Immediately after World War II, the Communist Party in had everything going their way. The moment seemed ripe to seize power by force. The partisans were still armed. There were entire regions in a state of terror. The Government was weak. The Reds controlled key positions in many ministries and held cabinet posts. They furnished ambassadors and important state functionaries. Communist mayors ruled several large cities, including , , , and . They administered the police force. Yet Palmiro Togliatti, the Italian Communist boss, took care that Italian Communism did not come into power. The reason was simple the Allies would have crushed any such insurrection attempt in short order. Whenever talks about such matters today, he invariably recalls what happened in in 1944.
When Professor Alexander Efremovich Bogomolov presented his credentials as ambassador of the U.S.S.R. in February, 1954, Communism in had become big business. The Communist Party got a good start after World War II by seizing Mussolini's private fortune and a good part of the property of the Fascist Party. It owns a series of corporations: Societa Importazioni-Exportazioni, Nord Export, Techno-export, Campagnia Centra Orientale, Campagnia Europeo-Balcanica, Neos, Unione Rappresentanze Estere, Societa Commerciale Finanziaria and Impress Mercantili Commerciali. The Party spends between 40 million and 48 million U.S. dollars a year. To run its elaborate headquarters on 's Via delle Botteghe Oscure (the Street of Dark Shops) costs annually another million dollars. Although the U.S.S.R. always contributes some funds, the Italian Communist Party passed along in 1953 US$480,000 to their less affluent comrades in . The Italian Communist Party has skilfully managed to penetrate important segments of 's social, economic and political structure. This penetration extends to the armed forces, the pseudo-independent Socialist Party and even the administrative apparatus of the . The most notable case is that of Alighiero Tondi, a former Jesuit priest of the in who took clerical orders in 1936. He electioneered for the Communist Party prior to the 1953 election and formally joined the Communist Party in April, 1953.
Luigi Barzini, one of 's outstanding correspondents, writing a series of articles on Communism in in 's influential Carriere della Sera, stated that " knows that nobody really likes militant Communism. He knows that such Communism always ends tragically", causing powerful defense coalitions to be formed against it ... There are two things that he is afraid of: isolation and unswerving anti-Communism." Under this soft "policy, Italian Communism has become a "serious, dangerous and learned party." As a result, older Italians find it hard to believe that Togliatti's suave, businesslike minions are really Communists, and younger Italians find it hard to believe that Communists are violent and disorderly. "Today in ," Signor Barzini says, "it is neither dangerous nor uncomfortable nor damaging to be a Communist, and having been one might mean salvation tomorrow."
In case of war with the U:, the Italian Communist Party has plans all ready. The effectiveness of the plan may be gauged by reference to a previous performance of the Party. In 1948, when was shot and almost killed, the comrades momentarily showed their rough hand. They blocked 70 roads leading to , thus preventing government troops from entering the city. In , they seized the radio station and broadcast false news. In an emergency, they could take over, according to Signor Barzini, "all vital points" in the nation in a few hours. "In , public order is maintained not so much by legal force as by prudence of the Communists."
Bianca Bianchi, ex-Social Democratic Deputy from , said recently in an interview with C. L. Sulzberger of The New York Times, "The Italian people always go along with the strongest. Many who had never been for the Communists are now saying, 'the next time we will be for the Communists because they are going to win.'" This strength of the Italian Communist Party which threatens the existence of parliamentary institutions may be explained by (1) Italian inexperience with democracy, (2) the leftist tradition in individual regions, (3) a trend towards the Right, (4) the difficulties of the Christian Democrats, and (5) economic imbalance.
If national unity came to not too long ago, democracy in is of even more recent vintage. While the Communists were still in the government set up under Allied sponsorship, a curiously worded Constitution was agreed upon. The Italian Constitution promised "a democratic Republic founded on work," It a promised everyone "the right to work," friar from Fraternitas, the flying squadron of monks organized in Emilia, complained that the Government was too weak to guarantee anti-Communists freedom to work in the face of Communist threats. A leading Florentine intellectual observed, "The Italian expects law and order from the state, possibly to counteract his own tradition of individualism and lawlessness. Yet time and again the Communist Party gives the impression of being stronger than the state."
The electoral figures are also instructive. On June 7, 1953, 34.8% of the voters cast their ballots for the extreme left-either for the Communisis or for Pietro Nenni's left-wing Socialists. While that represents a drop from the power in 1946, it represents a gain of almost 4% compared with the previous national election of 1948. More striking is the fact that the pro-Communist vote of 1953 was the same as the percentage cast for the Leftist parties in 1919, two years before the Italian Communist Party was formed. As long ago as 1913, before World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution, 32% of 's voters were balloting for the left. The Leftist tradition in has been powerful for more than 40 years, despite its temporary eclipse by Fascism. Many of the districts most faithful to Communism nowadays, especially those in "Red" Emilia and , were consistently pro-Socialist as long ago as 1900.
According to C. L. Sulzberger of The New York Times, "Democracy in may eventually be more endangered by the rise of the Right-wing sentiment in the Monarchist Party and the Italian Social Movement than by any striking increase in Communist support. ... The right has been gaining strength at the expense of the moderate center and above all at the expense of what still is Italy's largest party, that of the Christian Democrats. ... It is dangerous ... to the extent that it increasingly weakens the center." Dr. Alcide de Gasperi has expressed himself in support of this view when he said, "The problem now is not so much the reviva1 of Communism as it is the strengthening of the extreme Right. The two together represent a return to the shadow of the past. In a sense what has hurt democracy has been anti-Communism rather than Communism." Ignazio Silone, Social Democrat, one of the principal leaders of the Communist Party during the 1920's, expressed the belief that behind the propaganda emphasizing the strength of Communism might be the desire of the extreme Right to prepare a coup similar to the one that led to Fascism three decades ago. He said, "I fear the trend among the Right where the cult of force is influential. If all they respect is force, let's give them force. I fear that the atmosphere of menace now previling has only been created by the Right because it wants a coup."
The Christian Democrats, as the largest political party, labor under three disadvantages. First, they are deeply split among themselves. The extremes among them are perhaps farther apart politically than the southern conservative and the northern liberal factions of the U. S. Democratic Party. Secondly, being attacked by both the Leftist and Rightist groups, they have lost many adherents to the Monarchists. Thirdly, they are regarded by many as a "clerical" party. As "clericalism" has been a fighting word in for more than a century, they have to dissipate a part of their energy to clearing their name of any taint of "clericalism." The strength of the Communist Party in Emilia is partially explained by its opposition to "clericalism." Emilia was once part of the temporal domain of the Pope. A monk of the Order of the Servants of Mary explained, "The Papal States continued to rule during the last century and their authoritarianism created strong anti-c1erical feelings - now taken over by the Communists."
Despite economic progress including a 7 per cent increase in national income in 1953 and notable production gains. 's economic and social system is far from modern. The less developed south is very far from achieving the same standard of living as the industrially developed north. Ernesto Basinelli, an economist of , said, "There are two , north and south, and that is the gravest question we have. Every government must be two-faced, with one policy for the north and one for the south. And the policy for the south must be devised for a colonial area." The real state of development of the south may be ganged by the insular mentality of parts of the south. In down towards the toe of the peninsula, references as foreigners are still made of "Albanians, Greeks and Piedmontese."
The tactics of the Italian Communist Party are noted f or its multi-faced propaganda and its peaceful penetration. Propaganda of the Italian Communists promises everything to everyone. The Italian Communist Party is for "a lessening of international tension ... action in favor of the popular masses, the small and middle producers and the rural population ... extension of the home market ... increase of capital investment ... stepping up of full production activity." Amintore Fanfani said, "The greatest strength of Communism in is its mask. It does not present itself as Communists because the Party's leaders realize that Communism as such is unpalatable. Thus, when Palmiro Togliatti came back to during the war, he supported the King and allowed the 1929 Concordat with the Pope to be written into the Italian Constitution." The Communists masqueraded as nationalists. In the elections of 1948, their symbol was Garibaldi and not the hammer and sickle. They have been continually echoing the Italian demand for the return of . Giuseppe Saragut, Vice Premier, said, "Communism adapts itself to each local situation in the most admiral way. It speaks hundreds of languages in ."
Slow peaceful, penetration is another party line. Luigi Barzini stated, "This amounts to a silent, courteous revolution. gaining ground through good manners, a revolution carried out with the backing of the law, with no haste, moving from one election to the next, finally presenting the nation with a fait accompli, without provoking strong reactions and with hardly anybody realizing what is happening."
Luigi Balzini also presented a program for combating Italian Communism. He believes in reinforcing the state authority and in "methodic, inflexible application of the penal and civil codes, the prosecution of illegal practices, of corruption and indulgence in our public life, the modernization of bureaucracy, all that reassures a confused public that there is protection under the law, that there is no need to seek protection from the Communists. ... The Government ... can solve the Communist problem only by strengthening the middle class, helping it financially and morally, restoring its dignity, authority, pride and self-confidence. ... If Italians who are in a position to change our economy just wait to see how things go, how elections turn out, how others defend themselves from Communism, then the battle is lost."
It takes an expert on security matters like Premier and concurrently Interior Minister Mario Scelba, who established the vigorous National Armed Police (Reparto Celere) while serving as Interior Minister in the De Gasperi cabinet, to sound the note of optimism that is the trade mark of all politicians in power. Premier Scelba declared, "There is no danger of Communist conquest of power in , by legal democratic means or by violence. Communism remains a distinct factor in the national life that makes government action and the social situation difficult, but it has no chance of taking power. ... The forces at the disposal of the state are such as to prevent any attempt at conquest by violence."
Premier Scelba, be it remarked, offered scant comment on the peaceful penetration of the Communists into Italian political life. He probably didn't read the blueprint for combating Communism in offered by Signor Luigi Barzini.