On May 24, 1957, unlawful elements among a crowd protesting the acquittal of M/Sgt Robert G. Reynolds by a United States Court-Martial the day before, broke into the premises of the United States Embassy and, the United States Information Service in Taipei and caused damage to their properties. The Government immediately ordered the agencies responsible for law and order to enforce measures to put down the disturbances and expressed to the Government of the United States through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs its profound regrets and agreement to compensate for property losses. The Executive Yuan also reiterated its determination to further secure law and order and to protect foreign nationals residing in this country.
On May 25, an emergency meeting was called by the Executive Yuan to discuss problems concerning the unfortunate incident. The Ministry of National Defense and other related agencies were ordered to conduct a thorough investigation of the incident and submit factual reports on their findings. The following report is compiled from such reports submitted to the Executive Yuan as of June 11 by the Ministries of National Defense and Foreign Affairs and other agencies for presentation to the Legislative Yuan and for publication.
Contents
I. The Case of M/Sgt Reynolds Shooting Liu Tze-jan to Death
II. Outbreak and Subsiding of the Incident
1. Time
2. Location of the Incident
3. Cause of the Riots
4. The Riots and Actions Taken by Public Security Forces
5. The Nature of the Incident
III. Measures Taken During and Immediately After the Incident
1. Measures Taken by the Executive Yuan
2. Measures Taken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs J. Measures Taken by the Ministry of National Defense
IV. Review of the Handling of the Incident
V. Disposal of Persons Arrested in Connection with the Incident
VI. Conclusions
1. The Case of M/Sgt Reynolds Shooting Liu Tze-Jan to Death
In the evening of March 20, 1957, Chinese citizen Liu Tze-jan, male, 33, native of Kiangsu, typist of the Yangmingshan Training Institute and residing at the Institute's dormitory at Yangmingshan, was shot twice and killed by M/Sgt. Robert G. Reynolds in front of Reynolds' residence at B-2 FSDA, Yangmingshan. The Yangmingshan Police Station received a telephone call from Yao Li-mei, Reynolds' maid servant, at about 2350 hours, reporting the killing. Thereupon, Foreign Affairs Police Officer Han Chia-li proceeded to the scene, arriving there at about the same time as Sgt. E. R. McJunkins of the American Military Police.
According to Reynolds' first statement made to Officer Han Chia-li, at about 2345 hours when he was already in bed, Mrs. Reynolds came out of the bathroom and told him that someone was peeking in through the bathroom window. He took out a revolver and went out through the backdoor and went around the house to the front of the house B-2. Upon discovering a man clinging to the outside of the bathroom window and looking in, Reynolds shouted to him in Chinese: "Teng I Teng (wait a minute)". When he heard the voice, the man jumped down from the window and, crouched, walked toward Reynolds to a spot about 1 meter from Reynolds, holding high in his left hand a stick and attempting to attack. Reynolds shot him in the chest in self-defense. The man turned to the side and, having run several steps, fell to the ground on the side of the cement pavement. Reynolds then turned and headed for the house along the pavement, intending to telephone the police. After walking more than ten steps, Reynolds saw the man rising from the ground with his hands holding his chest and apparently intending to flee. Thereupon, Reynolds shot him the second time. When the man fled toward the park, Reynolds returned to the house and telephoned the police.
Officer Han, together with Reynolds and others, searched the park and discovered the victim of the shooting already dead, with his head toward the direction of the house and his feet toward the park, who was later identified as Liu Tze-jan.
Procurator Lo Pi-ta of the Taipei District Court was notified at 0800 hours of March 21 of the incident and was requested to proceed to the scene to take charge of the investigation. Through Chang Han-kuang, Chief, 5th Section (Foreign Affairs), Taiwan Provincial Police Administration, Lt. Col. T. L. Salonick, Provost Marshal of MAAG, was requested to come to the scene for discussion regarding cooperative effort to conduct investigation and to make other necessary arrangements. Procurator Lo Pi-ta arrived at Yangmingshan Police Station about 1015 hours. Also present were Chang Han-kuang; Li Pao-chu, Chief, CID, TPPA; Huang Ke-tung, Supervisor, CID; Lo Chung-hsien, Chief, Aliens Section, CID; Yeh Chao-chu, Medical Examiner, CID; Ho Chi, Chief Supervisor, Yangmingshan Police; Lt. Col. Salonick; Lt. J. Davey, PRO, Taiwan Defense Command; and others. As it was necessary to wait for Reynolds, Procurator Lo did not arrive at the scene for on-the spot investigation until about 1330 hours. The medical examiner' conducted preliminary check of the body and took photographs and arranged to have the body transported to the TPPA headquarters for detailed examination. The procurator questioned Reynolds who was then taken back by the American Military Police.
After subsequent questioning of various witnesses and necessary investigation, the Procurator came to the conclusion that Reynolds' claim of self-defense could not be established. For example, the stick alleged to have been held in Liu Tze-jan's left hand for attacking Reynolds was, according to Reynolds' statement, about 3 feet long and 1 inch in diameter. Diligent search of the areas near the scene did not result in the discovery of a stick of such descriptions. Only a cherry tree branch about 2 feet long and of the diameter of a thumb was discovered by the American Military Police and, at the time of its discovery, there were dew-like water drops on it and no sign of having just been handled by hands. Another point to be noted is the fact that, judging by the powder burns evidenced around the bullet holes, both shots were fired at close range not exceeding 30 cm. Together with the statements by Yao Li-mei and others regarding the time-lapse between the two shots, this would indicate that Reynolds fired the two shots almost consecutively. Still another point is that Liu Tze-jan must have lost all his strength to resist after he had been shot at close range in his vital organs the first time and fallen on the ground. Nevertheless, Reynolds shot him in his vital organs the second time, precipitating his death. All these would indicate that Reynolds killed wilfully and not properly in self-defense.
The result of the investigation was communicated by the Procurator's Office of the Taipei District Court to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a report dated April 10, together with the fatal weapon and other articles of evidence, for transmittal to the American Embassy.
As members of the MAAG constitute a part of the United States Embassy, in accordance with the provisions of exchange of notes effected in 1951 when U. S. Military Aid was accepted, and therefore enjoy diplomatic immunity, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through its director of the department concerned, informed a representative of the American Embassy on the morning of March 22 the government's concern over the case of the shooting and requested the American Embassy to urge the MAAG authorities to conduct investigation and trial in a just manner at an early date. The Embassy was also requested to order all American military personnel not to fire their guns unless in case of absolute necessity for self-defense, in order that further cases of unnecessary killing may be prevented and friendly co-operation between Americans and Chinese preserved. The American Embassy representative stated that the U. S, authorities also took the case seriously and considered its occurrence as most unfortunate. He requested the co-operation of the Chinese authorities in investigating the case and promised to take necessary action in dealing with the case.
The American Embassy was requested also by Mrs. Liu Ao Teh-hwa, widow of Liu Tze-jan, to take necessary steps to have Reynolds punished in accordance with law.
On March 26, when it was reported that the MAAG authorities were inclined to recognize Reynolds' act of shooting as proper self-defense and therefore not subject to legal action, Mr. Shen Chang-huan, acting Foreign Minister, called U. S. Ambassador Karl L. Rankin to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and formally reiterated the Government's concern over the case and requested him to direct the MAAG authorities to put Reynolds on trial by court-martial. He emphasized the importance of determining the right and wrong of the parties concerned in the case and warned against treating the matter lightly. Ambassador Rankin expressed his regret over the incident and agreed to do his utmost to consult the military for a satisfactory arrangement.
On March 28, the director of the department concerned of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in another interview with a representative of the American Embassy, informed him that, as a result of the preliminary investigation, police had reasons to believe that Reynolds' act of shooting Liu Tze-jan to death exceeded the proper limits of self-defense. The Director told him that as soon as the entire investigation was completed by the Procurator's Office of the Taipei District Court, a complete report of the investigation would be made available to the American authorities to serve as reference for the prosecution of Reynolds. The Embassy representative was also asked to arrange for the MAAG to take Reynolds into custody pending trial and was urged to remind the MAAG authorities to place themselves in the position of police and prosecutors, instead of defense counsel, in dealing with the case. The representative of the American Embassy stated that the MAAG authorities, in the absence of any evidence of the act not being in self-defense, were constrained under law only to restrict Reynolds' movements between his residence and office. He again requested the Chinese authorities to submit as soon as possible their report of investigation and articles of evidence to enable American authorities to take further action.
The report of investigation by the Procurator's Office of the Taipei District Court mentioned above was sent to the American Embassy by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on April 12, together with an English translation and article of evidence. In the accompanying memorandum, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reaffirmed its previous verbal request that U. S. military authorities take effective steps for the trial of Reynolds in a just and expeditious manner.
The decision of the American military authorities to court-martial Reynolds on a charge of voluntary manslaughter was not announced until May 14. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was formally informed by the American Embassy on May 15 that the trial was scheduled to begin on May 20 and was requested to send official observers to witness the proceedings. Four such observers were dispatched jointly by the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Procurator's Office of the Taipei District Court.
According to the report of the official observers, during the court-martial, which began on the morning of May 20 and continued on May 21 and May 22, various witnesses as well as character witnesses for the defense were put on the stand and the entire court twice proceeded to the scene of crime to ascertain various factors involved in the case, in particular the degree of illumination of the scene at night. At 0830 hours on the fourth day, May 23, when the trial was resumed, the Trial Counsel and the Defense Counsel began their debate. The Defense Counsel emphatically contended that Reynolds fired the gun in self-defense. The Trial Counsel pointed out that whether Liu Tze-jan was in the act of peeping could not be definitely proved in the absence of any witness and that, in twice shooting Liu Tze-jan in his vital organs without having given warning first, Reynolds obviously committed the crime wl1fully and should therefore be pronounced guilty of voluntary manslaughter as charged. After the debate, the Law Officer instructed the members of the court on the points of law, in accordance with which the defendant may be pronounced guilty or not guilty. The court was adjourned at 1100 hours and the members of the court retired for deliberation. At 1300 hours the proceedings were resumed and the Law Officer announced the verdict of the members of the court which acquitted Reynolds of the charge of voluntary manslaughter. Upon the announcement, there was a burst of applause by the American spectators present in the court. Throughout the trial, the manner in which the Trial Counsel questioned the defendant and handled evidence often left the people with the impression of being far from thorough. The applauding demonstration by the American spectators, after the verdict was announced, also proved hard to understand for the Chinese people. The announced result of the trial immediately gave rise to widespread resentment among people of all walks of life.
II. Outbreak And Subsiding of the Incident
(1) Time: May 24, 1957 1000 to 2400 hours
(2) Location of the Incident: The American Embassy in Taipei is located at the western end of Chung Cheng Road in the vicinity of one of the most crowded sections of the city, and near Chunghua Road and Central Market in the busy West Gate district. It is also near the bus terminal where many pedestrians are usually present. The United States Information Service and the Sugar Building where some American offices are located are also situated in business districts southeast of the Embassy. (See Appendix A: a sketch showing the areas where the riots took place)
(3) Cause of the Riots: In the evening of March 20, 1957, at about 2340 hours, M/Sgt Robert G. Reynolds of MAAG shot a Chinese citizen, Liu Tze-jan, twice and killed him. On May 23, when the United States Court-Martial pronounced Reynolds not guilty, there was induced a strong resentment among the Chinese population and the press also expressed dissatisfaction with the verdict. In the morning of the 24th at about 1000 hours, Liu's widow, Liu Ao Teh-hua, appeared outside the gate of the American Embassy to stage her protest. At about this time, the all clear had just sounded at the end of an air raid practice and people were heading for the market nearby. A crowd was gradually forming and, moved by the sight, becoming angry in its mood. Under such circum stances, the crowd went beyond the control of reason and, led by a few unruly elements, committed lawless acts as a blind mob.
(4) The Riots and Actions Taken by Public Security Forces:
A. Damage Inflicted on the American Embassy
1. In the morning of May 24 at about 1000 hours, Liu Tze-jan's widow, Liu Ao Teh-hua, accompanied by Liu's cousin named Feng Yuen-sheng, manager of the Far Eastern Travel Service, appeared in front of the American Embassy to protest. She carried a poster on which were written in English the words: "The Killer—Reynolds is Innocent? Protest against U.S. Court-Martial Unfair Unjust Decision." Underneath' were written in Chinese the characters: "Killer not guilty? I accuse. I protest." Passers-by watched and reporters, both Chinese and foreign, also came. At 1020 hours Chief Inspector Hsuan Shan-yu of the Taipei Municipal Police took 22 policemen to the scene and tried to persuade the widow to leave; but she refused. By this time there were three or four hundred in the crowd looking on, beginning to show signs of resentment. At 1040 hours, after having returned to the Municipal Police Headquarters and made his report, Hsuan, accompanying his Chief Liu Kuo-hsien, went back to the Embassy with 35 more policemen to rein force the guard. About this time (1040 hours), Col. Chang Han-kuang, Chief of the 5th Section of the Taiwan Provincial Police Administration, also arrived to help persuade the mob to break up and the widow to leave, but in vain. The crowd shouted insults at the policemen. Mr. Karl Ackerman, member of the American Embassy, invited the widow to go into the Embassy for a 'talk but was refused by her. At 1140 hours, Hung Chin-tseng reporter of the Taiwan Broadcasting Station, brought a tape recording machine to the scene and made a record of his on-the-spot interview with the widow who sobbed while telling her story. The mob became more incensed. (This tape record was played back on the spot, but not broadcast by the station. Loren Fessler, American correspondent, arrived earlier, at about 1030 hours, also with a recording machine which did not make any record because it went out of order.)
2. When the Taipei Garrison Headquarters learned at 1215 hours that a noisy mob had gathered at the gate of the American Embassy and that the condition was becoming more serious, it at once directed the Taipei Municipal Police to use all their power to disperse the mob, cut off the approaches to the Embassy and insure the Embassy's safety. But both the police and the military police were ordinarily distributed widely as required for the maintenance of law and order in all parts of the city and could not be called to one spot all at once. Furthermore, an air raid practice was held on that day, during which civil and military police, having to take part, were more widely dispersed than usual. The result was that the Taipei Municipal Police and the Taipei Military Police could only dispatch a limited number of their men to the scene after receiving order for action. Some of the men had to guard the Embassy from within its compound, and the majority stayed outside to grapple with the mob. As there was a big square in front of the Embassy, it was difficult to block with a small force all the approaching streets and stop the onrush of humanity.
3. By 1330 hours or thereabout, the crowd had increased in size to more than two thousand people. The feelings had become more incensed. It was at this time of confusion that someone started throwing stones at the Embassy and the mob roared. Two men scaled the front wall and entered the Embassy compound. They were, however, soon driven out by the policemen on guard inside the compound. At this time, the Taipei Garrison Headquarters issued further orders to call out more military police and security police arid cadets of the Police Academy to reinforce the force already on the scene.
4. At 1420 hours, the number of people in front of the American Embassy increased to more than six thousand. The reinforcements of civil and military police and police cadets had not yet arrived. The police force on hand remained insufficient to impose effective control. Scores of people from the mob scaled the wall and broke down the gate. More people rushed in and forced entry into the buildings. The police, greatly outnumbered and anxious to avoid bloodshed, refrained from opening fire. No effective anti-riot weapons were available and the police did their utmost to stop the crowd by bare hands and by persuasion, but to no avail. The mob persisted in rushing into the Embassy buildings, breaking doors and window panes and upturning furniture and filing cabinets. Some per sons went to the length of lowering the American flag and tearing it to pieces, and took a Chinese flag from the Embassy and raised it.
At about 1500 hours, Lo Kan, Chief of the Taiwan Provincial Police Administration, arrived at the scene and made an unfruitful appeal to the mob through a loud-speaker and in vain fired warning shots in the air. At this time, 77 cadets from the Police Academy and 40 military police arrived and succeeded in chasing the mob out of the Embassy building. At about 1520 hours, a group of 54 students from the Cheng Kung High School paraded past the Embassy but did not stop. At the same time, someone in the crowd shouted the news that Reynolds had left Taiwan by air. The mob was now incensed to the boiling point. Despite the efforts of the civil and military police to stop them, the mob again rushed into the Embassy building and inflicted further damage to the contents. Fourteen automobiles of various sizes were overturned and damaged. At about 1600 hours, a company each of military police and security police arrived in succession and proceeded to clear the Embassy of the mob. But additional waves rushed in and some of the mob forced their way into the basement air-raid shelter, where eight members of the Embassy were in hiding. They were all escorted out by the police, though four of them were injured on their way out by the crazed mob. The injured were escorted by the police to the hospitals where they received first aid treatment and were sent to safety.
At 1635 hours, General Liu Wei, Commander of the Military Police, arrived at the head of a company of military police. He and Provincial Police Chief Lo Kan pleaded with the crowd to quiet down and disperse through a loudspeaker mounted on a truck and used the combined forces of the civil and military police to force the crowd to disperse. By 1700 hours, the mob inside the Embassy compound had been completely cleared. But the civil and military police still had to' grapple with the mob outside the Embassy.
At about 1900 hours, Foreign Minister Yeh and Ambassador Rankin came to look over the scene at the Embassy. Part of the crowd again became excited. Someone threw a stone at Minister Yeh and hit him, fortunately without causing injury. Under the protection of the civil and military police, Minister Yeh and Ambassador Rankin left in safety. Later, more units of civil and military police and of troops which had been participating in the air-raid exercises in the city's outskirts began to arrive. By 2100 hours, the crowd outside the Embassy had all been dispersed. Twenty-one men of the police were injured during the entire period.
B. Damage Suffered by USIS
Up to 1600 hours on May 24, the situation in front of the USIS building opposite the City Hall had remained quiet and normal. A small number of policemen were sent to guard the building. Unexpectedly, at about 1600 hours, crowds of people began to gather nearby and, by 1700 hours a crowd of some five thousand had gathered. Despite all the efforts by the police and a platoon of military police which came to reinforce, the mob, following the lead of some lawless elements, pushed forward and a minority of the crowd forced their way into the building to indulge in destruction. They also beat up policemen and firemen. At 1835 hours, two companies of troops arrived and helped the police clear the building of the mob. Nine policemen were injured during the fracas.
C. Attack on the Taipei Municipal Police Headquarters
Around 1800 hours, after the mob had sacked the USIS, someone in the crowd suddenly shouted that police had arrested some people. The mob of several thousands turned and rushed to the Municipal Police Headquarters nearby and demanded release of those arrested men and handing over of the Americans (seven) seeking protection there. The mob was held back for a while and, when the police tried to disperse the crowd with fire engines, the mob rushed on and attacked the firemen. The mob also succeeded in setting fire to the police garage, resulting in the burning of four motorcycles and the wrecking of five jeeps and fire engines. The firemen on the fire engines who tried to stop them with spurts of water were surrounded and rendered powerless by the mob. Meanwhile a large crowd rushed to the main building of the Police Headquarters and some proceeded to seize the arms held by the police. Foreign Affairs Police Officer Liu Chih was shot and fell on the ground. It was then that the police was compelled to open fire for self-defense and for the safety of the Americans seeking asylum inside and of the arms and ammunitions stored in the building. People in the front of the crowd pushed forward by those in the back found it impossible to retreat. Consequently many were injured both among the mob and among the police.
Around 1930 hours, the mob forced into the downstairs office of the Police Headquarters. The personnel inside retreated upstairs and held the mob at bay. At about 2040 hours three companies of troops arrived and lifted the siege. Loud-speakers mounted on trucks were used to persuade the crowd to leave. The: mob was not completely dispersed until 2300 hours. Thirty-two policemen and 11 civilians were injured, among whom an office boy of the Weather Bureau named Wu Mai-tao, who had set fire to a police car, died of his wounds after being admitted to the Taiwan University Hospital. At 2400 hours, the police escorted the seven Americans to their own homes.
D. Narrow Escape of the Sugar Building (Housing American Offices)
Around 1500 hours, a growing crowd appeared near the Sugar Building. Some of the cars belonging to the MAAG personnel and parked near the building were wrecked. By 1530 hours, the crowd increased to some two thousand people. Fortunately, two companies of military police and a squad of cadets from the Military Police Academy were rushed to the place in time. At 1800 hours, they were reinforced by another squad of Military Police cadets, and all the roads leading to the building were blocked. No untoward event took place. Sporadic disturbances broke out on Po Ai Road and Canton Street but they were brought under control by the civil and military police dispatched there.
(5) The Nature of the Incident
As mentioned before, the incident was touched off by the public resentment over the acquittal of Sergeant Reynolds by the United States Court-Martial. For the traditional Chinese concept of justice lays particular emphasis on punishment for acts of killing. When Liu Tze-jan was killed by two shots and the U.S. Court-Martial pronounced the killer to be not guilty, the general public reacted instinctively in accordance with this traditional concept. Even those who were versed in law were not satisfied with the verdict which, they believed, overlooked the fact that Reynolds had obviously gone beyond the limits of proper self-defense. When Liu's widow appeared in front of the Embassy to make her protest, the bystanders sympathetic with her became increasingly incensed and let their unreasoned emotion run amok. Up to the present, aside from the few lawless elements who took advantage of the public emotion and led the crowd astray on the spot, ' there has been discovered no planned or organized effort behind the incident. On the contrary, there are many indications that the incident was the result of an unpremeditated emotional outburst.
First, when Liu's widow and a few of her relatives and friends went to protect in front of the American Embassy, the first crowd was formed entirely of curious passers-by. When the crowd became larger, it attracted more people, especially those living in the neighborhood. When the news spread, even people living farther out came to watch. But when they reached the scene, all were affected by mob psychology and became a part of the mob. The snowballing of the mob in turn heightened the feelings of the components of the mob and finally precipitated the riots. But it should be said that without the widespread sense of resentment already existent among the crowd, no such incident could have been precipitated.
Secondly, once the mob psychology assert ed itself, the indignation and emotion of the people against Reynolds' acquittal developed unconsciously into a nationalistic sentiment which, under intentional or unintentional agitation, was further turned into a mental state of utter Unreasonableness. Under these circumstances, lawless elements taking advantage of the situation would naturally infiltrate and agitate. Emotionally aroused as they were at the moment, it was difficult for the crowd to realize that their emotions were being transformed into lawless acts.
Thirdly, it was fully three hours and a half from the time when Liu's widow first appeared in front of the American Embassy in protest against Reynolds' acquittal to the time when the first stones were hurled at the Embassy building. And it was four hours and twenty minutes to the timl1 when the crowd started breaking into the Embassy. If they were pre-arranged and organized, the riots would not have developed at such a slow pace. Judging from the areas of disturbances, it is also hard to consider the riots as planned or organized, as the mob actions were at first limited to the Embassy and did not spread to the USIS building until after 1600 hours. The fact that all American residences in or outside the city were left unmolested should also serve as a clear indication that the riots were not planned or organized.
Fourthly, a careful check on the background of the participants in the riots has revealed that among the eleven injured, their occupations range from office boys, salesclerks, pedicab drivers, printing shop workers, to editors, students, and trades people. Their places of birth include Taiwan, Fukien, Chekiang, Liaopei, and Kirin. Their age ranges from 16 to 46 and their places of abode are scattered far and wide. Among the suspects arrested, there are lower-level government employees, tailors, workers, drivers, farmers, trades people, office boys, peddlers, reporters, students, and a few unemployed. They come from many provinces of China and live in all parts of the city and their age ranges from 16 to 45. For all these people of different occupations, social status, age, places of birth and residences to organize themselves for the purpose of carrying out certain pre-arranged activities would be something impossible of achievement in a short period of time.
As to the students, they too were almost unanimously dissatisfied with the not guilty verdict in the Reynolds case. But the demonstration of their feelings was generally confined to voicing their opinions in speech or in writing. To prevent possible disturbances, both the Ministry of Education and the China Youth Corps took timely steps in collaboration with school authorities in advising the students on the subject and in channelling their feelings. The situation in the schools was, therefore, comparatively quiet. Fifty-four students of the Cheng kung High School for Boys left the school without authorization and staged a silent parade outside the Embassy carrying placards but neither shouting slogans nor stopping to join the mob. The students of the High School for Boys of the Provincial Normal University who did not live in Taipei, were, when let off in the afternoon, grouped together and escorted by their teachers to the Taipei Railway Station where they entrained for home. A number of the students who were unable to reach the school in the morning because of the air-raid practice, passed by the Embassy and stopped to watch. A few others passing by the Embassy at noon on their way home for lunch also stopped to watch the crowd. These students, out of curiosity at first and later under the spell of the mob psychology, followed the crowd into the Embassy and participated in their sense less acts of violence. These students had their book satchels with them and wore their school identifications and shoulder insignias. (All students of senior high school level and up are members of the China Youth Corps and wear its insignias on their sleeves.) This should serve to prove that the students' participation in the riots was not pre arranged or organized.
III. Measures Taken During and Immediately After the Incident
(1) Measures Taken by the Executive Yuan:
At about 1350 hours on May 24, the Executive Yuan received information from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the worsening situation resulting from the mob action in front of the American Embassy. The Ministry of National Defense was immediately directed to order all public security agencies to take early effective measures against unlawful acts. From then on, the Executive Yuan kept contact with and received the reports from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry on National Defense, the Government Information Office and other agencies concerned.
For more efficiently dealing with problems continuously arising, representatives of all agencies concerned remained in conference at the Executive Yuan until early hours of next morning.
At midnight, the President of the Executive Yuan issued the following statement:
"In the early part of this afternoon, in the midst of a spontaneous demonstration before the American Embassy in Taipei against the verdict of acquittal of M/Sgt Robert G. Reynolds of the MAAG, certain un-lawful elements, taking advantage of the occasion, succeeded in diverting the purpose of the demonstration and incited the crowd into committing a series of acts of violence. As a result, much damage was done to the properties of the United States Embassy and the United States Information Service, and several members of the Embassy staff as well as Chinese law enforcement officers were injured.
"The government strongly deplores such unlawful acts which are inimical to our national interest and detrimental to the long friendly relations between the United States and China.
"The government has now taken all necessary measures to restore law and order and will punish the perpetrators of such outrages. It reitperates its determination to' fulfill its responsibility for the protection of foreign nationals residing in this country.
"It is earnestly hoped that all our citizens will remain calm and law-abiding, so as not to cause distress to our friends and to give comfort to the enemy. Any further lawless conduct shall be severely dealt with in accordance with law."
(2) Measures Taken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
In view of the strong unfavorable reaction on the part of the general public which considered the not-guilty verdict in the Reynolds case as a miscarriage of justice, Foreign Minister Yeh called in Mr. James B. Pilcher, Charge d'Affaires of the American Embassy, at about 0930 hours in the morning, May 24, and informed him of the undesirable effect of the court-martial verdict and requested him to consider the possibility of a review or retrial of the case. The Charge d'Affaires stated that, so far as he knew, under American law a criminal case could not be appealed or retried once the defendant was acquitted, but that he would request information from the U. S. Government whether or not the same principle would apply to cases tried by court-martial. (Subsequently the American Embassy replied that, in accordance with the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 44 of the United Code of Military Justice, a defend ant in a criminal case, without his own consent, could not be tried twice for the same offense. Thus, neither appeal nor retrial is permissible.)
About noon of May 24, Chang Han-kuang, Chief of the 5th Section of the Taiwan, Provincial police Administration, came to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, re porting that the protest staged by Liu Tze-jan's widow in front of the American Embassy had already attracted a sizable crowd and might lead to untoward incidents. In reply to his enquiry as to the Ministry's views on how to handle the situation, the Ministry's representative told him two things. First, reinforcement of police must be sent for to guard the American Embassy and all efforts must be made to prevent anyone from forcing his way into Embassy premises. Secondly, outright force should not be used in trying to chase away Liu Tze-jan's widow and the crowd in order not to precipitate incidents, but more police should be dispatched to guard all the streets leading to the Embassy, so that people could be prevented from coming near the Embassy to join the crowd.
At about 1230 hours, the Ministry received a telephone report from Mr. Pilcher, the American Charge d'Affaires, on the increasingly worsening situation, requesting further police reinforcement for effective protection of the' Embassy. The request was immediately transmitted to the responsible officers of the Taiwan Provincial police Administration. At 1400 hours, the American Charge d'Affaires presented himself at the Ministry and reported that the mob was then breaking into the Embassy and destroying its contents, that 17 members and employees of the Embassy were hiding in the basement air-raid shelter and that the police at the scene did not seem to be taking any effective preventive measures. He urgently demanded immediate dispatching of contingents of police and troops large enough to prevent any attempt on the lives f the American personnel. Minister Yeh hereupon contacted by telephone various security agencies, requesting immediate reinforcement of security forces. The American Charge d'Affaires remained at the Ministry, maintaining contact with American personnel by telephone, and left the Ministry at about 1800 hours to return to his residence on North Chung Shan Road under an armed escort provided by the Ministry of National Defense.
At about 1800 hours, the Foreign Ministry received a report that Ambassador Rankin had arrived at the Sung Shan airport back from Hongkong. Minister Yeh contacted him by telephone and arranged for General Lai Min tang, Assistant Chief of General Staff, to escort him to the Ministry. Upon his arrival at the Ministry, Ambassador Rankin verbally lodged a protest and demanded apologies and compensation for losses. Immediately afterwards, Minister Yeh accompanied the Ambassador on a tour of the Embassy premises to inspect the actual conditions of destruction.
The same evening the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cabled Ambassador Hollington K. Tong at Washington, instructing him immediately to transmit to the U.S. Government the profound regret of the Chinese Government over the unfortunate incident which was the result of public resentment against the acquittal of M/Sgt Reynolds. Text of the message is as follows:
"The Chinese Government expresses its profound regret for the incident that occurred today at the American Embassy in Taipei and the resultant damage to the Embassy property and injuries sustained by some of the Embassy staff.
"The incident arose out of public demonstration against the verdict of acquittal by US Court-Martial of Sergeant Reynolds of MAAG for his shooting to death of Chinese citizen Liu Tze-jan on March 20. All appropriate measures are being taken for the protection of American lives and property in Taiwan. A number of arrests were made on the spot. Thorough investigation is being made with a view to further apprehending those directly involved. The Chinese Government will also take early steps jointly with the US Embassy in Taipei to ascertain the losses and damage caused by the incident."
In the afternoon, May 25, under the instruction of the U.S. Government, Ambassador Rankin confirmed by a formal note his verbal protest and demands made the previous evening. A formal reply was given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at 2000 hours in accordance with the decision by the emergency meeting of the Executive Yuan the same morning, expressing regret and assuming full responsibility to compensate the damage and losses suffered by the properties of the U.S. Government and of its personnel. The texts of the notes are as follows:
American Note
"Confirming my oral statement to you last night, I hereby record my formal protest, with the strongest possible emphasis, at yesterday's events in which the American Embassy Chancery and the United States Information Service in Taipei were wrecked by mobs. The slowness of the police in taking appropriate action to protect these premises and other American property is particularly blameworthy.
"On behalf of my Government I demand adequate apologies and full indemnification for the losses caused."
Chinese Note
"In reply to your note of today's date which you handed to my Political Vice Minister this afternoon, I have the honor to state that my Government accepts full responsibility for the losses caused to the properties of the United States Government and its personnel in Taipei during the unfortunate incident which took place yesterday. As already communicated to the Department of State by Ambassador Tong yesterday, the Ministry is prepared to initiate early steps together with the Embassy as early as possible in ascertaining the extent of such losses with a view to determining the amount of compensation to be made by the Chinese Government.
"On behalf of my Government, I wish to express again my profound sense of regret for the incident for which I am under instructions to tender my Government's sincere apologies."
"In so communicating to you the above, I wish to convey my Government's earnest hope that this regrettable incident will not in any way mar the long friendly relations that have existed between our two countries."
(3) Measures Taken by the Ministry of National Defense:
A. Beginning 0730 hours on May 24, the personnel of the Ministry of National Defense took part in the air-raid practice. Admiral G. John Ma, Deputy Minister, received a telephone call at about 1350 hours from Mr. Huang Shao-ku, Vice President of the Executive Yuan, to the effect that, according to a telephone report from Minister Yeh, the protest staged by Liu Tze-jan's widow in front of the American Embassy has attracted a large crowd which was attempting to break into the Embassy premises and that prompt measures should be taken to prevent worsening of the situation. Thereupon Deputy Minister Ma telephoned General Li Li-po of the Peace Preservation Headquarters and told him to order all security agencies to take necessary preventive measures. After visiting the areas near the Embassy, he reported in person to General Peng Meng-chi, Chief of General Staff, at about 1435 hours, on the actual situation he witnessed. General Peng had received a previous report from General Liu Wei, Commander of Military Police, at 1430 hours, and had directed General Liu to concentrate all available military police and place them at the disposal of General Huang Cheng-wu, Taipei Garrison Commander, for assisting in dispersing the mob and restoring order. General Peng also took the following actions:
1. General Huang of the Garrison Command was authorized to command all the police, security forces and military police in the Garrison area as well as the one division originally attached to the Garrison Command, and to take effective measures to disperse the mob and to afford protection to all American residents and American organizations and installations.
2. All the Headquarters of various forces were directed to order all troops stationed throughout the island to be on the alert and take precautionary measures for preventing the incident from extending to other areas and for insuring the safety of American personnel and organizations.
3. The Peace Preservation Headquarters was ordered to strengthen security measures throughout the island and was charged with the responsibility of securing information on the mob action.
B. At 1605 hours, for the purpose of strengthening the effort of the Taipei Garrison Command in securing all important areas, orders were given to the field forces stationed in the outskirts of Taipei and in nearby districts to proceed to Taipei by motor transport. Beginning from 1640 hours, 50 detachments of 40 men each started to arrive at the locations of various American military organizations and residences of American officials to take up guard duty. Patrol was conducted in the areas where Americans resided in order to prevent extension of mob movement.
C. At about 1800 hours, by order of the President of the Executive Yuan, it was announced that beginning 1900 hours martial law was to be strictly enforced in the Taipei area by the Taipei Garrison Command and curfew was to be enforced.
At the same time (1800 hours) two additional divisions and one battalion of armored infantry were ordered to proceed to Taiwan to be placed under the Taipei Garrison Command. They began to arrive from 2215 hours on. By the dawn of May 25, all deployment had been completed.
D. At 2400 hours, the Taiwan Defense Headquarters was directed to order all troops to strengthen the martial law enforcement, to give protection to American residents and other aliens, and to designate officers for the specific responsibility.
E. At 2300 hours, General Peng Meng-chi called a meeting at the Taipei Garrison Headquarters in which General Huang of the Taipei Garrison Command, General Li of the Peace Preservation Headquarters, General Liu of Military Police and General Lo Kan, Chief of Provincial Police, and others took part. General Peng directed as follows:
1. All the crowds were to be dispersed and law and order in the city restored by 2400 hours.
2. The curfew was to be enforced between 0000 hours and 0500 hours every night. The public was to be informed of the curfew through broadcast, newspaper notice and other means.
3. Patrol was to be effectively strengthened to insure the safety of foreign residents.
4. During performance of duty, all police, military police and troops were authorized to use arms for self-defense and for suppressing mobs, in accordance with Article 3 of the Regulations Governing the Use of Arms by Police and Article 21 of Military Police Service Regulations.
5. The spreading of rumors was to be effectively checked.
F. Law and order throughout the city was restored after 2400 hours.
IV. Review of the Handling of the Incident
Law and order in the Taiwan area has been exceedingly good during the past ten years. Under the normal conditions, the security organs have been fairly effective on the whole in making use of the forces at their disposal to carry out their routine duties. They were caught unawares by the recent incident. Having been accustomed to peacefulness for so long, the security personnel have become not only slack in their precautions but have also been deficient in experience and in equipment to deal with mob violence. Suddenly faced with the crisis, they were not alert enough. They acted slowly and the steps they took proved to be inadequate. As a result, the situation became more serious until it finally deteriorated into riots to the great detriment of our national honor. In reviewing the case, it is only natural that defects and shortcomings should be carefully studied so that corrective measures could be adopted. In the meantime, there is also the need for a brief account of the difficulties which our law-enforcement personnel experienced during the incident and also the efforts which they made for the protection of foreign nationals.
First, on the test to which the police force was subjected. The Taipei municipal police has a complement of 1,321. This includes all the policemen and officers in the headquarters, in the various stations, sub-stations and depots looking after traffic, criminal investigation, communications and other police details. The total reserve police force comprises a 74-men contingent whose regular duty, according to reports by the organs concerned, is also heavy. Of these only 35 men can be used as a mobile force in time of need. In other words, the Taipei city police force even in normal times lacks mobility, experience and training to cope with riots and does not possess necessary anti-riot weapons. It so happened that an air-raid exercise was scheduled for May 24. The entire police force originally attached to the various stations, sub-stations and depots received assignments in connection with the exercise, thereby making it extremely difficult to muster them. On the day of the incident, the actual strength of the police force became more scattered, therefore weaker, than it is usually the case. This was the true situation on the day of the incident.
On the eve of the deplorable incident, i.e., May 23, following the acquittal of M/Sgt Robert G. Reynolds by the U.S. Court-Martial, of the charge of voluntary manslaughter, the Taiwan Provincial Police Administration in view of the general dissatisfaction with the verdict and the indignation of the people at large, issued an order to all police in the northern part of the island at 1830 hours for them to afford special protection to areas where most foreign nationals reside. But no other more definite and more thorough preventive measures were taken. There seemed to be a general feeling that nothing untoward could happen to upset law and order in a generally stable environment. It is an undeniable fact that both the Taiwan Provincial police and the Taipei city police were not sufficiently vigilant and were negligent in the adoption of preventive measures.
When Liu Tze-jan's widow appeared before the U.S. Embassy to lodge her protest against the verdict, it was about 1000 hours on the morning of May 24. It was not until 1330 hours in the afternoon when the crowd became agitated and impulsive and began to stone the embassy building. During the long period from 1000 hours, all the crowd did was to voice their protest. As yet there was no action against law and order. At first, the crowd was a small one and most of the people in it were curious onlookers. As the protest continued, it attracted more and more people. If the police had employed all possible effective means during the three-hour period, or if its senior officers had used various methods to persuade Mrs. Liu to leave the scene and done their utmost to urge the crowd, then shouting in front of the embassy, to disperse, and if at the same time they had poured all available police reinforcements into the area to cordon it off from the adjacent streets and to do their very best resolutely to maintain law and order, the incident could have been averted, or to say the least, would not have developed from a protest" into "riots". According to what Mrs. Liu had said to the public, her protest stemmed from her "hope to obtain a reasonable settlement." Chang han-kuang, Chief of the 5th Section of the Taiwan Provincial Police suggested to Mr. Karl D. Ackerman, Second Secretary of the U.S. Embassy, at 1100 hours, that Mrs. Liu be asked in to make known her protest. He told Mr. Ackerman that Mrs. Liu wanted the Embassy to provide her with a firm assurance that, before a reasonable settlement was reached, Sergeant Reynolds should not be permitted to leave Taiwan. It can be definitely said that Mrs. Liu's motive in lodging her protest in front of the Embassy was none other than a hope of being able to evoke an appropriate reaction from the Embassy and to win sympathy and support from the public in general. Nothing could have been" further from her mind than to cause an incident. If the police authorities had stopped all traffic leading to the scene and at the same time had reported the matter to the superiors for the latter to talk to Mrs. Liu and to convince her of the possible consequences and to assure her of their help in seeking a settlement, they could have done much to prevent the situation from getting out of hand. Unfortunately, the forms of persuasion they employed were ineffective and the steps they took to maintain law and order were tardy and feeble. In the end the situation deteriorated. In performing their duties and if and when necessary, they should make prompt and resolute decisions, for appeasement would only lead to calamity. This is the lesson which this incident has to teach us.
After the crowd had broken into the Embassy compound at 1530 hours, the situation had taken such a serious turn for the worse, that it could no longer be controlled by the limited police force on the scene. Although those in charge sent for more police reinforcements in a firm bid to stop and suppress the riots, they found they could not act in strength everywhere at the same time. Time was running out fast. The situation was not brought under control until security forces, dispatched in a hurry, arrived in the city. Nevertheless, even before the arrival of the security forces, the police, though greatly outnumbered by the crowds and largely helpless insofar as the crushing of the disturbance and the restoration of law and order was concerned, somewhat redeemed them selves by doing their best to protect the lives of foreign nationals and to rescue those who were injured. As many as 62 policemen were injured during their performance of duty (See Appendix D). Foreign nationals injured numbered 11 (See Appendix B). Eleven civilians were injured, including one person who died after being admitted into hospital (See Appendix C).
If attempts were made to arrest those resorting to lawless actions and the principal ringleaders inciting the mob to violence on the spot, a serious clash with the crowd would surely have resulted and in such an event it would be hard to tell what else might have happened. Yet the lawless elements must not be permitted to go unpunished. At the time of the incident, a number of CID personnel and other security personnel mingled in the crowd in plain clothes. While trying to quiet down the crowd, they also kept a sharp lookout on the lawless elements. Thus, the police was able to apprehend a number of rioters afterwards. The way the police handled this particular phase of the incident may be said to have been quite appropriate on the whole.
Secondly, the action of the military police. Though both the military police and the civil police are responsible for the maintenance of law and order, it is needless to say that each has its own legally prescribed functions and that there is a difference in their equipment too. Our military police is well trained; has a strict discipline, and commands the respect of the people, and it is usually highly effective in carrying out its duties. A portion of the military police is placed under the command of the Taipei Garrison Headquarters to help maintain law and order in the area. Normally, its special guard duties are as numerous as they are heavy and its components are deployed over a wide area. On May 24, military police that received orders to rush to the aid of civil police, started moving in force after 1600 hours. One company of military police reached the U.S. Embassy at 1635 hours. By that time, the embassy had already been extensively damaged by the mob. As soon as they arrived, they helped the police keep the crowd under control and later on disperse them. At the Sugar Building, military police constituted the bulk of the forces which enforced precautionary measures for the protection of the American personnel in the building. Nothing serious happened here. In this unfortunate incident, if the military police had acted more swiftly in mustering and rushing all available men to help guard the U. S. Embassy, the coordination between the military police and the civil police would have been better than it was on that day.
Thirdly, the calling-up of the military forces. By their duties and their deployment, the military forces may be divided into two parts, those constituting the garrison forces in the Taipei area and the field forces in general. There is one division of the former in the Taipei area responsible for garrison duty and it is under the direct command of the Taipei Garrison Commander. As to the latter, they are organized and deployed in the normal manner, undergoing training and preparing themselves for combat duty. Ordinarily they are not responsible for the maintenance of local law and order. Thus, the duties of the military forces differ from those of the police in that the primary responsibility of suppressing mob disturbances falls on the police, who, if necessary, are to be assisted by the military police. Only if the military police and the civil police combined should still be inadequate to, bring the situation under control, may the security authorities call on such military forces as are in the area to help. For this reason, the Garrison Commander at first hesitated somewhat on the use of the military forces to suppress disturbances caused by the civilians. Opportunity to control the situation promptly was thus lost and there also appeared a lack of coordination in the deployment of the civil and military police. It so happened, however, that on May 24 garrison forces in Taipei's vicinity were participating in an anti-parachutist exercise as part of the day's air-raid practice. As a result their numerical strength was widely scattered. It took time to issue orders for them to be concentrated' again before they could move. As to the mustering of field forces, after having received a telephoned report from General Liu Wei, Commander of the Military Police, at 1430 hours. General Peng Meng-chih, Chief of the General Staff, ordered the Taipei Defense Commander to take effective measures with the military police, the civil police and the garrison force under his command. At the same time, he kept a close watch on the situation. When he was convinced that he had to send in some field forces to help the Taipei Garrison Commander suppress the riots, he issued the necessary orders at 1605 hours. From 1640 hours onward fifty contingents comprising 40 men each, began to arrive in Taipei in close succession. They were directly assigned to the duty of guarding and patrolling districts where American organs are located or where American nationals reside. At 1800 hours, pursuant to an order of the President of the Executive Yuan, it was proclaimed that as from 1900 hours that evening, the Taipei Garrison Commander would declare martial law in the Taipei city area and that curfew would be enforced. Also at 1800 hours, it was decided to bring in more troops. By midnight it was quiet again throughout the city. All officers and men of the armed forces, who took part in guard duties in the city of Taipei after the occurrence of the incident, carried out their duties day and night despite the hardships involved. Their attitude was friendly and their coordination with the civil and military police was also highly satisfactory.
In reviewing the actual happenings on the day of the incident, it is clear that the security authorities failed to take preventive measures before it happened. They made the wrong moves once the incident began. As a result, the situation assumed more serious proportions. For this they should naturally be held responsible. As to the police force who rushed to the injured despite difficulties, they should be commended.
In the light of the experience the police force had just had in coping with riots, the Taiwan Provincial Government should see to it that measures be put into effect with a view to bringing about' thorough reforms in the deployment of the police force, the formation of mobile units, the institution of training to impart to the police force the modern technique and skill in coping with mob violence, and the replenishment of police equipment and arms. As to the re-demarcation of the inter-locking responsibilities between the Garrison Headquarters and other security organs, the allocation of duties, and the strengthening of coordination between the military police and the civil police, the Ministry of National Defense should make, a careful study and then effect definite improvements.
Taipei today is the seat of the Government of the Republic of China. It is utterly inconceivable that such a serious disturbance could have persisted here in Taipei for half a day, during which the nation's law and discipline were disrupted, social order was upset, and our international prestige impaired. This was most regrettable indeed. The three security chiefs concerned, namely, general Huang Cheng-wu, the Taipei Garrison Commander; General Liu Wei, Commander of the Military Police; General Lo Kan, the Taiwan Provincial Police Commissioner; and Colonel Liu Kuo-hsien, the Taipei Municipal Police Chief, have all been relieved of their respective posts for having failed to carry out their duties in a proper manner.
V. Disposal of Persons Arrested in Connection with the Incident
A total of 111 suspects were arrested in connection with the riots and turned over to the military authorities for questioning and trial in accordance with the pr0visions of Paragraphs 1 and 2, Article 8 of the Martial Law. Of this total number, 70 have been released and the remaining 41 have been indicted in accordance with law.
The suspects have been turned over to the military authorities for disposal, because Taiwan has been declared since 1949 as a war area where martial law is enforced. Under Article 8 of the Martial Law, all serious offenses which disturb the law and order in areas under martial law are to be dealt with in the following manner: "All following criminal offenses under criminal code, in war areas where martial law is enforced may be tried either by the military authorities or turned over to civil courts for trial:
"1. Internal rebellion.
"2. Treason.
"3. Disturbance of law and order.
"4. Endangering of public safety.
"5. Forgery of currencies, negotiable instruments, documents, and seals.
"6. Manslaughter.
"7. Infringement of personal liberty.
"8. Robbery, theft, and piracy.
"9. Extortion and kidnapping for ransom
"10. Destruction and damage of property.
"The foregoing provision shall apply also to other offenses under special criminal laws:
"All offenses committed in alert areas of this article under martial law referred to under headings 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, and 9 in Paragraph 2 of this article may be tried either by the military authorities or turned over to civil courts for trial."
Under the above provisions, the military authorities and the civil courts have concurrent jurisdiction over offenses cited in Paragraphs 1 and 2, Article 8 of the Martial Law, and committed in war areas under martial law. In case of contest for jurisdiction, however, there is yet no explicit legal provision for guidance. It was for the purpose of settling such disputes between the military and the judiciary that the Executive Yuan began in 1951 to work out a set of measures designed for purpose of pragmatic demarcation. These measures are followed only when contest for jurisdiction arises. They are not intended to amend the provisions of Article 8 of the Martial Law.
All the offenses committed by suspects arrested in connection with the May 24 incident at Taipei come under the provisions of Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 8 of the Martial Law. Owing to the unprecedented nature of the incident in point of number of participants, the extent of damage done and the magnitude of the harm to the good name of the nation, the like of which has not been seen for many decades, the Executive Yuan has authorized the military authorities responsible for the enforcement of the martial law to try the entire case.
The investigation of the entire case has now been completed by the Taipei Garrison Command. Excepting the 70 persons who have been released owing to insufficient evidence, the remaining 41 suspects have been indicted and are to be tried. The Government assures that no innocent person will be punished, nor will any guilty one escape due punishment. Those persons whose unlawful conduct has done damage to the nation as a whole will be punished in order to insure national security. Whatever motives they might have had in committing the unlawful acts, the results of such acts are punishable by law.
The attached table shows the results of the investigations conducted by the Taipei Garrison Command: (See Appendix E)
VI. Conclusions.
The above is a factual account of the causes of the May 24 incident, the events of that day, the measures the Government took at the time, and the disposal of suspects arrested in connection with the riots. A few conclusions may be drawn as follows:
1. This incident, which has caused great damage to our national interest and honor, is a painful lesson to both the Government, and the people. I an