will be increased from the current 32 to 54. And the National Assembly quota is also to be filled in two phases—increasing from 84 to 230 in 1992 and to 375 in 1998.
Parliamentary reform has been the top priority in the KMT's political reform program. If the bill on Voluntary Retirement of Senior Parliamentarians and the phased parliamentary rejuvenation plan are implemented, the Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan will be considerably reformed in 1992 and the National Assembly in 1998. Even if some senior parliamentarians refuse to step down by then, it is expected that few will have the longevity necessary to be of concern. At that time there will be little doubt left as to the competitiveness and representativeness of the ROC's political system.
Conclusions
The passage of the revised Civic Organizations Law and the Election and Recall Law has heralded a new era of competitive party politics in Taiwan. More specifically, the revised Civic Organizations Law is a landmark step in the evolution of the Republic of China from a revolutionary dream to a democratic reality. In addition, the revised Election and Recall Law provides a relatively fair basis of free contestation for political parties in local and parliamentary elections at fixed periods, thereby setting new rules for political competition.
In a purely formal sense, when the opposition politicians in Taiwan can freely form new political parties and engage in the electoral campaigns in the form of political parties, just like their counterparts in other democracies, the political system will have become genuinely competitive. But as long as the central representative organs are controlled by senior members who do not need to renew their mandates, the so-called free contestation is a much circumscribed one indeed.
While the problem of the senior representatives will certainly work out in time, there are other open questions. If the DPP scores more than a half of the popular votes in the next local and national elections, will it peacefully permit the KMT to retain the control of the central government? Although this supposition is very unlikely to materialize in the near future, the sooner the structural defects mentioned above are corrected, the smoother the transition to a truly competitive system.
Therefore, the passage of the retirement bill helps make a truly representative and competitive system achievable in the ROC. Taiwan-elected legislators, for the first time in four decades, will be closer to control of the Legislative Yuan after the upcoming parliamentary election in December. And after 1992 or so, the Taiwan-elected deputies may well become the majority in all three central parliamentary organs.
In the final analysis, after these three key political bills are put into effect the KMT will have more successfully transformed itself from a revolutionary and authoritarian party to a competitor in a competitive party system. And it is hoped that the DPP will transform itself as well by shifting from an anti-system movement to a loyal opposition party, and by channeling its activities toward competitive electoral and parliamentary politics. There is every reason to believe this will pave the way to a more stable and healthy political development in Taiwan and, eventually, for all China.