Taiwan Today

THE CHINA TANGLE By Herbert Feis Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1953. 445 pages Those who have followed the post-war flood of books about China may be pardoned if they conclude that so much has been published already in this field that no more is needed. But such a judgment is wrong if one considers the obvious need of illuminating all important aspects of the subject. In its own field, each of these books makes a definite contribution, adding significantly to the corpus of our knowledge with regard to the Orient. Herbert Feis' The China Tangle is a historical account of the American effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission. It does not pretend to be academic. There are no battles, no controversies and no inflammatory speeches. Mr. Feis, a meticulous scholar, at­ tempts to tell in this book "what the American Government tried to do in and with China during the war and the critical period of peace­ making and plans that went awry." From the first page to the last the author seems thoroughly at home in his milieu. He made an intensive study, fully and adequately substantiated by documents, of some of the most heated controversial issues including the Stilwell case, the Wallace mission, the Hurley resignation, the Marshall mediation and, last but not least, the Yalta Agreement. The author has perform­ed an invaluable job of collecting, collating and clarifying the American source material on the subject up to this point. More than once, Mr. Feis records, whenever President Chiang Kai-shek expressed his views which happened to be in disagreement with those of American dignitaries, political as well as military, "hindsight indicates he was right." In the work the author shows his ability to write in a sprightly fashion about Moscow's double-faced and double-tongued treachery in China. As Mr. Adolf A. Berle, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, 1938-44, very appropriately remarked: "The Chinese pattern revealed in Mr. Feis book was merely a variant on the pattern developed in Poland and Eastern Europe-the difference being that Chiang fought it out." (The New York Times Book Review, October 4, 1953) One of his most interesting comments is on the lack of sufficient knowledge about the Chinese Communists on the part of American officials-a problem which is most important, but least acknowledged and discussed. "Almost none of the government officials who conducted our relations with China day by day," he writes, "were well schooled about either Communist dogma or methods. Their training and experience were dominantly in the Oriental countries and in the Oriental languages. Their working life had been spent in lands with much history of their own, in which Communism up to then had played little part—in China, Japan, Indo-China, Malaya, Siam. These men did follow current Communist statements and activities not in China but elsewhere in ways that in the past had been judged adequate for their daily work. Few had felt the need to make a thorough study of the history and tactics of Communism; and fewer still had pondered deeply over its secret inner nature and compulsions. Their impressions were formed mainly during the period-prewar and war-when the Communists were avowing a wish for a common front, and associating themselves with other political elements in the West and East. Their knowledge was not deep enough to cause them to sustain cold disbelief when it was easier to believe." Americans need not, Mr. Feis thinks, make excuses for themselves. In the course of The China Tangle, Mr. Feis tells numerous events showing the treacherous character of Soviet diplomacy. He cites the case of Manchuria. "The Chinese armies named for Manchuria had first to be moved from the interior to points of embarkation ...(but) the Soviet government objected to the landing of Chinese troops at Dairen ... (Later) it did not oppose landings at other ports of Manchuria­ Hulutao, Yingkow and Antung ... But when the American ships (carrying the government forces) entered the harbor at Hulutao they had found the 4th Chinese Communist Route Army in control of the port The Soviet government was then saying it did not have enough forces at that port to guarantee a safe landing there, but would do so at Yingkow ... The American naval task force carrying the Chinese troops had gone on to Yingkow Again they found, as at Hulutao, that the Chinese Communists were already there ... (When the Chinese government) discussed the situation with Malinovsky (the Soviet Ambassador in China), he said that the guarantee of safety was no longer in force." Manifestly, the effects resulting from the delay of the arrival of the Chinese government troops in Manchuria were critical. In the words of the author, "the consequent delay gave time for the Chinese Communist forces to move far into Machuria, and to acquire Japanese weapons from stocks left about by the Soviet forces. It also allowed them to set up propaganda and recruiting offices and local governments. There were not many weeks lost-roughly four or five-but they were vital, and made a great difference in the contest for control of Manchuria." When Moscow's treachery became apparent it was already too late to seek any remedy! Although Mr. Feis' casual remarks on the internal situations of China during the war seem to be too generalized, and generalizations without specific instance tend to lose objectivity and vitality, his conclusions on the failure of American effort in China are both intelligent and fair. "In retrospect," he writes, "we may have done less in and for China while the war in Europe was being fought out than we might safely and wisely have done. We thought we were only deferring the greater aid until that part of the world-wide struggle against tyranny was won. And then the unexpected happened: the war in the Pacific ended abruptly before our effort in behalf of China reached its planned fullness." A political issue fades with time; authentic knowledge and sound judgment do not. The China Tangle makes available a fund of useful material that fills an important gap in our in­ formation about American foreign policy toward China with special reference to the period 1941-­46. For the reader who desires the light of objective scholarship cast on one of the major events in American relations with the Far East, acquaintance with this volume will be desirable. PAUL K. T. SIH THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS, 1952 By Richard P. Stebbins American Council on Foreign Relations, 1953. 438 pages. In the "target year" of 1954, it is interesting to look back and review what had been accomplished in the year prior to the advent of the Eisenhower Administration and the emergence of Malenkov. "The year 1952", prefaced Mr. Stebbins, "marked a culminating phase in the evolution of America's global policy and crystallized world situation whose future development might well prove decisive for the future of civilized man." The United States in World Affairs, 1952, is a comprehensive historical record. It contains eight chapters with the leading chapter entitled "World in Turmoil". At the outset, the author tackles the core of Stalin's foreign policy. After quoting one Soviet theoretician as saying in 1952, "In spheres of economic, public-political and cultural life a constant historical contest is in progress between the capitalist system and the socialist. In this contest the social system will inevitably prevail over the capitalist," Mr. Stebbins went on to summarize, "that the post war policies of the Soviet Government seemed guided by two main considerations directly corresponding to this outlook: (1) The possibility of outright war with the imperialist camp headed by the United States; (2) the opportunities for accentuating the 'general crisis of capitalism' by playing upon and exploiting the numerous conflicts or "contradictions.'" With regard to the central theme of American foreign policy which is the maintenance of her own national security, the author simply quotes President Truman's statement that the "Totalitarian regimes ... undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States." The Far East was discussed in Chapter IV. Mr. Stebbins referred to "Formosa and Pescadores Islands, renounced by Japan but not yet definitely assigned to any new clamiant." (p. 209) This is definitely not true. The conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace early in 1952 should leave no room for doubt as to the sov­reign ownership of Formosa and the Pesca­dores. Even the article on the Cairo Conference in the Eneyclopedia Americana quoted "that all the territories stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores shall be restored to the Republic of China." Divergence of opinion among democratic countries is dealt with in Chapter V. Here the author fails to point out the weakness of the British attitude which has made it difficult for the democratic world to show a united front against Soviet Imperialism. Sir Winston Churchill's cancelling of some defence contracts on the ground of rising defence costs (p. 402). British holding out for a separate naval command in the Mediterranean, (p. 420) and the British insistence upon an indirect relationship with E.D.C. (p. 398) did not contribute to the early development of a united Western Europe. Britain's lukewarm support of UN action in the Korean war (pp. 339-40) and her premature recognition of the Peiping Communist puppet regime are not suitable subjects for rousing speeches before the London Pilgrims' Society or the English Speaking Union. Another weak point in the democratic front is to be found in Latin American countries "where ... there had not produced whole-hearted attachment to the democratic cause in world affairs. Hence there was no reason for astonishment if Latin American Governments occasionally showed sympathy for the anti-Western tendencies exhibited by Asian and African spokesme." (p. 224) President Peron's "third way" movement and the popular sentiment in Latin America against U.S. imperialism will take much time and more patience to cope with. Our author thinks that the United Nations is by far the most important international organzation. Only by working through the UN will American intentions be freed from suspicion and make it possible for the United States to mobilise world opinion in her favor. In the section on "the burden of hospitality" Mr. Stebbins shares Congressional insistence on reducing U. S. financial contribution to a maximum of 33-1/3 percent of the United Nations budget. Many "Americans found it peculiarly galling that an organisation in which their country suffered such open disrespect was actually situated on American soil and, moreover, largely supported by the American taxpayer." (p. 374) The various UN activities, if incorporated into one chapter, will show, I suspect, to better advantage their significance and correlation. While Panmunjom was brought up in Chapter IV on "Far Eastern Perplexities," the discussion on the Disarmament Commission was allocated to Chapter IV on "Politics East and West." It appears to be sheer waste paper to give ten pages to the germ-warfare charges and Malik's verbiage on the same under the title of "Atoms, Ants and Peace." Mr. Stebbins puts European question in Chapter III with sub-sections on "elements of Atlantic policy," "NATO comes of age," "Genmany: integration or neutralisation," and "last peace contract and defence community." The book ends with a final chapter on "NATO in the Doldrum." Mr. Stebbins is not optimistic about Europe for "Europe, in the few short years between 1939 and 1945, had lost its centuries-old political, economic and military preeminence and had left ... a limited prospect of reasserting its cultural and intellectual leadership" (p. 109) The year 1952, with which the book under review is concerned, meant not only a change of administration in the United States. When the sequel for 1953 is published, we shall see that 1952 was a turning point in the position of the United States in world affairs. PING-VUNG WANG A Free and Independent China "Let me stress my conviction that peace in the Far East can only be assured by the ultimate solution of the problem of freedom and independence for all these nations. This seems to me to be fundamental. There can be no more imperialism, no more col­onialism, no more totalitarian dictatorship. And at the very center of this problem is ultimately a free and independent China." -Senator H. Alexander Smith.