By Edward Y. K. Kwong
The question of Japanese rearmament has never been sufficiently aired in the public or among the former allies that ranged themselves against Japan. After the outbreak of the war in Korea, the allies that were most responsible for the control of Japan under occupation suddenly came to the realization that here was another power vacuum. Here too World Communism directed from the Kremlin might launch its sudden, unprovoked attack. Even as the Republic of Korea was attacked by the North Korean Communists trained by their Russian and Chinese comrades, some part of Japan, notably Hokkaido, might be the object of invasion by a force of Japanese Communists trained in Soviet Russia or its Chinese satellite. The United States which had to bear the major portion of the cost of the war in Korea and to which the defense of the Japanese islands forms a major consideration in its strategic planning was the foremost in advocating the rearmament of Japan. The Government of the Republic of China, following President Chiang Kai-shek's policy of returning good for evil, had consistently been advocating a lenient policy toward Japan after the cessation of hostilities and found little difficulty in agreeing to Japan's rearming. All the other former allies agreed to the proposition only after long persuasion or after reassurance in the form of a guaranty by the United States.
Unanimity is also lacking among the former allies as to how far Japan's rearmament should go. Even among Japan's well-wishers there is little agreement as to what form Japan's rearmament should take, what size of armed forces she should have, and how the forces should be employed.
While the experience of World War II is still fresh in our memory, any wrong orientation of the objective of Japan's rearmament will cause alarm and consternation among Japan's neighbors and other Asiatic countries. For this reason those who advocate that Japan should be rearmed in excess of her defense needs or that her forces should be employed outside of her territorial limits will find themselves in the minority. If Japan is to rearm, it will be for the purpose of defending herself against aggression. However, in these days of atomic bombs and supersonic airplanes, the role of a defending army for such a country, as Japan calls for a vast extension of military establishments and all-out militarization of the citizenry, to which length an ordinary advocate of Japanese rearmament may not be prepared to go.
In order to assess Japan's defense needs, we had better first determine what country is liable to be her potential enemy. Among the countries that may be of immediate menace to Japan are the United States and Soviet Russia with or without the support of its Korean and Chinese Communist satellites. However, as practical politics, we shall consider an American invasion of Japan as of such remote possibility that it may be ruled out even for hypothetical discussion. There remains then only Soviet Russia.
A Russian invasion of Japan may take one of several forms, such as sponsoring a domestic revolt by the Japanese Communists, outright attack on Hokkaido and other Japanese islands which are flanked by waters and territories dominated by the Russians, or engineering an invasion by the North Korean and Chinese Communists. As Japan and West Germany figure prominently in the Soviet strategy of world domination, a Russian invasion of Japan, when it materializes, is likely to take a combination of these forms to preclude the possibility of failure.
This is what makes Japan's position so precarious, for it is hard to predict what hour the enemy will strike. At the present time, there is nothing but respect for the armed and industrial might of the United States that stands between Japan and her would-be aggressor, Someone might take exception to what I have said on the ground that Japan is slowly but gradually rearming and that she has in being at present the equivalent of an armed force in the National Police Reserve, which since October 15, 1952, has been known as the National Safety Corps, I was an eyewitness when members of the National Police Reserve held a parade in the streets of Tokyo last October. With due respect to members of this newly created force, I must say that it was but a ghost of the former mighty Japanese Imperial Army. One sensed the absence of something that made the difference between a victorious army and a force formed of parade soldiers. Nor could one detect on the part of the Japanese bystanders any concern, any respect, or any sense of elation and proprietorship that they used to manifest to their Imperial Army. For all the good that members of the National Police Reserve could do, they might as well be some Argentine soldiers parading in the Japanese capital for the entertainment of the bystanders.
Nor should the usefulness of the present small force of the National Safety Corps be exaggerated. With Japan's long coastlines and innumerable islets that can serve as the springboard or staging area for an invading army, this force of 100,000 men is entirely inadequate to fend off a strong foreign invasion. I would also entertain serious doubts as to its ability to suppress a domestic revolt when the latter "'has seriously gotten underway. With the experience of other Asian countries before us, we can almost be sure that the Japanese Communists are building with foreign assistance arms caches and strongholds in some mountain fastness or in some inaccessible parts in Hokkaido, Their ranks would be constantly swollen by repatriates from the China mainland and from Soviet Russia, who had been converted to Communism. When they start a revolt, it would be a full-dress affair; and in a mountainous country such as Japan, whatever little edge that a professional soldier has over a rebel or guerrilla will be nullified by the latter's familiarity with his surroundings and the terrain over which he operates. We need only look at what the Communists have done in other Asian countries to know the pattern which such a revolt will take in Japan. When the Chinese Communists, started their revolt in the mountainous provinces of Hunan and Kiangsi 1927, it took the government more than four years of arduous campaign with the assistance of tens of divisions to dislodge them from Central China. The Huks in the Philippines, the Vietminhs in Indo-China, and the jungle bandits in Malaya have all started from humble beginnings to become what now look like situations requiring the long-term commitments of their respective governments.
If there is any doubt concerning the ability of the present National Safety Corps to suppress serious domestic revolt, there is little question of its inability to defend the country against an invasion launched by the Soviets, if the protecting arm of the United States is engaged elsewhere, There are only two important east-west trunk line railroads on the main Japanese islands. There is a third line paralleling most of the way the southern line but converges with it at several points to pass over difficult terrain. As the southernmost line bears the burden of most of the traffic and if this line is put out of commission, the Japanese main islands would be paralyzed. This can be accomplished without difficulty by air bombing or commando raids, as both the northern and the southern railroads follow closely the coastline. It can also be accomplished by bombing or destruction of the many tunnels through which these railroads pass. When these railroads are put out of commission, the different localities will be under the mercy of the invading air or seaborne forces.
Therefore, a reasonable plan for the defense of such a country as Japan will have to take into account the eventuality when the United States, Free China, and other powers willing to render assistance are engaged elsewhere and can give Japan little, if any, help. The plan will envisage the actual invasion by hostile forces not in anyone place but in a dozen localities by air or seaborne units, after the railroads have been knocked out and the country is more or less paralyzed. Defense against the possibility of such an invasion calls for the creation of foci of strength in different parts of the country garrisoned by strong regular armed forces. They would have at their disposal large stores of ammunition and supplies in bomb-proof shelters. They would have to be assisted by a well-organized and well trained militia in the suppression of sporadic uprisings by fifth columnists or in the search of enemy agents and paratroopers dropped by air. This is an all-out war, a war that will, determine the survival of Japan as a nation in which every man and woman will have to take part or suffer the consequences. Therefore, the plan for defense not only calls for the creation of regular armed forces ten or twenty times the present strength of the National Security Corps but also the militarization of a large part of the population.
As the question of rearmament concerns the Japanese people most closely, we are naturally curious to know their reaction to this proposition. While there is a good deal of discussion in the Japanese press, it is difficult for anyone to form a clear-cut picture as to what the Japanese people want--whether they are for or against rearmament. The Japanese Government headed by Yoshida reflects this national indecision and has been shy in committing itself on the question of rearmament. This hesitant attitude has been ascribed to the desire on the part of the Japanese Government of angling for more aid from the United States. While it is difficult to rule out any motive of gain on the part of the Japanese leaders, their unwillingness to commit themselves to rearmament must be ascribed rather to Japan's economic weakness then anything else. Anyone who is familiar with Japan's post-war economy knows that she is in no position to support any army sufficiently large to ward off foreign invasion. From Japan's point of view, rearmament is feasible only under one or more of the following conditions: (1) long-term underwriting of the cost by the United States, (2) free accessibility to the raw materials and markets in Southeast Asia, and (3) heavy procurement of war materials and supplies in Japan by other governments, especially by the United States Government, for their own rearmament programs. With her present economic potential, Japan cannot build up an adequate defense force without bringing ruin upon herself and if she is assisted at the beginning to build it up, economic confusion may follow as soon as outside support is withdrawn. This being the case, we cannot blame the Japanese for being unwilling to go in for rearmament.
What is more, with the present popular mood and frame of mind of the Japanese people toward the question of rearmament, we are not at all certain that the people and Government of Japan are willing to go to any lengths in rearming themselves, even if they have the means to do so. Herein lies the real danger that is facing Japan today, her inadequate knowledge of and indifference to the danger of Communism. Some of her Government leaders are well aware of the hostility of Soviet Russia and her satellites toward their country and of Russia's aggressive designs against Japan. But among the ordinary citizens, ignorance and apathy prevail as to what the Communists would do to their country. Communist books are sold at all reputable bookstores. Communist propaganda material is freely circulated. Labor unions and other organizations are infiltrated by Communists. College students made a vogue of talking about Marxism and Stalinism. If this trend should go on for only a few more years, Japan would be ripe for Communism. She is treading the perilous road that all the Russian satellites were following before they went Communist. Hence, it is not enough for Japan's well-wishers to help Japan to rearm but they must convince the Japanese people of the danger of Communism and the urgent necessity of fighting it with all the means at their disposal.
There remains the question as to whether or not Japan after rearmament would go rampant as she did during World War II. While not every possible contingency may be foreseen, the chance for Japan to become a menace to other nations without her colonies and without access to the market and resources of the China mainland is extremely small. As has been said before, Japan's rearmament will have to be assisted or underwritten by the United States. Without the blessing of the United States, Japan is in no position to state an aggressive war of her own in the foreseeable future.
This brings up another question connected with Japan's rearming: whether or not Japanese should be used elsewhere to fight aggression, for some Asian countries which were invaded by Japan during World War II find strong objections to seeing Japanese employed outside of Japan. There are two aspects of this question. First, from the Japanese point of view, they should welcome this opportunity to serve the Free World. Japan is a nation long in manpower but short in material resources. The people of Japan should welcome opportunities to serve in countries threatened by Communist invasion but lacking sufficient force to defend themselves. I can think of half a dozen countries that may profit by bolstering their defenses with Japanese forces.
Secondly, if we look at the question from the point of view of Japan's friends, there is little reason for them to commit themselves not to use Japanese overseas, if the Japanese themselves are willing. The mere knowledge that such a large source of potential manpower is at the disposal of the Free World will have some deterrent effect on the aggressors. Then, if in the unfortunate eventuality that World War III should break out, the supreme duty of those of us fighting on the side of the democracies is to win the war. To that end, we should welcome the Japanese or any other people to fight with us in Japan or anywhere else. It will be supreme folly to bind ourselves beforehand so that this rich war potential would be denied us in an emergency.
Early US-Thai Relations
By Somchai Anuman Rajadhon
In view of the close and friendly relations between the United States of America and Thailand, it may be of interest to many people in this country to know something of the history of such relations. The American people and the Thai people have known each other for more than a century and ever since their first encounter up to the present time it is most gratifying to note that the friendship between the two peoples have I grown steadily and firmly. The main reason for such exceptionally cordial relations is because they were founded on a basis of peace, equity and reciprocity.
The relations between the two countries can be traced back as far as 1818 during the latter part of the reign of King Phra Bhuddha-Lertla when trade intercourse between the two countries was first established. When John Morgan who was sent by the British authorities at Singapore to enter into direct commercial relations with this country in 1821 arrived at Bangkok, he noticed in the Chao Phya, river two American boats loading sugar: Another American boat the “Persian”; was on her third voyage and had brought 5,000 muskets for which a ready sale to the Government was found as the Americans had an easy way of giving and taking. The relations between Thailand and the U. S. A. then were very intimate. It was said that the President of the U. S. A. had addressed a letter to the King of Thailand through the Captain of the first American boat arriving in Thailand, in which the President recommended him to the graces of the King. It was also said that the American met with an excellent reception in Thailand because they distinguished themselves by fairness in all their dealings. Such were the relations of the American and the Thai at the beginning of the 19th century.
The diplomatic relations between the two countries, however, were not established until 1833 when Edmund Roberts was sent to Thailand as Special Envoy of the U.S. Government with full powers to conclude and sign a treaty with that country. Three weeks after his arrival in Bangkok on February 25 in the U.S. sloop of war "Peacock", commanded by Captain David Geisinger, Roberts succeeded in having the provisions of the treaty verbally agreed upon. The actual signing of the treaty took place on April 1. Thus the first treaty between Thailand and the U.S.A. came into existence. Due credit must be given to Roberts for the success of his mission in so short a time, for without his pleasant personality, coupled with his sympathy an understanding, the negotiations and discussions regarding the terms of the treaty would have proved a failure. It was Roberts again who came to Thailand for the second time two years later to effect the exchange of ratifications of the said treaty. It is of interest to note that due to language difficulty the treaty was written in four different languages, i.e. Thai, English, Portuguese and Chinese. On his voyage back to the U.S., Roberts fell ill and when the "Persian," commanded by Captain Edmund Kennedy, arrived at Macao, Roberts passed away and was buried there.
The Roberts treaty was later found to be unsatisfactory, for no benefits to American commerce resulted in consequence of the enormous tonnage duties exacted by the Thai Government: amounting to the entire and absolute prohibition of our shipping, as the U.S. Government put it. Therefore in 1849 Joseph Balestier, American consul at Singapore, was appointed a Special Envoy by the U. S. Government to conclude a new treaty with Thailand. Balestier's negotiations came to nothing because of his ill temper. The Thai Government sent a message to the U. S. Government which after remarking that Balestier was a "person of much excitability" said: "Should the high Minister of the U.S.A. appoint an officer hereafter to come here for friendly negotiations, it is requested that they may appoint an efficient, prudent, and well disposed person, no inclined to anger, but like Mr. Roberts." Balestier, indeed, quarreled with every Thai official he came into contact with, and instead of a new treaty being negotiated, diplomatic relations between the two countries were worse than they had been before.
In spite of Balestier's complete failure, the U.S. Government spared no efforts in trying to come to a better understanding with the Thai Government concerning two subjects to mutual interest, viz. commercial relations and missionary work in Thailand. As regards the latter, there had been American Protestant missionaries in Thailand for more than twenty years. So in 1856 Townsend Harris, American Consul in Japan, was despatched to Thailand with instructions to make a new treaty which would improve commercial relations between the two countries and also secure for the missionaries the treaty right to pursue their work in that country unmolested. On May 29, Harris succeeded, not without much difficulty, in effecting a treaty with the Thai Government. He accounted for his success by saying that he had come to Thailand with 3 ships, “one loaded with presents, another with patience, and a third ready for things to be carried back.”
This treaty was similar to the one negotiated and concluded for the British Government by Sir John Bowring, in which extra territoriality was granted, the rate of import tariff fixed at 3 percent, and export duties determined according to a schedule attached to the treaty. In spite of the fact that the fifth article of this treaty was not acceptable to the Senate and had to be eliminated, the exchange of ratifications took place in the following year on June 15.
Upon leaving Thailand, Harris appointed as consul Rev. Stephen Mattoon, a missionary who had been in the country ten years. The new treaty was an impetus to trade and the first American firm, Russell & Co., established a branch at Bangkok. Other American traders soon appeared. This treaty is well as those concluded with other European countries at about the same period, were highly inequitable and detrimental to the sovereignty of the country. Therefore soon after the termination of the first World War, Thailand sought for revisions of these treaties and it was the U. S. A. which was the first to respond to the appeal of the Thai Government. The conclusion of a new and just treaty between Thailand and the U.S.A. in 1920 paved the way for similar treaties subsequently made with other countries. As is already well known, the man responsible for the success of the revisions of these obsolete treaties is none other than Dr. Francis B. Sayre. As a recognition of his great services to Thailand, the Thai Government conferred upon this American the rank and title of "Phya Kalyanamaitri."
Over a century has passed since Edmund Roberts went to Thailand to inaugurate the first official intercourse between Thailand and the U.S.A. and there has always been peace and friendship between the two nations. The Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement and the Agreement Respecting Military Assistance signed between the Government of Thailand and the Government of the U.S.A. in 1950 are the latest evidence of the close cooperation between the two countries in their striving for progress and security of the free world.
Cotton Yarn and Cloth Control during 1952
By K.Y. Yin
Taiwan's textile industry had no foundation to speak of before the retrocession of the island to China. In recent years, with a view to solving the problem of clothing which can not be ignored under our wartime economy, and in order to avoid the spending of a large amount of foreign exchange on imports of cotton yarn and cloth, the Chinese Government has been pursuing a determined policy of building up Taiwan's textile industry. In the face of the realities of the tense international situation, therefore, we have been simultaneously devoting our major attention to the development of the fertilizer and textile industries for the purpose of ensuring an adequate supply of food and clothing, and the wisdom of such a policy certainly cannot be questioned. During the past year, our cotton yarn and cloth control has achieved much success in the following respects:
1. Saving of foreign exchange through the utilization of U. S. Aid -- In 1950, more than US$13,000,000 was spent on imported textiles. That was a time when we were experiencing an acute shortage of foreign exchange on the one hand and were not sure of our ability to secure U. S. Aid on the other. In order to save foreign exchange, and in view of the fact that the spindles evacuated to Taiwan from the mainland could be installed at no great expense and that light industries were comparatively easy to develop, the Government decided to build up the textile industry on this island, especially as it would conform to the American Government's principle of extending assistance to those countries which were willing to help themselves. An understanding was accordingly reached with the ECA to obtain a sufficient supply of raw cotton, and at the same· time yarn and cloth were to be imported to make up whatever shortage there might be.
2. Increase of production and planning for imports -- With regard to the development of the textile industry, the writer as far back as 1950 already put forth the proposition that "to import yarn is better than to import cloth: and to import cotton is better than to import yarn." This policy of controlling yarn with cotton, and controlling cloth with yarn, indicates, I think, that we are moving in the right direction under a wartime economy characterized by shortage of resources, although such a policy as not been free from criticism. My personal conviction, indeed, has been further strengthened by the progress in our textile industry during the last couple of years. Let us examine some of the figures which testify to our increase of production. In June 1951, we had only 6,606 spindles in operation, but by December the number had already increased to 85,487. By the end of 1952, the spindles had increased to 130,906. In the case of cotton yarn production the monthly output in June 1951 was 2,375 bales, but by December it had already increased to 5,036. By the end of 1952, the monthly output had increased to 8,062.50 bales (including 29l.50 bales of 10-count yarn and 930 bales of 30-count yarn). In June 1951, we had 5,393 power-driven looms, but by November 1952, the number had already increased to 8,550. From June to December 1951, the average monthly output of cotton cloth was 120,000 pieces. In 1952, however, the average monthly output had reached 20,000 pieces. These figures fully testify to the success we have achieved in our efforts to increase production.
3. Regulation of supply and demand and stabilization of commodity prices -- For the year 1952 a weaving and rationing plan had been formulated beforehand. In meeting the demand for cotton cloth the principle to be observed was to weave the cloth needed with local yarn, and whatever shortage of yarn and cloth there might be was to be made up with imports. The cloth required was supplied under two categories: cloth woven by the mills for the Government, and cloth woven by the mills for themselves. In the case of two-thirds of the cloth required totaling 1,850,000 pieces, weaving contracts were signed between the Central Trust of China (CTC) and the weaving mills on the basis of the plan for the monthly production of cotton cloth, with the CTC supplying the yarn and the money needed for the payment of wages. After the cloth had been woven, it was, turned over to the CTC to be rationed at the prices fixed by the Government. The remaining one-third of the cloth was woven by the mills for themselves. The yarn required by the mills was bought from CUSA. It was stipulated that one half of the output of this category should be turned over to the Joint Office for Sales at Stabilized Prices organized by the Cotton Mills Association, while the other half was to be sold by the mills themselves. The total supply of cloth was 2,312,500 bolts, which was not far below the planned production of 2,335,000 bolts per year, calculated on the basis of yards of cloth for each person, in addition to that for military use which was supplied from a different source. As to the rationing method adopted, a part of the cloth required by the farmers was distributed by the Food Bureau in exchange for unhulled rice while another part was rationed by the Farmers Associations. With respect to the cloth required by the general public (including government employees, teachers, miners, fishermen and salt workers), it was sold through the Taiwan Association of Cooperatives, the Provincial General Chamber of Commerce, the Association of Cloth Dealers, the Joint Sales Office, the Welfare Societies of the various government organizations, the Provincial Fisheries Administration, the Taiwan Salt Works and the cloth stores contracted by the CTC. The price of cloth has been gradually going down since the enforcement of this system. At present, the index numbers of both wholesale and retail prices of cloth have fallen to the level of the months of July and August in 1951. In the case of grey sheeting and twill, their prices have even fallen below the ceiling prices as fixed by the Government. Thus our object of stabilizing cloth prices has been achieved, and for this reason the Joint Sales Office organized by the four Textile Associations and the Association of Cloth Dealers were abolished in the months of September and October respectively last year. Beginning from December 1952, the CTC also temporarily stopped commission weaving. As to the supply of cotton yarn, any increased output is now being sold through open, tenders each month in addition to that regularly rationed to the mills. During the current winter months, when cloth is normally in urgent demand, the prices of cloth are actually going down instead of rising. This serves to show that the measures we have taken have proved to be very effective.
4. Reasonable profits for investment -- Although the rate of interest in this province has repeatedly been reduced, the rate on the black market is still high. Under such circumstances, industrial investment can hardly be expected to be profitable. In order to create conditions which tend to make such investments attractive, we must of necessity enable the textile industry to obtain reasonable profits. However, a careful study of the development of the textile industry in Taiwan will reveal that while a part of the capital has been obtained owing to the attraction of profits, the greater part of it can be attributed to the fact that the raw cotton obtained from U.S. aid has enabled the mills to utilize their operating capital for the expansion of their installations. However, if the textile industry is actually making excessive profits as claimed the certain quarters, the Government should levy a tax on these profits so that the principle of "regulation of private capital as advocated by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the policy of "promoting private enterprise" pursued by the Government may be reconciled. As to what excessive profits are actually being made by the textile industry, the operations, of the Government-operated China Textile Industries" Inc. and the two provincial cotton mills can serve as yardsticks. Beside, on account of the fact, that the textile industry is making more profit, it is perhaps true that its staff members and workers are being paid salaries and wages higher than that received by those engaged in other industries. If such be the case, a stop should be put to this tendency after an investigation has been made by the authorities concerned.
5. Improvement of equipment and achievement of better quality -- The basic principle underlying any policy aiming at the control of daily necessities is to seek an adequate supply before attempting to produce high-quality goods sold at low prices. With regard to the improvement of quality, it was stipulated in the plan for the weaving and rationing of cloth in 1952 that the prices of the different kinds of cloth to be rationed throughout the year should be uniform and that demonstrative samples should be made so that the cloths produced by the various mills might be up to the required standard. Beginning from May 1952, cotton yarn from all the mills has been sampled and tested regularly by the Provincial Industrial Experimental Institute. Those mills whose product was not up to the standard were given penalties. Moreover, the mills were encouraged to import good automatic looms in order to improve the quality of their cloth. Recently the various mills have requested the CTC to purchase for them 1,671 Toyota automatic looms from Japan, the installation of which is expected to be completed before the autumn of this year. In the meantime, the textile industry on its own part has also been making efforts to improve the quality of its products. The Cotton Mills Association has set up a Committee for the Supervision of Production to see to it that steps are taken by the member mills to reduce their production costs and improve the quality of their products. The production of 30-count and 42-count cotton yarns and the establishment of a mill for turning out printed fabrics are results of the efforts to achieve better quality which have been made during the past year.
The five point discussed above represent the ways in which the Government's policy of cotton yarn and cloth control has functioned, and may also be considered as goals toward which our efforts should continue to be directed in the future. In the past, have repeatedly pointed out that the enforcement of our policy of protecting out industries should be coordinated with the needs which have arisen out of the conditions prevailing both at home and abroad so that our textile industry may by built up and self-sufficiency attained. This kind of protection, however, is limited in scope and temporary in nature. After a certain object has been achieved, it is only right that externally we should restore our original tariff on the mainland while internally we should abolish all controls in order that our textile industry may continue to develop under free competition, which in turn will help to reduce costs and bring about improvement of quality: When this has been realized, whatever surplus output we have may then exported to foreign countries. The present ample supply of cotton yarn and cloth, the stability of prices, the abolition of the Joint Sales Office, and the temporary suspension of the practice of commission weaving serve to indicate that the aforesaid object has been partially achieved. In my opinion, our promotion of the textile industry in Taiwan may be divided into five stages. In the first stage, owing to the insufficiency of textile equipment and the short supply of textiles; we have to adopt the policy of control, which means control of the market and enforcement of rationing for the purpose of distributing the goods directly to the consumers and preventing speculation and hoarding. This is a stage in which cotton, yarn and cloth are all rationed. In the second stage, when equipment for production has been replenished to a fairly, sufficient extent, supply and demand are nearly balanced, and rationing is gradually reduced, sales through open tenders are adopted in order to put an end to black market operations. This is a stage, in which cotton yarn and cloth are both rationed and sold through public tenders. In the third stage, when the equipment for production is fully sufficient, production is proceeding smoothly, and a balance between production and consumption has been attained, all rationing and sales through open tenders are abolished and free transactions in cotton, yarn and cloth are permitted. In the fourth stage, the rationing of the cotton required by the cotton mills is abolished. This a stage in which the mills can freely buy their cotton and sell their products. In the fifth stage, when the number of spindles in operation on this island has reached 175,000, the, mills may engage in free competition. However, no cotton will be supplied to newly established mills whose spindles are not included in the aforesaid figure of 175,000. These new mills will have to get their cotton from abroad, and the yarn produced by them will only be permitted to be sold on foreign markets. After they have sold enough yarn abroad to obtain the cotton they require, the remaining portion of their yarn may be disposed on the home market. Unless these restrictions are enforced, there will be too many new mills, and excessive supply of cotton yarn will again cause the market to become stagnant. As the textile industry continues to develop, all controls have to be loosened step by step, since the policy of cotton yarn and cloth control is but a measure of expediency taken by the Government. I sincerely hope each of these five stages will be completed as soon as possible as a result of the efforts made by those engaged in the textile industry.
There is another point which I must not fail to mention. Taiwan's textile industry which has been built up only during the last few years, is far behind that of Japan. If it is not protected from foreign competition, it will surely be ruined. Even in the case of our textile industry on the mainland, which already had a history of more than fifty years, our national tariff on imports was 50% ad valorem for cotton yarn and more than 65% ad valorem for cloth. Both in its scope and its history, the textile industry in Taiwan can in no way be compared with that on the mainland. If internal control is to be abolished, the protective tariff on imports should not be lower than that levied by the Government before the mainland was lost to the Communists. In 1949, when conditions on this island remained unsettled and there was a shortage of supplies due to the fact that the textile industry here had not yet been built up, the authorities purposely lowered the tariff to 5% for cotton yarn and 20-30% for cloth, which was decidedly a wise step. At present, however, circumstances have changed, and it is imperative that the restoration of the national tariff should be considered without delay so that we may not be criticized for our inability to adapt ourselves to the new situation.
Courting Death
There was a scholar by the name of Ma whose profession was that of a cattleman. Naturally he was not held in esteem by his neighbors. As the city had fallen to the hands of the bandits, he made up his mind to die a martyr. He said to his brother, "I have heard that one should do a good turn to his country, however insignificant; that service may be. We are just ordinary people. If we should kill one bandit before we die, our death is well compensated for. If we should be able to kill more than one, we shall be rendering a good service to our country." So he welcomed the bandits to his house where his brother lay in ambush," About four or five bandits were killed daily. And then his brother said, "To kill some evil-doers in secret is not an act of justice ... “ So saying, he hung the heads of the bandits over the door-sill. The two brothers immediately met their death: - Kuan Tse Fu:The Story of Two Scholars