North Korea, a constant instigator of trouble in East Asia, is always eager for the limelight. Every time it causes a “brink of war” crisis, tensions rise in the region, as was the case with its recent alleged torpedoing of a South Korean warship. The strategy is obviously intended to facilitate domestic stability, smooth political succession and regain international attention.
In 1974, North Korea agreed to inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency and in 1985 ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to gain access to Soviet technology for the construction of light-water nuclear reactors. In 1991, North and South Korea joined the U.N. and signed the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges and Cooperation and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
But in fact, North Korea had already begun developing nuclear weapons. In 1993, the IAEA requested inspections for two suspicious facilities at the north’s Yongbyon nuclear facility. Pyongyang refused and subsequently announced its withdrawal from the NPT.
Later, North Korea accepted the mediation of former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and reached a framework agreement in which the U.S. pledged to help the country build two light-water reactors. In the context of domestic policy, the first North Korean nuclear crisis played out against a backdrop of famine and rumors of the collapse of Kim Jong-il’s regime. Pyongyang skillfully used the nuclear crisis to diffuse international condemnation and to strengthen internal control.
After taking office in 2001, former U.S. President George W. Bush adopted a tougher stance on North Korea, naming it part of the “axis of evil” along with Iran and Iraq. This raised concerns in Pyongyang of a U.S. military strike. As a result, in 2002 North Korea admitted to visiting U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly that it was restarting its nuclear program, triggering the second North Korean nuclear crisis.
With the 2003 start of the Iraq war, the U.S. was unwilling to consider war in East Asia, and therefore relied on the “six-party talks” to handle the North Korean nuclear issue. In 2005, the fourth round of talks resulted in Pyongyang pledging to abandon its nuclear weapons ambitions and return to supervision under the NPT and IAEA in exchange for a U.S. promise not to attack the country.
The agreement was short-lived. In October 2006, North Korea conducted a nuclear weapons test. The U.N. Security Council then adopted Resolution 1718, which imposed economic and commercial sanctions on Pyongyang. Afterwards, North Korea signaled its willingness to return to the six-party talks. In subsequent negotiations, it pledged to work toward the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In 2007, Pyongyang promised to close the Yongbyon reactor in exchange for a U.S. pledge to remove the country from its list of state sponsors of terrorism.
North Korea, however, conducted another nuclear test in May 2009. The U.N. Security Council responded with the passage of Resolution 1874, which imposed further sanctions. Subsequently, Pyongyang again indicated its willingness to return to the six-party talks, and last November in New York, envoys from both sides met for consultations.
North Korea is quite adept at this method of fomenting crises—taking two steps forward, and one step back—to meet domestic demands and achieve its international objectives. It also makes use of a two-faced method when dealing with international condemnation: On the one hand, trumpeting its willingness for total war in response to international provocation; on the other, accepting mediation from the international community. The premise of this strategy, however, is to gamble with the people and society of North Korea, ignoring the fear of famine, isolation, or war.
After the first North Korean nuclear crisis, a Korea University professor and former minister of foreign affairs delivered an address in Taiwan. A Democratic Progressive Party legislator posed the following question: “North Korea is like a naughty child—when it wants candy it gets candy. Taiwan is a model student but receives only isolation from the international community. Shouldn’t Taiwan take its cue from North Korea?”
The former South Korean foreign minister said: “North Korea is North Korea; Taiwan is Taiwan. The important thing is that the people of Taiwan do not want Taiwan to become a second North Korea.” His meaning was that Taiwan should have no desire to contemplate the stark dilemma of adopting North Korea’s “brink of war” strategy in exchange only for complete isolation and extreme poverty.
—Philip Yang is a professor at the Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University. These views are the author’s and not necessarily those of Taiwan Today. This piece is a translation of the author’s commentary that appeared in the Chinese-language United Daily News May 26. Copyright © 2010 by Philip Yang
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