On their three big occasions this year, about a dozen Maoist ranking cadres played hide-and-seek at gatherings in Peiping and the provinces. Several members of the Central Committee and Politburo were absent from the October 1 "national 'day" celebrations while others, whose absence from the public scene was noted on May 1 and "army day" (August 1), were present. The general impression was a clampdown on both the leading rightists and leftists, with the latter faring worse.
Official name lists released by "New China News Agency" on October 1 and 2 did not account for one of the five members of the standing committee of the CCP Central Political Bureau, one of the 16 ordinary members of that bureau, 29 of the 143 members of the CCP Central Committee and 45 of the 109 alternate members of the committee. While absence of most probably can explained in terms of duty or ill-health, a number of those who were absent have remained in obscurity for several months and may be in political trouble.
The most conspicuous absentee was Chen Po-ta, who ranks after Chou En-lai and before Kang Sheng in the standing committee of the Political Bureau. This was made known in the NCNA report of September 30 on the "state banquet" and by the Radio Peiping commentary on the parade of October 1. In each case, only two instead of three names of 'standing committee members were listed, apart from Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao.
Subsequently, the NCNA dispatch on the parade gave the appearance of trying to make Chen Po-ta's absence less conspicuous by mixing the names of members of the standing committee with those of ordinary members of the Political Bureau in a single list. This unusual step seemed to indicate Peiping's sensitivity about speculation which could be expected to arise as a result of Chen's non-attendance.
It may be that Chen was ill. But other possibilities cannot be ruled out. For example, he may have come under criticism at the second plenum of the 9th Central Committee, which was held from August 23 to September 6.
Chen Po-ta has been noticeably inactive in recent months by comparison with such other standing committee members as Chou En-lai and Kang Sheng. He has made only four reported public appearances since May Day-on May 5 and 21, June 11 and August 1. His inactivity probably has left Chou En-lai with more freedom to act in the top decision-making body - the standing committee-at a time when the influence of the pro-leftist forces to which Chen belongs has been declining. Chen has been a close personal aide of Mao since Yenan days. His friendship with Chiang Ching, the wife of Mao, was made manifest in 1966 when he was chosen as the nominal head of the CCP central group in charge of "cultural revolution" in order to facilitate the free maneuverings of its first deputy head, Chiang Ching.
Another prominent figure, Hsieh Fu-chih, also was absent on October 1. His name has not been mentioned by Peiping since March 19. Earlier speculation that he may be in eclipse has been strengthened.
Hsieh has had close relations with the leftist faction. He was named chairman of the Peiping municipal revolutionary committee in April of 1967, when the leftists were at the height of their power. In June and July of 1967 he went to Yunnan with a group of leftists; all the others since have disappeared. He was humiliated by the local rightists at Wuhan in July of 1967 but was warmly welcomed by Chiang Ching on July 22 when he and Wang Li were rescued and returned to Peiping. It is possible that he has become a victim of the power struggle between the two factions.
Liu Po-cheng, a member of the Central Political Bureau, a former marshal and an old leader of the PLA, was absent on May 1 and August 1 but was present on October 1. Another old marshal, Chu Teh, also reappeared.
Li teh-sheng, one of the four alternate members of the Central Political Bureau and the new director of the PLA's general political department and chairman of the Anhwei provincial revolutionary committee, did not attend the celebrations in Peiping. Instead, he turned up in Anhwei. This was unusual in view of his duties at PLA headquarters. Li's case is different from those of Hsu Shih-yu, Chen Hsi-lien and Li Hsueh-feng who, having no positions in central organs apart from being members or alternate members of the Central Political Bureau, were therefore at their post as chairmen of the Kiangsu, Liaoning and Hopei provincial revolutionary committees, respectively, for the October 1 activities. It is interesting that Liang Chi-ching, a former deputy political commissar of the Kiangsu military district, who was well known for his pro-leftist stand in opposition to Hsu Shih-yu, has become a leading officer of PLA units in Anhwei. He may be protected by Li Teh-sheng.
If it is a general practice that provincial revolutionary committee chairman should preside over local celebrations on October 1, then it is strange that Chang Chun-chiao should have appeared in Peiping with 12 other members of the Central Political Bureau instead for staying in Shanghai, where he is the chairman of the municipal revolutionary committee. He was the only provincial level revolutionary committee chairman present in Peiping for the occasion. Leftists have been removed from power in several provinces, and Chang may be encountering increasing opposition in Shanghai, where hitherto has been the strongest of those who, like him, rose during the "cultural revolution.”
Yang Teh-chih, a member of the CCP Central Committee, first vice chairman of the Shantung provincial revolutionary committee and commander of the Tsian military region, appeared in Peiping instead of in Shantung. His chief opponent, Wang Hsiao-yu, chairman of the Shantung revolutionary committee and a member of the CCP Central Committee, was not reported as present at the celebrations in either Shantung or Peiping.
Four other provincial revolutionary committee chairmen were not mentioned: Teng Hai-ching of Inner Mongolia, Li Yuan of Hunan, Liu Ko-ping of Shansi and Li Tsai-han of Kweichow.
It is significant that two well-known supporters of Chiang Ching, Liu Chieh-ting and his wife, Chang Hsi-ting, did not attend the celebrations in either Szechwan or Peiping. Both are vice chairmen of the Szechwan provincial revolutionary committee.
Some former power holders were absent: Chen Yi, Chen Yun, Hsu Hsiang-chien, Teng Tai-yuan, Wang Chen, Chang Yun-yi, Chang Ting-cheng and Hsu Hai-tung. All also were absent on May Day and “army day”.
These members and alternate members of the CCP Central Committee who had not appeared in public for a long time showed up on October 1: Nieh Jung-cheng, Li Fu-chun and his wife, Tsai Chang,Teng Tzu-hui, Chen Chi-han, Chang Tien-yun, Tseng Shan, Lai Chi-fa, Chao Chih-min' and Nieh Yuan-tzu.
Wen Yu-cheng first reappeared August 1. He is a close associate of Huang Yung-sheng, "chief of the general staff" With the recent death of Li Tien-yu, "deputy chief of the general staff," Huang faces the task of finding two replacements to fill vacancies in the administrative group of the CCP Central 'Military Affairs, Commission,
Officials in central party departments
A list of 85 "responsible persons" and "representatives of the revolutionary-masses" of the various departments under the CCP Central Committee who attended the October 1 parade in Peiping was released by NCNA. 'It is far shorter than the list of 149 persons from the same departments who attended the May Day gathering in Peiping but lengthier than the list of 72 who attended the parade on October 1 last year. The earlier lists covered a wider range, consisting of "military representatives" in addition to "responsible cadres" and "representatives of revolutionary masses," It was stated that persons from the "various work teams" were included in addition to those from the "various departments."
The new practice of omitting "military representatives" and persons from the "work teams" began on May 21 of this year, when a list of officials from Central Party offices who attended a rally to acclaim Mao's anti-American statement was released by NCNA. This came three weeks after May Day.
It is possible the Peiping authorities wished to avoid giving publicity to the fact that even Central Party organs are under military influence; also that factional strife is still so pronounced in these organs that the continued presence of military arbitrators is necessary. "Military representatives" were not mentioned in the October 1 list of persons in offices under the "state council," although they had appeared in the "state council" list of May 21, when their counterparts in Central Party departments were omitted.
This omission of "military representatives" does not necessarily indicate their withdrawal. Many of them are referred to as "responsible persons" - a term which is wider and less precise than: "responsible cadres" - of the Central Party departments or "state council" offices'.
Policy toward overseas Chinese
The "warm reception" given to "patriotic" overseas Chinese who went to Peiping to attend the October 1 celebrations this year may be an indication the regime wishes to project a new image of its attitude toward Chinese living abroad. The realities of the current policy toward overseas Chinese residents on the mainland contradict the "new image."
The 1966-67 reversal of the regime's former lenient policy toward "returned compatriots" was influenced by two attitudes which were widely adopted during the "cultural revolution." These were a professed opposition toward "capitalist tendencies" and an insistence on "equality of treatment and opportunity" for all.
Before the "cultural revolution," authorities in Peiping appealed to the "patriotism" of overseas Chinese. They encouraged overseas Chinese to return to the mainland and participate in the "great revolutionary movement dedicated to the socialist construction of the motherland." The authorities also persuaded them to contribute to the regime's foreign exchange reserves through investment in development projects and remittance of money to relatives on the mainland.
As part of this policy, the regime offered certain inducements, including:
1. Generous interest rates for those who invested their overseas capital in "state-run" enterprises.
2. For recipients of foreign remittances, allocation of extra rations of food, cloth and other consumer goods.
3. The setting up in the mid-1950s of a number of schools in various parts of the mainland for those who wanted to return for education. These schools usually did not charge for tuition, accommodation or other facilities. Three universities, two in Kwangtung and one in Fukien, were established for overseas Chinese students.
4. The building of "new towns" to provide accommodation for many of the "returned compatriots." Initially, two-story concrete houses with gardens were available for occupation by the overseas Chinese. Later, flats were provided instead of houses. This was because the local people, whose accommodation was not of the same standard, resented the special consideration given to the "returned compatriots."
The privileged position of the overseas Chinese developed into a sensitive issue during the "cultural revolution." It led to severe criticism by Red Guards of the favored treatment given the overseas Chinese.
As a result, the "Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission" was disbanded in 1966. Its duties appear to have been absorbed by a section of the "Public Security Bureau." The regime stopped promotion of overseas Chinese capital investment at about the same time and the above-average interest offered investors was lowered. In addition, recipients of foreign remittances no longer received extra rations, houses and flats which had belonged to overseas Chinese became "state property."
When Communist overseas Chinese schools were permanently closed down in 1966, many students applied for return to their countries of residence.
There has been a further development this year which is indirectly related to the regime's current policy toward overseas Chinese. This is the "anti-Hongkong style" campaign started in May. It was directed in particular at Kwangtung peasants, who were told that poverty, vice and exploitation were rife in Hongkong. Hongkong was depicted as a center of evil forces, where a good but poor man would soon be forced to resort to corrupt practices in order to survive.
As part of the same movement, travelers from Hongkong returning to visit their relatives on the mainland have been regarded with suspicion and often have become the objects of struggle meetings. If the traveler is found to be a former escapee or to have a "bad background," he may be detained by the authorities and may receive a sentence of several years labor reform. There have been reports' that travelers from Hongkong have been executed as counter revolutionaries.
Problems among rusticated youths
Statistics and other information recently released by several provinces reveal that the rustication of educated youths under the down-to-the-countryside" movement is continuing with undiminished intensity.
According to a Yunnan Daily editorial, entitled ''Do a good job of re-education of rusticated educated youths," " ... in the past year, more than 200,000 educated youths coming from Peiping, Shanghai and Yunnan have gone down to the rural areas of Yunnan." A Radio Chengchow broadcast said re-education had been carried out for "some 11,000 rusticated educated youths born the urban areas of Chengchow, Kaifeng and Chumatien" in the last year or so. Radio Taiyuan of Shansi province reported that 1,200 youths had left Taiyuan to settle in the countryside.
Radio Nanning of Kwangsi province said some 8,000 graduates of senior and junior middle schools in Nanning, Liuchow, Kweilin and Wuchow municipalities recently went to the rural areas to receive re-education. Radio Canton said nearly 1,000 senior and junior middle school graduates had left the city for the countryside. The broadcast revealed that since the beginning of this year, some 13,000 educated youths in the city had been rusticated.
These reports also imply that the problems which have been associated with the campaign since its inception still confront the authorities. The Yunnan Daily editorial, while claiming that "the new generation, full of socialist awareness and education, is growing up healthily" as a consequence of the youths "trying very hard to reform and to educate themselves in the vast rural areas,"' dwells at some length on the difficulties which are being encountered. "On the problem of going down to the rural areas, there has always been an acute class struggle," the editorial admitted.
A handful of class enemies, motivated by "a deep hatred for Chairman Mao's Instruction (on educated youths)" have been trying their utmost to carry out sabotage activities, the editorial complained. "The capitalist and the feudal remnant forces in both the urban and rural areas are also trying to win over the "new generation." In addition to the problems created by the class enemies, the"down-to-the-countryside" movement is hampered by the fact that members of the leadership “do not have a good understanding oil the great significance of the great revolution. They have not grasped the work tightly." "As a result "the editorial continued, “there are quite a number of problems in the work. ”
The Chengchow broadcast censured cadres and peasants for being daunted by their difficulties in dealing with youths whose illusions about life in the countryside were dispelled by reality. On arrival in the rural areas, the youths had expressed their determination to settle down. However, after laboring for some time, they came to "loathe dirt and fear fatigue," thinking that there was "no future in agricultural work." The broadcast said that this caused some of the cadres and poor and lower middle peasants who lacked understanding of the youths' "capricious ideas" to conclude erroneously that the re-education of educated youths was "difficult."