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A Historical Milestone: China vs USSR in UN

April 01, 1952
On August 14, 1945, when World War II was about to end, China and the Soviet Union signed a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance together with four agreements, to which a number of notes, annexes, protocols, and extracts from the proces-verbaux were attached. This is the fatal Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945, a source of incalculable trouble in the whole Far East.

Whenever they think of the Treaty, the Chinese people invariably think of the notorious Yalta Agreement that the war-worn President Franklin Roosevelt signed with Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Marshal Josef Stalin behind China's back but at her expense. With great reluctance, we agreed to this Agreement to which we were not legally bound. We entertained the hope that by giving Russia what we ourselves highly treasure, we could earn the goodwill and cooperation of our powerful neighbour.

This hope turned out to be only wishful thinking. Even such an unequal treaty, so very advantageous to the Russians, could not satisfy the appetite of the masters of the Kremlin. No sooner had her signature been affixed to the Treaty than the Soviet Union considered it nothing more than a scrap of paper.

In the Treaty and the Agreements, there were clear-cut stipulations on the Manchurian trunk railways, on Port Dairen and Port Arthur, and on relations between the Soviet Commander-in-Chief and the Chinese administration after the Japanese surrender. But in none of the cases did Soviet Russia fulfill the letter or the spirit of the Treaty. An act of violation of the treaty and of the Charter of the United Nations was thus perpetrated by the Soviet Union.

Our case against Soviet Russia was brought up in three consecutive regular sessions of the United Nations General Assembly beginning in 1949.

In the Fourth Session in Paris, we first introduced a draft resolution determining that the Soviet Union had violated the Sino-Soviet Treaty and the United Nations Charter. We further requested Member States not to recognize the Communist regime, or to render it any assistance, but to respect China's political independence and territorial integrity. At that time, most Member States still cherished illusions about the Soviet Union, thinking that she could be won over by international tolerance and that Communism and Democracy could exist in peace. The idea of singling out Soviet Russia as the black sheep of the family of nations shocked them. Therefore, the General Assembly, instead of accepting our formula, adopted two other resolutions: one decided to refer the Chinese charges to the Interim Committee for continuous study and examination; the other called upon all States to respect China's political independence and to refrain from acquiring spheres of influence or obtaining special rights in China.

In 1950, our Delegation to the Fifth Session of the General Assembly, on account of the then unfavorable circumstances, scaled down its demand to only the dispatch of a special commission to investigate the Soviet violation of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945. Once again our draft resolution was pigeon-holed, and substituted by two other resolutions, reiterating what the last session had decided.

Then came the fruitful Sixth Session of 195I. On January 26, 1952, the First Committee (Political and Security) of the General Assembly took up the Chinese item entitled "Threats to the Political Independence and Territorial Integrity of China and to the Peace of the Far East, Resulting from Soviet Violations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of August 14, 1945 and from Soviet Violations of the Charter of the United Nations" as it appeared on the Agenda. On the same day the Chinese Delegation tabled the following draft resolution: The General Assembly.

Considering that it is a prime objective of the United Nations "to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained",

Noting that the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concluded on August 14, 1945 a Treaty of Friendship and Alliance which provides, inter alia,

(a) that the Contracting Parties "agree...to act in accordance with the principles of mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-intervention in each other's internal affairs", and

(b) that "Soviet Government agrees to render China moral support and assist her with military supplies and other material resources, it being understood that this support and assistance will go exclusively to the National Government as the Central Government of China,"

Finding that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics obstructed the efforts of the National Government of China in re-establishing Chinese national authority in the three Eastern Provinces (Manchuria) after the surrender of Japan and gave military and economic aid to the Chinese Communists against the National Government of China,

Determines that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in her relations with China since the surrender of Japan, has violated the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of August 14, 1945.

Dr. T. F. Tsiang, Chairman of the Chinese Delegation, addressed the Committee twice in the course of the debate on this subject, once when he introduced the Chinese proposal, and a second time at the end of the general discussion. From what he said we could find out the basic facts and arguments in support of the charges against the transgressor.

The Soviet Union entered the war against Japan only five days before the latter surrendered. As a matter of fact, no actual fighting took place during those five days. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union, making good use of her geographical position, managed to send troops into our Northeastern Provinces to reap the fruits of our victory, achieved after eight long hard years. Furthermore she ignored her pledge that her troops would evacuate Manchuria three months after the Japanese surrender, as stipulated in black and white in one of the Notes exchanged between the Foreign Ministers of both countries. Then she willfully prevented the Chinese National troops from landing at Port Arthur and Port Dairen to re-establish Chinese administrative authority in these provinces. Then she harbored the Chinese Communists in the Northeast provinces and gave them all the weapons they had taken from the Japanese Kwantung Army, thus making it impossible for the Chinese Government forces to resume control, and enabling the Chinese Communists to occupy most of the strategic points to engage in open rebellion against the Central Government. At last she sovietized the entire Chinese mainland through her pawn, the Mao Tse-tung regime.

Article 5 of the Treaty reads: "The High Contracting Parties, having regard to the interests of the security and economic development of each of them, agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration after the re-establishment of peace and to act in accordance with the principles of mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-intervention in each other's internal affairs."

Article 6 reads: "The High Contracting Parties agree to afford one another all possible economic assistance in the post-war period in order to facilitate and expedite the rehabilitation of both countries and to make their contribution to the prosperity of the world."

And in a Note attached to the Treaty, Mr. V. M. Molotov, the then Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, gave unequivocally the assurance that the Soviet moral support and military assistance would go "exclusively to the National Government". In view of the foregoing, can the Soviet Union reconcile her pledge to respect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity with her subsequent action? Did the Soviet Union support exclusively the National Government? Did the Soviet Union help facilitate and expedite the rehabilitation of China? If not, why could we not establish the charge that the Soviet Union had violated the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945?

In his general statement, Dr. Tsiang not only brought forth the aforementioned arguments, but also denounced the Yalta Agreement as a "disastrous mistake in history". It is to be noted that never before had a highly-placed official in the Chinese Government openly condemned that Agreement.

Mr. Y. A. Malik, the Soviet delegate, could say very little to deny the accusations. He emphasized over and over again that China (Communist China) and the Soviet Union were living on the best of terms and that there was no question of Chinese independence and integrity. He attributed the fall of the National Government on the mainland entirely to its own unpopularity and claimed that it had nothing to do with Soviet Russia. He also asserted that since a new treaty between China (Communist China) and the Soviet Union had come into force, the old one no longer existed. His conclusion was that the United Nations should not seriously take up the non-existent charges of a delegate representing a non-existent government based on a non-existent treaty.

Shortly before voting on the Chinese draft resolution the Thai delegate tabled an amendment replacing the word "violated" by the worlds "failed to carry out". The amendment was somewhat unexpected. Naturally it would weaken the language of the original text, which indicated clearly that the Soviet failure to carry out the Treaty had been deliberate. However our Delegation accepted the amendment for two reasons: Firstly, the most important and strongest part of the draft, the "finding..." clause in the preamble, the wording of which implied Russia's deliberate violation of the Treaty, remained unchanged. Secondly, the general trend in the Committee seeming to favor the amendment, its acceptance would probably help pass the resolution in the Committee and secure the requisite two-thirds majority in the plenary meeting.

The United States took the lead in supporting our cause. The majority of the Latin American countries, with the exception of Argentina, Guatemala and Mexico, voted in our favor, while the whole East European Bloc abstained. As to the Asians and Arabs, votes were divided.

Most of those who abstained argued that a decision of the United Nations against the Soviet Union would re-open the wounds inflicted on the East-West relations and intensify the already tense international situation. Others were unable to subscribe to our proposal simply because they had switched recognition to the Red regime.

On January 29, our proposal as modified by the amendment of Thailand, was put to a roll-call vote and was adopted by a margin of 24 to 9 with 25 abstentions.

Three days later, the General Assembly met in plenary session and confirmed the verdict with one more vote in our favor.

At long last, our battle against aggression in this world body has come to a triumphal end.

Of some interest is the fact that Sir Gladwyn Jebb of the United Kingdom said the discussion of the Chinese complaint was one of academic importance only and he was not alone in his opinion.

I admit that no military sanction against the Soviet Union by the United Nations was called for, nor was any other substantial punitive measure under consideration. Yet, by pronouncing this moral judgment, the United Nations took cognizance not only of the responsibility of the Soviet Union for the Communist encroachment on the Chinese mainland but also the Soviet Union's ambition towards world sovietization. By passing the Chinese draft resolution, the United Nations showed the world that it upheld right over might. This victory in the diplomatic field not only raised the prestige of our Government, but also enhanced that of the United Nations, since it is obvious that such a victory would strengthen its raison d'etre. Is all that of academic value only?

This is a big historical event. It is likely that its full effect will not be felt until some years hence.

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