Allen S. Whiting and General Sheng Shih-tsai.
Michigan State University Press, East Lansing, Michigan,
1958. 301 pp. US$5.00
Reviewed by Geraldine Fitch
This book, divided into two parts, consists of Allen Whiting's analysis of Soviet strategy in Sinkiang (1933-49) and General Sheng Shih-tsai's condensed autobiography under the title: "Red Failure in Sinkiang."
Dr. Whiting is remembered in Taiwan for two articles in the Saturday Evening Post: one on the adjustment of the Chinese prisoners of the Korean War who chose freedom on Taiwan; and a second, entitled "Mystery Man of Formosa", about General Chiang Ching-kuo. Whiting is primarily a professor of political science and a research scholar; his book therefore has the advantage of careful documentation where possible, and careful evaluation where conclusive proof is unavailable. Reference notes at the end of each chapter, index, glossary, appendices, maps and bibliography make it a carefully annotated work. In its preparation, Dr. Whiting had the cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Sheng Shih-tsai, former governor of Sinkiang, made his autobiography available for translation (under the auspices of Asia Foundation.) Personal or political references in General Sheng's story, irrelevant to the context of the book, were deleted, and relevant material gleaned from personal interviews with him in Taiwan was incorporated.
The book is an analysis of Soviet strategy, with the following three related problems given secondary consideration: (1) Tokyo's efforts to penetrate Inner Asia and the interplay between the Japanese and Moslems to this end in Sinkiang; (2) the relationship between Stalin and Mao, with Sinkiang's capital of Tihua (Urumchi) serving as a vital line of communication between the two; (3)Sheng's swing from the Communist orbit into that of National China made the Chinese government anxiously aware of the Sinkiang problem at a time when Chungking was beset with wartime problems.
Unfortunately, although the book deals with Soviet Communist strategy, the author makes no differentiation between pro-Communist and non-Communist sources of information. He is quite explicit about the "protective coloration" of General Sheng, Kuang Lu and others who, he admits, had to make certain political shifts "if they were to survive"; but on the other hand gives his readers no hint of the pro-Communist proclivities of an Owen Lattimore or a Sol Adler. Similarly, on the basis of a report by Wong Wen-hao, then Minister of Economics for China (but now in the Communist regime) to John Carter Vincent, then in the US Embassy of Chungking, he concludes that not all informed people were of one mind about the desirability of ending all Soviet activity in Sinkiang. But he does not add, in text or notes, that both of these men were favorable to Communists.
It is interesting to note that as early as 1934, when the Japanese charge d' affaires, Counsellor (surely "Councillor" is in error) Wakasugi pressed President Chiang for an explanation of Russian influence in Sin kiang,
Chiang said "The situation in Sinkiang is an international problem in which communization will cause serious effects on other nations. I am trying to separate this district from Soviet influence, but unfortunately my country is too occupied with Japanese relations." That was a double-barreled reply for the Japanese official, and points up the two-fold problem which Sinkiang posed for the Republic of China.
The Japanese attack on China in 1937 brought about rapprochement between the Soviet Union and National China. Sinkiang became the invaluable pipeline for aid from Moscow to Chungking. But I found no place where the author pointed out that China had to "pay through the nose" for Russia's aid. He does make plain that behind the facade of what was known as the "United Front", Soviet strategy continued to work to the disadvantage of the Republic of China. Stalin kept the Chinese Communists on their Long March from retreating into Sin kiang, not so much because of the majority of non-Chinese races (Uighurs, Kirghiz, Turkis, Kazakhs and Tungans), but rather to enhance Russian Communist influence in the province.
In all this, Sinkiang's pivotal role precluded maintaining the province as a closed sphere of influence. Sheng's drift to the left was accelerated by the "United Front" also. It was correct at this time for him to be friendly with both Moscow and Yenan, at the same time giving official obeisance to Chiang Kai-shek and Chungking. He finally expressed his desire to become a member of the Chinese Communist Party. But if he became subservient, to the Yenan Communists, it would have lessened his subservience to Moscow, and increased Chinese Communist influence in Sinkiang. This Stalin did not want. Therefore, though his application for membership apparently won approval in Yenan, it was personally vetoed by Stalin, who enrolled Sheng in the Russian Communist Party.
In his autobiographical part of the book, Sheng says that only by joining with the Kuomintang against Japan could the Chinese Communists win any measure of support from the Chinese people. He goes further: "Had Japan not struck China at this very time, forcing a national emergency which brought surface unity within the country, and between China and Russia as well, Mao Tse-tung might well have been summoned to Moscow or purged from the party, as had all his predecessors, so total appeared the failure of his policies."
Sinkiang, on the other hand, according to Governor Sheng, gave hope to "all the genuinely progressive and liberal reform groups in China",—partly because of his "Six Point" policy, partly due to the routing of the fascist-imperialist plotters (the Japanese and the Russians), the harmony between diversified races, and the programs of socialist welfare.
Stalin had kept the Moslem Ma Chung-ying in reserve to limit Governor Sheng's power; he had vetoed Sheng's membership in the CCP to limit Yenan's role in Sinkiang. During the uprising, Russia helped the rebels up to a point, then mediated with the Nationalists, lest Ili become too powerful. In this sense, Sinkiang was a pawn of Russia's policy of divide and rule. Russia sought a major role for Soviet influence, even on the eve of Chinese Communist conquest, when (reportedly Soviet officials in Urumchi dickered with the nearly defeated Nationalist general (at a price) to ensure Russian rather than Chinese Communist influence in the province which the Republic of China was losing. The Nationalist general, unwilling to capitulate and unable to evacuate, let those of his men who so desired flee to Taiwan, while he and the others surrendered to the Communists. By this time, General Sheng was no longer governor, and no longer Communist. Fed up with Soviet perfidy, he had returned to the nationalist fold in 1942.
THE BLACK BOOK ON RED CHINA
by Edward Hunter
The Bookmailer, New York 1958, 172 pages $2
Reviewed by Hang Chow
This is a record of the black deeds of the Chinese Communists. Never has there been a group of men who had done so much harm to their fellow countrymen and the people of the neighboring countries in so short a time. In the words of the author: "Criminals have always been among us, but never before has crime been made a system of ethics and employed as fundamental government policy for political and aggressive purposes."
Rightly the book begins with the Chinese Communist aggression against the surrounding countries. These include, in addition to Vietnam and Korea, Indonesia, Burma, Philippines, Malaya, Japan, Thailand- -in short, every country in Asia. Of these, Burma needs special mention, for she is the most deluded and the most pathetic case vis-a-vis the Chinese Communists. She was the first Asian country to recognize the Peiping regime. But recognition brought her no peace. Instead she was rewarded by the Chinese Communists with continuous guerrilla warfare and invasion of the borders.
While the whole world seems to be anxious to have trade with the Chinese Communists, it may not be uninteresting to see how their slave labor operates. The number of slave laborers in the Chinese mainland is variously estimated between 20,000,000 and 50,000,000. A total of 20,000,000 workers in corvee labor, working on government conservancy projects alone, was admitted by Red China in 1953 in its People's Handbook published by the newspaper Ta Kung Pao.
One of the evil devices used by the Chinese Communists to force slave laborers to work at a frenzied pace is the deferred death sentence. This is to condemn a person accused of treason, or counterrevolutionary activities, or lesser crimes to death and then commute his sentence to a specified or unspecified period of "reform by labor," as slave labor is euphemistically called. If later the work of the slave laborer should prove unsatisfactory, his case would be reopened and he may be executed forthwith. "A prisoner who is condemned to death become momentarily grateful for the imposition of a slave labor sentence - it saves his life. He is expected to exert his all, in terror, while being constantly reminded that he is living on borrowed time."
It may be argued that there would not be enough people to be hailed before the court with charges of treason or counterrevolutionary activities. But this is exactly what Hunter is trying to prove. He shows that there are continuing revolts on the Chinese mainland. This is the result of the universal hatred for the Red bosses. The Reds are hated by the exploited workers and farmers and by people of all religious faiths. With their slipshod way of handling criminal suspects, the Communists can hail anyone before the court on trumped-up charges. No wonder the prison and slave camps are filled.
The skill of the author is shown by the fact that he obtains his material mainly from Red sources. Non-Communist sources have only been utilized on such matters as drug traffic. By using the Communists own words, Hunter builds up his case against the Chinese Communists and anyone who reads through these pages will condemn them for their wanton aggression abroad and their maniacal oppression and genocide at home, for their exploitation of the workers and for their attempt to poison people of other countries by narcotics.
He will then naturally come to the same conclusion as the author, namely, that the Peiping regime should not be admitted into the United Nations. It should not be admitted on the ground of universality, for otherwise all the articles in the United Nations Charter would have to be scrapped. Its admission would make a mockery of those provisions in the United Nations Charter relating to the rights and freedom of man. It does not represent the 600 million Chinese people but could only misrepresent them. "Unless the U. N. were fitfully blind to each of its basic principles." the author rightly concludes. "Red China cannot be considered for membership."