Edited by Lucian Wu
Heritage Press, Taipei, 1962. 170 pp.
HK$3.50, NT$28.00
Reviewed by Margaret Pei
This small but well-packed volume runs the gamut through melodrama, essays of humorous content, some memorable poems and includes a veritable potpourri of present-day literary talent. Also included are selections of modern Chinese art by avant-garde painters of free China. Altogether there are four short stories, four topical essays and six poems. As was said in a collection of stories old and new, published in Soochow in the early 1920s, "The eater of peaches need not reject the apricot," so the reader of this book will find something to suit any palate.
Pai Hsien-yung, recently graduated from National Taiwan University writes a romantic tragedy, set in Kweilin. It tells the story of a beautiful maid who enters the service of a large family to take care of the "young master." The character of Jade Love, neurotic and rather saccharine, biting her lover's flesh until the blood comes, is a strong one.
The story is well told. Jade Love's feminine charms disrupt the peace of the family. The male servants are on tenterhooks, vying for her attention. But Jade Love has eyes only for the sick consumptive Ching-sen, a pathetic, hounded creature who seeks relief by going off with a young and pretty opera star.
There are many glimpses into family life of a decade ago, vivid descriptions of festivals, customs and mores that also are apropos today.
In the "Embroidered Slippers", Nieh Hua-ling, manages to interject some interesting sidelights on modern Chinese marriage, saying "It is like a watch; once it goes wrong, it will never be right; it will be either too fast or too slow. You cannot, however, do without it, everyone has a watch, even if it works badly."
"The Net" by Hung Chih-huei is a tender story about marriage in its early stages. It tells of a young mother unexpectedly meeting her former admirer and the odd behavior of her young husband, whom she finally finds she does love best.
Chiang Kwei's "Snakes & Ghosts" provides horror and blood in a hair-raising tale of rather classic style.
The four essays open the doorway to understanding the day-to-day life of the Chinese populace. Shih Ko, expounding on the controversial subject "On Borrowing Money," writes with lucidity and erudition plus inside know-how.
Disregarding Shakespeare's immortal words "neither a borrower nor a lender be," the writer explores lending hazards and comes out in favor of extending loans and then forgetting them. The idea is that when you do get paid back, it seems like money from heaven.
Chiu Nan writes on the "Haircut." He has contrived in three pages of the book to cover the whole tonsorial art. It is to be noted that Chinese barbers are world-famous for their "tender touch," and that visitors from Europe go into raptures over a Chinese shave.
Chiu Nan also has written on "Bathing." He expresses himself with lack of sentimentality and just the right touch of levity.
"Fan Talk" by Fang Tu is an entertaining disquisition on the uses and misuses of the fan.
Lucian explains in the Preface that young Chinese writers and artists are trying to break away from traditionalism, to find new directions. As he remarks, to do so without Western imitation is not easy.
Shyr de Jinn, one of free China's best-known younger artists, writes on "New Chinese Painting in Taiwan." It is an exhaustive treatment of an absorbing subject. Among illustrations, "Eye of the Typhoon" by Shyr de Jinn, a dramatic and colorful abstract, and "Still Life" by Liao Chi-chin evoke memories of Cezanne and Matisse. The distinctive self-portrait by Ku Fu Sheng shows great individuality and a marvelous sense of color.
The six poems are varied, Nancy Ing composes charmingly on the "Bamboo." Hsiu Tao, seemingly obsessed with the cold, has succeeded in writing some interesting if rather cryptic lines. The two poems by Yeh Wei-lien, with superior translations, are beautifully conceived and written. Beautiful are such lines as "In the faraway provinces a shower beats a city in an afterglow"-and "They say one senses a pavilion of brightness of the past."
For a good sampler of new Chinese writing, the reader need not look farther.
RECOGNITION OF COMMUNIST CHINA
By Robert P. Newman.
The Macmillan Company, New York, 1961.
288 pp. Cloth, US$4.95. Paperback, $1.95
Reviewed by Geraldine Fitch
The author, associate professor of speech and director of debate at the University of Pittsburgh, says of his thesis: "The book is an analysis of the issues involved, a weighing of the available evidence on the issues-and an evaluation of the conclusions that result. Three kinds of issues are considered: moral, political and legal ... My conclusion is that recognition should be extended, and Communist China admitted to the U.N."
The publishers say: "Cutting through a smoke screen of false analysis and passionate invective, the author concludes that the American people have been fantastically misinformed and-to an extent-deliberately confused on every aspect of American recognition of China." Like William Lederer in A Nation of Sheep, Prof. Newman would have the American people appear stupid dupes of misinformation on foreign affairs. Such emotional and gross exaggerations sell the American people short.
The publishers say "He has no axe to grind." This may be doubted, as he does a hatchet-job on all writers favoring the Republic of China as "pressure-group writers," while invariably calling those who favor recognition of Chinese Communist and its admission the U.N. "independent scholars." Macmillan's final word for the author is that he asserts: "America's political maturity can come only with recognition."
The reader must decide for himself whether it is Newman or the American government which is politically mature. In his concluding chapter, the author admits that he finds the leadership of the US. Department of State "reprehensible" on this whole subject. He does not include "the foreign officers whose opinions have been unheeded and un publicized," which (from earlier references) means those discredited for favoring the Chinese Communists and who unfortunately were heeded until the mainland was lost. He does include the "Secretaries of State, Assistant Secretaries for Far Eastern Affairs, and China desk men who determined policy and directed its execution." From earlier references, these include Dulles, Robertson, Parsons, McConaughy and Rusk.
"These men," the author says, "should have led an effort (sic) to base policy on reality rather than seeking to 'prolong the fiction that the pathetic government on Formosa is in fact, the government of the great Chinese nation.' " His use of the quotation (from Reinhold Niebuhr) indicates his approval of it, although it is demonstrably untrue. Aside from the fact that the Republic of China may conceivably liberate the mainland, as France recovered its entire territory from Nazi occupation, it is completely untrue that the Republic of China is a "pathetic government." It is, by any standards, a good government-and certainly one of the best in all Asia.
Then he adds: "They should have accepted the clear opinion of the American people (in Gallup polls referred to earlier) that we should negotiate at the top level with the People's Republic and seek to decrease Chinese hostility, rather than attempting to increase the bitter feelings on this side and spurning legitimate negotiations." This statement is so loaded that it needs to be broken down and examined.
First, note the "clear opinion of the American people" who (we were told) have been "fantastically misinformed" and "deliberately confused." Secondly, the Gallup poll of February, 1957, (cited in Chapter 8) showed 70 per cent of those replying as opposed to admission of Peiping to the UN., and on a second question as to whether Dulles should negotiate with Chou En-lai "to see if better relations should be worked out," 53 per cent were for, 30 per cent against, and 17 per cent without opinion, on an innocuous inquiry about trying to work out better relations. Our presidents negotiate with Mr. Khrushchev; "better relations" sounds worth a try. Yet it is not a very "clear voice" for it, and a large majority are against admission of the Peiping regime to the UN.
The Gallup poll of 1954 (cited in Chapter 15) showed 79 per cent opposed to seating Peiping in the U.N. and on a further question: "Do you think the U.S. should be friendly to Red China and try to win her away from Russia-or should treat (her) strictly as an enemy nation?" 47 per cent were for and 40 per cent against. This was fewer than on the other poll's secondary question, and not very decisive. By the time the reader reaches the concluding chapter, he is evidently supposed to forget what those Gallup polls were about, forget the large majority against recognition or admission to the U.N., and instead to hear "a clear voice" from the "fantastically misinformed American people" calling for negotiations at top level with Peiping based on secondary questions answered with indecisive peeps.
The final allegation in that charged sentence was to the effect that US. State Department men were "attempting to increase bitter feelings on this side, and spurning legitimate negotiations." Is it true? Did the State Department need to "increase bitter feelings" among Americans following the Korean War? Did they spurn negotiations at Panmunjom or Geneva or Warsaw? And did negotiations "decrease Chinese hostility"?
Bias and prejudice are shown in the references to writers against recognition as "pressure group writers" and those who favor it as "independent scholars." This reviewer is referred to as a "pressure group writer" (though I have no idea what group presses me). In another reference I am included with "registered agents" of the Republic of China, though my position in Taipei was as consultant or English editor for the Government Information Office, with no connection with policymaking or politics. US. law does not require a person doing such work outside America to register as a "foreign agent."
Misleading statements are many, but only a few can be given here:
1. "Christians in China are worshiping openly." True only in the sense that 12 out of 220 churches on the mainland remain open.
2. "Nowhere in public statement or the 1955 resolution was any promise made to defend Quemoy and Matsu." Misleading because the resolution gave Eisenhower authority to defend "such related positions and territories ... as appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa" and this was publicly explained as meaning the defense of the offshore islands, if the President thought an attack on the islands was related to the defense of Formosa. It was so implemented in the battle of Quemoy in 1958.
3. Chiang "once resigned the presidency for a few months in 1949 ... (but) his promised resignation in 1960 did not materialize." President Chiang has never resigned, as the Constitution makes no provision for such a step, but twice (not once) stepped down (or retired for a period) in protest (as during negotiations with the Communists in 1949). In 1960 he said he would not run for a third term if the Constitution had to be changed. The matter was taken to the Council of Grand Justices and the limitation of two terms was suspended "for the duration of the period of Suppression of the Communist Rebellion."
4. Newman (as well as the ADA) insists that recognition of Peiping would not constitute betrayal of the Nationalists. Misleading because Peiping has laid down provisos for the return of Taiwan to the mainland and the withdrawal of the 7th Fleet. Either would violate the 1954 treaty or betray our loyal ally.
5. Equating a possible first veto by the US. in the U.N. with 99 vetoes already cast by the U.S.S.R. is very misleading.
It would take a book of equal length to deal with all the misleading statements and half-truths, but there are also many statements demonstrably untrue:
1. There is a wild supposition, contrary to all evidence (including Wedemeyer's that President Chiang had never "broken a promise made to the United States") that during World War II, Chinese at the highest level, "even the Generalissimo himself," threatened to make a separate peace. Several times Japan offered unilateral settlements, but such offers were never even considered. What follows is just as untrue, that "almost all observers of current Chinese affairs believe that if the U.S. were to recognize Communist China or propose a trusteeship for Taiwan, some influential Chinese would come to terms with Peiping." "Almost all observers" is a gross exaggeration, for this reviewer knows many observers of current Chinese affairs, but not one making such a prediction. To make such a charge against "influential Chinese" is utterly unrealistic, showing gross ignorance of the single-mindedness of the Republic of China regarding Peiping.
2. That Democrats were "forced by Republican pressure ... to go along with a policy that was opposed to recognition" must amuse the Republicans. With 19 resolutions in Congress, carried by an overwhelming majority of both Republicans and Democrats, and a plank against recognition in the platforms of both parties in 1956 and again in 1960, this charge seems less than honest.
3. That "the United States does not regard Taiwan as part of the Republic of China, and consequently Chiang's right to control the island is in doubt" is untrue on several counts. The Cairo Declaration promised its return to the Republic of China (to Chiang in person); the Japanese surrendered it; it was restored to China on October 25, 1945, and to make it complete, the Japanese signed a separate treaty with China on April 28, 1952, in Taiwan.
4. Repeated references to the Republic of China as a "government-in-exile" when it is still on its own soil, and the claim that its status is less than that of governments in exile during World War II, when the reverse was true. Those countries had lost their territory and their people.
5. Equating executions (grossly exaggerated) in the Nationalist war on Communists with the millions liquidated under the Red regime, and two reformatories of free China with Peiping's labor camps that are enslaving millions today.
6. That "devastating famines" have been moderated on the mainland. The worst famine of all time, largely due to the "commune" folly, shows the bias of his estimates.
7. That Peiping's involvement in the Korean War "does not establish her aggressiveness."
8. The charge that "hatred had reached pathological proportions" against the United States in China before the Communist takeover is completely false, as any American in China during modern times can testify.
To these and numerous other accusations may be added the false premise of an entire chapter that Peiping is an outlaw because of our hostility or our treatment, instead of the reverse. What stretching of the elasticity of debate! And one statement has become untrue since (to the humiliation of the pseudo-liberals that he quotes to support recognition), i.e., that "The vote supporting us in the U.N. decreases steadily," and "Most of the independent scholars believe that Peking's admission to the U.N. over our opposition will take place." As it turned out, more U.N. members supported the U.S. position against admission of the Peiping regime in December, 1961, than ever before. Opposition to the seating of Peiping had been called "a hopeless cause" by the author.
Newman is to be commended for giving the reader an impressive amount of material on both sides of the question, even though he did not leave the conclusions to be drawn by the reader. Many readers will have the political maturity to weigh the reasons given by State Department experts against the wishful thinking of the pseudo-liberals that, even though the Chinese Communists are tyrannical at home and "unreliable in honoring international agreements," membership in the U.N. might have a salutary effect on them. The author's conclusion is that "even though recognition would bring all manner of evils in its train" (with no benefits listed) "yet we should recognize." And then we should advise the deserted small nations of Asia "not to follow our example." What a world leader the author would make of his country!