The "newborn regime" in Hunan province, i.e., the "preparatory team for the Hunan Provincial Revolutionary Committee" set up and controlled by local military leaders of army Unit 6900 with the help of former Party leaders, is being persistently and seriously challenged from all directions, particularly by the "extreme leftists" who are pro-Mao/Lin "rebels" and Red Guards.
This was disclosed in an editorial of the Hunan Daily, mouthpiece of the preparatory team, broadcast over Hunan radio December 8.
Entitled "Resolutely Uphold and Defend the Proletarian Newborn Regime", the editorial admitted that in all Hunan province, only one of nine administrative regions, Shaoyang, and two of seven municipalities - Changsha, the provincial capital, and Chuchow, an industrial center - had set up preparatory teams for local revolutionary committees.
Enemies from the extreme left as well as the right were scheming and playing all sorts of tricks and had launched savage onslaughts against the "proletarian new regime" in an attempt to smother it in its cradle and to hamper and sabotage the "cultural revolution", the editorial said.
Who are these "enemies"? The editorial mentioned "some comrades in our own ranks" together with "a handful of traitors, special agents, stubborn Party powerholders, monsters and freaks in society, and landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements and rightists".
These "comrades in our own ranks" were accused by the editorial of having been utilized by "class enemies" to do things that "sadden our friends and gladden our enemies". They were charged with cherishing such "erroneous ideas" as "petty bourgeois factionalism, anarchism, individualism, etc.", and with entertaining an "incorrect attitude" towards the provincial preparatory team.
The editorial cited "various facts" to show how the "petty bourgeois factionalism" in the "ranks of the masses" is being "utilized" by the "class enemies" to sow dissension, influence public opinion and "blacken" the preparatory team.
The editorial admitted it was unavoidable for the "newborn regime" to have shortcomings and commit mistakes, but declared it was intolerable for the critics of the preparatory team to "stand on antagonistic ground, limitlessly aggravate their accusations and adopt a malicious and undermining attitude".
The editorial warned that all "revolutionaries" should avoid being "misled by the extreme left thought trend". It exhorted them "resolutely to defend" the preparatory team, "resolutely uphold" its authority, "resolutely respect" its leadership and "resolutely support" its work. This is an indication of the uncooperative attitude of the "revolutionaries" toward the team.
Difficulty in getting along with the "revolutionaries" probably will drive the preparatory team toward further reliance on old Party leaders and cadres.
In the provincial capital of Changsha, the municipal preparatory team is headed by a military man, Chang Yi, director of the political department of the Hunan provincial military district. This indicates that not only the provincial preparatory teams but also the local ones are controlled by the army.
The Changsha preparatory team was officially established on November 26 - three months or so after the formation of the provincial team. It consists of 23 members, including 11 representatives of revolutionary masses, four representatives of the "People's Liberation Army" and eight representatives of the "revolutionary leadership cadres".
Thus the combined strength of the military and the former Party cadres guaranteed an absolute majority over the "revolutionary masses".
Military takeover goes slowly in Anhwei
The military authorities in Anhwei province have encountered tremendous difficulty since March, 1967, when Peiping assigned them the task of forming a new regime to seize power from the Party powerholders headed by Li Pao-hua, former first secretary of the Anhwei provincial committee of the Chinese Communist Party. So far they have been unable to announce the formation of even a preparatory team for a provincial revolutionary committee.
One reason for this seems to be that they have been acting harshly toward former Party officials who had been firmly united under the experienced leadership of Li Pao-hua. As a result, few of the Party officials have cooperated with them. This was indicated by the absence of any former Party officials at the October 1 rally held in Hofei, the provincial capital. What is more, none of the former officials has been mentioned on any other occasion.
Another factor could be the lack of unity among the military authorities. This was suggested by the fact that only one military leader, Lou Hsueh-cheng, who was referred to as a "responsible person of the army units stationed in Hofei", was mentioned as having been present at the October 1 rally. This is in sharp contrast to most other provinces, except Yunnan and Tibet, where lists of military leaders or combined lists of military and civilian leaders were reported as attending October 1 celebrations. Yunnan had no name mentioned. Tibet had only one.
The military authorities' difficulties may be increased by the "rebels" or "revolutionaries", who are divided into two major factions. These factions have engaged in "struggle by force". On September 5, representatives of both sides were received in Peiping by Mao's wife, Chiang Ching. and Kang Sheng, who strongly urged them to unite. Though members of the two sides agreed to a reconciliation, they resumed fighting as soon as they had returned to Anhwei.
Another negative factor is the opposition to the military authorities put up by Red Guards and "rebels". However, the conflict seems to be not so violent in Anhwei as in such other provinces as Heilungkiang and Hunan.
On March 27, the Peiping Party center issued a "decision on the Anhwei problem". Although no details were published, the main theme must have been that the present leadership of the army units stationed in Anhwei should become the center around which a new provincial regime was to be created.
This was two months after the "rebels" in Anhwei had claimed (on January 26) a seizure of power from the provincial Party powerholders.
Despite this claim, Anhwei radio on December 11 broadcast a December 9 editorial of the New Anhwei Daily, mouthpiece of the local military authorities, which indicated that the Party center's decision was being flouted. The editorial swore to "defend the decision to death".
The decision on Anhwei is called the "nine articles". The editorial sadly declared:
"In an incomparably heavy spirit, we the proletarian revolutionaries and the vast revolutionary masses of the entire province have looked back at the course of combat during the past eight months and more since the Nine Articles were issued ... All we wish to say can be put into one sentence: Never disappoint Chairman Mao and the Party Center."
The editorial then described the many sorts of opposition to the "proletarian headquarters", Le., the provincial military authorities:
"A handful of traitors, special agents, obstinate Party powerholders, black hands and landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, bad elements and rightists started rumors, shot poisonous arrows in a big way and maliciously attacked the Nine Articles. Some of them launched the offensive from the front, some from the side, some stirred up ghostly winds and kindled vicious fires, some displayed red flags to oppose the Red Flag ... At present the enemies are still attacking and opposing the Nine Articles by all contemptible means.
"Certain comrades in the revolutionary ranks adopted incorrect attitudes towards the Nine Articles. Some of them, starting from their petty bourgeois factionalism, approved a certain part of the Nine Articles but boycotted and opposed the rest. Some listened to enemies' rumors. These persons should not be looked upon with cold indifference or derided or coerced or held down. On the other hand, they should be threatened with danger if they do not give up their suspicion and antagonism.
"The petty bourgeois factionalism of some persons in our ranks is being utilized by the class enemies to lead them onto vicious road".
Opposition to the military authorities in Anhwei was confirmed by Anhwei radio on November 20 in the broadcast of an editorial from the previous day's New Anhwei Daily:
"Recently, in certain parts of this province, a handful of Party powerholders etc., have stirred up trouble and used every means to create rifts in mass organizations. They incite 'civil wars' among the masses, obstruct or undermine the great revolutionary great alliance, and sow dissension between the revolutionary masses and the Liberation Army - all with a view to causing disturbance and diverting the general orientation of the struggle."
Red Guards were obliquely censured in the following passage of the same editorial:
"Every comrade must prevent or overcome the idea that 'I alone am the left, I alone am revolutionary'."
Revolutionary group established in Tientsin
A Tientsin municipal revolutionary committee was belatedly set up December 6, 15 months after the "No. 1 Party powerholder" in that city had been harassed to death and all powerholders brought to public trial by the local army units and pro-Mao/Lin "rebels". The initial list of the committee leadership shows that it is controlled by military leaders and old Party cadres.
Four top leaders of the Tientsin revolutionary committee were named by the "New China News Agency" on December 6. They were:
- Chairman: Hsieh Hsueh-kung, first secretary of the Tientsin municipal committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
- Vice Chairmen: Hsiao Ssu-ming, political commissar of the Hopei provincial military district; Cheng San-sheng, a "responsible person" of PLA units stationed in Tientsin and commander of the Tientsin garrison; and Chiang Feng, a "revolutionary leadership cadre".
Previously there was a preparatory team for this revolutionary committee. Hsieh Hsueh-kung was its head. Hu Chao-heng and Liu Cheng were mentioned as members in addition to Cheng San-sheng. It is possible that Hu and Liu have now become members of the revolutionary committee.
Hu was a member of the secretariat of the CCP's Tientsin municipal committee and mayor of the city. He is now called a "revolutionary leadership cadre".
Liu Cheng was a "responsible person" of army units in Hopei, chairman of the military control commission controlling the Tientsin public security bureau and a "responsible person" of the Tientsin garrison.
A Red Guard tabloid published in October reported that Hsieh Hsueh-kung "recently" had been appointed first secretary of the CCP's Tientsin municipal committee and Yen Ta-kai its acting second secretary. In fact Hsieh was appointed to that post at the beginning of 1967 or in the later part of 1966.
One tabloid reported that "Tientsin municipality has been placed directly under the Party center". However, this has not been confirmed officially. From 1949 to 1958 Tientsin was directly responsible to the "central government" in Peiping, enjoying in this respect the same status as Peiping and Shanghai. In February, 1958, it was placed under Hopei province and became the provincial capital of Hopei in April, 1958. Presently, Hopei's capital is Paoting. Tientsin has a population of four million.
The anti-Mao/Lin Party powerholders in Tientsin were headed by Wan Hsiao-tang and Chang Huai-san. On December 6, 1967, Hsieh Hsueh-kung made this announcement:
"The birth of the Tientsin municipal revolutionary committee ... heralds the thorough collapse of the Chinese Khrushchev's agents in Tientsin-the counterrevolutionary revisionist clique headed by Wan Hsiao-tang and Chang Hsai-san."
Wan Hsiao-tang was first secretary of CCP's Tientsin municipal committee in 1966. When Red Guards were launched far and wide to destroy the Party apparatus, he was dragged by them to a huge public trial on September 19, 1966, and "struggled against" under a scorching sun for eight hours. He died that evening.
An obituary released by the "New China News Agency" on September 21, 1966, said Wan had died of a heart attack. This was obviously designed to conceal an unnatural death. It is the practice of the Peiping press when a Party leader dies never to disclose the nature of his illness or the cause of his demise.
Chang Huai-san was a member of the secretariat of the Tientsin municipal committee of CCP. He and a group of officials from that committee and the municipal administration, including three vice mayors and the wife of Wan Hsiao-tang (herself the head of a department in the municipal public security bureau) were dragged to a public trial by PLA personnel on February 26. A tabloid published photographs of the trial.
Since Wan was already dead and Chang had been "dragged out" early in 1967, the strength of the Liu Shao-chi faction must have been greatly reduced. The explanation of the long delay in setting up the Tientsin revolutionary committee may be found in the continuing conflict among "rebels" opposed to the formation of the "great alliance" and the "three-way alliance" rather than a resistance from Liu's supporters.
Mao loses control of the Hopei situation
The Hopei provincial military district is fighting the 38th Army, which was sent by Peiping authorities into the Paoting area of Hopei. Both sides are making use of local "rebel" organizations. The military district is supporting former provincial Party chief Liu Tzu-hou. An agreement for rival "rebel" groups to surrender their firearms was breached immediately after it was signed.
This state of affairs indicating the inability of the Mao/Lin regime to control even the area surrounding Peiping is revealed in Red Guard tabloids.
The provincial military district had decided to set up a "Hopei General Command for Struggle-Criticism-Transformation" and summoned representatives of "rebel" groups from all counties. The chief task of this organization was to be the expulsion of the 38th Army or "4800 Unit" from Hopei and the establishment of Liu Tzu-hou, formerly first secretary of the Hopei provincial Party committee of the CCP, as a "revolutionary leadership cadre". This proposal was vetoed by Peiping military region authorities who control Hopei, Peiping and Inner Mongolia. Instead, a mass rally was held in Paoting, the provincial capital, on October 30. At the end of this rally, certain "rebel" groups that opposed the military district were dismissed.
From November 8 to 14, the "rebel" groups that supported the military district besieged and attacked with firearms a number of factories in the western suburb of Paoting city. The factories were strongholds of groups opposing them. Officers and troops of the 38th, including the deputy chief of staff, who intervened to protect the beleaguered groups, were kidnapped and severely beaten by the "rebels" as officers of the provincial military district directed the attack.
The anti-military district groups recalled that:
"In early September, 1966, we were under heavy pressure from the provincial committee, the regional committee and the municipal committee. In the adverse current of February, 1967, we were in prison. In March, there were black winds and monstrous waves. In July and August, there were sounds of rifles and guns."
There was no claim of victory in the tabloids, which were published by the anti-military district groups.
Purge hits important group of theoreticians
A large group of important theoreticians and propagandists, manipulators of Red Guards and "rebel" leaders in Peiping's ministries and possibly followers of Mao's 'wife, Chiang Ching, have been purged by the Mao/Lin faction in the last few months. They were backstage bosses of the notorious "May 16 Detachment". Their downfall may be the result of a showdown between "premier" Chou En-lai and the "Central Group in charge of the Cultural Revolution". Chou seems to have emerged stronger.
Some of the purged individuals are theoreticians and propagandists who have been playing vital roles in the criticism of Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping and Tao Chu and who started the explosive "revolutionary rebellion" in the "central government" offices. They have not criticized Mao's wife; therefore they are possibly her supporters. These men exercised a strong influence over a large section of the Red Guards in Peiping and in other areas.
The purge was launched on the claim that these persons had formed a counterrevolutionary clique to spilt the Party center, the PLA and the "Central Group in charge of the Cultural Revolution". The major "crimes" attributed to the clique are those of having opposed Chou En-lai; attacked such close associates of Chou as Li Fu-chun, Li Hsien-nien and Chen Yi, all "vice premiers", and Yu Chiu-li, "minister" of petroleum industry; launched the slogan of "dragging a handful of powerholders from the army"; linked up with Hsiao Hua, former director of the general political department of the PLA and acting head of the "Group in charge of the Cultural Revolution" in the army; caused split and struggle-by-force between rival Red Guard groups in the universities and colleges of Peiping; of having tried to involve Kang Sheng; and of having undermined the power of Hsieh Fu-chih. They have been accused of plotting with Chen Tsai-tao, commander of the Wuhan military region who staged a revolt on July 20, and Huang Yung-sheng, commander of the Canton military region.
None of them has been accused of opposing Mao's wife Chiang Ching, first deputy head of the "Central Group in charge of the Cultural Revolution", or Chen Po-ta, or of directly attacking Lin Piao, whereas there are some indications that Kang Sheng is connected with the group.
The majority worked in the "Central Group in charge of the Cultural Revolution" and in the organs and offices directly affiliated with the group or in close relationship with it.
The "May 16 Detachment" of Red Guards in the Red Chinese capital is said to have been an instrument of this clique. A total of 32 persons was involved in the purge.