On March 22, 1966, just one week before the opening of the 23rd Congress of the Soviet Union, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party told the Soviet leaders and the rest of the world they would not send a delegation to be present at that major conclave of world Communist leaders. They had waited almost a month after receiving the Soviet invitation to send their letter of rejection. The Chinese boycott dramatized the intensity of the dispute and the well-nigh irreparable fissure in the world Communist movement.
There are at least five bases for the dispute between Peiping and Moscow which deserve attention, for in many respects they all lie behind the major points of divergency between the two Communist regimes. These are forces which continue to challenge Marxist doctrine and illustrate its inadequacy.
1. National Differences — The Chinese Communists have recruited and won support internally by playing up the theme of Chinese national interests and pride. They have published maps which list as Chinese territories to be recovered lands currently considered part of Soviet Russia. The Soviets revealed that in 1952 alone there had been more than 5,000 border incidents, and they have reported on tens of thousands of Kazakhs and Uighurs fleeing from Chinese Communist oppression in Sinkiang to the safety of Soviet territory. Historical national differences cannot be easily dismissed. The question of nationalism has ever been one to plague Communist ideologies.
2. Weltanschauung — The matter of world outlook or, perhaps, philosophy of life also lies at the base of the Sino-Soviet cleavage. The matter of how each of the great Communist powers approaches the world determines priorities as well as revolutionary goals, and here the differences in national character really make themselves felt.
The dramatic recovery of Western Europe, as well as the unity of the West in face of Soviet blandishment, began to convince the Soviet leaders that their real challenge still lay in Europe. Russians were and are German-conscious, Thus, following Stalin's death, the Soviet leadership began slowly and quietly to face once again toward Europe and to give priority to the solution of problems in Europe. Bulganin and Khrushchev made peace with Tito and visited Britain, and eventually Khrushchev began to propound the strategy of "peaceful competition" and "peaceful coexistence".
Communist China, on its part, began to give increasing attention to what it was later to term the "rural areas of the world", Asia, Africa and Latin America. Just as the Soviets were sensitive about Germany, Chinese were sensitive about Japan, and Mao's regime began to stake out its own special sphere of interest. Chinese Communist leaders found themselves in conflict with their Soviet comrades over who should have the prime power in North Korea or in North Vietnam. There was even an attempt to reassert Chinese influence in the first Soviet satellite, the "People's Republic of Mongolia". Little wonder that by 1964 Suslov was complaining about the "appearance of hegemonic plans among the Chinese leader".
Thus, the way in which the Communist leaders in China and in the Soviet Union looked out upon the world precluded an identity of interests so necessary for the agreement in their faith.
3. Status Quo versus Revolution — In many respects, despite its commitment to world revolution, the Soviet Union is a satiated power. The Soviet Union, in fact, includes territories taken from other people, and the Soviets are, so to speak, a status quo power in that they would like to keep what they have. In some respects, therefore, the Soviet leaders can hardly be expected to risk what they have in order to support the revolutionary goals of the Chinese Reds, who are far from satiated.
The Chinese Communists are, on the contrary, revolutionary in their approach, and on a number of scores. First, as long as the Republic of China in Taiwan exists beyond their sphere of control, they regard their Communist revolution in China as incomplete, and further their whole mystique of inevitable victory and infallible doctrine is seriously challenged. This is particularly true in face of the obviously fairer deal which has been given to the Chinese farmers in Taiwan. Secondly, the Chinese Reds wish to assert a major role in world affairs both inside the Communist areas and in the "in-between" areas, and here they have run up against competition and outright resistance on the part of the Soviet leaders who wish to maintain their leadership of the world "revolutionary forces".
As a revolutionary power, Communist China hails all demonstrations, violence, warfare and struggle as necessary and desirable — everywhere in the world. The Soviet leaders have expressed more reservations on this score and are likely to express still more as time goes on. They have more to lose.
4. Strategic Assessment — The Chinese Communist strategic assessment of the world situation is based in large part upon ignorance which stems from the attempt to project the internal Chinese Communist experience onto an unwilling world, from the manner in which Party members in China feel compelled to report to the top only what the leaders want to hear, and from China's self-imposed isolation and insistence on policies of "self-reliance".
Mao's strategic assessment of the world is, like his writings, based on his ridiculously oversimplified dualism which the Soviet leaders recognize is inadequate for explaining the complexities of a world where many of the predictions of Marx and Lenin have just not worked out. As the Soviet leaders have pointed out, thermonuclear weapons will not distinguish between bourgeoisie and proletarians, between oppressors and oppressed.
5. Personalities — There have been increasing indications in the exchange of polemics that several of the top Communist Chinese leaders and Soviet leaders have rub bed each other the wrong way. Peiping's leaders have on several occasions shown ill-concealed hauteur, condescension, and disdain toward Soviet leaders, particularly Khrushchev. Chinese Communist publications have frequently descended to the level of personal attack.
Whereas the Chinese Reds frequently find the Soviet leaders boorish, ill-mannered, unreliable barbarians, the Russians in turn find the Chinese Communist leaders arrogant, dogmatic, clannish, ignorant and possibly even "inscrutable". Within a system where flattery moves up to the top and tends to play up to the prejudices of the leaders, it seems probable that, given the national differences, personality clashes as a symbol of clashing national interests will continue to promote disputes at the very top level between Peiping and Moscow.
The body of doctrine called Marxism Leninism is so much a part of the thought pattern and the institutional makeup of Communist China and Soviet Russia that the manner in which these basic national differences and conflicts are interpreted will continue to push the ideological disputes into central position.
Newsdom (Sinwen Tiend), Weekly, "Japan's idea of Reviving Its 'Co-prosperity Sphere' " by Chen Ho-sheng--
A ministerial level Southeast Asia economic development conference sponsored by Japan was held in Tokyo April 6-7 with eight Southeast Asian countries attending. As a result of the conference's success, Japan's diplomacy in Asia has entered a new stage. Previously Japan had advocated an "Asian diplomacy" and sought to make a beginning in Southeast Asia. With this conference, it has established a beachhead.
But the expansion of Japan's influence in Southeast Asia is bound to raise a storm there.
First of all, Japan's presence certainly will affect Communist China's attempt to infiltrate the area. Peiping leaders Liu Shao-chi and Chen Yi, who had just visited Pakis tan and Afghanistan, announced just after the Tokyo conference that they will visit Burma soon. This shows that: (1) Red China is suffering militarily, politically, and economically from the encirclement of the free nations, and (2) that expansion of Japan's influence in Southeast Asia will accentuate the encirclement trend and hurt Peiping politically and economically.
As the Japanese government seeks to push its "Asian diplomacy", its biggest opponent will be the Peiping regime. Many Japanese intellectuals believe that only by cooperating with the Republic of China closely and obtaining its support can Japan unfold its diplomacy in Southeast Asia successfully. The reasons are:
First, the economic prosperity and political stability of Asia hinge upon friendly cooperation between free China and Japan. If Japan cannot obtain the cooperation of the Chinese people, its "Asian diplomacy" will be only an empty slogan.
Second, the economic potential of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia should not be underestimated. Any disregard of the economic and social influence of the overseas Chinese in Asia will undermine Japan's diplomacy.
As a result of Chinese Communist nuclear tests and political and military threats, Japan has begun to understand its danger. Japan's Prime Minister Sato announced that the American-Japanese mutual defense treaty would be continued after 1970 and that if Okinawa was attacked, Japan would send troops to help defend it. However, Japan has no intention of a confrontation with Peiping. In giving economic support to Soviet Russia for the latter's development of Siberia, Japan apparently hopes to use the Soviets to restrain the Chinese Communists. Collaboration with the United States and the Soviet Union against the Peiping regime is the core of Japan's new diplomacy.
At present, Japan is still unable to carry out an independent political diplomacy and intends only to pursue an independent economic diplomacy. The U.S. war policy in Vietnam has not produced the expected results and American prestige has suffered in Southeast Asia. However, the Russians, busy at home and faced with Chinese Communist obstruction, have not been able to take advantage of the situation in Southeast Asia. Japan hopes this works to her advantage.
However, Japan will be subject to some limitations. First, Japan does not have enough money. The Southeast Asia countries urgently need economic assistance and long-term, low-interest loans. Second, Japan must limit its activities to economic development. When the Tokyo conference met, the Washington Post commented that Japan had ambitions for a new "Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere". The Russian and Chinese Communists made similar comments. The Southeast Asian countries have different political positions. If Japan attempts to exercise political pressure, these nations will not line up with Japan. Furthermore, nationalism is flaming high in most Asian countries.
The Nation (Hsien Tai Kuo Chia), Monthly, "See the Chinese Mainland from Hongkong" by Koo Huai--
Hongkong is a show window of the free world and the Chinese mainland is a hell of enslavement. Because of geographic proximity, we can see the Chinese mainland more clearly from Hongkong than from other free areas.
The people of Hongkong feel that the Chinese Communists are expert in earning foreign exchange. In the last two years, the number of Chinese Communist stores selling mainland products in Hongkong has increased from a few to more than 30.
In the early 1960s many Hongkong residents regularly sent "food parcels" to their relatives on the mainland. Later the Chinese Communists set up "service stations for overseas Chinese". Chinese residents in Hongkong need only make payments to Communist agencies and their relatives can receive food from the stations. At the same time, the Chinese Reds have restricted the influx of "food parcels". Thus the cash value of the parcels has become foreign exchange for the Peiping regime.
Recently the Chinese Communists have worked out other tricks of earning foreign exchange from overseas Chinese. Because the Hongkong people (mostly Cantonese) are fond of eating and drinking, the Chinese Communists established a reception center in Canton for Chinese from Hongkong. Foods similar to those of Hongkong can be bought at the center. Travelers need only buy coupons from the Communist "China Travel Agency" at the railway station in Kowloon. With coupons in hand, visitors can order anything they want at the center or give a feast for relatives and friends. Such a privilege is denied the people of Canton. Moreover, people who receive cash remittances from relatives and friends in Hongkong are not permitted to leave the mainland. The Chinese Communists hold them in the hope of getting more foreign exchange from abroad.
Modern Critique (Shih Tai Pi Ping), fortnightly, "The Reaction of Singapore and Malaysia to the Change of the Situation in Indonesia" by La Su—
Singapore and Malaysia were pleased to hear of the denigration of Indonesian dictator Sukarno. Since Sukarno launched the "Crush Malaysia" campaign two years ago, Singapore and Malaysia have been under constant threat of military invasion. Social order, commerce, and industry were affected.
After news of Indonesian changes reached Singapore, the stock market boomed. Businessmen began to think of investment after peace returns to the Malacca Straits.
Government officials, however, were more cautious. Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman said that because the Indonesian people had been told Malaysia was a neo-colonial scheme, the policy of confrontation could not be ended all at once. He expressed hope that the Indonesian army would gradually change the Indonesian view of and policy toward Malaysia.
Deputy Prime Minister Tun Ruzak said that Malaysia welcomes the emergence of an anti-Comtnunist government in Jakatta and that Indonesian Communists had instigated Sukarno to adopt a hostile policy toward Malaysia. He expressed hope confrontation will be ended and friendly relations between Indonesia and Malaysia re-established.
The people of Singapore are concerned about the future foreign policy of Indonesia. K.C. Lee, secretary general of the Singapore Alliance Party (an opposition party), said he hoped the Indonesian government would recognize that Indonesia's confrontation is meaningless and even harmful to Indonesia. He added that for the sake of peace in Southeast Asia, the people of Singapore hope Indonesia can have a democratic government that will improve the livelihood of its people.
When the coup d'etat attempt brought Indonesia to the edge of chaos, Malaysia did not take advantage of the opportunity to retaliate against the Indonesians. A high-ranking official declared Malaysia will never try to crush any country.
However, Sukarno still insisted he would crush Malaysia. He set up a special command with himself as commander-in-chief and General Nasution as deputy commander-in chief.