The international situation has been confused and adverse currents of appeasement have been rampant for the last year. The Chinese Communists-taking advantage of the temporary improvement of their relations with the United States, the upsurge of pro-Communist forces in Japan, the retirement of the Japanese prime minister, Mr. Eisaku Sato, and political turmoil incidental to the organization of a new cabinet in Japan—are trying to nullify the Sino-Japanese peace treaty, which was signed by the Republic of China after eight years of heavy losses and great hardships in achieving victory in the war against Japan. In this effort to isolate the Republic of China and elevate their own position as a violent group, the Chinese Communists have shamelessly distorted historical facts and repeatedly fabricated the lie that they alone fought and won the eight-year war against Japan.
The Chinese Communists seek to deceive Chinese youth, befuddle the people of the United States and Japan, and thereby promote their aims in negotiations with Japan. The shabby intrigue of basing their propaganda on distortions of historical fact is beneath the notice of those who are well informed. But the Chinese Communists go right on repeating their lies and distortions, hoping that some people will believe them and that young people in various countries who did not live through World War II will be deceived. During the War of Resistance Against Japan, I was Chief of the General Staff and subsequently Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Ground Forces in the China Theater of the Allied Forces. Since learning of the lies of the Chinese Communists, which bring contempt upon our sacred War of Resistance, I have become convinced that in our international information activities, we must stand up and make a fighting reply to Chinese Communist propaganda, lest the lies be accepted and cause harm to our country.
The Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 1937, which led to the eight-year War of Resistance Against Japan, was brought on by the ambitions of the Japanese militarists. They hoped to take advantage of the Communist rebellion on the Chinese mainland to conquer all of China through open aggression. For their part, the Chinese Communists took advantage of the Japanese militarists' aggression to assure their own survival and expansion. Both China and Japan suffered from the war. The Chinese Communists profited from the conflict, which gave them opportunity to carry out their treacherous intrigues, thus providing the root of troubles not only for Asia but also for all the world. I recall that when Mao Tse-tung received a group of visitors from the Japanese Socialist Party in 1961, he said: "We must thank Japan, because without the invasion of China by the Japanese militarists, we might still be living in caves." In his article "Long Live the Victory of the People's War," Lin Piao frankly admitted that "the victory of the Chinese people in the war against Japan prepared the conditions under which we seized power on the national level." From these admissions, it is clear that the four pledges made to the National Government by the Chinese Communists on February 10, 1937, acceptance of the reorganization of their 18th Army Group and New 4th Army in August and October of that year, respectively, and the subsequent pretended surrender of the Chinese Communists were intended to take advantage of the war against Japan for the expansion of their own forces.
The four pledges of the Chinese Communists were: (1) to work for the full implementation of the Three Principles of the People; (2) to scrap the policy of armed uprising and the sovietization movement and to abandon the program of violently dispossessing landlords; (3) termination of the existing soviet regime; and (4) abolition of the Red Army in both name designation and its reorganization as National Revolutionary Forces to join in the front-line struggle against Japan.
As a consequence of these pledges, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, then president of the National Military Council and the highest ranking commander-in-chief of the Chinese Armed forces, reorganized the 20,000-man remnant of the Red Army in northern Shensi into the 18th Army Group, which had three divisions based on the number of troops and the quantity of weapons, in the fall of 1937. Chu Teh and Peng Teh-huai were appointed commander and deputy commander, respectively, and Lin Piao, Ho Lung and Liu Po-cheng were named division commanders. These forces were assigned to the Second War Area in northern Shansi under the command of Yen His-shan to engage in guerrilla activities. By the time of the evacuation from Nanking, the Central Government had again approved of the reorganization of Communist troops under Yeh Ting and Hsiang Ying into the New 4th Army, which consisted of about 10,000 men (although those with rifles numbered only about 5,000). The strength of this army was about equal to that of a division, and it was assigned to the Third War Area in East China under the command of Ku Chu-tung to engage in guerrilla activities south of the Yangtze River near Nanking and Wuhu.
In the fall of 1937, before Chu Teh led the 18th Army Group out of northern Shensi, Mao Tse-tung addressed the troops, saying in part:
"The Sino-Japanese War gives us, the Chinese Communists, an excellent opportunity for expansion. Our policy is to devote 70 per cent of our efforts to this end, 20 per cent to coping with the Government and 10 per cent to fighting the Japanese. "
He also said: "This policy is to be carried out in three stages. During the first stage, we are to work with the Kuomintang in order to ensure our existence and growth. During the second stage, we are to achieve parity of strength with the Kuomintang. During the third stage, we are to penetrate deep into parts of Central China to establish bases for counterattack against the Kuomintang. "
This evidence proves that in the early period of the war against Japan, the Chinese Communists were devoting most of their energy to increasing their own strength and to expansion. They had started the so-called four big campaigns:
(1) Expansion to an army of 1,000,000 men. The purpose was absorbtion of local militiamen and the remnants of regular forces together with the recruitment of volunteers.
(2) Expansion of the party membership to 1,000,000. The Communists sought to recruit teachers, students and staff members of schools.
(3) Collection of 10,000,000 catties of rice and other cereals. This was to be carried out in the name of the War of Resistance Against Japan so as to obtain reserve foodstuffs free or at low cost.
(4) Collection of reserve funds totaling 100,000,000 dollars through donations or taxes under the name of the War of Resistance Against Japan.
The Chinese Communists established branch offices in important cities and towns of the rear area to recruit youth and student refugees through deceptive methods and send them to such cadre training schools at Yenan in Shensi province as the "Yen an Anti-Japanese Military and Political University," "Marxism- Leninism Academy," "Lu Shun Art College" and "North Shensi Public School." Chinese Communist Party organizations which had been inactive or dispersed were restored; such satellite organizations as the "National Liberation Pioneers Brigades" and "National Salvation Associations" were established. The Communists expanded both party and army strength under the treacherous policy of "70 per cent of effort for expansion." At the end of the war, Mao Tse-tung said: "At the beginning of the war, we had only 40,000 party members and 30,000 troops. By the end of April, 1945, after eight years of war, we have 1,200,000 party members, 900,000 regular army troops and 2,200,000 militiamen." This was the huge "harvest" gathered by the Chinese Communists as they took advantage of the war and used the pretense of war participation to expand their ranks.
The Chinese Communists spent the first three years of the war in recovery and expansion. As soon as they were strong enough, they made an aboutface and began to sabotage our war effort against Japan. From November of 1940 to October of 1941 alone, the high command received documentary or telegraphed reports from various war areas of 395 incidents in which the Chinese Communists had attacked the National Armed Forces. This had a serious adverse effect on the Government's effort to resist the Japanese invasion. These are some of the more flagrant examples of Communist attacks:
(1) In the period from December, 1937, through the following January, the Chinese Communists sent from their bases in northern Shensi and their 18th Army Group base in Shansi more than 10,000 cadres to areas under our control in enemy zones of Hopeh, Honan and Shantung; and from the New 4th Army they sent more than 2,000 cadres to controlled areas in northern Kiangsu and Anhwei. These cadres set up secret organizations in towns and villages to engage in subversive activities; they also infiltrated our regular troops, militia and guerrilla forces for purposes of alienation and agitation.
(2) In March of 1938, the Chinese Communists used threats and lures to take over our guerrilla forces of about 40,000 commanded by Lu Cheng-tso in central Hopeh and reorganized them into a third column. At the same time, the 129th Division of the Chinese Communists commanded by Liu Po-cheng took advantage of our fierce battle with attackers of the Japanese 20th, 104th, 108th and 109th Divisions in the Second War Area and suddenly relaxed its defenses at Tung Yang Kuan. Japanese troops poured into our rear; forces near Lin Fen were surrounded and compelled to retreat into the mountains west of the Tung Pu Railroad.
(3) In April of 1938, cadres from the Communist New 4th Army sowed seeds of discord between Li Min-yang, commander-in-chief of National Armed Forces in the Lower Yangtze River Area, and Han Teh-chin, governor of Kiangsu and concurrently commander of the 89th Army. The Communists supported Li against Han and provoked intramural combat between forces of the two. It is common for the Chinese Communists to pit one side against another and bring them into collision.
(4) In May of 1938, the second column of the Communist 18th Army Group attacked our militia under command of Chang Yin-wu in such rural areas of Hopeh and Chahar as Po I, Hsiao Tien, Pei I, Chi Hsien and Pei Ma Chuan and killed about 90,000 militiamen. The Communist column continued the attack and finally eliminated all the militia of Hopeh under such leaders as Chiao Min-li, Ting Shu-peng, Chang Si-chu and San Chung-yeh.
(5) Early in 1939, the Communist 120th Division commanded by Ho Lung, which previously had been stationed in northwestern Shansi, moved into the central Hopeh plain and together with the Communist third column carried out large-scale attacks against the National Forces. In March of that year, the Communist 115th Division commanded by Lo Jung-huan moved to Shantung to take command of all the Communist columns in that province and invaded controlled areas of the National Forces bordering Shantung and Kiangsu. The first and second columns of the Communist New 4th Army were under the command of Chen Yi and the fourth column was under command of Chang Yun-yi. Both of these unleashed attacks against National Forces in the controlled area behind enemy lines along the Yangtze River. Our forces had suffered great losses by the end of the year, while the strength of the Communist 18th Army Group had been expanded to 400,000 men and that of the New 4th Army to 100,000 men.
(6) After turning back 10 Japanese offensives, National Forces in Shansi consisting of the 14th Army based on Chung Tiao Mountain and the 61st Army based on Yu Liang Mountain mounted counteroffensives in December of 1939. These actions were sabotaged by a Communist-instigated mutiny of 10 regiments of the National Forces and by Chinese Communist leaking of information about the counterattacks to the Japanese.
(7) In January of 1940, when our 69th Army and New Army were reinforcing troops in central Hopeh, Communists commanded by Ho Lung and Lu Po-cheng intercepted, ambushed and attacked them en route at such places as Pu Yang, Ching Ho, Wei Hsien and Nan Kung and inflicted heavy losses. The Communists also attacked National Forces commanded by Lu Chung-lin, governor of Hopeh and concurrently commander-in-chief of the Hopeh-Chahar War Area, along the border of Hopeh and Chahar. These Communist attacks cut communication lines and food supply routes of the National Forces and compelled them to withdraw into eastern Shansi.
Communists attacked National Forces under command of Sun Liang-cheng and Kao Shu-shun in Hopeh and gave the Japanese time to build roads and set up an economic structure. In August of 1940 another force of Communist troops attacked and occupied Lu Chun, temporary seat of the Shantung Provincial Government, and prevented Governor Shen Lung-lieh from carrying out his functions. In October, Communists attacked the forces of Han Teh-chin in an attempt to sabotage operations of the Kiangsu Provincial Government and the war area commanded by Han. In January of 1941 the Communist New 4th Army attacked the 40th Division of the National Forces in the so-called "New 4th Army Incident." In August of that year, two regimental commanders of the National Forces under the command of Wang Chin-kuo in Shansi were kidnaped by the Communists and their forces nearly inactivated. Late in September of 1941, the Communists attacked the National Forces of Wu Shih-min in Shansi; this led to the suicide of Wu. Throughout 1941, militia and civic organizations behind the enemy lines were so heavily beset by the Communists that they were not in proper condition to carry out their functions. Then, in 1942, Russia suffered setbacks in the war with Germany and could no longer support the Chinese Communists. The Third International was dissolved. Mao Tse-tung undertook a purge to liquidate his own dissidents. With the power of the party shaken and unable to mount large-scale attacks on National Forces, the Communists changed their tactics of sabotage and open attack to those of propaganda warfare. The Chinese Communists began to spread rumors that the National Forces were extremely weak and that only their 18th Army and New 4th Army Group could carryon the resistance against Japan. The rumor of today that only the Chinese Communists fought the war follows the same pattern as the propaganda of 1942.
In 3,000 days of uncertain winds and rain of blood, the National Forces fought 40,070 big and small battles against Japanese forces. In the same period, the Chinese Communist 18th Army Group fought only two guerrilla battles: one at Pinghsingkuang (Pinghsing Pass) in Shansi province in September of 1937 and the other in southern Shansi in the spring of 1938. According to our records of these two battles, the National Forces threw six divisions into the Battle of Pinghsingkuang, including Kao Tse's 84th Division and Li Hsien-chou's 21st Division of Kao Kuei-tzu's 17th Army, Wu Ting-lin's 64th Division of Lu Mao-en's 15th Army, the 65th Division led by Liu Mao-en and Liu Feng-ping's 73th Division. At that time, the Chinese Communists had just established their forces. Lin Piao's 115th Division, Ho Lung's 120th Division and Liu Po-cheng's 129th Division had no combat capability whatsoever. In the Battle of Pinghsingkuang September 26, the main force of the Chinese Communist 115th Division took part in a surprise attack on a Japanese military supply convoy. This gave the Chinese Communists opportunity to publicize their participation in the War Against Japan. Thinking of our six divisions and considering the nature and results of the surprise raid on the enemy's convoy of military supplies, it is not difficult to imagine the function performed by the Chinese Communists in this battle. The guerrilla attack in southern Shansi was the second in which the Red Chinese troops participated.
Ho Lung's division and Chao Cheng-shou's 1st army were responsible for cutting communications in northern Shansi, while Liu Po-cheng's division and Tseng Wan-chung's army were assigned to pin down Japanese troops in the Tungyangkuang (Tungyang Pass) and Changchih areas. The severing of communications and the pinning down of enemy troops were not tasks of supreme importance in this battle. After these two battles, the Chinese Communists never again took part in military action against the Japanese. However, once they had seized the mainland, the Chinese Communists used the failure of the Government to suppress their rebellion, the supposition that the winner is always right, and other deceptions, in an attempt to steal victory in the War of Resistance from the National Forces and rewrite the history of the Chinese people's courageous struggle against the Japanese aggressors. They told these lies: "The 8th Route Army (the 18th Army after its reorganization), the New 4th Army and the South China Column were the main forces in the War of Resistance Against Japan. They resisted and at tacked 69 per cent of Japanese troops and 95 per cent of Wang Ching-wei puppet troops, fought 125,165 battles against the enemy, killed 1,714,117 soldiers of the Japanese army and Wang's puppet army, seized 1,952 pieces of artillery, 11,895 machine-guns and 682,831 rifles and pistols, and recovered a million square kilometers of land from Japanese forces." Additionally, the Chinese Communists took many still pictures and motion pictures of Japanese weapons and equipment given them by the Russian forces which occupied Northeast China (Manchuria) after Japan's surrender. They then distributed these pictures and films at home and abroad and shamelessly claimed they seized the weapons and equipment during the War of Resistance Against Japan. Their purpose was to provide supposed evidence for their fabricated history of the war. However, they could not conceal all the facts.
The American writers Theodore H. White and Annalee Jacoby, who were sympathetic to the Chinese Communists' cause, have admitted in their collaboration Thunder Out of China that Mao Tse-tung's troops fought only "when they had an opportunity to surprise a very small group of the enemy," and that "during the significant campaigns it was the weary soldiers of the Central Government who took the shock, gnawed at the enemy, and died." In his book The Amerasia Papers: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China. Professor Anthony Kubek of the University of Dallas pointed out: "Mao's idyllic interpretation of the Communists in the front lines of defense is recognized today as the sheerest nonsense. In the early stages of the war the Communists not only avoided direct confrontation but were so invisible, as a matter of fact, that Japanese generals did not take them seriously. The result was that Chiang Kai-shek's armies, not the Communist armies, were the target." In Wedemeyer Reports, General Albert C. Wedemeyer wrote: "No Communist Chinese forces fought in any of the major engagements of the Sino-Japanese War-neither at Shanghai in 1937 nor at Taierchwang in the North in 1938 (the Battle of Hsuchou), nor in the defense of the Wuhan cities in that same year, nor in the battle for Changsha, nor later on the Salween and Burma fronts."
As General Wedemeyer has reported, the Chinese Communist forces did not participate in any large battle against the Japanese. From the unexpected occurrence of the July 7 Incident in 1937 to Japan's unconditional surrender, our ground forces fought 40,070 battles against the Japanese invaders, including 38,931 small battles, 1,117 important battles and 22 big battles. With the exception of the Battle of Pinghsingkuang and the guerrilla battle in southern Shansi, the Chinese Communists did not send a single soldier to fight against the enemy.
The Chinese Communists have continuously publicized their claim of having defeated the Japanese in the eight-year War of Resistance. All of us know, however, that war is a competition of forces and that the strength of the forces is the decisive factor in victory. There are three requirements in the organization and use of force:
(1) An efficient organ of command to provide planning and supervision.
(2) An executive system to see to the execution of plans.
(3) Administrative and logistical support to assure adequate supplies and maintenance.
In the initial period of the war, the Japanese warlords had 17 divisions of infantry and a complete special force. (Twenty-one divisions were mobilized soon after the start of the war.) At the outset, the Japanese had 738,000 troops, warships totaling 1,900,000 tons and 2,700 aircraft. After pledging support to the Central Government in the War of Resistance Against Japan, the Chinese Communists established the 18th Army Group and New 4th Army with a total strength of more than 30,000 men. These were untrained, undisciplined, poorly equipped Communist forces with most of their activities confined to northern Shansi in the Second War Area and Nanking and Wuhu in the Third War Area.
Some observers may point out that because the Chinese Communists devoted 70 per cent of their efforts to building up their own strength, they had expanded their forces from 30,000 to 470,000 toward the end of the war. (The Chinese Communists claimed they had 900,000 troops at this time.) Even if the 470,000 figure is accepted, the Japanese had 1,283,200 troops in the China Theater at the end of the war, not including those forces which had been transferred to the Pacific area. The count of Japanese did not include the nearly 1 million troops of Wang Ching-wei's puppet regime. Japanese forces outnumbered those of the Chinese Communists by about 3 to 1.
Furthermore, because they were always on the run, the Chinese Communist forces were scattered through Hopei, northern Honan, Shantung, northern Honan, Shantung, northern Kiangsu, northern Anhwei and Hainan island. With such limited numbers and with those so widely scattered, how could the Chinese Communist forces possibly have "killed 1,704,117 soldiers of the Japanese Army and Wang Ching-wei's puppet army?" Moreover, because of refusal to follow the plans and obey the commands of our Supreme Head quarters in their organization and activities, and because they did not have an efficient organ of command, they could not perform their combat function effectively. They did not have a competent organ for carrying out their plans. Their administration and logistical support lacked vigor and flexibility. Behind all this lies the fact that the Chinese Communists had used funds provided by the Central Government for other than military purposes without permission. After the Central Government reorganized the Chinese Communist 8th Route Army into the 18th Army Group (with three divisions) and other Chinese Communist forces into the New 4th Army (with four detachments), the Communists were treated the same as the National Forces and received military funds regularly.
Subsequently, after the first negotiations with the Chinese Communists in July of 1940, the Government approved expansion of the 18th Army Group into three armies (with six divisions and five supplementary regiments) and enlargement of the New 4th Army into two divisions. The Communists still received the same treatment as the National Forces and were given military funds on a regular basis. However, the Chinese Communists used the funds provided by the Government only for two ulterior purposes: (1) to subsidize or bribe front organizations, fellow-travelers and individuals and cultural organizations which proclaimed neutralism in order to facilitate subversive activities in the Government's rear areas, and (2) as deposits in their banks in frontier areas to pay for propaganda and the training of new cadres. For example, they allocated part of the funds provided by the Government to their Hsinhua Daily in Chungking, to Life Book stores in various areas, the Masses Magazine, the Liberation Weekly, the Yenan Anti-Japanese Military and Political University, the Marxism-Leninism Academy and the Central Party School with the objective of luring and buying up youths in our rear area. The actual funds of the Chinese Communist forces came from various sources: "frontier currency" issued by the Communists," "frontier banks," money seized from local people through liquidation, struggle and other violent means, and money earned from the growing and selling of opium and from smuggling. This situation was unfavorable to the administration and logistical support of the Chinese Communist forces and reduced their combat capability.
All Communist forces which were officially reorganized and whose expansion was approved by the Central Government received weapons and equipment identical to those issued to the National Forces. Even ordinary gas masks were no exception. But one thing must be understood: Because the Central Government had not completed national defense reconstruction at that time and because of the lack of foreign aid, most weapons of the National Forces were made or modified at home. The combat capability of our forces, therefore, could not be compared with those of the Japanese forces. According to General Okamura Neiji in his memoirs, the Japanese General Staff held the view that a Chinese division under the direct jurisdiction of the Central Government was the equivalent of a Japanese regiment and that a Chinese division under the jurisdiction of a local government was the equivalent of a Japanese detachment. If we accept this standard, the four divisions of the Chinese Communists in the initial period of the war were equivalent to about four Japanese regiments or only four detachments. After July of 1940, the Chinese Communists enlarged their forces to eight divisions with approval of the Central Government. These forces were equivalent to about eight Japanese regiments or only eight detachments. With only eight detachments of armed forces, how could the Chinese Communists have fought 125,165 battles against the enemy, killed, 1,714,117 Japanese soldiers and troops of the Wang Ching-wei puppet regime, seized 1,952 pieces of artillery, 11,890 machine-guns and 682,831 rifles and pistols, and recovered 1 million square kilometers of territory from the Japanese forces? " The lying figures of the Chinese Communists are far too large to be believed by anyone.
The Japanese Government accepted the Potsdam Declaration and made an offer of surrender to the Allied Nations on August 10, 1945. On August 15, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs received an official communication announcing Japan's surrender to the National Government. On the same day, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek sent a message to the supreme commander of Japanese forces in China, Okamura Neiji, in Nanking setting forth instructions on the principles of surrender. The Generalissimo appointed me as representative of the supreme commander of the China Theater to accept the Japanese surrender. Japan's representative, Shigemitsu Aoi, surrendered to the Allied Forces aboard the USS Missouri September 3. The surrender for the China Theater was held in Nanking September 9. Acting on behalf of Generalissimo Chiang, I accepted the Japanese surrender document which Okamura Neiji had signed on behalf of the Japanese Government.
After Japan's official surrender to China, Generalissimo Chiang instructed that separate surrenders be held in 14 districts of the Chinese mainland and Indochina (Vietnam) north of the 16th degree of north latitude.
The number of districts was subsequently increased to 15 as Chen Yi received Anto Toshkichi's surrender for the Taiwan-Penghu area in Taipei. The Japanese forces officially surrendered to the National Government in all of these districts. Japanese forces did not surrender to the Communist forces or give up their weapons to them except in the middle section of the Tientsin-Pukou Railroad, along the entire line of the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railroad, on the eastern section of the Lungchow-Lienyun Railroad and in Shansi Province, where the Communists had sabotaged communications lines, obstructed Government acceptance of Japanese surrenders and engaged in looting Japanese supplies. When the Chinese Communists spread propaganda about receiving weapons surrendered by the Japanese forces, they were actually referring to weapons which the Japanese handed over to the Russians in Manchuria. The fact that robbers handed their loot over to their servitors has nothing to do with the carrying out of Japanese surrender.
I have never ceased to be angry about the Chinese Communist propaganda claims of receiving surrendered weapons and territory from the Japanese. In truth, with the victory won, the Chinese Communist forces did not comply with orders of the National Military Council. Instead, they rushed to be the first in entering the northern and northeastern provinces, as well as the border areas of Honan, Hupeh and Anhwei provinces, so as to seize Japanese weapons and occupy territory before the Government forces arrived. The Chinese Communists falsely claimed that the weapons received from the Russians in Manchuria had been directly surrendered to them by the Japanese. The quantity of these weapons was enormous and we underestimated the count slightly just after V-J Day.
Regrettably, these excellent weapons and this equipment were obtained from the Russians after victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan and not captured from the Japanese during the conflict. The Chinese Communists did not have the weapons and equipment to attack the elite troops of Japan during the war. Instead, they used the weapons to mount a rebellion and attack the weary National Forces after the war. The exhaustion of the National Forces after eight years of war and such other factors as U.S. discontinuance of military assistance resulting from the treachery of pro-Communist elements in the U.S. State Department, opportunities lost because of U.S. military mediation and the huge amount of weapons and equipment supplied to the Chinese Communists by the Russians reversed the positions of strength and weakness between the National Government and the Chinese Communists and brought about the failure of efforts to suppress the Communist rebellion on the mainland. I can think of this only with the deepest feelings of remorse.
It is obvious that from any point of view—whether based on the Chinese Communists' original strength, their reorganized strength, their weapons and equipment or the war areas assigned to them—the Communists could not possibly have "shouldered the major task of resistance against the Japanese, engaged in 125,165 battles against the enemy, killed 1,714,117 troops of the Japanese forces and the puppet army" as falsely claimed in the Chinese Communist propaganda of today. This shameless fabrication is so lacking in factual support that it literally exposes itself. The Chinese Communists have made up other slanders, including the claim that the discipline imposed on their New 4th Army was an attack by National Forces and that the stationing of Hu Chung-nan's troops in Sian was solely for the purpose of defense against the Communists. These are attempts to defame the Central Government and are beneath the contempt of those who know the facts.
I would like to raise these questions: If the war against Japan was not under direct command of the Central Government and not fought by the National Forces, why did the Allied Forces of Britain and India solicit the support of our highest commander-in-chief, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek? Why did the 26 Allied Nations of World War II choose Generalissimo Chiang as the commander-in-chief of the China Theater, which included Thailand and Vietnam in addition to China? When foreign governments renounced the unequal treaties with China and signed new treaties on a basis of equality, why did they sign with the Central Government and not the Chinese Communists? Why did President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill wish to have Generalissimo Chiang meet them in Cairo for an exclusive summit conference and join together in a declaration on behalf of the Allied Nations? Why did even the motherland of the Chinese Communists, the U.S.S.R., supply such equipment as small airplanes to the Central Government during the war? When the Japanese surrendered, why did they not yield to the Chinese Communists instead of the Central Government? What can the Chinese Communists do to wash out or change these iron facts of history? Now the Chinese Communists are trying to lure Japan into revoking the Sino-Japanese peace treaty and seeking to fabricate new history. We cannot allow them to deceive the people with their substitution of lies for the truth and their treachery. We must refute the false with the true and painstakingly present the facts to the young people of this country as well as those of the United States and Japan so that vicious falsehoods can be exposed and the facts clarified, the Sino Japanese peace treaty safeguarded and our friendly relations with Japan strengthened. With our knowledge of the united front tactics of the Chinese Communists, we shall firm up our will and determination under the wise leadership of President Chiang Kai-shek and complete the task of eliminating the Chinese Communists and recovering our lost territory at the earliest time. This provides worthy and meaningful commemoration of the July 7 anniversary of the outbreak of the war of Resistance Against Japan.