Written by Chiang Kai-shek as Supplements to Dr. Sun Yat-sen' s Lectures on the Principle of People's Livelihood.
Rendered into English by Durham S. F. Chen
Published by China Cultural Service,
Taipei, Taiwan, 1954. 107 pages.
As indicated by its title, this book is intended as a supplement to Dr. Sun Yat-sen's unfinished work on the San Min Chu I, the most authoritative exposition of the basic teachings of the founder of the Kuomintang and father of the Republic of China. The San Min Chu I was originally delivered by Dr. Sun in the form of lectures at Canton in 1924. There are six lectures on the Principle of Nationality and six on the Principle of People's Rights. Those parts of the magnum opus are complete in themselves. But the lectures on the Principle of People's Livelihood were left uncompleted by Dr. Sun.
It was to supply this deficiency that President Chiang, successor to Dr. Sun as Tsungtsai (Director-General) of the Kuomintang~ decided too write these chapters. As President Chiang has pointed out, "From Dr. Sun's speeches and writings on the San Min Chu I published before 1924, we learn that, in his conception, the problem of people's livelihood (Minsen) included, in addition to food, clothing, housing, and means of travel, other aspects such as national fecundity, social welfare, education, and health and happiness." (p. 1) But the latter group of questions was not touched upon in Dr. Sun's lectures as delivered in 1924. That was why the writing of some supplementary chapters was necessary.
President Chiang tells his readers that in writing these supplementary chapters he tried to "elucidate Dr. Sun Yat-sen's views on national fecundity, social welfare, education, and health and happiness as explained by him in private conversation and to collate the measures he had formulated with my own personal observations and plans and policies I have drawn up." (p. 3) In a certain sense, this work may, therefore, be considered as a joint product of the two foremost leaders of the Kuomintang.
This booklet is divided into four chapters. An introductory chapter explains how this work came to be written an outlines the task of building up a free and secure society, which is the real purpose of the Principle of People's Livelihood.
In Chapter II, the author undertakes a study of the problems of national fecundity, social welfare, and education. His proposals for the solution of the population problem in China after the recovery of the Chinese mainland include "a balanced development of the national economy and a balanced distribution of population in the spirit of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's International Development of China,'" "the development of manufacturing, mining, fishery, and animal husbandry according to the regional distribution of natural resources; such a regional distribution of population as to facilitate the proper development and exploitation of those resources;" and "a balanced development of cities and villages so as to achieve the ruralization of cities and the urbanization of villages and to permit the enjoyment by every family of adequate space and a health; environment." (pp. 16-17)
Under the general topic of social welfare, the author makes an analysis of the child problem, the problem of the sick and the disabled, the problem of old age, and the problem of funerals and interment. It is through the promotion of social welfare that the author proposes to build up a free and secure society "in which every individual is capable of leading an· independent life and is master of himself, and-there is mutual help and cooperation between one individual and another. (p. 18)
The type of education to be introduced in China upon the recovery of the Chinese mainland is one in conformity with Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Principle of People's Livelihood or Minsen, according to President Chiang. This Minsen type of education, says our author, "should teach the youngsters such knowledge as to fit them for the business of life. It should, in other words, teach them by planned instruction to cultivate their personality and develop their talents in the midst of a democratic life and enable them, both as members of their own families and as citizens, to engage in productive work and dedicate themselves wholeheartedly to the promotion of social progress and national regeneration," (p. 49)
The subject matters to be taught under such an educational system should include, says the author, "four aspects: intellectual, physical, moral, and social." (p. 46) He maintains that only a good combination of such kinds of training is really sound education," and goes on to show the effects of a one-sided education in which some of the four aspects is wanting. For example: "Without the mellowing influence of moral and social training, intellectual studies are likely to degenerate into mental gymnastics and prove to be useless to the individual, his family, his country, and his society and can never hope to make 'the least contribution to humanity at large. Without the edifying influence of moral and social training, physical exercises are likely to become the exclusive concern of a few star athletes who win athletic honors for their alma mater, but are unlikely to have the beneficent effect of promoting the physical and mental health for the citizen body as a whole." (pp. 46-47)
President Chiang speaks with justifiable pride of the ancient type of education based upon the six arts of ceremonial, music, archery, charioteering, writing, and mathematics which has contributed to China's greatness during the Han and Tang Dynasties. He has the highest praise for it, because it "aimed at the training of a citizen whose body and mind should be developed in perfect balance, who should be as dexterous with his hands as he would be mentally alert, whose intellectual and moral qualities should be cultivated in equal measure, and who should embody in himself the attainments of a soldier as well as those of a man of letters." (pp. 47)
In Chapter III, which treats of health and happiness, the author thinks of an individual as being healthy if he can maintain a proper equilibrium between his physical and moral development, and as being happy if he can achieve the necessary harmony between his emotional and rational faculties.
In discussing the role of the fine arts in promoting mental health and happiness, the author pays a fine tribute to Chinese scholars who set much store by the cultivation of their character and virtues and the refinement of their temperament and regard the ability to play the guitar, to excel in chess, to be good calligraphists, and to paint beautiful pictures as of supreme importance. "The highest aim of the fine arts," according to President Chiang, is the attainment by the individual of a state in which his intellectual and moral qualities are developed in perfect accord each with the other and there is complete harmony between his physical and mental faculties." (p. 87)
Being a devout Christian, President Chiang waxes eloquent on the importance of a spiritual life to man. "What marks man off from the lower animals is his spiritual life," says he. "Lack of spiritual stability leads to a split personality. When the individual cannot maintain the integrity of his personality, neither can society maintain a stable order and foster good manners." (p. 90)
It is President Chiang's firm conviction that "Only religious faith and a strong belief in certain fundamental principles regulating the life of man are really inherent stabilizing forces that contribute to the normal development of the human personality." (p. 90)
In the fourth and concluding chapter, the author outlines three stages of social development which are identified by ancient Chinese writers as an Age of Anarchy, an Era of Minor Prosperity, and an Era of the Great Commonwealth.
Needless to say that what the Book of Li calls the Great Commonwealth corresponds to what the author means by a free and secure society. In that free and secure society, "all boys at the age of five or six will be required to go to primary schools," according to Dr. Sun Yat-sen. "Thereafter," the author quotes the father of the Chinese Republic as saying, "they will be trained and brought up by the state until they are twenty years old; this is to be looked upon as a right to which every Chinese citizen is entitled. The schools will teach all branches of knowledge so that the students may, upon graduation, become independent citizens enjoying all the rights of political suffrage, liberty, and equality. All citizens, on reaching the age of twenty, will work for their own bread and butter. The state will grant pensions to those over fifty who have no means of support. Children whose parents have too many offspring and are, therefore, unable to support them will be taken care of by the state. When China has reached this stage of development, Chinese civilization and culture will compare not less, but more, favorably with those of Europe and America." (pp. 106-107)
That was the ideal Dr. Sun Yat-sen wanted to realize throughout his revolutionary career. It remains the ideal to which all his followers, with President Chiang at their head, are dedicated.
—ANDREW B. MA
HOW COMMUNISTS NEGOTIATE
by Admiral C. Turner Joy
The Macmillian Company, New York
1955 178 PP.
Few people enjoyed negotiating with the Communists, least of all Admiral Joy. So this account of the Korea cease-fire parleys is a story of delays, frustration and prevarication on the part of the Communists. It tells of the opportunities lost by the United Nations Command and of the paradoxical situation of winning at the battlefield and losing at the conference table. The surprising thing is that this situation was brought about through no lack of argumentative skill but through outside interference.
It all started in June, 1951, when Jacob Malik made a radio broadcast suggesting that a truce be arranged by opposing military commanders in Korea along the 38th Parallel. Washington immediately directed General Matthew B. Ridgway, then Commander in Chief of the UN forces in Korea, to broadcast by radio a message to the Communist military commanders in Korea, inquiring whether truce talks were desired and suggesting that the Danish hospital ship Jutlandia be used as venue for the talks. In reply, the Communists sent the arrogant message by radio, "If you desire a truce, come to Kaesong and we'll talk." Under ordinary circumstances, the Communist suggestion should be turned down, for its acceptance would be tantamount to acknowledgement of defeat. But General Ridgway considered that in the interests of saving time and showing sincere intentions Kaesong should be accepted. Thus Admiral C. Turner Joy was appointed head of the United Nations Command delegation to talk with his opposite number, General Nam II of North Korea. It turned out that Nam II was only a front. The man actually responsible for the direction of the negotiations on the other side was a Chinese Communist by the name of Hsieh Fang.
From the beginning the Communists wanted to create the impression that the United Nations Command was suing for peace. According to the Chinese tradition, and that of the Koreans, the ruler or victor faces south and the subjects or the vanquished face north. So in making arrangements for seating at the conference table, the Communists made sure that the north side of the table went to them by the simple expediency of barring the United Nations delegation from access to it. Then at the first meeting, they provided Admiral Joy with a short-legged chair, on which the Admiral almost sank out of sight, while across the table Nam II towered a good foot above him.
To complete the illusion that the UN delegates were suing for peace, the Communists maintained heavy guards everywhere. During a recess of the first meeting, the author was threatened by a Communist guard pointing a burp gun at him growling menacingly. Then there was the sentinel posted conspicuously beside the door to the conference room who told people that .the gaudy medal he was wearing had been given him for "killing forty Americans." Things like these might not advance the Communist cause at the conference table but there is no question that they provided good grist for their propaganda mill at home and abroad.
Of the various kinds of tricks and tactics used by the Communists to deceive people confronted by the author during his long negotiations with them, the following are typical of the ways used by followers of Russian imperialists:
At the beginning of the parleys, the Communists wanted to introduce what the author labels as the loaded agenda. By this he means that the Communists wanted to rig up the agenda in such a way that all subsequent discussions would be mere confirmation of the conditions they laid down. Thus they introduced a two-point agenda reading as follows:
1. Establishment of the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line between both sides, and establishment of demilitarized zone, as basic conditions for the cessation of hostilities in Korea.
2. Withdrawal of' all armed forces of foreign countries from Korea.
It will be remembered that at this time the Communist forces were generally some ways north of the 38th Parallel and the United Nations forces were exerting steady pressure at all fronts to push them back. The establishment of the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line would, therefore, mean that the UN forces had to fall back and that the Communists might reoccupy positions they had lost.
Another tactics used by the Communists was delay. The author attributes this to the fact that they wanted to exploit the Westerners' desire to hurry and seek to gain advantages by aggravating the American tendency to impatience through the imposition of endless delays. The longest delay by the Communists was in connection with the question relating to the exchange of prisoners of war. The United Nations Command wanted voluntary repatriation, to which the Communists strenuously objected. In the end they accepted this condition, but only after a year of delay, which prolonged the war in Korea more than fourteen months and caused hundreds of thousands of casualties on both sides.
An important fact to be remembered in negotiating with the Communists is that they feel they can welsh on any agreement displeasing to them by the simple expediency of saying that your interpretation is an incorrect one. Therefore, the author points out that long before any agreement was reached the Communists were thinking of inserting conditions that would facilitate their breaking the agreement. He sounds the warning: "Never trust a Communist promise, however given: trust only Communist deeds."
From the negotiator's point of view, the most intolerable of the Communists' tactics is perhaps their fondness of repeating the same statement again and again. The author compares this to the philosophy of a small lad who had a dollar changed into pennies at one bank, then back into a bill at another bank, then back into pennies, ad infinitum. When asked why he pursued this seemingly senseless practice, the lad replied, "Sometime somebody is going to make a mistake, and it isn't going to be me." The Russians are past masters in this game. They made use of all the international conferences to propagate their line time after time without variation. Their pronouncements on disarmament or on the atomic bomb are substantially the same today as they were three years ago.
The Korean Armistice Conference terminated in July, 1953, fully two years after it had started. All in all, it is surprising that the Americans as a nation of poker players should come out with such a poor showing when they entered the game with a fistful of aces knowing all the time that the Communists had nothing better than a deuce in the hole. In summing up the lessons learned from his negotiations the author thinks the failure o£ the United States to take punitive action against the Peiping regime was responsible for much of the difficulties experienced in the armistice negotiations. He thinks that as the recognized leader of the free world in the struggle against international Communism, the United States had every good reason from a moral standpoint to take the initiative in punishing the Chinese Communist aggressor, particularly when the United Nations General Assembly had denounced the Peiping regime as an aggressor in the Korean ·war.
This leads him to the conclusion that we should enter negotiations with Communism when, and only when, negotiations serve the cause of freedom best. We must not, he adds, negotiate merely because the enemy wants to do so. We must negotiate not merely from strength, but with strength.
—EDWARD Y. K. KWONG