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Documents: President Chiang Kai-shek tells Japanese journalists that the Yoshida Letter is binding / Background of the Yoshida Letter

July 01, 1968
President Chiang Kai-shek tells Japanese journalists that the Yoshida Letter is binding

Following is the full text of the official release detailing President Chiang Kai-shek's June 8 meeting with 16 Japanese journalists:

President Chiang Kai-shek received the 16 members of the visiting Japanese press mission last Saturday (June 8) morning in Kaohsiung and answered questions raised by the group.

The President said the war in Vietnam does not involve that country alone but all of Southeast Asia. The root of the conflict, he added, lies in the Peiping regime on the Chinese mainland rather than in the North Vietnamese Communist Party in Hanoi. He went on to make these points: All the disasters and disturbances in Southeast Asia today have occurred since Chinese Communist usurpation of power on the Chinese mainland. The wars in Korea, India and now in Vietnam, the continuous Communist threats to Indonesia and Southeast Asia, and the Communist infiltration and peril in Japan and Korea are all manipulations of the Chinese Reds. Additionally, a problem is taking shape in the Ryukyus and inevitably will come to a head within the foreseeable future. So long as the Chinese Communists remain in possession of the mainland, there will be no stability in Southeast Asia and no peace in the world.

The President wondered whether pro-Communist Japanese had patriotically considered the future of their country in urging the establishment of diplomatic ties with the Peiping regime, in supporting Peiping's admission to the United Nations and in opposing the binding effect of the Yoshida Letter. He reiterated that the Vietnam war is only a part of the Asian problem and said that Japan occupies the key position in Asia. In which direction should Japan go, he asked: right toward the United States or left to fall into the lap of the Chinese Communists? The course that Japan takes will decide its security and wil1 affect all other Asian development, he added.

President Chiang analyzed the position of the Peiping regime. He said the Chinese Communist regime has descended into anarchy with the criticism, struggle and house arrest of their leader, Liu Shao-chi, and went on to say: The organization of the Chinese Communist Party has disintegrated with the disappearance of its secretary-general, Teng Hsiao-ping. The armed forces have been fragmented into a number of factions that are on the verge of perilous conflict. Among those ruthlessly purged are Peng Teh-huai and Huang Ke-cheng in the past and Lo Jui-ching, Ho Lung, Tao Chu and Yang Cheng-wu more recently. The situation has disintegrated to the point of civil war.

President Chiang noted the suggestion of the recent conference of Japanese diplomats in Asia that "Peiping's great cultural revolution will end by October of this year". This conclusion was derived from the assumption that the mainland situation would be clarified with establishment of the "revolutionary committees" and the summoning of the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. The President predicted that completion of the so-called universal and Party "revolutionary committees" and opening of the Ninth Congress of the CCP would mark the beginning of the final collapse of the Peiping regime. We shall be able to observe and ascertain - within a period of three to six months after establishment of the so-called all-state "revolutionary committee" - whether the Peiping regime still exists and whether the process of its collapse has been accelerated. All the Chinese people expect conflict to break out among the factions of Peiping's armed forces during this period, a development that is bound to lead to civil war. Japanese friends of the Republic of China should wait and see these developments.

The President said that besides the problems of Party, administration and armed forces, the Chinese Communists face the problem of what is in the hearts of the broad masses of mainland people. The President asked: Who among the mainland people still has confidence in Mao Tse-tung? Who does not want the Peiping regime overthrown? The President continued: The loss of human hearts is more serious for Peiping than the collapse of Party, administration and armed forces. The direction of the international political tides of today is toward freedom and democracy, for which everyone is longing. If any infamous criminal seeks to oppress the people and maintain his political power through resort to the strength of the armed forces and the use of violence, his rule will collapse with surprising rapidity and the possession of nuclear weapons will not help him. The world affords many examples of this.

President Chiang again pointed out that pro-Communist Japanese have frequently advocated recognition of the Peiping regime, admitting it to the United Nations and scrapping the Yoshida Letter. The idea that these actions will be easily accomplished is an illusion. The President said: The Yoshida Letter is directly related to the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty and both he and Yoshida understood that the letter was a supplement to the treaty. The letter came into being because the Japanese Government as represented by Mr. Yoshida and the Government of the Republic of China under the leadership of President Chiang felt that the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty no longer covered all eventualities. Abrogation of the Yoshida Letter today would be tantamount to the scrapping of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty.

The President said that if the Japanese Government should decide to establish diplomatic relations with the Peiping regime - as pro-Communist Japanese demand - Japan first would have to break off diplomatic ties with the Republic of China. In such an eventuality, President Chiang said, he would announce annulment of the peace treaty signed by the Yoshida administration. The problem of signing another peace treaty with the Peiping regime would thereupon face the Japanese Government. Any such second peace agreement would certainly involve questions of indemnity, Japan's continued adherence to the Japanese-American Treaty of Mutual Security and sovereignty over the Ryukyus. These are only a few of the issues that would arise. Others involving the internal situation of Japan would occur one after the other. For the moment the Chinese Communists may not raise a single question, the President continued. But if Japan's relations with the Republic of China were severed, the Peiping regime would subject the Japanese Government to demands for ransom and threats of various kinds. The President wondered whether pro-Communist Japanese had taken into consideration all the possible developments involved and the danger to the security and future of Japan. He asked the members of the group whether they were prepared for such an eventuality.

President Chiang said he had often heard people say that Japan could peacefully coexist with the Chinese Communists and easily provide for its own security by steering a neutral course that leaned neither too close to the United States on the right nor toward the Communists on the left. The neutrality of today is a Communist-invented deception. So-called neutrality and coexistence are synonymous with submission to Communism. They mark the first unconscious step in the process of becoming a Communist slave. Japan will make a serious misjudgment and imperil its security if it pursues a course of neutrality merely because the Peiping regime possesses nuclear weapons. A day's peace may be possible but disasters will follow in ceaseless succession. The Chinese Communists regard the United States and Soviet Russia as their archenemies in the world and Japan as their principal antagonist in Asia. Peiping's objective is to gain control of Asia and then to communize the world. Consequently, it most fears Japan's endeavors to provide Asian leadership. The Chinese Communists and the Japanese are incompatible in all things. How can the Chinese Communists permit Japan to defend itself as it might wish to? Today's Japan can tip the balance of the scales in East Asia. So Japan should exercise its spiritual, moral and decisive influence with strength and dedication, thereby assuming the responsibility for assisting other Asian nations in resisting the Peiping regime. Never should Japan voluntarily pursue a course of neutrality, of coexistence or of acceptance of a satellite's role. This could only invite catastrophe. Any Japanese drift toward the Peiping regime will be tantamount to a submission to the Chinese Communists. In such an eventuality, Japan would be opposed by the other Asian nations. These nations would reject Japanese leadership. Japan itself would sacrifice its freedom and democracy.

The President concluded: We are convinced that for its own good and in the interest of its international stature, Japan should stand forthrightly against the Chinese Communists both diplomatically and economically. Peiping is the source of evil in Asia. If the Japanese insist on leaning toward Peiping, the Chinese Reds will steadily increase their infiltration and subversion of Japan. Disaster will become inevitable. So long as the Peiping regime exists, there will not be so much as a day of peace in the countries of Asia and particularly not in the countries of East Asia. The only course open to us is the elimination of the Chinese Communists and recovery of the Chinese mainland by the Government of the Republic of China. Failing this, the Vietnam peace talks can result at best in only momentary and superficial solution. The settlement can never be complete and satisfactory. New war flames of a more furious nature soon would be erupting in other parts of the Asian continent.

President Chiang expressed hope that other Japanese would turn out to be as knowledgeable and foresighted as was Mr. Yoshida during the postwar years. He expressed hope that these Japanese would help maintain close cooperation and profound friendship with the Republic of China by joining hands in actions to terminate the threats to the security of Asia and to assure world peace. This is the only way, he said, in which Japan can remain secure, independent and free.

Background of the Yoshida Letter

In August of 1963, the Kurashiki Textile Co. of Japan signed a contract with the Chinese Communists for the sale of a complete vinylon plant on installment payments. With the approval of the Japanese Government, the Import-Export Bank of Japan guaranteed payment of the full amount of US$20 million.

The Government of the Republic of China protested. In effect, the Japanese Government's guarantee of repayment constituted a form of economic assistance to the Peiping regime. Although the Chinese Government never approved of Japanese trade with Red China, it previously had taken cognizance of Japan's need to trade, and on a basis of "separating economics from politics" had not raised specific objection to nonstrategic ccmmerce carried out on a cash basis.

Taipei-Tokyo relations deteriorated sharply in the wake of the vinylon plant deal and were further undermined when the Japanese returned a Chinese Communist defector to the mainland. Trade was materially reduced and diplomatic ties were strained. The Japanese Government began to express concern at this turn of events.

On February 23, 1964, former Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda asked Mr. Shigeru Yoshida, the elder statesman of postwar Japan, to visit Taiwan as his special emissary and to discuss Sino-Japan relations with President Chiang Kai-shek. After consulting Mr. Ikeda, Mr. Yoshida wrote, with full approval of the former, to General Chang Chun, Secretary General to President Chiang, a personal letter in May, 1964, in which he assured that the Japanese Government would not underwrite credits for trade with the Chinese Communists. Both former Prime Minister Ikeda and President Chiang considered the letter binding upon the Japanese Government and this was confirmed in subsequent statements by Japanese Government officials.

Relations between Taipei and Tokyo quickly improved. The Japanese Government refused Import-Export Bank guarantees for sale of a textile plant by the Dai Nippon Textile Co. and for vessels from yards of the Hitachi Shipbuilding Corp. The Japanese Government thereafter abided by terms of the Yoshida Letter. On February 8, 1965, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato told the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives that his Cabinet was bound by terms of the Yoshida Letter. On December 5, 1967, at a time when Japan was fearful of a total cut-off of Peiping trade, Cabinet Secretary-General Kimura said that the Yoshida Letter could not be nullified.

In the last five years, Japan has sold only one packaged plant to Peiping. The temptation to seek large profits with Government guarantees has led to the recent Japanese suggestions that the Yoshida Letter is (1) not binding, or (2) can be nullified. These contentions are not in accord with the facts herein set forth.

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