By William J. Lederer.
W. W. Norton and Co., New York,
1961. 194 PP. US$3.75.
Reviewed by Geraldine Fitch
The nation is the USA. The sheep are the American people. The author pours out on both an insulting commentary on their failures, ineptitudes, ignorance and stupidity. The following is a fair quote taken at random:
"Our foreign-relations business, then, is being run on doubtful facts. We are like a sandlot team sent to play in the World Series. No wonder many of our leaders have been too timid to make difficult decisions. No wonder they have procrastinated ... They have not had accurate information on which to base decisions. Mostly they have had the second-hand rumors, guesses, and propaganda supplied by ill-informed amateurs."
The co-author of the controversial Ugly American then proceeds to fill a book with "second-hand rumors, guesses and propaganda", plus half-truths, distortions, falsehoods and exaggerations. (Not having read The Ugly American, this reviewer was unprepared for Lederer's use of his reading-public as a punching-bag for practice of below-the-belt blows and found this the most negative and distorted book I have ever read.) Making a crusader's plea for truth ("public information officers have become prostituted"), for an informed public opinion ("much of our government's energy is squandered in obtaining a pre-determined public opinion"), for journalists of integrity ("the press is helping to misinform the United States"), the author spews out more false charges, misinformation, and distortion of truth than can be corrected short of another book.
One aspect of Lederer's technique can be illustrated by an incident recently reported in Taipei. For the first time in the history of Taiwan (though similar incidents have happened from time to time in Central Park, New York), an American tourist was attacked without provocation on a street in Taipei, suffering superficial scratches and a cut on his wrist requiring four stitches, as he grappled with the assailant for his knife. The tourist received the apologies of press and public. The assailant was apprehended and examined for insanity.
Lederer would take an isolated incident like the above and make it appear typical of a country and its people. His chapter about one editor in Thailand is a case in point. What's more, without even an isolated incident to pin his charges to, he can make villains out of great and good people. President Chiang is one of those on whom Lederer vents his spleen, despite his service under three American admirals (Radford, Stump and Felt) who hold President Chiang in high esteem. This reviewer has known China's president for nearly 35 years as a good and great man, especially in his humility and sincerity. On the day of writing this review, I heard a visiting US senator (a Democrat) call him "one of the greatest men of our generation". Lederer calls him a rascal, a blackmailer, a ruthless politician who knows nothing of democracy or freedom. The picture is completely false.
On the jacket-blurb, Pearl Buck says of this book: "Every sentence is a distillation of truth". To be specific, let me quote some of the author's flat assertions, which are not true at all. The half-truths must be ignored for lack of space.
* "It was Chiang himself who created the 'agrarian reformers' tale."
President Chiang never called the Chinese Communists anything but Communists. According to the testimony of Louis Budenz, it was XL (Owen Lattimore) who was delegated by the Communist apparatus to sell this idea to the American people.
* "Formosa does not belong to the Chinese Nationalists."
The return of Formosa and the Pescadores to the Republic of China was promised in the Cairo Declaration of 1943. It was so restored by the Japanese surrender at which China was represented, and—besides the peace treaty later signed by the allies with Japan—a separate Treaty of Peace was signed between the Republic of China and Japan in Taipei on April 28,1952. Lederer failed to do his home-work.
* "The United States had the authority to stop Chinese troops from being stationed on Quemoy and Matsu (The Dulles-Yeh letters)".
This is a dishonest reference to official correspondence, or guess-work. The communiqué on which the letters were based was a gentleman's agreement that the Republic of China would not use military force as the primary means of liberating the mainland. The United States did not have the authority to dictate to the Republic of China in its internal affairs.
* The author implies that President Chiang considered Communist peace offers "if the United States did not back him on Quemoy and Matsu." He calls this "Blackmail. An old play for Chiang."
Chou En-lai made such peace offers openly, offering to make President Chiang governor of Formosa. President Chiang ignored this completely, as he did the 7 or 8 peace offers of Japan via German channels in World War II. General Wedemeyer testified to Congress that Generalissimo Chiang was a man of complete integrity, who had never let us down, and when asked the question in reverse, he could not say we had never let Generalissimo Chiang down.
* Lederer says the Chinese "claim that tiny Quemoy and Matsu are absolutely necessary for the defense of Formosa".
The reviewer has interviewed the highest military officers here, both Chinese and American, and never heard this claim made by either. President Chiang's position is that he will not retreat from another inch of free territory. The American military claim the islands are defensible, as they were proved in 1958.
* "Any military man with a sense of history realizes that an army made up of young Formosans conscripted into military service ... probably will be ineffective in battle."
This might be true if the author's earlier statement (p. 48) were true: "The Formosans prefer an independent nation for Formosa." Most of the island people realize that the Communists could take over an "independent" Taiwan. As for the Taiwan-born recruits in the armed forces, they were tested under fire on Quemoy in 1958 and their loyalty and courage were acclaimed by over 100 foreign correspondents on the spot. (Lederer was not there.)
* "The assertion that Chiang's army is a potent weapon is poppycock."
This may be Lederer's idea, but not that of the American military officers who have trained them, and if all these fine Americans are prejudiced, as the author implies, there are still the many visiting top-level American officers, and military missions from other countries, who have seen them in combat or on maneuvers, as well as the foreign correspondents on Quemoy who had covered other wars and said, "There was no such saturation shelling without let-up at New Guinea, Kwajalein or in Korea."
* "Chiang could not last a month without our support."
Whether this is true or not, no one knows, but it is beside the point. As the strongest nation of the free world, the US would probably bear the brunt wherever war comes. But does this mean that the USA does not need allies? President Chiang has the second largest armed forces in the free world. He has repeatedly said, "We do not need your ground troops. We will do our own fighting. Just give us the same material support that Russia gives the Reds." Why denigrate our allies? We will need them.
* In the election of 1960, "Chiang simply decided that, contrary to the Constitution, he would continue as dictator in Formosa and - to heck with what the people thought."
President Chiang refused to run for a third term if the Constitution had to be changed to make it possible. He said the Constitution was more important than any individual. Lederer's statement is untrue, grossly unfair and insulting. There was wide clamor to retain President Chiang's leadership, as well as that of the Vice President. The matter was taken to the Council of Grand Justices by the National Assembly (similar to our electoral college), and it was legally included in the Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion.
* Americans "have been frightened away from exercising the boldest and proudest of American traditions: the privilege of saying what they think." (p.64)
This is typical of the author's carelessness and sweeping exaggerations. How many Americans are afraid to say what they think? Hit is a majority, then we live in a totalitarian state. And since when is irresponsibility in speech, without regard to truth or evidence, "our boldest and proudest tradition"?
* "The brutal truth about the Chinese issue seldom has been adequately presented."
Lederer has been "brutal" enough by any standard, but far from the truth. Some of his "mish-mosh" of thread-bare gossip and fabrication includes the old charges of billionaire Soongs and Kungs who somehow "got rich off of Chiang"; of Rhee having been put in power by America (Dr. Philip Jaisohn was groomed for the post by our State Department, and got one vote when the time came in the National Assembly; Kim Koo got 14, and Syngman Rhee all the rest --194.); a "horde of skilled Chinese public relation operators" (the so-called China Lobby--figment of the imagination); and "corrupt and dictatorial governments" in South Vietnam, Laos, Indonesia, Formosa, Guatemala, Jordan, Iran and Nicaragua". And since Lederer says our expenditures "reek of inefficiency and corruption", why be so critical of corruption in other countries? At least in Korea and Japan where black-marketing of US goods has been found on a large scale at times, does the author not know that it took dishonest Americans to make it possible?
* "Who remembers the 1920s when Chiang Kai-shek started public life as a close associate of the Communists?"
Who remembers? I do, for one. It was Dr. Sun Yat-sen, not Generalissimo Chiang, who tried "coexistence" with the Communist. Generalissimo Chiang's report after Dr. Sun sent him to Moscow was that he did not trust the Russian Communists. Still in the 1920s, he threw the Russian advisers out of China, closed the Soviet consulates, and raided the Russian Embassy for the proof of the Soviet conspiracy.
"Every senior member of the Soong clan, except Mme. Sun Yat-sen, had important strategic posts in the government."
Only one out of three brothers had such a post, Mme. Kung had no post in government, and Mme. Sun had a high post in the Communist government when it took over.
* "Our bookstores bulge with material concerning China and the Generalissimo." Books favorable to President Chiang have always bucked the greater number, more popular, books dealing in the same libel and slander about President Chiang that Lederer re-hashes in A Nation of Sheep.
Such a book is unworthy of the author, the publisher and the friend who (perhaps without reading it) said "Every sentence is a distillation of truth." If any distilling were done, the slight basis of truth was evaporated and only the muck is left.
WHO WOULD VOLUNTEER?
By Lyle H. Munson
The Bookmoiler, Inc., New York, 1961. US$ 2.00
Reviewed by Thomas T. C. Kuan
Lyle H. Munson's Who Would Volunteer is a unique work among books, articles, or pamphlets on Kinmen (Quemoy). It tells the story of Kinmen through photographs of the local people in their everyday life on that front-line island. Each picture is annotated with a short caption.
As the author demonstrates, Kinmen is not merely a tiny island of beaches; but a resourceful field of oysters; not an island of barren rocks and hills; but an islet with good irrigation canals and cultivated farms. It is not an island guarded by a handful of old soldiers; but garrisoned by many young and vigilant troops, and inhabited by 50,000 civilians, consisting of the sweat-soaked farmers, the seafaring women, the proud grandmothers, the innocent grandchildren, the diligent housewives and the young and lovely school boys and girls.
Further, it is also a place where the atrocities of the Communists can best be observed:
Mr. Munson elaborates: the Chinese Communists have attempted repeatedly since 1949 to wrest Kinmen from the defense line of. Taiwan. In 1949, an invasion force of 40,000 men was assembled On the mainland. But that force was destroyed or captured; over 7,000 Communist soldiers were taken prisoner. In 1950, a 15,000-man assault was repulsed. On August 23,1958, the Chinese Communists again launched shelling on Kinmen. Within the course of six weeks, the Communists had fired on the Kinmen complex with more than 500,000 shells. Civilian houses, schools and hospitals were bombed indiscriminately. While these Communist atrocities brought many a hardship to the local people, they did not succeed in bringing Kinmen to its knees. On the contrary, the barbarism had cemented the determination of the civilians and the armed forces to resist the inhuman Communist attacks.
The pictures present before the readers the scrap-piles of collected duds and metal from exploded shells, and their consequences: the wrecked schools, the damaged houses, the wounded mothers, the disabled children and the mourning orphans sobbing amidst the ruins.
But these pictures also show the recovery of Kinmen from the war scourges. Tourists have seen the newly-built houses and heard the singing of the school children. Farmers are busy with their land, fishermen engaged with the sea catches. It seems that the war is over, but something has been left. That is the indelible crime of the Communists and the undaunted spirit of the populace to resist aggression.
The author answers for the world the question: Why the free Chinese hold so dearly this thirteen-and-a-half square miles island?
Kinmen is an observation post opposite Taiwan, overlooking the Chinese mainland. As long as it is in the hands of the Republic of China, it will preclude Communists from operating Amoy as a military base. Further, while a strong free China garrison is stationed in Kinmen, invasion can be prevented. As the author indicates, Kinmen force would threaten the rear of the Chinese Communists and could even launch counter-landing on the mainland. Moreover, there is a compelling reason for defending Kinmen at any cost, a reason known by all Chinese, from those who are free to those deprived of their freedom, from the lowliest beggar to the dictator of the Red regime, from the overseas Chinese in London to the Chinese living in New York. Kinmen is symbolic of the fact that free China is technically and legally in control of the vast expanse of the Chinese territory and its multitudinous population.
As Mr. Munson says, the people of Kinmen are not afraid of the Communists. They have fought off invasions. They have taken saturation shellings. They are confident that they, and the thousands of soldiers who share their villages and farms, can hold the island stronghold against military attack. They do not falter. None seeks to evacuate the island. This is their home; their land; their life. Their only fear is America .... and whether or not it will stand firm. A 17-year-old school-boy summed it up in one wonderfully direct question: "Since the shells hit only us, why should the Americans give in to Mao?"
The author further logically adds: as the British would not give Hongkong to Mao, nor would Americans cede Manhattan, why should the free Chinese evacuate Kinmen, which is a symbol closely watched by every Asian on the face of the globe?
Mr. Munson concludes by pleading: "There are men, in very high places in Western governments, including our own (the United States) who speak of surrendering these people and their homeland. The shameful immorality of such intrusion into the lives and affairs of free allies does not influence them."
This book is a strong argument against the under-current of giving up this island for promise, not of peace, but of Communist condescension to negotiate. Also, it is an eloquent argument to espouse the cause of these people and all freedom-loving peoples of the world.
The writer impresses the readers: Kinmen is like some huge pre-historic animal, capable of enduring the terrible injuries, mangled and bleeding from many wounds, and yet preserving its life and movement.
Mr. Munson will not mind a slight typographical correction of his book: Historically, Matsu is a part of Chekiang Province, not Sinkiang Province, as was printed under the caption, 'Fisherwomen going to collect oysters.'