This is the month of the American Bicentennial. The free Chinese people of Taiwan have joined with their American friends in the celebration. Many missions have gone to the United States. Receptions and exhibits have been held in the Republic of China. Special attention has been given to American history. The U.S. election campaign has been watched with deep interest.
To the Chinese of Taiwan, the United States is more than just another country. The very name in Chinese - mei kuo - means "beautiful country ," and this is thought of in a philosophical, idealistic sense as well as a reflection of "America the beautiful" in terms of scenery. There has been something special about the United States in Chinese eyes ever since the first contacts were made not long after the Declaration of independence.
Americans came to China - as to Japan looking for trade and a profit. Among the traders the count of sinners was certainly higher than saints. But the United States was never a colonial power except in its own westward expansion. That was continental. The United States did not look toward Asia or Africa for territorial accretion. Special privilege, yes; annexation, no. When manifest destiny brought the Philippines under U.S. rule, many American hearts and minds were troubled.
Missionaries accompanied the American men of business. Their influence in the China of the 19th century was immense. Modern medicine was largely introduced by those who were seeking to save souls as well as lives. In retrospect, the medicine was not so important as the concepts of science which accompanied it. China had earlier made some progress toward the scientific method:
By the latter days of the Ch'ing dynasty, the hold of the past was supreme. It had to be broken by those who learned something of the ways and education of the West.
The first American missionaries reached Canton in 1830. One of them, Elijah Bridgman, edited a journal, Chinese Repository. which is a valuable source of information about the Canton of that time. The other 1830 arrival was David Abeel. Arriving in 1833 was Samuel Wells Williams, a scholar who was U.S. charge d'affaires in China at various times until 1874. He was to become first professor of Chinese language at Yale University.
Possibly the most interesting of the Americans who went to China early in the 19th century was a New Englander, Peter Parker. He was to be transformed from a "beautiful American" serving China's medical needs to an "ugly American" who was caught up in the diplomatic web and fell victim to his obsession that the United States should annex Taiwan.
The Rev. Parker was born to a farm family at Framingham, Mass., in 1804. At the age of 30, he had been graduated from Yale in both theology and medicine. He studied Chinese in Singapore, then set up his Ophthalmic Hospital at Canton in 1835. Contemporaries have written that the hospital flourished. American and British businessmen provided support. Most patients came from the ranks of influential Chinese, who found treatment for cataracts and other eye conditions that did not respond to the prescriptions of Chinese medical practitioners.
Parker's hospital outlasted Parker's time in China. Annual reports were issued. That for the 1850-51 period said 42,528 patients had been treated in the 15 years since the hospital opened. The report declared: "Every variety of ophthalmic disease, also humors, hernias, dropsies, dislocations, fractures and stone ... have been treated with the usual success." A selection from thousands of cases is given, interspersed with the sentiments of thankful patients illustrative of the favorable im pression produced upon their grateful hearts, and' demonstrating the divine wisdom of medical mis sionary operations.
A patient named Sie Wan-kwoh wrote this ode after "Dr. Parker cut me open and put me right:"
By the stream and by the steel,
He can save and he can heal:
Life and health he can import.
Be he honored - and his art.
One of Dr. Parker's patients was Lin Tse-hsu, the Imperial Commissioner who attempted to suppress the opium trade at Canton. He had hernia but declined to call at the hospital in person. Dr. Parker sent him a truss and indicated that it served "tolerably well." Commissioner Lin understandably makes no mention of the contraption in his diary. Parker was asked by Lin to translate a book on international law and to check the translation of the commissioner's letter to Queen Victoria.
Parker did not immerse himself in medical care to the exclusion of the China around him. He was a committee member of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge in China. He suggested, also, that Westerners could learn from China and the Chinese. His attitude was patronizing but his mind was not so closed as those of some of his confreres. Early on, Parker began the training of several young Chinese to be doctors.
In the United States for a visit in 1840, Parker married a relative of Daniel Webster, who had just become secretary of state. No doubt this lighted the fires under Parker's already simmering political ambitions. Before returning to Canton with his wife in 1842, he had several talks with President John Tyler.
This was an eventful period in Sino-American relations. In 1844, Caleb Cushing, the first U.S. Commissioner to China, negotiated the Treaty of Wanghsia. Parker was Cushing's secretary and interpreter. Earlier, it had been said of Parker that he opened China to the Gospel at the point of his lancet. Now the knife was replaced with the bludgeon of power politics. The Treaty of Wanghsia, first between the United States and China, gained for America the same privileges the British had exacted in the Treaty of Nanking two years earlier. China was opened up for trade and extraterritorial rights were accorded American citizens.
However, the United States at least renounced the right to intercede for its nationals caught smuggling opium. Revision of the treaty was to be permitted after 12 years. Americans were allowed to buy Chinese books and employ teachers for the study of the Chinese written language and dialects. The Treaty of Wanghsia was one of the first to include a most favored nation clause. The good was mixed with the bad in the Cushing-Parker effort.
For 13 years, until he returned to the United States for good in 1857, Dr. Parker provided the only continuity in the Sino-American relationship. He acted as charged d'affaires five times before his appointment as commissioner in 1855. He alone of the commissioners was able to speak, read and write Chinese. He met with President Franklin Pierce at Washington in 1855 and was given full powers to seek revision of the Wanghsia accord. The U.S. government wanted to station an emissary in Peking, to obtain facilities for increased trade and to assure the personal liberty of Americans in China.
Returning to Canton, Parker was snubbed by the Chinese commissioner. He sought the help of the British and French, but the representatives of the two European powers considered that the American was daft for proposing that China reform its judiciary and send ambassadors abroad. Unable to dispatch President Pierce's letter to the Emperor, Commissioner Parker headed up the coast. In Foochow, he saw the governor and asked him to forward the letter. Subsequently, the governor returned the missive (which had no doubt been copied and translated) to Parker at Canton with the suggestion that it be presented to the Chinese commissioner there.
British and American traders and officials applauded when an American ship captain, sailing upriver toward Canton, destroyed some Chinese fortifications after being fired upon. In a dispatch to Washington, Parker said: "Were the three representatives of England, France and America, on presenting themselves at the Pei-ho ... to say the French flag will be hoisted in Corea, the English ... at Chusan, and the United States in Formosa, and there remain till satisfaction for the past and right understanding for the future are granted; but, being granted, these possessions shall instantly be restored, negotiation would no longer be obstructed and the most advantageous and desirable results to all concerned secured."
Washington learned that the American consul in Hongkong, James Keenan, had carried the U.S. flag over the Canton wall when the British briefly occupied the city. Secretary of State William L. Marcy instructed Parker to remove Keenan and not to get mixed up in British quarrels with China. The Pierce administration was coming to a close, and Parker may have realized that his own days were numbered. He went overboard on behalf of his campaign to raise the American flag over Taiwan.
In February of 1857, he wrote Washington: "The subject of Formosa is becoming one of great interest to a number of our enterprising citizens, and deserves more consideration from the great commercial nations of the West than it has received; and it is much to be hoped that the government of the United States may not shrink from the action which the interests of humanity, civilization and commerce impose upon it in relation to Taiwan." He summoned Commodore Armstrong from Hongkong and sought to persuade him to support the scheme. The annexation was to be justified "by the principles of international law, since grievances against the Chinese government justified reprisals; and because Formosa was an island desirable to the United States." It was admitted that occupation "in any other country than China ... would be regarded as a virtual dissolution of avowed amicable relations."
Commissioner Parker by now was thinking of permanent, not temporary annexation. In March of 1857, he wrote: "In the event of the establishment of a line of steamers between California, Japan and China, this source of coal will be advantageous. That the islands (Formosa and neighboring islets) may not remain a portion of the (Chinese) empire is possible; and in the event of its being severed from the empire politically, as it is geographically, that the United States should possess it is obvious, particularly as respects the great principle of the balance of power."
In his next communication, he said: "Great Britain has her St. Helena in the Atlantic, her Gibraltar and Malta in the Mediterranean, her Aden in the Red Sea, Mauritius, Ceylon, Penang and Singapore in the Indian Ocean, and Hongkong in the China Sea. If the United States is so disposed and can arrange for the possession of Formosa, England certainly cannot object."
The Pierce administration was succeeded by that of James Buchanan. The State Department was more than ready to get rid of Dr. Peter Parker. He was dismissed and succeeded by William B. Reed. The instructions to Reed were clear and to the point: "This country, you will constantly bear in mind, is not at war with the Government of China, nor does it seek to enter into that empire for any other purpose than· those of lawful commerce, and for the protection of the lives and property of its citizens. The whole nature and policy of our government must necessarily confme our action within these limits, and deprive us of all motives either for territorial aggrandizement or the acquisition of political power in that distant region .... You will not fail to let it be known to the Chinese authorities that we are not party to the existing hostilities, and have no intention to intervene in their political concerns, or to gain a foothold in their country. We go there to engage in trade, but under suitable guarantees for its protection. The extension of our commercial intercourse must be the work of individual enterprise, and to this element of our national character we may safely leave it."
Another early American diplomat left a better taste in Chinese mouths than did Peter Parker after deserting the scalpel for his dream of Taiwan annexation. Anson Burlingame, a graduate of Harvard Law School, was a member of the U.S. House of Representatives from 1855 to 1861. Abraham Lincoln named him minister to Vienna in 1861 but the Austrian government wanted none of a man who had made pro-Kossuth speeches. By this happy accident, Burlingame became the American minister to China. It was a difficult time for China: the Taiping rebellion had not yet been suppressed, the unequal treaties had infringed sovereignty, the central government was weak, anti-foreign feeling was strong and foreign traders wanted even more privileges.
Burlingame quickly became a leader of the Peking diplomatic corps. He urged the cooperation rather than the competition of Western powers along with settlement of disputes through diplomatic means rather than by dispatching gunboats. The Chinese government was impressed by his friendship and sincerity. In November of 1867 he resigned as American minister and was named China's imperial envoy charged with the conduct of Chinese international relations. In February of 1868, he began a tour of Western capitals. The mission crossed the United States in a triumphant progression. Burlingame made speech after speech about China's receptivity to Western ideas. In Washington, he negotiated with Secretary of State William Seward the "Burlingame Treaty" supplementing the Reed treaty of 1858. One of the articles put on record U.S. respect for China's territorial integrity. Another provided for reciprocal immigration. This was later to be undone by the U.S. Exclusion Acts, but at the time it was unique and a striking statement of the equality of nations. In London, Burlingame won a declaration that China was entitled to the forebearance of foreign nations. He was still serving as China's foremost foreign envoy when he contracted pneumonia and died in St. Petersburg, Russia, on February 23, 1870. He is probably the only diplomat in history to change his coat successfully and without rancor on the part of either of the two states he represented.
Meanwhile, the Chinese people had been spreading across the globe. Britain was credited with having the empire on which the sun never set. China still has the people on whom the sun could never set, because at least a few Chinese are to be found anywhere. Southeast Asia has been the principal destination. This was arranged by propinquity and opportunity. Further afield, the United States became the destination of preference - and still is. America matched the durability of the Chinese against the toughness of the Irish in building its continental railroads. Chinese dug for gold in California, then opened restaurants to feed hungry miners and laundries to wash their clothes. Even today, when the Chinese are winning Nobel Prizes, no big city in the world is without a Chinese restaurant.
China had both American friends and detractors after Peter Parker left the scene. By and large, however, official U.S. policy was in the best interests of China. There is a continuing argument as to whether missionaries won rice bowl converts or the hearts of the people. Many Americans who went to China were interested in self-aggrandizement, even when they didn't wish to usurp Taiwan. But compared with others, the Americans were well-meaning and even benevolent. Moreover, their political example had an important influence in the overthrow of the Ch'ing dynasty and the substitution of republicanism for Manchu rule.
Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the Founding Father of the Republic, was educated in Honolulu. He was at home ill the English language as in his native Cantonese. His medical education was in Hongkong, and he then tried to practice in Macao. Just across the Pearl River was the oppressive backwardness of the Manchus. Sun Yat-sen soon found that the rulers of dynastic China were not prepared to listen to any voice raised in favor of reform and the lessons of science. He became a revolutionary. Dr. Sun did not put the American system on a pedestal. Rather - in his Three Principles of the People - he tried to combine the best of China with the best of the United States. He was especially impressed with the political philosophy of Abraham Lincoln and its stress on government of the people, by the people and for the people.
China was threatened from without as well as from within. European nations had carved up Africa and were looking for new continents to conquer. China was a tempting prize - rich, populous, civilized and weak. The Manchu failure to modernize seemed an invitation to participation in the dismemberment of China. Spheres of influence and special interest were developed by Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia and Japan.
Only the United States declined to join in the game of colonialism. Americans were not imperialistic. They believed in a strong China, not a weak one. Missionaries and businessmen wanted a stable environment in which to continue their work. In 1899, the United States had newly come to the ranks of the world powers as a result of the Spanish-American War. No one yet took the diplomacy of the American upstarts seriously. Secretary of State John Hay had to win his objective of a free approach to Chinese trade by indirection. He proposed that Britain, Germany and Russia join the United States in accepting the principle of the "open door" in trade with China. Similar notes were addressed to France, Italy and Japan. He said that the Chinese tariff should continue to be collected by Chinese officials regardless of the spheres of influence.
The open door favored British trading interests, and they were prepared to accept it. The other powers wanted none of any such arrangement and avoided commitment. Hay seized upon the opportunity and said that in the absence of opposition, the open door was in effect. All of the powers had naturally endorsed the policies involved. Secretary Hay's unilateral proclamation did not prevent further exploitation of China but did begin the slow process of closing out such indignities as special privilege and extraterritoriality.
In retrospect, some of the finest pages in Sino-American history are those concerned with the Boxer Incident of 1900. If the anti-foreign sentiments of the' Boxers were irrational, so was the response of the foreign powers. The United States joined in the march from Tientsin to Peking with the greatest reluctance. Others - British, Russians, French, Germans, Japanese, Italians and Austrians - generally regarded the incident as an opportunity to try to pump more blood out of the Chinese turnip. President McKinley and Secretary Hay did not share this sentiment. They consented to participate in the expedition only out of fear that U.S. failure to do so would expedite attempts of the others to dismember China.
Secretary Hay made clear to the other powers that the United States desired the preservation of China's national integrity. In the end, the Twelve Demands addressed to China sought a cash indemnity rather than territory or additional special privileges. The United States then undertook to reduce the amount of the indemnity. Although the amount finally agreed upon - US$333 million to be paid in 39 annual installments - was 75 per cent more than the figure proposed by the United States, it would have been much higher in the absence of American insistence on reasonableness and compassion.
The U.S. share was less than US$25 million. When losses were found to have been less than expected, President Theodore Roosevelt recommended reduction of the payments by approximately half. Congress gave its approval. The first remission of the indemnity was used to build Tsing Hua College. Another remission 16 years later - in 1924 - led to establishment of the China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture.
China responded to American generosity in kind. The first remission paid for the education of Chinese students in the United States as well as Tsing Hua construction. The 1924 remission financed educational and scientific programs in China. Tsing Hua College later became National Tsing Hua University. Both the Tsing Hua Endowment Fund and the China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture are under the management of the Board of Trustees of the China Foundation for the Promotion Culture, a self-perpetuating body consisting of both Chinese and American members and governed by its own constitution.
Initially, students were sent to the United States after two years at Tsing Hua. Financial assistance was subsequently extended to the students of other universities. Examinations were conducted. Nearly 1,300 students went to the United States on Boxer indemnity scholarships and another 500 received supplementary assistance. Some of China's finest scholars received their advanced training through this channel.
In 1974, in a Fourth of July address to the American University Club, President (then Vice President) Yen Chia-kan declared: "Never in history, I think, has an intentional servitude been put to such high-minded and constructive use. Both the United States and the Republic of China can be proud of the record. The seeds we have sown together are bearing rich fruit. The continuing friendship and cooperation between the two countries speaks eloquently of that."
The Taipei Association of Ningpo Natives sent this scroll to the United States as a bicentennial gift. (File photo)
Alwin Nikolais dancers came to Taiwan for five performances in celebration of the U.S. bicentennial. (File Photo)
When Dr. Sun's National Revolution succeeded, the United States was generally sympathetic with the objectives of the Republic. When Japan presented its Twenty-one Demands to China in January of 1915, the United States urged moderation. There were some countercurrents. The Lansing-Ishii agreement of November, 1917, gave U.S. recognition to the "special interest" of Japan in China as a consequence of "territorial propinquity." This iniquity was terminated on March 30 of 1923.
Further American goodwill toward China was manifested in the Washington Conference of 1921 and 1922. The nine powers attending agreed by treaty to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial and administrative integrity of China, to give China opportunity to develop a stable government, to maintain the principle of equal opportunity in China for the commerce and industry of all nations and to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China to seek special privileges that would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states. Some promises were kept. Foreign post offices were discontinued.
A tariff conference agreed that Chinese national tariff law would come into effect as of January I, 1929. Until 1931, the Japanese refrained from further major acts of aggression.
American sentiment in favor of China and against Japan continued to grow with the Mukden and Marco Polo Bridge incidents. The start of the War of Resistance Against Japan found the United States deeply sympathetic to China but temporarily unable to provide much in the way of physical assistance. The depression still afflicted the American economy. War clouds were gathering over Europe with the expansion of Nazi power.
Franklin Delano Roosevelt did what he could. So did the American people and American fighting men in the years before Pearl Harbor. China was far away and the place names were strange. Yet Americans voluntarily participated in a boycott of Japanese-made goods. In 1937, Claire Lee Chennault retired from the U.S. army and became air adviser to the Republic of China. In the next three years, he trained Chinese pilots in aerial warfare against the Japanese and reorganized the small Chinese Air Force. In 1941 the "Flying Tigers" (American Volunteer Group) came into existence and began to intercept Japanese bombing missions. Military aid began to reach China in larger quantity after 1941, although the first priority still went to the European theater.
Too much has been made of World War II differences between China and the United States - especially those involving President Chiang Kai-shek and General Joseph Stilwell. Many other Americans, including President Roosevelt, appreciated the contribution of China and the Chinese Armed Forces to the victory over Japan. The American chief executive and Winston Churchill met with President Chiang at Cairo late in 1943 and pledged the return of Taiwan to China at the war's end - a promise which was kept.
President Roosevelt believed that China was destined to be one of the great powers of the world. He supported a permanent Security Council seat for the Republic of China as the United Nations Organization came into being. This was accorded and China signed the roster as a Charter member. However, 1945 found China exhausted from eight years of war against Japan and faced with the continuing rebellion of the Communists. The government of the Republic of China was unable to take as large a part in world affairs as had been projected for it. Even so, in the years through 1971, when the Chinese Communists usurped the U.N. seat, the Republic of China remained a loyal and active member of the international organization and a strong supporter of the U.S. position there.
The United States provided some assistance for the rebuilding of postwar China and some military aid to the National forces in the 1945-1947 period. A number of American leaders thought the National Government could reach a compromise with the Communists. General George Marshall tried and failed to bring about a coalition. Unable to make peace, the United States stood aloof from the conflict and thereby played into the hands of the Communists, who continued to enjoy the full support of the Soviet Union. The Russians turned over to their Chinese proteges the armaments surrendered by the Japanese. In 1949, the National Government moved its capital and base to Taiwan to carry on the struggle.
Less than a year later, the United States was engaged in a full-scale war against the Chinese Communists, who marched across the Yalu River in support of North Korea and then pursued the Americans into South Korea. American economic and military assistance to the Republic of China was resumed. The National Government's Armed Forces were rebuilt and re-equipped. From 1951 through 1965, the United States extended about US$1.5 billion in economic assistance. Military aid exceeded US$2.5 billion in the years from 1951 through the mid-1970s. A mutual defense treaty was signed in 1954. The Republic of China made ground facilities available to the United States during the Vietnam War. U.S. military installations still present in Taiwan include the Taiwan Defense Command and the U.S. Military Advisory Assistance Group. These include representatives from all the American military services.
In the economic sphere, the United States deserves and is given a large share of the credit for Taiwan's "economic miracle," which has produced East Asia's second highest standard of living for the 16 million people of the island province. Sino-American trade will top US$4 billion in 1976, exceeding that with the Chinese Communist-held mainland by more than eight times. If the ROC isn't among the "Big Ten" of U.S. trade this year, it soon will be. American investment in Taiwan industry exceeds US$500 million and includes some of the biggest names in electronics.
The long, constructive and mutually satisfactory Sino-American relationship has in the last few years developed one serious flaw involving the American effort to "relax tensions" with the Chinese Communists. President Richard Nixon decided, apparently about the time of his 1968 election, that he wanted to create an opening to the Chinese Communists. His first step was to withdraw American objections to Red China's membership in the United Nations. Although such might not have been his intention, the result included the loss of the Republic of China's seat at the U.N. He also accepted an invitation to visit the Chinese mainland, and in 1972 signed with Chou En-lai the "Shanghai communique." This document calls for the relaxation of Washington-Peiping tensions and is said by high American sources to imply the eventual U.S. recognition of the Chinese Communists. However, in reaching the agreement with Peiping, President Nixon asserted that the United States was not seeking to make new friends (the Chinese Communists) at the expense of old ones (the Republic of China).
Whatever Richard Nixon may have had in mind was interrupted by Watergate, his departure from the White House and the passing of American presidential power to Gerald Ford, the first U.S. chief executive not to be elected by the people. However, President Ford did inherit from Nixon a China policy which he has apparently continued. The secretary of state in charge is the same: Henry Kissinger, who negotiated the peace that lost South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos to the Communists.
In late May, Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona said that Dr. Kissinger had told him the United States had no plans to break relations with Taiwan and recognize the Chinese Communists after the November election. As one Taipei newspaper remarked, "The people of the Republic of China might feel more reassured if Dr. Kissinger spoke for himself." After President Ford's mainland visit last year, Secretary Kissinger inspired a State Department spokesman to imply that no Taiwan formula would be required for the recognition of the Chinese Communists because the Chinese Communists could be trusted.
This meant that in Dr. Kissinger's view, the United States could accept private Chinese Communist assurances that they would not attempt to seize Taiwan by force and violence. The U.S. government could then stipulate that the mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China was no longer necessary, recognize Peiping and continue relations with Taiwan on a de facto basis (the Japanese formula). Not much has been heard of this proposition since it was advanced, presumably because only Peiping advocates are prepared to accept the premise that the Chinese Communists are trustworthy. In the wake of Vietnam, even Dr. Kissinger said that they were not. The secretary of state has never answered the fundamental question of what the United States would get out of Peiping recognition that it doesn't already have.
In recent months, the principal arguments for recognition have been (1) that it must be done before the passing of Mao Tse-tung and (2) that in the absence of a formal relationship with the United States, the Chinese Communists might return to the embrace of the Soviet Union. Such arguments are offered without detailed explanation. That is understandable, because they will not stand the test of analysis. Mao has no love for the United States, which is sometimes his Enemy No.1 and sometimes No.2. His interest is in world hegemony, and that implies destruction of the United States as well as the U.S.S.R. As for rapprochement with the Soviet, that would destroy Maoism.
"Relaxation of tensions" with the Chinese Communists has turned out to be a slow and fitful process. Nearly all of the concessions have been on the American side. Peiping was compelled to allow the opening of a U.S. liaison office on the Chinese mainland. There was no other way for the Chinese Communists to get to Washington. However, the Americans stationed in Red China go nowhere and see no one. They are effectively shut out of mainland life. Thomas Gates, the new liaison chief in Peiping, waited weeks before being allowed to pay a courtesy calion Hua Kuo-feng, the new "premier." Such trade as has developed is in Peiping's interest. Once the Chinese Communists had their Boeing airliners and some grain to make up for poor harvests, the volume slumped drastically.
Only when the United States opposes the Soviet Union does the Chinese Communist regime have something good to say about the Americans and their foreign policy. The rest of the time the U.S. is a target for the dirtiest names the Maoists can think up. Events on the mainland have not been conducive to furtherance of the U.S. relationship. The campaign of denigrating Confucius and Lin Piao brought the Communists to the brink of a new "cultural revolution." Antagonism between the "leftists" of Chiang Ching, the wife of Mao Tse-tung, and the powerholding "old cadres" who surrounded Chou En-lai reached new heights. No sooner was Chou dead than the Maoists threw out his successor, Teng Hsiao-ping. Maoism was already unstable when Tienanmen blew up in the faces of the Chinese Communists.
Another obstacle to serious U.S. consideration of recognition has been the adamant position of Peiping with regard to the Republic of China and Taiwan. From Shanghai to date, the Chinese Communists have yielded nothing. Their position is that Taiwan is a part of "China" and that the Americans must get out of the island lock, stock and barrel without regard to what happens afterward. In their own statements, both domestic and to countries other than the United States, the Chinese Communists have made no bones about their intention to use military force against Taiwan. They claim this is a wholly Chinese domestic matter.
Details of any U.S. "Taiwan formula" proposals to the Chinese Communists are not known. It is certain that Peiping has not agreed to anything that would preserve and protect Taiwan as the island province of the Republic of China. Most speculation has centered on the "Japanese formula" of recognizing Peiping and derecognizing the ROC but continuing trade with Taiwan, and concepts of "one China and an autonomous Taiwan." As noted previously, Kissinger has been represented as willing to trust the Chinese Communists not to attack Taiwan. His reasoning is that for Peiping to do so would incur the displeasure of the United States, which supposedly would be protecting the Chinese Communists against Soviet aggression. The catches are that the Chinese Communists have never given any indication of trustworthiness and that the United States is in no position to change its policy toward the U.S.S.R. in order to chastise Peiping. Both points emphasize that there is and can be no formula.
Those who seek the U.S. recognition of Red China are beginning to worry about a number of things: mainland instability, the failure to find a formula, the opposition of the American people and members of Congress, the forthcoming Republican and Democratic nominating conventions, and the election of a president. Gerald Ford may not be the chief executive next January. The position adopted by the recognition advocates is based on these contentions: (1) That the Chinese Communists are growing restive and may make a deal with the Soviet Union if the United States does not break with the Republic of China; (2) that no formula is necessary because nothing will happen when the Americans depart Taiwan and remove the protection of the defense treaty; and (3) that in any event, the Republic of China is strong enough to defend itself militarily, politically and economically.
Many friends of the Republic of China have spoken out against what they have described as the "recognition movement." They include influential members of the House of Representatives and the Senate. Their views have elicited a strange variety of responses from the Ford administration and Secretary Kissinger. On one day, a State Department spokesman said the process of normalizing relations with the Chinese Communists was continuing but that "we are not in a position to talk a timetable." The implication was that a timetable does or could exist. The next day, President Ford's press secretary insisted that there was no timetable. Ford himself said the Peiping relationship was "on schedule" and that if problems arose "we will meet and handle them." If there is a schedule, how could there not be a timetable?
As of mid-June, the rumor mills continued to grind. An anonymous source quoted Dr. Kissinger as saying that the United States would not and could not abandon Taiwan, that there were no plans to change the existing relationship with the Republic of China and that the mutual defense treaty would be honored. John K. Fairbank, a China scholar returning to the United States from visits to Hongkong and Taipei, predicted that Washington would recognize Peiping after the November election but with the stipulation that it continued to "maintain an interest" in the security of Taiwan.
In the face of recognition alarms, excursions and uncertainties, the free people of the Republic of China are adhering to the counsel of the late President Chiang Kai-shek to avoid disquiet in time of adversity and instead to be "firm with dignity and self-reliant with vigor." The feeling is that where there is life there is hope, and that old friends who have stood together in peace and fought together in war can be frank and honest with each other. The position of the Republic of China is not beclouded or confused. Free China does not accept U.S. recognition of the Chinese Communists; it does not consent to any formula.
The Republic of China does not think the Americans can "relax tensions" with the Chinese Communists. The American presence in Peiping is to be regretted. There is nothing to be gained there; the cause of the Communists is being abetted and that of the free Chinese hindered. The liaison offices in Peiping and Washington exist and are not likely to be withdrawn because of the Republic of China's objections. However, recognition goes beyond the pale. As Premier Chiang Ching-kuo has said, it would lead to Asian instability and then to conflict.
The Communists, not the free Chinese, are threatening war in the Taiwan Straits. They have declared many times that if the Republic of China does not surrender, if the people of Taiwan do not lay down their arms and accept the fetters of communization, they will enforce their will by military means. Teng Hsiao-ping said the Taiwan problem would be solved as easily as sweeping up a pile of dirt on the floor. Hua Kuo-feng would not put the intention differently.
The Republic of China does not ask the United States for the impossible. It does not seek assistance for counterattack and mainland recovery. But recognition must be left on the shelf until the Chinese of Communism and the Chinese of the Three Principles of the People settle the issue of China's future. Although the United States is not responsible for the future of China, it does have a responsibility for the 16 million free people of Taiwan. That obligation cannot be waived by any Washington declaration that Peiping is the capital of China and that the treaty duly and honorably signed with the Republic of China on Taiwan is no longer valid.
Americans need to be realistic about the consequences of Peiping recognition. Once the Chinese Communists had been embraced and the Republic of China derecognized, once the Americans were gone from Taiwan, the United States would not longer be able to protect the 16 million free Chinese and their island province. In Vietnam, the United States closed out its options and the Communists came. Taiwan would be the same, except that the people could be expected to put up a better fight. There would be no evacuation - except of Americans.
Warnings of war in the Taiwan Straits if Peiping is recognized should not be regarded as scaremongering. The Chinese Communists have announced their intentions. With the end of the Taipei-Washington relationship, the Republic of China no longer would be under any obligation to keep the peace in its area. The right of counterattack would immediately become operative. Responding to Communist aggression, the Republic of China would do all within its power to cross the Taiwan Straits and encourage mainland compatriots to take up arms against their oppressors.
Americans have sometimes suggested that the Republic of China is too strong and that the Chinese Communists would not dare to attack Taiwan. They forget that in addition to some 3 million men under arms, the mainland Chinese also have the third largest navy in the world. They have amphibious capability and more than 50 submarines. They have nuclear-tipped weapons and the declared willingness to use them. In all the world, only Mao Tse-tung has spoken out in favor of nuclear war.
Peiping probably would not resort to arms in the immediate wake of recognition. Other options would be employed: economic pressures applied on a worldwide scale, arm-twisting of overseas Chinese, infiltration, subversion and even blockade. The people of Taiwan could fight invaders on the beaches and in the mountains. To cope with economic attacks would be more difficult. Peiping has already given indication - in Japan and the European Economic Community - of the freeze it would like to apply to the Taiwan economy. Communist attempts to erode the free Chinese position in the Asian Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund are continuing.
In the last public opinion poll taken on the subject, the American people expressed themselves as 70 per cent opposed to the recognition of the Chinese Communists at the expense of the Republic of China. Americans are often said to be poorly informed about foreign affairs. They do know, however, that the free Chinese of Taiwan have been their friends and that the Chinese Communists of the mainland have been their enemies. Furthermore, recognition advocates have not been able to identify a single U.S. advantage to be derived from recognizing Peiping.
For reasons which are inexplicable, an almost mystical impression has been created that if the United States and the Chinese Communists joined hands, the Soviet Union would be automatically deterred from aggression. The mystique flies in the face of the fact that for many years the Chinese Communists have been doing everything possible to embroil the United States in war with the U.S.S.R. That is the conflict Peiping wants and will continue to work for, regardless of whether the United States has a liaison office or an embassy on the Chinese mainland.
No American leader - and this includes Presidents Nixon and Ford and Secretary Kissinger - has expressed a willingness to wound the Republic of China grievously, if not mortally, as the price of Peiping recognition. That is, however, the inescapable consequence of any U.S. decision to formalize the Chinese Communist relationship. Recognition of Red China would be an act unworthy of the "beautiful country" and a heavy blow to hopes for world peace and an opportunity to advance the cause of freedom and democracy.