Initial reports on Abe's politics are confusing. The favorite adjective used to describe Abe, per a recent Time Asia article, is "enigma." He is characterized as a populist, but he is also the scion of a long line of political elites. He is said to be a hard-line nationalist, yet he tries to project an air of pragmatism in international affairs. He has visited the Yasukuni Shrine and been instrumental in revising Japanese textbooks to remove any apologies for Japan's actions during World War II, but insists he wants to improve the tattered relations between Japan and the PRC that he has inherited, despite the fact that the strains have arisen in large part from former Prime Minister Koizumi's nationalistic gestures.
From Taiwan's point of view, Abe's premiership carries with it several positive developments. First and foremost is the continuity in foreign policy that it promises. Abe has retained the current foreign minister, Taro Aso, who has been instrumental in forging closer ties with the United States in matters related to Asian security. In particular, Aso was involved in reaffirming the agreement last year committing Japan and the United States to the joint protection of Taiwan. Abe, too, has pledged to strengthen Japan-U.S. ties. The prospect of a joint Japanese-U.S. response may provide a necessary deterrent to any plan by Beijing to confront Taiwan militarily.
Abe's nationalist assertion of Japan's right to take a normal place in the world, including a loose interpretation of Japan's constitutional constraints on the use of armed forces, may also provide a welcome counterweight to the PRC's military and economic pretensions. A resurgent and confident Japan may force China to temper both its rhetoric and its actions. The specter of a China that is unable to bully Japan may give heart to other countries and lead to increased pressure on Beijing to act cooperatively and multilaterally on the host of economic, military and environmental issues that impact the well-being of all countries in the region. Currently, such confidence and pressure is lacking, allowing the PRC to shape regional politics to its own liking.
Abe's ascension likely will not lead to progress in other symbolic and material areas of importance, however. Despite his acknowledgement of the pain Japan has caused neighboring countries in the past, Abe has been vigorous in attempting to divert attention away from war atrocities, comfort women and other emotional issues that still have currency in Taiwan, South Korea and China, and he is likely to continue to dismiss concerns that arise from those issues. While he has yet to commit himself publicly, Abe is also likely to visit the Yasukuni Shrine again. This will inflict emotional distress on many people and increase tensions in the region, as the strong nationalist sentiments in South Korea and the hypernationalist policies of the Beijing authorities will lead both countries to react vigorously and perhaps intemperately to such developments.
The nationalist Abe is also unlikely to recede from Japan's claim over the Diaoyutai Islands and surrounding fishing grounds, thus keeping alive an issue that has caused difficulties between Taiwan and Japan in the past.
Of even greater concern is the possibility that Beijing will react wildly to the prospect of a resurgent Japan, in league with the United States, challenging its regional supremacy. It has shown this tendency domestically, implementing policies that brutally suppress any attempt to hold it accountable or to lessen its powers. This could lead to crippling trade wars and an arms race that will make the possibility of armed conflict more likely. It may also lead Beijing to attempt to strengthen itself by moving militarily against Taiwan, and to do so quickly before Japan and the United States have time to deepen their defense ties.
One must also not discount the possibility that Abe's nationalistic stance is not as benign as he portrays. The combination of right-wing patriotism and populist gestures he embodies has proved a potent brew in other contexts, even if the virulent and militaristic Japanese nationalism of the 1930s was not of that exact variety. Yet Abe's ability to enact a rabidly nationalistic program at present is negligible given both caution within the Japanese political system and vigilance on the part of the United States and others on the outside. A likelier and more comforting scenario has Japan taking its place in Asia in the same way that Germany resumed its position in Europe. Like Japan, West Germany was constrained by the United States and by the discipline imposed by confrontation with a large, not overly friendly, neighboring power. Taiwan could live with such a development.
--David Lorenzo is Associate Professor of Political Science at Virginia Wesleyan College. These views are the author's and not necessarily those of VWC.
Copyright 2006 by David Lorenzo