CHINA YEARBOOK 1964-65
China Publishing Co, P. O. Box 337,
Taipei, Taiwan, China, 1965, 954 pp., US$5
Reviewed by William Chou
Yearbooks are not intended to make pleasant, leisure reading. They are reference books for the scholar and the layman—and this is one of the best. It can be appropriately described as the indispensable volume about the Republic of China.
This is the 18th in a series, and the period covered is from July, 1963, through June, 1964. However, some important developments are brought down to the end of 1964. Of course, the strength or weakness of any yearbook is related to its timeliness. It is to be hoped that in the future the China Yearbook editors will find it possible to cover the calendar year and still go to press two or three months after the period's close.
This is the scope of the China Yearbook:
* Major developments of 1963-1964.
* General information section that covers (for both Taiwan and the Republic of China) history and culture, geography, population, economic resources, religion and philosophy, politics, and the offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu.
* Government and its functions, including the system, administration, National Assembly, presidency, legislature, judiciary, and those two unique creations of the five-power system of government, the Examination and Control Yuans. Taiwan's self-government is also described.
* National defense, including structure, the armed forces, and veterans' affairs.
* International affairs, broken down into China's role in the United Nations and its relations with East Asia, the Middle and Near East, Africa, Europe, Central and South America, and North America. Also included are public relations and overseas Chinese affairs.
* Economic developments, including the general situation, income and capital formation, budget and accounting, public finance and taxation, money, banking and insurance, international cooperation, rural reconstruction, land reform, agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, fisheries, water conservation, industry, mining, commerce, foreign exchange and trade, communications, and tourism.
* Social affairs, with a breakdown into labor, social security, cooperatives, public health, women's activities, and civic and business organizations.
* Education and culture, which includes education, educational and cultural organs, science, literature and arts, physical education and sports, and mass communications.
* Chinese Communist regime, a valuable section that includes a history, political activities, foreign affairs, economy, military affairs, and culture and education.
* Chronology, which begins with establishment of the Republic in 1911 and comes down to December 31, 1964.
* Who's Who, an invaluable compendium that presents brief biographies—each up to date—of Republic of China leaders from President Chiang Kai-shek to the up-and-coming young men and women in business, government, and the professions.
* Appendix, which includes important new laws and treaties, the Constitution, major presidential messages, and other important official statements.
* A miscellaneous category that is a treasure trove of government directory and listings of national holidays, countries having diplomatic relations with China, diplomatic and consular missions abroad, and English translations of Chinese laws.
Also inserted at the end of the volume—and easily removed, if the reader wishes—are maps of the Republic of China and the province of Taiwan. Both are indexed.
Illustrations show life and agricultural and industrial progress on the island; some are in color.
The overall index is improved over past editions—although its cross-references are still insufficient. Indices are a nuisance, always, in the making of a book, but the editors would do well to keep in mind that no reference work can be better than its index.
Whatever may be its faults, the China Yearbook is a must in the library of anyone who wants to keep up on the Republic of China. The information it contains can be found elsewhere, but mostly not in English and only by wading through hundreds of volumes emanating from as many sources.
For the money, it's the Chinese best buy of all time. Editions are available in both ordinary and India paper. Sea mail postage is included in the price.
CHINA AND THE BOMB
By Morton H. Halperin
Frederick A. Praeger,
New York, 1965, 166 pp., US$4.95
Reviewed by Charles C. Clayton
The real significance of Communist Chinese membership in the nuclear club lies not in alteration of the Asian balance of power but in the augmentation of Mao Tse-tung's ambitions. The author of this study of the changes the bomb has wrought on the Asian international scene analyzes the motives and objectives of Red Chinese foreign policy since their first nuclear test.
The author has drawn on the resources of the Harvard Center for International Affairs, the Council on Foreign Relations, and his own contacts with U.S. government agencies for background in analyzing Chinese Communist military policy. He first reviews the Peiping-Washington confrontation and says the relationship can be expected to remain hostile as long as the United States supports the Republic of China and opposes Peiping's ambitions in Southeast Asia.
He relates the history of Red China's nuclear program, which was begun in 1957 with Russian assistance in building reactors and a gaseous diffusion plant. Moscow withdrew its aid in 1960. Since that time progress has been costly. However, the author believes that in time the Chinese Communists will be able to develop a sophisticated delivery capacity.
Halperin suggests that Mao wants nuclear capability for four reasons. The first is to provide a deterrent to American attack. The second is to enhance Peiping's influence in the Communist bloc and the third to provide support for the so-called wars of national liberation. Finally, Mao seeks Chinese dominance over all of East Asia. The danger of U.S. intervention in Asia can be mitigated by holding American allies in Asia as hostages, Mao believes.
One of the significant discussions in this book is the analysis of Chinese Communist nuclear strategy. He maintains that the argument between Moscow and Peiping is not over the destructiveness of nuclear war. Both believe the West will suffer the only serious casualties. The Chinese Reds, he says, saw the nuclear balance changing in 1957 with the success of the first Sputnik, and urged Russia to use its advantage by supporting local wars of liberation. Halperin argues that one reason why China developed its own bomb was to force Moscow to accept its stand that the nuclear power of the West can be neutralized only through "resolute and united action by the Socialist camp".
The Chinese Communist position, according to the author, is not that nuclear war is inevitable, but that peace can be achieved only through militant opposition to the West. They argue that the more nuclear capability the Socialist countries possess the more successful the deterrent is likely to be. Peiping, Halperin believes, threw up a smoke screen with its demands for complete prohibition of nuclear devices to conceal its own embarrassment over the partial test ban treaty.
It is the author's belief that Peiping will seek to exploit the bomb for propaganda purposes to strengthen its claim of being a major power, to improve its prestige in the Communist bloc, and to blackmail China's neighbors in Asia. However, he suggests that until the Chinese Reds can build a stockpile of bombs and perfect a delivery system, there probably will be a "hiatus in major foreign-policy ventures on her part". The obvious reason is to avoid giving either Russia or the United States any excuse to move in and prevent the perfection of nuclear weapons.
In another chapter the author discusses in detail America's policy, including the pros and cons of blocking China's nuclear capacity by force, by pre-emptive action or by any other means. He discusses the alternative the United States faces in accepting Peiping's nuclear capacity. He points out the effects on American relations with Russia and with Red China.
In treating Indian and Japanese reactions he writes:
"Though the Indians may well recognize that the Chinese use of nuclear weapons would lead to retaliation in kind by the United States and perhaps by the Soviet Union, they would also have to reckon with the destruction of Indian cities by the Chinese. It may be difficult to convince the Indian government that it should continue its resolute opposition to the Chinese Communists."
Japan, he notes, is especially sensitive and "any Japanese government that accepted nuclear weapons (even for defense purposes) would be subject to bitter and widespread opposition. "
This is an extremely readable and dispassionate book. The footnotes are short and serve to explain rather than to impress the reader. There is much in it that is subject to argument. But it is a provocative discussion of nuclear gamesmanship and it deserves attention as an attempt to bring into focus the issues in what may be the world's most crucial problem of the years just ahead.