The Kansas City Times said September 5: "It hardly seemed possible, but Red China diplomacy appears to have sunk to yet another low-water mark in Africa. Tom Mboya, minister of economic planning and development in Kenya, has called on President Jomo Kenyatta to shut down the (Red) Chinese embassy and break diplomatic relations.
"True, the final decision is Kenyatta's, but when an associate of Mboya's stature speaks out so bitterly, more than words are apt to be in the wind. The minister accused the Chinese (Communists) of meddling in Kenya's affairs. 'They are jealous of the peace and stability that we enjoy,’ Mboya declared. 'And in their own country they are starving.'
"Thus another tragic-comic chapter seems about to be written in the fumbling, wildly inept effort of the Communists to subvert Africa's young independent states. Small wonder if the Reds are disheartened: Booted out of the Congo; sent packing from Ghana within hours of the fall of dictator Kwame Nkrumah; regarded with suspicion even by Guinea's leftist president, Sekou Toure.
"Generally speaking, the Communist setbacks have stemmed from two causes, shoddy performance on aid agreements and a crude penchant for political tampering. In Kenya they were fairly warned. President Kenyatta as early as 1965 announced publicly there was no room for communism in his nation, and the following year he rejected a 17-million-dollar aid offer from the Soviet Union.
Worry over the Chinese (Communist) threat to Africa was most critical in late 1963 and early 1964. That was when Premier Chou En-lai was making his grand tour of the continent and proclaiming it 'ripe for revolution.' There have been revolutions, all right, but they haven't favored the Chinese (Communists). And with the present spectacle of torment and failure inside (Red) China itself, it is hard to see how the African disenchantment can do anything but worsen." (Full text)
Daily Telegraph
The Daily Telegraph of London said August 30: "What cure is there for the dangerous hysteria that afflicts (Red) China today? When a Red Guard mob wrecked the British Embassy in Peking last week a form of strict quarantine was recommended by this newspaper rather than an immediate formal rupture of diplomatic relations. The latter course can only be followed in peacetime if British subjects can be extricated, and plainly at present even the Embassy diplomats cannot be. They are hostages to Red China. The reprisals taken by restricting and quarantining the (Red) Chinese Mission staff in London have begun to work. The first reactions to this control have been maniacal sorties and disgraceful assaults on the police. Restriction of the (Red) Chinese staff should be increased until the Mao regime allows a safe exit to the British in Peking, and the new Police Order on the area surrounding the (Red) Chinese Mission is a good beginning.
"There is bound to be a fresh outburst of savagery in Peking after the sentences justly imposed in Hongkong on seditious (Red) Chinese newspaper editors. The colony is able to look after its own security provided there is no weakening of resolve in London. What is now needed is that Britain should arrange in concert with friendly countries an extension of the quarantine, which could well be economic as well as political." (Full text)
Washington Star
The Washington Star of Washington, D.C., said August 24: "Back in January, 1950, when it became the first Western nation to extend diplomatic recognition to Mao Tse-tung, Britain justified the move on the ground of 'realistic' self-interest and the 'hope' that it might be able to have friendly and constructive dealings with Peking.
"From the start, however, the Chinese Communists, by declining to exchange ambassadors plus other offensive behavior, plainly indicated that it had no desire for such dealings. Now, in the worst incident of its kind in Peking, the Mao regime has thanked the British for their effort at amity by sacking their embassy and beating up their diplomatic representatives.
"Quite accurately, but with understatement, Prime Minister Wilson's government has described these acts as 'outrageous and uncivilized' by the Peking authorities. Even so, as if feeling a masochistic compulsion to turn the other cheek, the British—who presumably also still favor Red China's admission to the United Nations—have officially announced they do not intend to sever diplomatic relations with the whirling dervishes in charge (or are they?) of (Red) China.
"Perhaps this amounts to another display of realism and hopefulness by a stiff-upper-lip London. And perhaps it will please those censorious people at home and abroad (including Britons) who have made a sort of pastime out of berating the United States government for refusing to recognize Communist Peking as a diplomatic equal or a fit candidate for membership in the family of civilized nations.
"Who is really being realistic and who unrealistic in this matter? For our own part, we think our country's policy is amply vindicated by the Maoists themselves." (Full text)
Daily Mail
The Daily Mail of London said August 31: "The Government must do everything it can to get our diplomats and their wives and children out of the hate-filled atmosphere of Peking as safely and as quickly as possible.
"Until a few weeks ago there was a case for keeping the mission open as a listening post on the chaos that is (Red) China today. But now Mr. Donald Hopson and his colleagues can hear nothing but the baying of Mao's mad dogs.
"(Red) China is in the middle of one of its recurring periods of collective madness. The nation is ripping itself apart and gnawing at its own guts.
"There are two ways of dealing with a wounded dragon: either put it out of misery or get out of its way. We have no means of putting this particular dragon out of its misery and it no longer serves any purpose for us to leave our diplomats in harm's way.
"So, as soon as a proper deal can be struck with whatever authorities are in charge in Peking, let us bring them home and wait for the (Red) Chinese to return to sanity.
"Then, when there is a viable Government in Peking able to control the Red Guards and willing to enter into proper diplomatic discourse with the other nations of the world, we can resume our experiment of trying to establish proper relations with (Red) China.
"But the signs are not good. (Red) China's present bout of xenophobia is so vicious and the internal struggle for power so intense that the return to sanity would seem to be a long way away." (Full text)
South China Morning Post
The South China Morning Post of Hongkong published September 16 a news analysis by Julian Amery: "The pattern of the cultural revolution in (Red) China is bewildering. From the provinces come reports of strikes and peasant revolts. There has been fighting in such major cities as Chungking, Wuhan and Canton. The attitude of the Army is uncertain. Chairman Mao hurls almost daily denunciations at President Liu. Yet both retain their jobs and official residences and somehow co-exist in an increasingly turbulent Peking.
"What is the struggle all about?
"The paramount problem for China at the end of World War II was food. How could the Chinese feed their population, then put at 500m? The country could not grow enough rice or wheat. World demand for China's main exports of tea, porcelain, bristles and tung oil was very limited. There was no Chinese capital to invest in industry.
"Chiang Kai-shek and his American advisers had a plan. American aid in the form of fertilizers and agricultural machinery would increase the output of food. American private capital would finance industrial development. American political support would enable China to cut defense expenditure to the bone.
"But this plan depended for its success upon peace in China. Instead there was a civil war; and the Communists won.
"The Communist victory took the Chinese (Communist) economy back to Square One.
"All American aid was withdrawn. Soviet aid could not begin to fill the gap.
"The Communist leaders were determined to industrialize. But without foreign aid industrialization meant raiding the countryside to feed the towns. It also meant that the proceeds of exports went on buying machinery and not food.
"The Communist leaders feared an American attack from Formosa or Korea. On top of industrialization they therefore embarked on a rearmament programme. This, combined with the withdrawal of American aid, soon produced a critical food shortage. Its desperate character was revealed by a rationing system of incredible stringency and by such strange expedients as the campaign to exterminate all bird life. Yet still the population kept growing.
"The Chinese Communists faced a choice.
"They could slow down industrialization, cut defense, and give the peasants greater incentives to grow food. But this would have meant postponing 'Socialism.'
"The alternative was to stick to their programme and rob some one else's larder.
"There are two 'larders' in the Far East: the wheat lands of Siberia and the rice bowl of Southeast Asia-South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Burma. Both areas produce large surpluses.
"The Soviets barred the way to the north. They were short of wheat themselves.
"The Chinese (Communists) therefore turned to the rice bowl. Indo-China's frontier with (mainland) China was wide open. The Chinese (Communists) accordingly stepped up their support of Ho Chi-minh until, at Dienbienphu, the French reached breaking point.
"The first stage after 1955 was the consolidation of Communist rule in North Vietnam. Next came the build-up of the Viet Cong to infiltrate South Vietnam, where the rice bowl begins.
"But here the Chinese (Communists) faced a new and stronger enemy. American influence had taken the place of the French presence in South Vietnam. The Chinese (Communists) accordingly turned to the Soviets for help.
"Khrushchev's response was encouraging. He poured Soviet aid into North Vietnam and threatened the West in Berlin. Then came the showdown in Cuba.
"When the Soviets were forced to withdraw their missiles from Cuba many Western observers expected them to react against South Vietnam. Instead they accepted defeat across the board and moved towards a policy of co-operation with the United States, aimed at raising living standards inside Russia.
"Here was the real turning point in Sino-Soviet relations. Khrushchev soon saw that the price of a deal with America was to break with (Red) China. He was prepared to pay it. Soviet aid to (Red) China was suspended. Technicians were withdrawn; and a conference was planned to expel (Red) China from the circle of Communist states.
"This reversal of Soviet policy left the Chinese Communists in the lurch. They had gone too far down the road to industrialization and nuclear armament to turn back to an agrarian economy. They accordingly decided to 'go it alone' in Southeast Asia.
"At first all went well. (Red) China's support for the Viet Cong brought South Vietnam after the murder of President Diem to the verge of collapse. The Chinese (Communists) defeated the Indian Army. They won over most of the East Asian Communist parties. They mounted a Communist coup in Indonesia. Meanwhile, they stepped up the re-equipment of the (Red) Chinese Army and pressed on with their nuclear programme
"But in human terms the cost of 'going it alone' was appalling. In Britain even a sharp increase in the defense budget has only a marginal effect on the standard of living. But in (Red) China, where subsistence level is the norm, the nuclear programme alone must have caused the death of hundreds of thousands of people and reduced millions to near-famine conditions.
"Mao seems to have been convinced that the Americans really were 'Paper Tigers.' In the crunch they would quit South Vietnam. The British were judged even more irresolute. 'Confrontation' with Malaysia would be a push-over for Sukarno.
"There were indeed powerful forces in America and Britain working for the withdrawal of American and British troops from Vietnam and Malaysia. Had they prevailed the rice bowl would have passed under Chinese (Communist) control. (Red) China would then have had her food surplus. With it she would have exercised a powerful pull over a starving India.
"But Mao had miscalculated. Just in time the Americans poured troops into South Vietnam and launched their bombers against North Vietnam. British resistance in Borneo defeated Sukarno's policy of confrontation with Malaysia and so led to the counter-revolution in Indonesia and the extermination of a quarter of a million Indonesian Communists. Mao was thus defeated in Indonesia and lost the initiative in Vietnam. He cannot count on the Soviets. He dare not let the Vietnam war escalate for fear of an American nuclear attack. His forward policy is in ruins.
"The (Red) Chinese people and the Chinese Communist Party know this. For months now they have been refusing to pay the price of a forward policy which is leading nowhere. All over the country the administration has been dragging its feet. The peasants are eating their own food. The workers are going slow. The party bosses no longer have the heart to enforce the draconian orders issued by Peking.
"The so-called 'cultural revolution' is in fact Mao's counter-attack against a Communism led by Liu which is resisting his policy at every level. Calling in the Red Guards to replace the Old Guard is simply bribing youth to do the dirty work which experience is refusing to perform.
"Can Mao succeed? Can he re-assert his authority over the whole of (Red) China? Much here must depend upon the Army and the extent to which its far-flung command will obey orders. But the odds are mounting against Mao. He can scarcely abandon his forward policy and adopt Liu's line, yet short of an American withdrawal from Vietnam the forward policy is doomed to fall, while the cost of it must provoke growing resistance in (Red) China.
"And now a new danger threatens Mao.
"A main reason for Khrushchev's fall was that his colleagues thought he had gone too far in seeking a deal with America at (Red) China's expense. But now they, too, have passed under the Claudine Forks. Israel's victory over Egypt and Syria was an even worse defeat for the Soviets than Cuba.
"It is still possible that the Soviets will double stakes on a losing game and try to create a second Vietnam for the West in the Middle East. But the signs point the other way.
"The Glassboro talks suggest that Kosygin, like Khrushchev after Cuba, is now moving towards a deal with America. But the Americans will never make a deal while the Soviet Union supports North Vietnamese and thus (Red) Chinese expansionism in Southeast Asia. A deal can only be made at Ho Chi-minh's and Mao's expense.
"If Mao's forward policy remains blocked the odds are that (Red) China will slide towards civil war. The unity of the Chinese (Communist) state is already fragile. The absence so far of arrests, trials or killings of Chinese (Communist) leaders testifies to Mao's weakness rather than his humanitarianism. He knows that any bloodshed in Peking could easily detonate a chain of separatist pronunciamentos in the provinces.
"There is reason to believe that the provincial authorities in Sinkiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Manchuria are already looking towards the Soviets. They control some of (Red) China's nuclear installations. No one would be more pleased than the Americans to see these come under Soviet influence.
"But if the northern provinces turn towards the Soviets the south may well look to the Americans. The American decision to keep Formosa as a 'fleet in being' is now seen to have been farsighted.
"Americans and Soviets might thus be drawn into a de facto partition of (Red) China, leaving the Peking Government as a buffer state between their respective spheres of influence.
"Meanwhile, the first casualties of the cultural revolution are likely to be the Communist regime in North Vietnam and the Viet Cong in the south. Ho Chi-minh knows that the Soviets will not and the Chinese (Communists) cannot do more than keep his head just above water. This already unenviable situation is likely to be made worse by mounting chaos across his overland communications and by the closing of the Suez Canal to his seaborne supplies from Russia.
'In the circumstances the Americans have everything to gain by stepping up the pressure." (Full text)