One basic factor must be borne in mind. Kinmen, Matsu and other offshore islands are a part of the territory of the Republic of China and have never come under Chinese Communist occupation. Whether or not they should or could be defended is a matter that must be decided by the Republic of China herself.
The desirability of defending Kinmen, Matsu and other offshore islands may be viewed on political as well as military grounds. The present situation in Taiwan is comparable to that of England immediately after the Dunkirk evacuation during World War II. At that time, the overriding consideration in the defense of England was to achieve control over the English Channel in order to deny the German forces any opportunity to attack across the channel, while consolidating the bases at Gibraltar, Malta and other points to keep open the sea lanes that would assure the British Isles with continued support from overseas territories as well as from the allies in preparation for the eventual counterattack. It was the effective control over the English Channel that made possible the defense of Britain itself which in turn led to allied victory.
Today, to defend Taiwan, we must first of all control the Taiwan Straits, and the defense of the offshore islands is an integral part of the entire system of control over the Taiwan Straits.
The advantages gained by holding Kinmen, Matsu and other offshore islands are as follows:
1. Effective defense must be built in depth; and defense against enemy air attack relies particularly upon capability for giving distant early warnings. With the offshore islands secured in our hands, we achieve an increased depth in the defense of Taiwan itself and gain more time for early warning in case of enemy air attack.
2. Our possession of the islands enables a close watch on Communist military activities in the coastal areas of the Chinese mainland ranging from Foochow at the north to Amoy at the south. It assures early discovery of any Communist attempt at concentration of forces as a prelude to an invasion of Taiwan.
3. Such capability for early discovery of Communist attempts frees the main force of the U. S. Seventh Fleet from the necessity of constantly concentrating its craft in the vicinity of Taiwan, thus increasing its mobility in deployment.
4. The garrison on the islands fulfills in part the need for day-to-day air reconnaissance and reduces dependence on air patrols, thus lessening the possibility of accidental skirmishes through air reconnaissance.
5. With these islands in our hands, the Chinese Communists are denied the use of the mainland ports nearest Taiwan in any attempt to invade Taiwan. Instead, they have to depend on the ports farther away. This means greater distance to be covered in longer time and calls for employment of modern landing vessels instead of the motorized junks they have at hand. It also means that the invasion fleet must be exposed on the sea for a longer period of time and must run greater risk of being destroyed. In short, the chances of a Communist attack on Taiwan are thus lessened.
6. Any Communist attempt to invade Taiwan must take into consideration the possibility of a counter-invasion by our forces based on the offshore islands, which would endanger the enemy rear. The Communists need think twice before actually invading Taiwan.
The above is based on a purely military point of view. If we look at the question in terms of political and psychological factors, the importance of the offshore islands is even more obvious. The free world cannot afford to retreat in the present struggle against communism. So long as the democratic countries remain unwavering and maintain a firm stand in the face of the Communist threat, the chances for the Communists to plunge recklessly into a war will be limited. In the past ten years, free China has achieved considerable progress in military, political and economic fields and in improving the livelihood of the people. The proximity of Kinmen and Matsu to the mainland enables the news on these achievements to penetrate the Iron Curtain and keep up the hope for freedom of the enslaved millions there. There have already been countless cases of people who risk their lives in search for freedom. In the event of a Communist war of aggression or any serious disturbances behind or outside the Iron Curtain, the outbreak of revolution on the Chinese mainland to overthrow the Communist tyranny is almost certain. On the other hand, should we abandon the offshore islands, the people on the mainland would not only find it more difficult to learn the truth about the free world, but also assume that the free world has neither the strength nor the determination to halt Communist expansion; and their hope of regaining freedom would waver and their efforts toward that objective falter.
Since the end of World War II, the western allies have maintained a firm position on the Berlin issue. Despite threats of war and several attempts at blockade, the Soviets have failed to force the West to yield. The western leaders attach such importance to Berlin not because the city possesses any particular military value nor because West Berlin is easily defensible from a strategic point of view. It is rather because this tiny piece of land symbolizes the hope of 17,000,000 East Germans for regaining their freedom. As the only free basis behind the Iron Curtain, West Berlin is an opening through which the West could disseminate ideas of freedom in the Communist areas and encourage the people there to free themselves from the shackles of communism. At the same time, the West is aware also of the most serious consequences, both political and psychological, of surrendering to the Communist threat of force. Hence the great Berlin airlift of 1948; and President Eisenhower's solemn affirmation of no retreat from Berlin in 1958, which made Khrushchev back down. In terms of political significance, whatever course of action taken in regard to the offshore islands, including Kinmen and Matsu, will have the same effect on the Chinese people on the mainland and the free peoples of Asia as that which Berlin has on the people of the East European satellite countries as well as on those of the free nations in western Europe.
Apart from its impact on the mainland population referred to above, abandonment of Kinmen and Matsu would have the following consequences:
1. From a military point of view, without the offshore islands, the defense of Taiwan itself would be rendered much more difficult. First, the loss of these first-line surface observation posts would necessitate stepped-up air reconnaissance and patrol which may well increase the chances of accidental encounters and lead to greater tension in the Taiwan Straits. The enemy could moreover assemble his forces and vessels in greater secrecy, utilize the sea ports nearest Taiwan and thus facilitate his invasion attempt. Secondly, without the cover of the Chinese garrison forces on the offshore islands, the United States, bound by the Treaty of Mutual Defense, would be obliged to maintain constantly a larger naval force for patrolling the Taiwan Straits in order to prevent any sudden Communist attack. The appetite of the Chinese Communists for aggrandizement being insatiable as it has always been, abandonment of Kinmen and Matsu would only further encourage the Communist forces and increase the danger of direct collision with the United States forces which may lead to a large-scale war.
2. For the past several years, the fighting forces and the civilian population of free China have striven hard to prepare themselves for meeting any Communist invasion and, with morale at an all time high, are confident of ultimate victory. To abandon the offshore islands without a fight, no matter what explanations may be offered, would inevitably be interpreted as a result of outside pressure. It would not only seriously jeopardize the military and civilian morale, but also revive the unhappy memory of the episode of the abortive peace talks we had to hold with the Chinese Communists under external pressure. This would lead to serious damage to the friendship and mutual confidence between the Republic of China and the United States as allies and play right into the hands of the Communists.
3. The overwhelming majority of the overseas Chinese, encouraged by the progress and growing strength achieved by free China in the past few years, have shown their abhorrence of the Chinese Communist regime and rallied to the support of the Republic of China. Resisting Communist threats and enticement, they help uphold the firm anti-Communist stand of the governments of their host countries and constitute a stabilizing factor in their respective communities. Abandonment of Kinmen and Matsu would, however, indicate to many of them a tendency for appeasement on the part of the free world. Out of disappointment and faced with the possibility of the Chinese Communists gaining in world stature, they may well switch their support to the Chinese Communist regime. Should that happen, the Communist activities at subversion and infiltration would become even more rampant in the already troubled Southeast Asia. While the entire area may not be lost at once, there would certainly arise a situation increasingly menacing to the free world and requiring countermoves more costly both in manpower and in resources.
4. To the free world as a whole, abandonment of Kinmen and Matsu would mean surrender of the will to be free before the force of arms. It would mean renunciation of the sacred principles of freedom and reemergence of appeasement. Consequently, in the continuing struggle against Communist aggression, the solidarity of the free world would be impaired, as the United States could no longer sustain the allied faith in her leadership. The ranks of fence-sitters and neutralists would be further swelled. The leaders of the free world would then find it even harder again to try to rally the people to the sacred cause of freedom, justice and democracy.
From the above, the inevitable conclusion is that Kinmen and Matsu should and must b6 defended. Only with these islands under our control can the security of Taiwan and Penghu be safeguarded and free passage in the Taiwan Straits be effectively protected. And only thus can the chances of any direct armed clash between the United States and the Chinese Communists in this area be reduced and the danger of touching off a general war be eliminated.
We have thus far explained why Kinmen and Matsu should be defended. Now let us see whether they could be defended.
Whether a strategic area can be effectively defended involves a number of factors. Among the most important are the ability of the commanding officer and the morale of the troops. In the annals of war, there are many instances wherein renowned generals won brilliant victories in defending a certain area with small forces against a strong enemy. Those who urge the abandonment of Kinmen and Matsu argue that these islands are separated from the Communist-held mainland only by a narrow channel and are therefore indefensible. They neglect the fact, however, that since 1949, the Chinese Communists have made repeated attempts to invade these islands. In serious encounters at various times, they not only failed to take the islands, but suffered total losses in landing troops and crushing defeat in air battles. Free world territories share thousands of miles of common boundaries with Communist countries without even any water barriers between them. If easy defensibility should be the sole yardstick, much of these territories which are even harder to defend than Kinmen and Matsu would also have to be abandoned. A case in point is Berlin. Whether or not any free territory should be defended must depend, therefore, not upon whether it is easily defensible, but upon whether it should be surrendered to the enemy.
Furthermore, we have every reason to believe that Kinmen and Matsu can be effectively defended. For defensibility is determined on the basis of the following factors:
* The size and strength of the force to be employed in accordance with the strategic value of the area concerned;
* The will to fight on the part of the troops;
* The ability of the commanding officers; and
* Other elements such as political situation and morale of the population.
In regard to the first factor, we have made full preparation for the assured defense of these islands as required by their strategic value as we see it which has already been examined above. Concerning the second and third factors which are often decisive, a brief review of the record of the battles of Kinmen since 1949 would be useful in gauging the morale of the garrison force and the competence of its commanders.
1. In October, 1949, the Communists assembled two army corps, totalling 40,000 men, on the mainland coast opposite Kinmen. Under the cover of the fire from more than 70 shore guns, they made a successful landing on Kinmen. At that time, the garrison consisted of troops who had just been evacuated from the mainland, battle-worn and not in top form in organization, equipment and training. Moreover, they were not yet fully entrenched and fortifications remained meager. Nevertheless, the garrison force, protected only by fieldworks, succeeded in stopping the onslaught. After a fierce battle which did not let up for 24 hours, the invading force was destroyed, with over 7,000 of its men taken prisoner.
2. Since the first "artillery duel" on September 3, 1954, the Chinese Communists have repeatedly subjected Kinmen to intense artillery bombardment, the five main assaults launched respectively on June 24, 1957; August 23, 1958; January 7, 1959; and June 17 and 19, 1960. The most vicious were the ones launched on August 23, 1958 and June 17, 1960, during which the Communist shore artillery fired more than 470,000 rounds and 170,000 rounds respectively. All through these "artillery duels," the enemy was able to inflict on the garrison force only very light casualties, not much more than 400 in killed and wounded. During the same period, air engagements resulted in a ratio of loss in aircraft at 31 to 1 against the Communists.
As to the factors of political situation and morale of the population, there is even more reason to believe that advantage is with us. In our several battles in defense of Kinmen, not only the free Chinese on Taiwan gave their whole-hearted support, but the people on the mainland were heartened at the prospect of delivery from the Communist rule. There was at least one known instance of anti-Communist uprising by the peasant population near Amoy. Although it was eventually suppressed, this heroic revolt fully testifies to the fact that people in all China are in their heart with the defenders of Kinmen. We also have had the support of our friends in other free nations who could not but repudiate the barbarism of the Communists and be impressed by the bravery of, our defending forces. On the other hand, the Chinese Communists have lost much prestige because of their repeated failure to seize Kinmen; and their power of influence particularly in Southeast Asia has accordingly declined. This, in turn, has helped strengthen the anti-Communist will of the countries in that area. Moreover, the fact of the moral support and logistic assistance rendered us by the United States in this connection has certainly helped reinforce the confidence in the American ally on the part of the anti-Communist countries in Southeast Asia that are parties to bilateral or multilateral treaties of defense with the United States.
Those who advocate abandoning the offshore islands also argue that our allies would be involved in a war with the Chinese Communists over these islands, thus igniting a global conflagration. Here we must point out two things. First, as in the case of Berlin, the free world's avowed firm stand on the city's defense is based on the grand strategy of collective security and not on its military value alone. Secondly, it should be remembered that it was the United States declaration disclaiming Korea's strategically value to American security that invited the Communist invasion of Korea, causing 150,000 American casualties. No such suggestion should be permitted again to encourage the Chinese Communists into another venture of war through miscalculation.
For the past twelve years, the Chinese Communists' repeated attempts to invade the offshore islands have met defeat at the hands of the free Chinese who have fought bravely with the moral support of their allies. We have never requested the United States to send troops to defend these offshore islands on our behalf; nor will we do so in the future. What we ask of our allies for the defense of these islands are their moral and material support, not their troops.
We are almost certain that the Chinese Communists, unless encouraged directly or implicitly, would not dare to risk defeat again by invading the offshore islands. Even if they do, we are confident that the same fate awaits them.