One of the reasons attributed to the U. S. move to establish diplomatic relations with Outer Mongolia is that the latter is now a bone of contention between Soviet Russia and the Chinese Communists, and that by establishing diplomatic relations with Outer Mongolia, the United States will be able to drive a wedge between the two. This may be good enough for wishful thinkers, but we have reason to believe that the Communist countries would not be so easily misled by so obvious an intent of the United States. In our opinion, instead of alienating the Chinese Communists from their Soviet brother, this will draw the two closer as a result of the presence of a common enemy in Outer Mongolia.
The disadvantage of such a diplomatic move is so clear that we hardly need to refer to the official statements on Outer Mongolia issued on June 9 by the spokesman of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Even some unbiased Western observers were quick to see the harmful effect, which it would have upon the relations between the United States and free countries in Asia. The U. S. move indicates that the United States, in spite of her assurances dispensed by Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson during his recent tour in the Far East, is far from sure of her own stand. There is indeed little to reconcile between Mr. Johnson's words and the present U. S. move to make diplomatic contact with Outer Mongolia.
As water cannot coexist with fire, neither can the solidarity of the free world with Outer Mongolia. The United States cannot have both at the same time. In contrast to Mr. Johnson’s trip in the Far East, which was intended to strengthen the solidarity of the free nations in Asia, the present U. S. move toward Outer Mongolia will only sow seeds of distrust among the free Asian nations toward the United States. Whatever may be the gains of the United States from its establishment of diplomatic relations with Outer Mongolia, it is full of risks and uncertainty. On the other hand, as the loss of friendship with the free countries in Asia will be instantaneous and real, it is rather difficult to understand why the United States needs to trade a sure friendship with the free world for uncertain diplomatic ties with a Red satellite. Moreover, how would she explain it to her own people if the goodwill of the United States were not properly reciprocated by Outer Mongolia because of opposition by its masters in the Kremlin and the Forbidden City of Peiping?
In regard to the question of Outer Mongolia's admission to the United Nations, we must not fail to see that the prerequisites for any country to be admitted to the United Nations are, according to the United Nations Charter, first, it must be an independent state, and second, it must be peace-loving.
Outer Mongolia has fulfilled neither of the two conditions. The consistent stand of the Republic of China on Outer Mongolia's admission to the United Nations is that we are opposed to any package deal in the admission of new members to the United Nations. Our view is that all applications for membership should be considered on a country-to-country basis. Nothing indeed is more contradictory to the letter and spirit of the U.N. Charter than the so-called package deal, which is reminiscent of the days of secret diplomacy between the Great Powers at the expense of the interests of the lesser ones.
The real import of a package deal is that the qualified applicant countries would be barred from entry into the United Nations because of the Soviet use of its veto power unless the unqualified satellites of Soviet Russia are also admitted. To resort to package deal means that the United Nations has failed to abide by its principles. This is worse than secret diplomacy and is, in fact, a new form of international blackmail.
If the substitution of idealism by realism is so complete that the majority of member nations including the free world nations headed by the United States have voted for the Mauritania-Outer Mongolia proposal, then we cannot but strongly doubt if there is still any need for the United Nations and if a United Nations of this character could be of any use in promoting peace and security of the world. If the Mauritania-Outer Mongolia proposal should be accepted, then the situation of the United Nations would be just like the story told in the Bible that the dealers in cattle, sheep and pigeons turned the holy temple of God in Jerusalem into an indecent market. For the peace and sacredness of the United Nations, may we pray that Jesus Christ shut the door of the United Nations to those pseudo-states whose presence in the United Nations would only precipitate war and bring calamity to the whole world.
The Theory of “Residual Sovereignty”
The joint communiqué issued after the meeting on June 20-21 between U.S. President John F. Kennedy and Japanese Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda declared that Japan retains "residual sovereignty" over the Ryukyu islands and that the United States welcomes Japanese cooperation in her efforts to enhance the welfare and well-being of the Ryukyus. In the meantime, it is reported that the U.S. authorities on the Ryukyu islands have permitted the people there to hoist the Japanese flag on public holidays.
There is certainly no need to employing such a problematic term as "residual sovereignty" in the communiqué, especially in view of the fact that the Ryukyu islands were under the suzerainty of China for a period of more than five hundred years extending from 1372 to 1879. If there should be any residual sovereignty, the Republic of China would have a better claim to it than Japan.
We are more inclined to believe in the theory of the indivisibility and integrity of the sovereignty of state. Once sovereignty over a territory is renounced by a state as a result of its defeat in war, the renouncement should be irrevocable and complete. There is no such term as "residual sovereignty" in international law or in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1952. It should be emphasized that the arrangements of the Peace Treaty with Japan were based on the terms of the Cairo Declaration of November 25, 1943 and the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945. According to the two Declarations, the Ryukyus as well as other islands outside the four Japanese home islands must remain beyond Japan's sovereignty.
The "residual sovereignty" theorists may argue that none of the articles in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1952 has expressly provided that Japan has renounced her right, title and claim to the Ryukyu islands such as she did to Taiwan, the Pescadores, the Kurile Islands, etc. They contend that all that Japan has agreed regarding the Ryukyus under the San Francisco Peace Treaty is that she will concur in any U.S. proposal to place the Ryukyus under the U.N. trusteeship system with the United States as the sole administering authority. Therefore, pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, though the United States has the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, they maintain that Japan still retains latent sovereignty or the so-called residual sovereignty over the Ryukyu islands.
Those advocating this theory, however, should not forget that the San Francisco Peace Treaty is based upon the Potsdam Declaration and that the Republic of China is not a signatory of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Even according to the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan has agreed to place the Ryukyu Islands under the United Nations' trusteeship system and from the moment the United States has begun to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the Ryukyu islands, Japan has already abandoned her sovereignty over those islands. Moreover, according to the Instrument of Surrender signed by Japan in Tokyo Bay on September 2, 1945, Japan explicitly declared that "we hereby undertake for the Emperor, the Japanese Government and their successors to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration in good faith and to issue whatever orders and take whatever action may be required by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the purpose of giving effect to that Declaration."
It is, therefore, beyond any doubt that Japan has from the moment of her surrender abandoned her title, right and claim to the Ryukyu islands. If there should be any residual sovereignty of Japan over the Ryukyu islands, it is not because Japan has any right to claim it but because the United States has fondly thought that she may draw Japan closer to her by kindling Japan's hope of repossessing the Ryukyu islands.
"A Bone in Soviet Russia’s'Throat”
The Berlin issue, as Nikita S. Khrushchev said, is "a bone in Soviet Russia's throat". From his viewpoint it is not without good reason that he should make every endeavor to remove it. For the explanation of Khrushchev's latest cry over Berlin, the following reasons may be given:
First, West Berlin has been for years the haven of discontented East Germans and since 1945, according to the June 16 issue of the Time magazine, some 14,000,000 East Germans-almost one fourth of East Germany's entire present population - have fled to the West. Among them are 16,000 trained engineers, 16,500 primary and secondary school teachers, 5,107 doctors, dentists and veterinarians. Two-thirds of them have been workers and peasants who are the mainstay of the Communists. It is a big leak in the Iron Curtain and the exodus constitutes a constant drain on East Germany's manpower. Because of the shortage of labor, Pankow has failed to live up to the Soviet plan that East Germany should play the role of being the center of production and trade to meet the European countries inside the Iron Curtain.
Second, it is not unlikely that Khrushchev reckoned that tension thus created in Berlin would at least serve the Soviet purpose of diverting the United States' attention from Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America. It will be a crucial test of the experience and tenacity of the new American president, and is a part of the Soviet consistent plan to discredit the United States in the eyes of the free world. On the outcome of the Berlin controversies will be based Khrushchev's cold-war strategy for the future. The game is certainly worthwhile because there will be no risk of war in any way. If the United States puts up a strong stand, he could always back down in time.
Third, Khrushchev might have thought that at this moment when the foreign policy of the Kennedy administration is still in the making, he will have a chance to sell to the West the idea of turning Berlin into a "free city." By means of repeated war-like pronouncements, he thought he might frighten one or more of the Western allies into retreat in the hope of isolating the others, thus weakening the Western stand on Berlin.
On the other hand, the United States and her Western allies, despite Soviet threat and intimidation, have shown their determination to maintain the status quo of Berlin and preserve their legal rights there. They have made military plans to resist any pressure, which may be brought to bear upon them in Berlin.
In view of this firm stand on the part of the Western nations, it is expected that Soviet Russia will be intelligent enough to stop in time her aggressive gestures on Berlin. This once again proves that Communist encroachment on any free territory can only be checked by the will and determination to resist aggression on the part of the free nations.