Taiwan Today

In this delightful, readable book E. H. Cook­ridge describes the Soviet espionage net that covers the world. The author is on solid ground, for he was formerly a British secret service agent and is a recognized political journalist and expert on Russian affairs.

One of the things that distinguishes the Soviet secret service from other secret services is its size and the virtually unlimited scope of its effort. The number of agents employed by the Soviet government on intelligence work has been estimated at about 250,000, not including the internal political police. This number is at least ten times larger than that of agents used by all Western nations combined. And it does not include the number' of sympathizers and fellow travelers who place themselves at the disposal of the Soviet intelligence net. Their number can only be guessed at and the total would be in excess of 750,000.

Such large numbers are required partly because the Soviet secret service has become during the last 20 years a bureaucratic machine and partly because its tasks and targets are very much wider than those of any other intelligence or­ganizations. In addition to the military and political espionage and the gathering of economic and social information, the Russian agents would engage in infiltration (into students' clubs, as well as government departments, trade unions and scientific and cultural societies); sabotage, varying from arson to provoking or embittering industrial disputes, and the preparation for and, when required, participation in armed uprisings.

Vladimir Petrov stated before the Royal Commission in Canberra that, in addition to its active spy nets, the Soviet secret service maintains in almost every country at least one "sleeper apparatus," an organization that remains quiescent and without specific tasks against the day when it becomes active on the outbreak of war. Whittaker Chambers testified during the spy trial in the United States that he was a "sleeper."

An idea of the immensity of the Russian espionage network can be gained by a look at its internal structure. The headquarters in Moscow consist of the First and Second Directorate, each headed by a director. These directors rank as Deputy Ministers.

The First Directorate, or Directorate of Counterespionage, collects strategic and general intelligence abroad and protects the Soviet Union's military, strategic secrets and, in some ways, also political and economic information. There are in this directorate the following important divisions:

1. The Foreign Division is the general staff of the Soviet secret service. Its functions combine intelligence research, intelligence collection, and intelligence dissemination. The division prepares reports on intelligence for the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee, the suc­cessor to the Politburo.

2. The Operative Division organizes and directs the operations of the secret service.

3. The Information Division: Every aspect of human activities outside of the U.S.S.R., whether political, economic, social, or cultural, apart from purely military and strategic matters, receives its attention. The Information Division main­tains—in conjunction with the private Section—the "Descriptive Central Index"—with its per­sonal details of millions of people inside and outside the Soviet Union.

4. The Secret Division collects specimens of genuine documents, official identity papers, pass­ports, and so on of every foreign country, and maintains a reference library of maps, uniforms, badges, emblems, and costumes. This division manufactures all forgeries required by secret service or government departments.

5. The Recruiting and Training Division maintains at least 299 special schools for training secret service agents, although only 20 or 30 specialize in training agents for external service.

6. The Communications Division carries out the routine business of maintaining communications with the networks and deals with any special transportation problems of the secret service agents that may arise.

The Second Directorate, or Directorate for Positive State Security, is an institution that has no parallel in the West, as a brief description of some of its divisions in the following will tell.

1. The Propaganda Division has as its objective "the weakening and destruction of the capitalist countries." It maintains secret contacts with the Communist parties abroad. One of its main objects is to create and maintain fifth columns.

2. The Special Division executes individuals or groups at the order of the government. During the war the division was known as Bureau No. 1 and was entrusted with the task of directing Stalin's scorched earth policy and organizing mass sabotage and guerrilla activities behind the German lines.

3. The Individual Division checks on the reliability of Soviet citizens and government officials at home and abroad.

4. The Allied Division is the secret service department which deals with the Soviet satellite and Communist countries.

The Second Directorate controls also the "Mo­bile Groups for Special Tasks" for the liquida­tion of deserters abroad.

The targets of the Soviet secret service are based on the Communist doctrine that all capitalist countries are enemies. Even during World War II, the NKVD agents operated in Britain and the United States as if they were in enemy territory. Russian agents will go to any length in their attempt to achieve their objectives. Some of the accounts given by the author of the executions carried out by the "Mobile Groups for Special Tasks" compare favor­ably with the best cloak-and-dagger stories.

In the chapter entitled "Successes and Failures" the author assesses the successes and fail­ures of the Soviet espionage system. On the credit side the greatest feat is the work of Richard Sorge, whose information on Japan's with­drawal of 30 divisions from Manchuria for the contemplated attack on Burma, Indonesia and the Philippines, leaving a few second rate divisions to guard the Siberian frontier, enabled Stalin to transfer his forces guarding the Man­churian frontier to the West and save Moscow and the war for the Russians.

As regards the failures of the Soviet secret service, the author correctly appraises that the really disastrous failures have been concerned not with obtaining information but interpreting it. To prove his case, he mentions the failure of Stalin to interpret the intentions of Hitler to invade Russia. Warning of the coming attack had been received both from the Russian agents and from the British intelligence service, but Stalin refused to believe in it, and his mis­take cost millions of lives.

In the concluding chapter, the author suggests a few ways as a defense against the Soviet secret service. One of these is to deny the Soviet secret service of its access to amateurs and dupes. For many of these have little idea of what they are doing. "Spreading knowledge of the methods of the Soviet secret service should," rightly concludes the author, "therefore, receive first place in our defense."

The author calls the readers' attention to the systematic abuse of the diplomatic privileges and the use of "cultural" organizations and trade del­egations for espionage and subversion. "The West," he advises, "had to adjust itself to the association of diplomacy and espionage, not by discouraging diplomatic relations, but by insur­ing they are confined to diplomacy." This is an excellent idea, but he proffers no sure way by which this objective can be attained. The abuse of the diplomatic privilege by Russia and her satellites explains why they are so assiduously seeking to reestablish trade and diplomatic re­lationship with Germany and Japan and several other countries. It also makes the consistent attempts of Britain and India to influence other

I countries to recognize the Chinese Communist regime look as if they are playing the game of the Communists.

Edward Y. K. Kwong

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When the driver of Shu Sun Shi, named Chi Chu Shang, was gathering firewood in Tai-yeh, he got a unicorn and by accident broke its left foreleg. Shu Sun Shi considered it as inauspicious and left the unicorn outside of the city wall. Meanwhile he sent a messenger to tell Confucius: "I have got a deer with one horn. Do you know what it is?" Confucius went to take a look at it and said: "This is a unicorn. Where does it come from? Where does it come from?" He wiped his face with his sleeve and wept till his tears rolled down to his lapel. When Shu Sun Shi heard of this, he took the unicorn back. Tse Kung, a disciple of Confucius, asked: "Why did you weep?" "When a unicorn appears," answered Confucius, "it fore­shadows the corning of an enlightened king. But if it appears at a wrong time it betokens calamity. I am therefore troubled."

—Confucian Family Analects.