Interests favoring Beijing's forceful management of North Korea are many. First is the loss of face it incurs for failing to restrain Pyongyang. Kim Jong Il's recent actions endanger Beijing's investment in its claim to influence North Korea without the need for extensive international sanctions, commentators like the Christian Science Monitor's Robert Marquand hold. Here, loss of face translates into a wider loss of soft power.
Second is the belief that aggressive behavior on the part of North Korea feeds the growing pressure within Japan to remilitarize. China, commentators assert, wishes to starve that pressure. Third, and related, is China's interest in minimizing U.S. activities in the region. While the United States does now have a considerable military presence in Japan and South Korea, an out-of-control North Korean regime could spur an even beefier military and political presence to prevent Kim from exporting missile and nuclear technology.
On the other side of the ledger are reasons for Beijing to soft-pedal its approach to North Korea. First, it is thought that Beijing does not take North Korea's actions seriously. In Marquand's words, Chinese leaders see the recent missile launches as ongoing installments of "political theater" meant to attract attention and which, therefore, are not evidence of any serious threat. More importantly, it is generally agreed that however tiresome the PRC finds Pyongyang, Beijing would rather Kim's regime remain in power than collapse and flood northern China with refugees. An alternative outcome to intense pressure--an attack by North Korea's military on the South--is also considered problematic because it would trigger American intervention. This conceptualization of China's interests envisages it doing only enough to give the appearance of concern but, in reality, doing nothing substantial to pressure Kim. What the PRC wants is stability in the region, both for economic reasons and to prevent the aforementioned prospect of a North Korean disaster. While Kim himself is not a stabilizing force, his presence and happiness does keep North Korea from sliding into anarchy or war.
When analysts put these reasons side by side, they tend to weight more heavily those that favor forceful intervention. Perhaps this is wishful thinking on the part of Western commentators, however, or it could be that they magnify the importance of China's concern for increased Japanese and American military activities and refuse to accept that Beijing could possibly believe that propping up Pyongyang presents the best prospects for regional stability.
But this analysis misses other reasons why Beijing may move slowly when confronting North Korea. Such reasons are related to a mixture of long- and short-term interests and acknowledge that the PRC's primary purpose is not to attain stability for its own sake, or even for the sake of economic development, but to create a regional situation that best fits its plans for expanded influence. Those plans probably call for more fluidity than analysts generally concede.
A more fluid region enhances China's position. The longer North Korea--facilitated by Beijing's soft approach--remains a perceived threat to its neighbors, the more important are Beijing's services as a manager of the situation. This is particularly true if the United States continues to reject bilateral talks with North Korea and insists on the six-party format. Such a policy puts a premium on China's good offices. China is able to take advantage of this situation due to America's military overstretch and its own Security Council veto. Thus, according to this analysis, the continuation of the North Korean problem seems to increase rather than decrease China's face and soft power.
Perhaps more important is the fact that the longer Beijing is valued and Pyongyang loathed, the less attention is paid to Beijing's own activities and its threats to the region. A PRC that is valued for its ability to influence North Korea is excused transgressions in Tibet. A PRC that attempts to dissuade Pyongyang from lobbing missiles into the Sea of Japan is forgiven its own lobbing of missiles in Taiwan's direction. And a PRC that is considered a counterweight to a fanatical North Korea--and thus on the side of stability in the region--is only feebly questioned about its own destabilizing military buildup and threats toward Taiwan.
Put this way, the balance of interests tilts toward the side of the PRC seeming to do something about North Korea but, in reality, doing just enough to keep the pot of North Korean adventurism from boiling over.
--David Lorenzo is Associate Professor of Political Science at Virginia Wesleyan College. These views are the author's and not necessarily those of VWC.